A recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision provides a primer on the proper way to expand the size of a board of directors and the proper way to fill board vacancies, as well as explaining the difference between a de facto and a de jure director.  See Stream TV Networks, Inc. v. SeeCubic, Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0310-JTL (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2020).

This opinion should be readily accessible for every corporate litigator who is called upon to address whether:

(1) the size of a board of directors was properly expanded;

(2) director vacancies were properly filled; or

(3) whether the actions of a de facto board member were binding even if because of technical mistakes that director was not properly appointed such that she would qualify as a de jure director.


Many additional consequential statements of Delaware law with widespread utility are included in this gem of a 52-page decision.



•           The court describes the well-known prerequisites for obtaining a preliminary objection.  See page 16.

•           The court provides a tutorial, with copious citations to statutory and caselaw authority, to explain:  (i) how to expand the size of the board of directors; (ii) who has the authority to expand the size of the board; (iii) how to fill vacancies on the board; and (iv) who is authorized to fill vacant board seats.  See pages 17 to 20.

•           This opinion features a maxim of equity that would be useful to have available when the situation calls for it: equity regards as done what ought to have been doneSee page 20.

•           The court explained that only the charter or the bylaws can impose director qualifications, and in any event those qualifications must be reasonable.  See page 21.

•           The court explained that a director could not agree to conditions of service as a board member that would be contrary to the exercise of the fiduciary duties of a director.  See page 22.

•           An always useful reminder of the three tiers of review of director decision-making are provided.  Those three tiers are: (i) the business judgment rule; (ii) enhanced scrutiny; and (iii) entire fairness.  See pages 50 to 51.

•           In addition to explaining when those three tiers apply, the opinion also regales us with a classic recitation of the business judgment rule as the default standard:

“ . . . the default standard of review is the business judgment rule, which presumes that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.”

See page 50.

•           This decision teaches that unless one of the rule’s elements is rebutted, the court merely looks  to see whether the business decision made was rational in the sense of being one logical approach to advancing the corporation’s objective.

•           The court explains the difference between a de facto director and a de jure director, and which actions of a de facto director are binding.  See pages 23 to 25.

•           Another extremely important aspect of this decision (which takes up the majority of the 50-plus pages) is a deep dive into the historical foundations of Section 271 of the Delaware General Corporation Law which applies generally to the sale of most or all of the assets of a corporation, and which would typically require stockholder approval. See page 27 through 48.

•           The court supports with detailed reasoning and extensive footnote support, its conclusion that Section 271 does not apply to an insolvent corporation that transfers assets to a secured creditor.  Compare DGCL Section 272 (allows directors to mortgage corporate assets).