This is a short compilation of several sources that are useful references for new protocols that are either recommended or required for remote court proceedings, including remote depositions. The links below include reminders of professionalism standards and other norms that still apply in the context of these new technological developments.

Procedures for hearings via Zoom in the Court of Chancery available at this hyperlink.

Sample protocols for trials held via Zoom, or related remote methods, available at this hyperlink.

Witness protocols for trials held remotely are available at this hyperlink.

A letter decision from the Court of Chancery, in Macrophage v. Goldberg, reminding lawyers about the importance of decorous attire, even during remote court hearings, is available at this hyperlink.

A useful guide for protocols established for remote depositions conducted via Zoom, or related videoconferencing, approved in the Court of Chancery, is available at this hyperlink.

This post was prepared by Frank Reynolds, who has been following Delaware corporate law, and writing about it for various legal publications, for over 30 years.

The Delaware Chancery Court recently allowed a Facebook Inc. shareholder plaintiff to inspect the directors’ electronic communications concerning how the company ended up paying $5 billion for a 2019 board settlement with government regulators that would cover founder/CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s liability in Employees Retirement System of Rhode Island v. Facebook Inc., No. 2020-0085-JRS memorandum opinion (Del. Ch. Feb.10, 2021).

Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slight’s February 10 post-trial opinion granted part of an investor’s motion for access to two remaining groups of board-level documents in one of the long-running books-and-records battles under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law stemming from Facebook’s record-breaking settlement of Federal Trade Commission charges over the company’s data privacy practices.


The Vice Chancellor’s ruling on whether Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island could inspect the directors’ decision to pay $4.9 billion more than the $104 million their defense firm advised was necessary to settle liability for Facebook alone was his second in two years on the scope of discoverable documents on whether the board had overpaid to get a settlement that would shield Zuckerberg.

In Vice Chancellor Slights’ May 2019 ruling, a consolidated set of shareholders in a parallel Section 220 action seeking documents and communications relating to Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica data privacy debacle won access to other categories of board level documents. In re Facebook, Inc. Section 220 Litig., 2019 WL 2320842, at *19 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019).

And then there were two

The February ruling is important because the pension fund plaintiff asserted that the communications that would prove the directors breached their duty by wasting corporate assets to insulate their CEO in the settlement could now only be in two remaining categories:

1. Electronic communications from, to, or copied to a member of the board concerning Facebook’s settlement negotiations with the FTC

2. Hard-copy documents exclusively provided to, or generated by, any member of the Board relating to Facebook’s negotiations with the FTC.

Since his February ruling allowed the pension fund to inspect Facebook’s non-privileged electronic communications, if ERSI does not find the proof it seeks there, it could set up a future final Section 220 battle – likely combining all plaintiffs — over access to the final category— consisting of attorney-client privileged and attorney work-product documents.

The plaintiffs have argued that Facebook intended to make the attorney-client/work-product category the vault for all the sensitive communications and documents that exposed the directors’ plan to use corporate assets to shield Zuckerberg from personal liability. However, the Vice Chancellor said in the February ruling that as long as it is still possible that any other category of documents might contain the information the plaintiffs seek, it is too soon to open that vault.

Plaintiff “has not demonstrated good cause under the Garner fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege to justify compelling the company to produce privileged documents for inspection” the Vice Chancellor said in the February opinion, referring to the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals’ Garner decision that plaintiffs could not examine privileged documents until all non-privileged sources had been searched. Garner v. Wolfinbarger 430 F.2d 1093. That Garner decision and its principle were adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indiana Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW 95 A.3d at 1278–79.

In his February opinion, Vice Chancellor Slights said he granted access to all non-privileged board communications because “the documents already produced provide no insight into why Facebook would pay more than its (apparently) maximum exposure to settle a claim.”

No penalty for confidence

According to Facebook, the documents produced prior to this litigation, coupled with Plaintiff’s own trumpeting of confidence that it could survive a motion to dismiss in a plenary action by pleading the facts it already possesses, reveals that Plaintiff has received more than “sufficient” information to fulfill its stated purposes for inspection.

But the court said, “that a stockholder plaintiff believes it has a basis in facts already known to pursue claims of wrongdoing against company fiduciaries does not mean the stockholder should be denied use of the tools at hand to develop those facts further.”

Too soon for Garner exception

“While the attorney-client privilege may be asserted by a corporation that has sought legal advice, the privilege is not absolute and an oft-invoked exception applies in suits by minority shareholders,” the court said in finding that the availability of the privilege must “be subject to the right of the stockholders to show ‘good cause’ why the privilege should not apply.”

While Garner identifies multiple factors, the court might consider when assessing whether the stockholder has demonstrated “good cause,” which focuses the good cause inquiry on three factors:

(i) whether the claim is colorable,

(ii) the necessity or desirability of information and its availability from other sources and

(iii) the extent to which the information sought is identified as opposed to a blind fishing expedition.

But the Vice Chancellor noted that whether the privileged information sought “is both necessary to prosecute the action and unavailable from other sources” has been described as “the most important” of the Garner factors. ERSRI argued but could not demonstrate the privileged information it seeks is unavailable elsewhere “because it has not seen the responsive, non-privileged electronic communications that Facebook is withholding.”


The court thought it was “likely that non-privileged electronic communications among board members can provide ERSRI insight into why the board decided to enter the 2019 settlement without exposing the advice of counsel upon which, at least in part, that decision was based.”

But there are two other possibilities: the board’s discussions that led to its $5 billion settlement decision are restricted to the “privileged” vault, or they somehow reached a consensus with little or no formal discussions. Either possibility could lead to a novel third Facebook Section 220 ruling in the future.

A recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision provided an exemplary analysis of when a deadlock in an LLC might be the basis for a dissolution. In Mehra v. Teller, C.A. No. 2019-0812-KSJM (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2021), the court applied case law, statutes, and learned commentary that it synthesized in a careful application of those applicable principles that were distilled based on the facts of this case.

Two central issues were addressed by the court:

(1) whether there was a failure to achieve votes necessary for board action; and

(2) whether the board deadlock was “genuine” or merely manufactured to force the appearance of a deadlock. See Slip op. at 48.

This 75-page opinion by Vice Chancellor Kathaleen St. Jude McCormick deserves to be read in its entirety, but the key takeaways, in my subjective view, that make this decision especially noteworthy are the following:

(1) The court’s comprehensive and detailed analysis that examines the two determinative issues should be read by anyone who needs to determine whether circumstances of a particular case satisfy the definition of deadlock for purposes of seeking a dissolution. See Slip op. at 48 to 58.

(2) Especially important are footnotes 243 and 244, which explain why the deadlock in this situation was not disingenuous, and was not merely pre-planned for strategic purposes.

(3) The court illustrates why it refused to invalidate the dissolution based on equitable grounds. This explanation by the court provides guidance to address the common defense that the person seeking dissolution is not doing so equitably. See Slip op. at. 69 – 75.

A recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision recited the standards applied in Delaware to determine when to stay a case or allow it to proceed when similar litigation between the same parties is proceeding in another state. In AG Resources Holdings, LLC v. Terral, C.A. No. 2020-0850-JRS (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2021), the court addressed the titular topic in a 24-page decision that  provided a careful chronology of the litigation between the parties in Louisiana as well as detailed background facts.

But for purposes of this short blog post, I will provide highlights of what I regard, quite subjectively, as the most noteworthy takeaways from this ruling that would have the broadest application to corporate and commercial litigators in Delaware:

This decision provides guidance for what standards will be applied when a motion to stay or dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) is filed–depending on which of the following circumstances are in play:

  • If the Delaware case was clearly the first-filed case, compared to the related case pending in another forum. See Slip op. at 8 and n. 19. (apply Cryo-Maid factors giving due deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum.)
  • If, however, the Delaware action follows the filing of a similar action elsewhere, “the court applies the discretionary McWane standard that allows the court to defer more readily to the court in which related litigation was first filed”. Id. and n. 20.
  • If the pending cases both outside and in Delaware are filed at about the same time, the court applies the “forum non conveniens analysis by applying the factors set forth in Cryo-Maid.” Slip op. at 9 and n. 21 That is, less emphasis in such a situation is placed on the priority of filing.

Two nuanced variations on the above three situations require more careful analysis. For example:

  • When litigation is contemplated and one party files a DJ action in an attempt to preempt the filing by the opposing party in a different forum, the court’s analysis “requires a closer look”. Slip op. at 10 and n. 25.
  • Also, when the issue involves the internal affairs of a Delaware entity or issues arising under a Delaware entity’s constitutive documents, Delaware courts may have a greater interest in retaining the matter. Slip op. at 20 and n. 45.

All of the foregoing assumes that there is not a controlling, mandatory forum selection clause (as compared, for example, to a merely permissive forum selection clause). In such a situation, reference should be made to the many cases highlighted on these pages analyzing the enforceability of mandatory forum selection clauses. (Just make sure there is no delay in the enforcement of such a clause.)




This post was prepared by Frank Reynolds, who has been following Delaware corporate law, and writing about it for various legal publications, for over 30 years.

The Delaware Supreme Court recently revived an investor’s derivative challenge to a merger of energy companies, finding he retained standing because he sufficiently pled a direct claim attacking the fairness of the deal itself for undervaluing his claim against the controlling partner of one of the merger mates in Morris v. Spectra Energy Partners (DE) GP, LP, No. 489, opinion issued (Del. Supr. Jan. 22, 2021).

The justices unanimously reversed the Chancery Court’s dismissal of plaintiff Paul Morris’ charges that Spectra Energy Partners L.P. unitholders were shortchanged in a merger with Enbridge, Inc. because SEP’s controller failed to include the worth of a $661 million projected recovery from Morris’ suit. Morris v. Spectra Energy Partners (DE) GP, LP, 2019 WL 4751521 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2019).

The high court remanded the case for the Chancery Court to decide whether to use a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment to resolve the matter.


The decision is noteworthy because the en banc court used the so-called Primedia test as a way to determine when a derivative plaintiff qualifies for an exception to the general rule that he loses his standing to continue his suit against his directors or controller if his stock is eliminated in a stock-for-stock or cash-out merger. In re Primedia, Inc. Shareholders Litigation. 13 67 A.3d 455 (Del. Ch. 2013).

The Primedia test, taken from a 2013 Chancery Court merger opinion, applies to claims challenging a merger because the equity owners are not being fairly compensated for the value of material derivative claims. To establish standing, the plaintiff must allege a viable derivative claim that:

  • Was material to the overall merger transaction,
  • Will not be pursued by the buyer, and
  • Is not reflected in the merger consideration.

“Under Primedia’s three-part test, which applies to claims alleging an unfair merger because the price does not reflect the value of derivative claims, the plaintiff must allege a viable derivative claim assessed by a motion to dismiss standard,” Chief Justice Collins J. Seitz Jr. wrote for the high court.

“The standing inquiry has assumed special significance in the area of corporate law,” the Chief Justice said, noting its pivotal role in merger challenge suits. “Classifying a claim as either direct or derivative bears directly on standing and is in many ways outcome-determinative in post-merger litigation.”


After a $3.3 billion “roll up” of minority-held units that was part of a merger between Enbridge and Spectra, former SEP investor Paul Morris lost standing to litigate an alleged $661 million derivative suit on behalf of SEP against general partner Spectra Energy Partners (DE) GP, LP. Morris filed a new class action complaint that alleged the Enbridge/SEP merger exchange ratio was unfair because SEP GP agreed to a merger that did not reflect the material value of his derivative claims. The Court of Chancery granted SEP GP’s motion to dismiss the new complaint for lack of standing. In re Primedia, Inc. Shareholders Litigation. 13 67 A.3d 455 (Del. Ch. 2013}.

Double discount doubted

The Chancery Court held that to have standing, the plaintiff’s suit must reflect the public unitholders’ beneficial interest in the derivative litigation recovery. The court discounted the worth of the $661 million derivative suit to $112 million and then further reduced it to $28 million to reflect a one-in-four chance of prevailing in the litigation. Finally, the court compared the $28 million to the $3.3 billion merger transaction and found it immaterial to the $3.3 billion merger and dismissed it.

Thus, the court granted SEP GP’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing without reaching SEP GP’s alternative argument that Morris failed to state a claim for relief. During the litigation, and with the motion summary judgment pending, Enbridge acquired SE Corp in a stock-for-stock merger, eliminating Morris’ stock, becoming SEP GP’s ultimate parent and controller of SEP.

The appeal

Morris’ appeal argued that if the Chancery Court had accepted his well-pleaded factual allegations as true and drawn all reasonable inferences in his favor, it would not have discounted the potential value of the claim to the point that it was immaterial to the merger value. The high court found that Morris properly alleged that former public unitholders were harmed because “SEP GP has allowed Enbridge to engineer the Roll-Up Transaction on terms that were patently unfair and unreasonable to SEP and its public unitholders, and that could not have been approved in good faith by the New Conflicts Committee or the SEP GP Board.”

Two errors

The justices found as to the main issue on appeal, that the Chancery Court had erred twice, in that:.

1. It “strayed from the proper standard of review” under the Primedia test and Morris did retain standing for his claim because “it was ‘reasonably conceivable that the [SEP) general partner acted in subjective bad faith,” and

2. Even if it was proper to discount the $661 million in damages alleged in the complaint to reflect the public unitholders’ interest in the derivative recovery, the court should have compared the $112 million pro rata interest in the derivative claim recovery to the public unitholders’ 17% proportional interest in the merger consideration.

“If the plaintiff has alleged a viable derivative claim, where it is reasonably conceivable that the claim is material when compared to the merger consideration and could result in the damages pled in the complaint, the plaintiff has satisfied the materiality requirement at the motion to dismiss stage for standing purposes,’’ the justices decided.

I have been writing an ethics column for the national publication of The American Inns of Court, called The Bencher, for about 24 years or so. My latest column appears in the current edition and is reproduced below, courtesy of The Bencher and The American Inns of Court.

Company’s Privileged Communications Must Be Provided to Board Members

By: Francis G.X. Pileggi*

A recent decision from the Delaware Court of Chancery decided an issue of first impression in Delaware: does the management of a Delaware corporation have the authority to unilaterally preclude a director of the corporation from obtaining the corporation’s privileged information? The Chancellor’s answer to the question was: no.

For purposes of this short ethics column, a practice tip for lawyers based on this case would be to remember that, generally speaking, directors and the corporation are joint clients when legal advice is given to the corporation through its directors. This general rule is especially important in the context of a fractured board with competing board factions.

The Court found in the case styled In re WeWork Litigation, No. 2020-0258-AGB (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2020), that when management attempted to prevent the entire board from obtaining the company’s privileged data, it had turned on its head a bedrock principle of Delaware corporate law that directors are charged with the duty to manage the company.

The issue arose in the context of dueling special committees of the board of The WeWork Company, and the efforts of one of those committees to seek privileged communications among management of the company. One special committee of the board opposed a motion to dismiss filed by two temporary directors who formed a second special committee. The first committee had filed a complaint against SoftBank Group alleging breach of contract obligations related to the purchase of the company’s stock.

There was no request for communications between the second special committee and its counsel. Rather, the first special committee sought the Company’s privileged communications about how the second special committee was formed and how it may have been influenced by the CEO of SoftBank.

One of the exceptions to the general rule that directors have unfettered access to corporate data is in those situations where “sufficient adversity exists between the director and the corporation such that the director could no longer have a reasonable expectation that he was a client of the board’s counsel.” See Kalisman v. Friedman, 2013 WL 1668205 at * 4-5. The Court explained, however, that that exception did not apply based on the facts of the WeWork case.

The Court emphasized that the board, and not management, must make any decision about withholding the company’s privileged data, after analyzing whether the directors had a reasonable expectation that they were clients of the board’s counsel. In the WeWork case, management usurped the role of the board in making that decision.

The Court’s reasoning is based on a “cardinal precept” of Delaware law that the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors. For that reason, directors must be treated as joint clients when legal advice is rendered to the corporation through one of its officers or directors. By claiming that the directors were precluded from receiving the company’s privileged information, management contravened basic tenets of Delaware law.

When providing counsel to a corporation with a divided board, and access to privileged communications is disputed, a careful lawyer will confirm that management is not the client. Moreover, one should remember that in this context privileged communication may also be subject to review by all members of the board.


*Francis G.X. Pileggi is the managing partner of the Delaware office of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP. His email address is He comments on key corporate and commercial decisions, and legal ethics topics, at

16th Annual Review of Key Delaware Corporate and Commercial Decisions

By: Francis G.X. Pileggi and Chauna A. Abner

This is the 16th year that Francis Pileggi has published an annual list of key corporate and commercial decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery. This list does not attempt to include all important decisions of those two courts that were rendered in 2020. Instead, this list highlights notable decisions that should be of widespread interest to those who work in the corporate and commercial litigation field or who follow the latest developments in this area of Delaware law. Prior annual reviews are available here.

The Delaware Business Court Insider again published this year’s Annual Review though it appeared in two parts due to its length, in last week’s edition and in this week’s edition. Part I and Part II are reprinted below with the courtesy of The Delaware Business Court Insider. (c) 2020 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved.

This year’s list focuses, with some exceptions, on the unsung heroes among the many decisions that have not already been widely discussed by the mainstream press or legal trade publications. For example, the Sciabacucchi; Solera; and AB Stable (Anbang) cases have already been the subject of extensive commentary by others. Links are also provided below to the actual court decisions and longer summaries.


Supreme Court Instructs on Nuances of Fiduciary Duties of Disclosure and Loyalty

A Delaware Supreme Court decision from 2020 that deserves to be read by anyone interested in the nuances of Delaware law on the fiduciary duties of disclosure and loyalty of a manager or a director in connection with communications with stockholders or others to whom a fiduciary duty is owed, is Dohmen v. Goodman, No. 403, 2019 (Del. June 23, 2020), in which Delaware’s High Court answered a question on this topic certified from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Key Takeaways:

There is a “per se damages rule” in Delaware that covers only those breaches of the fiduciary duty of disclosure involving requests for stockholder action that impair the economic or voting rights of investors. Importantly, this per se damages rule only covers nominal damages. Again, for emphasis: the per se damages rule does not apply to damages other than nominal damages. Therefore, in order to recover compensatory damages, one who proves a breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure must also prove reliance, causation and damages. See Slip op. at 24.

The Court in its en banc opinion provides a useful overview of fiduciary duties in general, and addresses the many nuances–that change depending on the situation presented–of the duty of disclosure in particular as it relates to requests for action by stockholders or others to whom a fiduciary duty is owed.  See Slip op. at 9-10.

Brief Overview of the Case:

The procedural background of the case involved an issue of Delaware law that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified to the Delaware Supreme Court. In other words, the Ninth Circuit asked the Delaware Supreme Court to decide an issue of Delaware law that was originally presented to the Ninth Circuit.

This gem of a 24-page opinion, which is relatively short for many Delaware opinions, was decided based on stipulated facts, which in a very simplified way, decided a claim by a limited partner in a hedge fund, who as limited partner in a limited partnership was owed a duty by the fund manager, which was structured as an LLC. Among the claims by the limited partner was that the general partner of the limited partnership, the LLC manager, breached fiduciary duties by failing to disclose that the general partner was the only investor in the fund other than the suing limited partner, and related omissions or misrepresentations.

Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law:

In connection with its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court recited several useful truisms of Delaware law. For example, the agreements at issue did not disclaim the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and therefore, the general partner owed fiduciary duties to the limited partners, similar to those owed by directors of Delaware corporations. See footnotes 15 through 16.

The Court recited the very nuanced and multifaceted aspects of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty that applied to communications with stockholders or limited partners. Those duties depend on the context of the communication, and whether the communication is to an individual stockholder or to a group of stockholders. See footnotes 18 through 32 and accompanying text.

The Court described several different types of factual situations which impact the application of the duty owed in connection with communications that involve a request for stockholder action, as compared to those that might involve merely periodic financial disclosures. The per se damages rule does not apply to the latter.

The Court discussed the most important Delaware decisions involving the duty of disclosure and how it is applied in various factual circumstances.

Bottom Line:

The Court explained that the per se damages rule only applies when a director seeks stockholder action and breaches their fiduciary duty of disclosure, in which case a stockholder may seek equitable relief or damages. That is, when directors seek stockholder action, and the directors fail to disclosure material facts bearing on that decision, a beneficiary need not demonstrate other elements of proof, such as reliance, causation or damages. This rule only applies to nominal damages and does not extend to compensatory damages. See Slip op. at 10 through 11.

Link to original post on these pages about this case.


Supreme Court Interprets Key Words in Agreement

A Delaware Supreme Court decision from May 2020 is noteworthy for the approach it takes in determining the meaning of a word in an agreement, for example, by parsing the syntax and sentence structure where the word at issue appears in the agreement. In Borealis Power Holdings Inc. v. Hunt Strategic Utility Investment, L.L.C., No. 68, 2020 (Del. May 22, 2020), the Delaware Supreme Court provides useful guidance about how to determine the meaning of a key word in an agreement. In this matter, despite a lengthy definition in the agreement of the word “transfer”, the parties still disputed its meaning.


The underlying dispute involved a complex constellation of interrelated entities which the Court provided a graphic description of by way of a chart. The essential facts on which the dispute was based involved the interpretation of an LLC agreement which imposed restrictions on the transfer of LLC units and provided for the right of first refusal and other provisions triggered by a “transfer.” Several terms were defined in the agreement–with rather lengthy definitions–but the definitions did not provide sufficient clarity. The most consequential definition that was disputed was the meaning in the context of the agreement of the word “transfer.”

The problem presented to the Court of Chancery was whether the sale of an interest triggered either a right of first refusal and/or a right of first offer, and if both applied, which was to be given priority.

The Court of Chancery concluded that a sale by Hunt of its shares to Borealis would be a “transfer.” The Supreme Court had a different view.

The finding by the Court of Chancery that the purchase of Hunt’s shares constituted a transfer, triggered the requirement to offer the shares to Sempra. As a result of other consequences of that holding, the Court of Chancery found that Sempra was the only party with the right to purchase the Hunt shares, and entered judgment in favor of Sempra. This expedited appeal followed an expedited trial. It remains noteworthy that this opinion came only 30 days after the final submission of the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Analysis by the Supreme Court:

The Supreme Court held that the right of first refusal in Section 3.9 of the agreement at issue is only triggered by transfers by the Minority Member and its Permitted Transferees, and that Hunt is neither. Put another way, Delaware’s High Court held that the fact that the right of first refusal is only triggered by transfers by the Minority Member is dispositive in favor of Borealis, regardless of whether the Hunt Sale could be said to effect an indirect transfer.

One of the agreements involved was governed by New York law and one was governed by Delaware law–but the Court noted that the law of both states as it relates to contract interpretation in this case is the same. See footnote 22.

Two other footnotes contain important observations of Delaware law that are especially worth remembering:

(1) The management of an LLC is vested in proportion to the then-current percentage or other interest of members in the profits of the LLC owned by all the members, and “the decision of members owning more than 50% of the said percentage or other interest in the profits [is] controlling.” Footnote 27; see Section 18-402 of the Delaware LLC Act.

(2) Also noteworthy is the observation by the Court that an argument that was only raised in a footnote would justify “passing over it” because footnotes, according to Delaware Supreme Court Rules, “shall not be used for argument ordinarily included in the body of a brief.” Footnote 28. See Del. Sup. Ct. R. 14 (d)(iv).

The most noteworthy parts of this pithy 21-page decision are found in the last few pages which include the core of the Court’s reasoning.

In particular, the most memorable part of the Court’s reasoning is the parsing by the Court of the syntax and sentence structure of the agreement in order to interpret the meaning of a particular word in the agreement. The Court focuses on the “subject of the operative sentence” in Section 3.1, of which “the verb phrase ‘may only transfer’ serves as the predicate.” The Court further explains that the subject of the operative sentence is neither accidental nor unimportant because it is the same subject for which the verb phrase “intends to transfer” serves as the predicate in section 3.9.

The Court added that the subject, which is stated conjunctively, does not include Hunt. Therefore, the Court reasoned that it was unnecessary and inappropriate to parse the definition of transfer, as defined in the agreement, to determine the scope of Section 3.1 and Section 3.9, because: “the subjects of the opening sentences in both of those sections do that for us.” See Slip Op. at 20 – 21.

In sum:

Although the detailed factual background needs to be reviewed more closely in order to fully understand the Court’s reasoning, for anyone who wants to understand Delaware law regarding proper contract interpretation, and interpretation of the meaning of a word, even when it is defined in an agreement, this opinion is must-reading.

Link to original post.


Delaware Supreme Clarifies Contract-Based Right to Corporate Records

A Delaware Supreme Court opinion issued in July 2020 should be required reading for anyone interested in the latest iteration of Delaware law on the contract-based right to demand “books and records” in the alternative entity context. Delaware’s High Court ruled in Murfey v. WHC Ventures, LLC, No. 294, 2019 (Del. July 13, 2020), that the Court of Chancery erred by interjecting into a limited partnership agreement a statutory requirement from Section 17-805 of the Delaware LLC Act that did not appear in the parties’ agreement.

The great importance of this ruling can best be appreciated by emphasizing that the Court did not opine in any manner on the statutory requirements for demanding books and records of a business entity–about which we recently provided an overview of key decisions on this topic, with the title of: Demands for Corporate Documents Not for the Fainthearted.

We will add to that characterization of Delaware decisions interpreting statutory provisions for demanding corporate documents, a general observation based on the instant decision: Contract-based demands for books and records of business entities are not for the fainthearted either. A few reasons that support our observation include the following:

  • This Supreme Court decision features the en banc Justices split 3-2, along with a less-than-common reversal of a Chancery decision. So, that procedural note underscores that 6 of the best legal minds in Delaware (5 jurists on the high court and 1 in Chancery rendering opinions in this case) cannot find unanimity on this issue.
  • The original demand in this case was made on January 10, 2018. The Chancery complaint was filed in September 2018. Through no fault of the court system, this final decision on appeal came down on July 13, 2020. About 2 years is still lightening-fast for the period from filing a complaint to a final decision by a state’s highest court, but that still implies substantial legal fees and the need for financial and other types of stamina for someone who is serious about seeking corporate records.
  • Although this decision provides authoritative guidance on this nuance of Delaware business litigation, a careful parsing of the opinion still reveals a fertile field for indeterminacy–which makes it a challenge for the lawyers toiling in this vineyard who are trying to predict the outcome of this type of contract interpretation dispute–even if one need not be concerned with applying the multitude of court decisions applying the statutory provisions for inspection rights in this context.
  • We will end our introductory observations on a positive note: despite the plethora of case law interpreting the various statutory provisions for demanding books and records, such as Section 220 and Section 18-305, this decision is a welcome addition to the relatively few published Delaware opinions that address the purely contract-based right to books and records of an alternative entity.

Basic Factual Background:

Based on the assumption that readers of this post are familiar with the basics of Delaware law in this area, we are only highlighting the irreducible minimum amount of facts to provide context for the key legal principles announced.

This case followed a typical pattern. The company provided some documents initially, and at the time of trial the only issue was the very limited documents the company refused to produce.

Somewhat unusual was that only one specific type of document was the subject of the trial court decision and the appeal: the K-1 of the other limited partners in the limited partnership. Although the company allowed counsel for the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s valuation expert to review those K-1s, they refused to let the plaintiffs themselves review the K-1s of other limited partners–even subject to the common confidentiality agreement.

The limited partnership agreements involved allowed for a rather broad scope of documents to be demanded, including tax returns which were specifically listed as being subject to production. The company took the curious position that a K-1 (of other limited partners) was not part of the tax returns of the company–or at least not within the scope of documents they need to produce.

Primary Issue Addressed on Appeal:

Whether the Court of Chancery erred by injecting into the terms of the agreement that provided for a right to books and records–additional statutory prerequisites. Short answer: yes.

High Court’s Reasoning–Key Takeaways:

The majority opinion made quick work of dispensing with the defense that valuation was not a valid basis for requesting the disputed documents or that tax returns were not needed to complete a valuation. See, e.g., footnotes 65 and 66 as well as related text. More notably, the Court found that the statutory notion of a “proper purpose” was not applicable to contract-based demands. See, e.g., footnote 53 and accompanying text (quoting with approval prior decisions so holding.)

Also noteworthy is the Court’s reference to dictionary definitions of words, including prepositions, at issue in this case. See footnotes 32 and 33.

The Court reviewed many prior Delaware decisions that addressed when, if ever, it would be appropriate to infer words or conditions that do not appear in the terms of an agreement, such as statutory prerequisites. Slip op. at 18-25.

A key part of the Court’s reasoning was that: because the partnership agreements involved

… do not expressly condition the limited partner’s inspection rights on satisfying a “necessary and essential” condition [a statutory concept], and given the obvious importance of tax return and partnership capital contribution information to the Partnerships’ investors, as evidenced by the agreements, we are not persuaded that such a condition should be implied. Slip op. at 25.

The majority opinion’s “rebuttal” of the dissenting opinion deserves to be read in its entirety. Slip op. at 32 to 37. Two especially notable excerpts:

  • “The words ‘necessary and essential’ do not appear in the written agreements”. Slip op. at 35.
  • “… we also do not agree that the parties to a limited partnership agreement have to expressly disclaim any conditions applied in the Section 220 context (or the Section 17-305 context….)” Footnote 85.

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Supreme Court Rejects Two Common Defenses to Section 220 Demands

A recent decision from the Delaware Supreme Court provides hope to stockholders who seek to obtain corporate documents pursuant to Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law to the extent that Delaware’s High Court removed two common defenses that companies use to oppose the production of corporate records to stockholders. In AmerisourceBergen Corporation v. Lebanon County Employees Retirement Fund, No. 60, 2020 (Del. Dec. 10, 2020), the two most important aspects of the ruling are that:

(i) A stockholder making a Section 220 demand need not demonstrate that the wrongdoing being investigated is “actionable;” and

(ii) When the purpose of a Section 220 demand is to investigate potential wrongdoing and mismanagement, the stockholder is not required to “specify the ends to which it might use” the corporate records requested (i.e., exactly what it will do with the documents it receives).

Over the last 15 years we have highlighted many of the frustrating aspects of decisions construing Section 220 to the extent that one needs stamina and economic fortitude to pursue what oftentimes is an unsatisfying result. See, e.g.,recent overview on this topic.

This decision should be in the toolbox of every corporate litigator not only because it announces a new path for Section 220 cases and reminds us of the basic prerequisites of the statute, but also in light of it partially overruling and distinguishing some prior cases. This opinion also confirms that several Chancery decisions that were not in harmony with this decision should no longer be followed.

Key Takeaways:

       One of the most important takeaways from this decision is that the Court clarified that when the purpose of a Section 220 demand is to investigate potential mismanagement, the stockholder is “not required to specify the ends to which it might use” the corporate documents requested.  See page 22.

       The second most important takeaway from this case is the Court’s holding that a stockholder pursuing a Section 220 demand need not demonstrate that the alleged wrongdoing is “actionable.” See page 25.

       The three prerequisites (not including the many nuances) for successfully pursuing a Section 220 demand to inspect a corporation’s books and records requires a stockholder to establish that: (1) such stockholder is actually a stockholder; (2) such stockholder has complied with Section 220 respecting the form and manner of making demand for inspection of such documents; and (3) the inspection such stockholder seeks is for a proper purpose. See pages 12-13.

       The Court recited the many examples of proper purposes that have been recognized to be reasonably related to the interest of the requesting stockholder. See footnote 30 for a lengthy list, which includes “to communicate with other stockholders in order to effectuate changes in management policies.”

       The Court reiterated the well-known requirement that when the proper purpose of a stockholder making a Section 220 demand is to investigate potential mismanagement, a stockholder needs to demonstrate “a credible basis” from which the court may infer that “there is possible mismanagement that would warrant more investigation.” See page 15.

       Although a credible basis of wrongdoing needs to be presented by a preponderance of the evidence to pursue the proper purpose of investigating potential wrongdoing, a company will not be permitted to mount a merits-based defense of such potential wrongdoing. See page 37.

       Moreover, while trying to harmonize prior decisions on these nuances, the Court observed that some of the decisions struck a discordant note. See footnote 109.

       The Court also affirmed the following two aspects of the Court of Chancery’s ruling: (1) regarding the scope of documents, the Court found that it was appropriate to include a requirement that the company produce officer-level materials and (2) the high Court found it was not an abuse of discretion to order a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition–because the company refused to describe the types and custodians of corporate records that it had in response to discovery requests. See pages 39 and 43.

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Chancery Provides Refreshing Section 220 Guidance

The Delaware Court of Chancery rendered a decision in November 2020 that belongs in the pantheon of noteworthy Court opinions addressing the nuances, first principles and practical challenges regarding Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. There are many decisions on this topic addressing the right of stockholders to demand inspection of corporate records, but few are as “blogworthy” as this decision in Pettry v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0173-KSJM (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2020). Compare another pantheon-worthy Chancery decision earlier this year in AmerisourceBergen. See Lebanon Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 2020 WL 132752 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2020), which was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court.

Weighing in at 69-pages, this opinion’s length is indicative of the complexities of Section 220 that are belied by the apparent simplicity of the statute. Our favorite part of this decision is the acknowledgement that when pursuing the statutory rights that Section 220 appears to allow, one can easily be stymied by the gamesmanship of companies who can play a war of attrition, usually with impunity, in light of the asymmetrical economics involved. See Slip op. at 3-5 and footnote 6 (citing an article addressing the obstacles to pursuing Section 220 rights: James D. Cox, et al., The Paradox of Delaware’sTools at Hand Doctrine: An Empirical Investigation,” 75 Bus. Law. 2123, 2150 (2020)).

Similar observations about the practical hindrances, economic and otherwise, to utilizing Section 220 have often been the topic of blog posts over the last 15 years. See, e.g., recent blog post explaining that Section 220 cases are not for the fainthearted.

This Gilead case provides guidance on an important topic that warrants a very lengthy analysis. We provide highlights via bullet points, and then interested readers can click on the above link and read all 69-pages.

The bullet points that we find to have the most widespread applicability and importance are the following:

• The Court criticizes the trend in which companies often inappropriately litigate the underlying merits of a potential, future plenary suit as opposed to addressing whether the prerequisites have been met for a Section 220 demand, as well as the tendency of companies to otherwise prevent stockholders from using Section 220 as a “quick and easy pre-filing discovery tool.” Slip op. at 3-4.

• The Court provides many quotable explanations of the “credible basis” standard that must be satisfied in order to rely on the proper purpose of investigating suspected wrongdoing. The Court emphasizes that this “lowest possible burden of proof” does not require a stockholder to prove that any wrongdoing actually occurred; nor does it require a stockholder to show by a preponderance of the evidence that wrongdoing is even probable. Slip op. at 23, footnotes 103 and 104.

• Rather, the Court instructed that the recognized proper purpose for using Section 220 to investigate suspected wrongdoing is satisfied when there is a credible basis to suspect merely the “possibility” of wrongdoing. Id. at 24, n.106.

• The Court addresses the common tactic used by companies challenging a proper purpose when they assert that the “stated proper purpose is not the actual proper purpose for the demand.” This opinion teaches that in order to succeed in such a defense, the company must prove that the “plaintiff pursued its claim under false pretenses. Such a showing is fact intensive and difficult to establish.” See footnote 153 and accompanying text.

• The Court made quick work of dispensing with the issue of standing in Section 220 cases. The Court reasoned that the standing argument in this case was in reality a Potemkin Village (our words) for the company’s challenge to the viability of derivative claims that the plaintiffs might pursue in the future. Although the Court discussed standing under Section 220 in general, it also underscored that a Section 220 proceeding does not warrant a trial on the merits of underlying claims. Slip op. at 41–42.

• The Court instructed that generally Section 220 plaintiffs need not specify the “end-uses” of the data requested for their investigation. Slip op. at 49.

• The Court also provided helpful practical tips about the scope of production required once the preliminary prerequisites of Section 220 have been satisfied. The Court noted that in some instances the company will be required to provide more than simply formal board materials. See Slip op. at 51-54.

• The opinion acknowledged that in some instances after limited discovery in a Section 220 action, plaintiffs can refine their requests with greater precision and that in some cases the Court has asked the plaintiffs to streamline their requests. See Slip op. at 63.

• In response to the Court being vexed by the overly aggressive tactics of the company, the Court invited the plaintiff to “seek leave to move for fee shifting.” As one example of the Court’s observation that the company was taking positions for no apparent purpose other than obstructing the exercise of the statutory rights of the plaintiff, the Court noted that the company refused to produce even a single document before litigation commenced.

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Must-Read Chancery Decision for Buyers of Businesses Whose Value Depends on Retaining Customer Relationships

The Delaware Court of Chancery in August 2020 addressed the issue of whether a seller was liable for not disclosing the notification it received prior to closing that one or more key customers were terminating their relationship with the seller’s business. Swipe Acquisition Corporation v. Krauss, C.A. No. 2019-0509-PAF (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2020). The Court’s decision and other decisions cited below must be read by anyone who seeks a deep understanding of Delaware law on this topic.

Key Issue Addressed:

When will a fraud claim survive in connection with a purchase agreement that restricts claims for misrepresentations and limits claims for indemnification? In this case, most of the motion to dismiss was denied, but one of the reasons this decision is noteworthy is because it exposes the lack of a bright-line-rule on this issue when compared to other decisions addressing the same or similar issues–depending on the specific terms of the anti-reliance clause involved and the specific claims of fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions.

As an indication of how common this issue is, a few days before this ruling the Court of Chancery issued another decision that addressed the issue: Pilot Air Freight, LLC v. Manna Freight Systems, Inc., No. 2019-0992-VCS (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 2020).

Key Facts of Swipe case:

This case involves a dispute over the lack of disclosure by the seller prior to closing when the seller learned that a key customer was claiming to terminate its business relationship even though the sales price was impacted by the existence of key customers. The sellers knew that if the buyers learned of the termination by the key customer involved that the deal might not close. See Slip op. at 8. Nonetheless, the sellers did not inform the buyers of the termination of the key customer at issue. Moreover, the sellers did not amend any of the financial information provided to the buyers, which had then become stale. Id. at 9. Based on weaker-than-expected performance before the closing, the buyers and the sellers did agree to reduce the purchase price even though the loss of the key customer was not disclosed.

Key Principles of Law with Widespread Applicability:

  • The Court cited to multiple cases to explain when an anti-reliance clause will not bar a fraud claim. See Slip op. at 28-29.
  • The Court also elucidates when a fraud claim and a contract claim will not be considered duplicative; when both can proceed at the preliminary stage of a case; and when a contract claim and a fraud claim will not be considered boot-strapped. See id. at 31-33.
  • The Court explained why duplicative claims may often survive at the motion to dismiss stage. See footnote 61 and accompanying text.
  • The Court explained the primacy of contract law in Delaware, and when parallel contract claims and breach of fiduciary duty claims may not proceed in tandem. See footnote 58 and accompanying text.

In addition to the cases cited above on the topic at hand, this decision should be compared with the Delaware Superior Court’s Infomedia decision that was issued just a few short weeks before this Chancery ruling. Of course, the exact terms of the applicable agreements and the detailed circumstances are often determinative, but in the unrelated Delaware Superior Court decision about a month earlier, the Court concluded that the failure to inform the sellers shortly before the execution of an asset purchase agreement that key customers intended to terminate their service contracts, even though written notice had not yet been received, would not be a sufficient basis for fraudulent misrepresentation claims due to anti-reliance provisions in an asset purchase agreement, thereby resulting in a grant of the motion to dismiss, based on the terms of the agreement involved in that case. See Infomedia Group Inc. v. Orange Health Solutions, Inc. (Del. Super. July 31, 2020).

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Chancery Determines Standard Applicable to Contested Transaction

The recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision in Salladay v. Lev, No. 2019-0048-SG (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2020), addressed the standards the Court may apply to review the conduct of directors in a contested transaction, and determined that the entire fairness standard applied, based on the facts of this case, resulting in a denial of a motion to dismiss.

Key Points:

This decision provides the latest iteration of Delaware law regarding the analyses the Court employs to review a challenged transaction to determine whether fiduciary duties were fulfilled.

In this case, the Court determined that the business judgment rule did not apply. The Court provides a practical, educational elucidation of why the efforts to “cleanse” the transaction did not revive the business judgment rule, in light of the failure to satisfy the prerequisites discussed in Corwin v. KKR Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); Kahn v. M & F Worldwide (MFW), 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014); and In re Trados, Inc. Shareholders Litigation (Trados II) 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).

The Court also discusses the recent Delaware Supreme Court cases which clarified “where or when the line is drawn” for the “cleansing” criteria to be considered as being imposed “ab initio,” such that a deal will earn the deferential BJR review standard, in Flood v. Synutra International, Inc., 195 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018), as well as Olenik v. Lodzinski, 208 A.3d 704 (Del. 2019).

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Chancery Explains Proper Methods to Expand Board Size and to Fill Board Vacancies

A recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision provides a primer on the proper way to expand the size of a board of directors and the proper way to fill board vacancies, as well as explaining the difference between a de facto and a de jure director. See Stream TV Networks, Inc. v. SeeCubic, Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0310-JTL (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2020).

This opinion should be at the fingertips of every corporate litigator who is called upon to address whether:

(1) the size of a board of directors was properly expanded;

(2) director vacancies were properly filled; or

(3) whether the actions of a de facto board member were binding even if because of technical mistakes that director was not properly appointed such that she would qualify as a de jure director.

Many additional consequential statements of Delaware law with widespread utility are included in this consequential 52-page decision.


       The Court describes the well-known prerequisites for obtaining a preliminary objection. See page 16.

       The Court provides a tutorial, with copious citations to statutory and caselaw authority, to explain: (i) how to expand the size of the board of directors; (ii) who has the authority to expand the size of the board; (iii) how to fill vacancies on the board; and (iv) who is authorized to fill vacant board seats. See pages 17 to 20.

       This opinion features a maxim of equity that would be useful to have available when the situation calls for it: equity regards as done what ought to have been done. See page 20.

       The Court explained that only the charter or the bylaws can impose director qualifications, and in any event those qualifications must be reasonable. See page 21.

       The Court explained that a director could not agree to conditions of service as a board member that would be contrary to the exercise of the fiduciary duties of a director. See page 22.

       An always useful reminder of the three tiers of review of director decision-making are provided. Those three tiers are: (i) the business judgment rule; (ii) enhanced scrutiny; and (iii) entire fairness. See pages 50 to 51.

       In addition to explaining when those three tiers apply, the opinion also regales us with a classic recitation of the business judgment rule as the default standard:

” . . . the default standard of review is the business judgment rule, which presumes that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.” See page 50.

      This decision teaches that unless one of the rule’s elements is rebutted, the Court merely looks to see whether the business decision made was rational in the sense of being one logical approach to advancing the corporation’s objective.

       The Court explains the difference between a de facto director and a de jure director, and which actions of a de facto director are binding.  See pages 23 to 25.

       Another extremely important aspect of this decision (which takes up the majority of the 50-plus pages) is a deep dive into the historical foundations of Section 271 of the Delaware General Corporation Law which applies generally to the sale of most or all of the assets of a corporation, and which would typically require stockholder approval. See page 27 through 48.

       The Court supports with detailed reasoning and extensive footnote support its conclusion that Section 271 does not apply to an insolvent corporation that transfers assets to a secured creditor. Compare DGCL Section 272 (allows directors to mortgage corporate assets).

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Delaware Court of Chancery Provides Rule 11 Insights

There are relatively few Chancery decisions on Rule 11 compared with more common corporate and commercial litigation issues that are the subject of Chancery opinions, and an October 2020 letter decision provides insights into why there are not more rulings on Rule 11. In POSCO Energy Co., Ltd. v. FuelCell Energy, Inc., Civil Action No. 2020-0713-MTZ (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 2020), in which a motion for leave to amend under Rule 15 was granted without awarding fees, while distinguishing both the Lillis and Franklin Balance cases, the Court explained that Rule 11 should not be casually raised, but that in any event a requirement for invoking it is to provide separate written notice and an opportunity to cure, as opposed to including it as part of a motion addressing other issues as well.

The Court explained that:

FuelCell has invoked Court of Chancery Rule 11 casually and repeatedly in this matter.21 The Court may only determine if Rule 11(b) was violated “after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,” and a litigant may only initiate those proceedings by “[a] motion for sanctions . . . made separately from other motions or requests.”22  Under that plain language, if FuelCell seeks sanctions for conduct it believes violates Rule 11, it must do so in an independent motion, not in argument opposing unconditional leave to amend. And, in my view, it is distracting, detrimental to the famed collegiality of the Delaware bar, and counterproductive to the “just, speedy and inexpensive determination” of judicial proceedings to summon Rule 11 in rhetoric.23

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Chancery Declines to Order Reserve for Fraud Claims Against Dissolving Corporation Under DGCL Section 280

There remains a relative paucity of opinions addressing the nuances of the dissolution statute under DGCL Section 280, compared to the Delaware decisions addressing other sections of the DGCL, so we refer to a September 2020 Court of Chancery decision that denies a Motion for Reargument under Rule 59(f) of a ruling that rejected a request to set aside a reserve for a fraud claim–even though the letter ruling was barely three-pages long–in the matter styled In re Swisher Hygiene, Inc., 2018-0080-SG (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2020). The prior decision was highlighted here.

The Court explained that the allegations did not state a “creditor claim”, though the ruling expressly did not prejudice the right to “bring litigation to determine” the fraud claim, which related to disputed ownership of stock in the company being dissolved.

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Chancery Enforces Forum Selection Clause in Charter for Inspection Demand

One of our selected Court of Chancery decisions is almost as noteworthy for what it did not decide as for what was decided. In JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Grove, C.A. No. 2020-0005-JTL (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2020), Delaware’s Court of equity enforced an exclusive forum selection clause in a company charter, based at least in part on the internal affairs doctrine, to prevent a stockholder in a Delaware corporation from filing suit in California in reliance on a California statute to demand the inspection of corporate records, notwithstanding a California statute that appears to allow a stockholder to sue in California for corporate records if the Delaware company has its principal place of business in California.

What the Court did not decide is whether a stockholder may contractually waive her rights under DGCL section 220. Count this writer as a skeptic on that point. The Court reviewed several overlapping agreements, such as a stock option exercise agreement, that the stockholder signed and that purported, at least in the company’s view, to waive inspection rights under DGCL section 220. Some of the agreements were governed by Delaware law and some by California law.

This decision could be the topic of a law review article due to the many core principles of corporate law and doctrinal underpinnings the Court carefully analyzes. But, we only provide a few bullet points with an exhortation that the whole opinion be reviewed closely.

  • The Court provides an in-depth discussion of the foundational concepts that undergird the internal affairs doctrine as it applies to the request for corporate records, as well as related constitutional issues that arise.
  • But footnote 7 acknowledges contrary authority that suggests that a local jurisdiction may apply its law to a demand by a local resident for corporate records of a foreign corporation.
  • The Court compares DGCL section 220 with its counterpart in the California statutory regime.
  • The exclusive forum selection clause in the charter was addressed, and the Court explained that but for this provision, the California court would be able to apply DGCL section 220.
  • Importantly, the Court emphasized that is was not deciding whether a waiver of DGCL section 220 rights would be enforceable. Although at footnote 14 the Court provides citations to many Delaware cases that sowed doubt about the viability of that position–but then the Court also cited cases at footnote 15 that more generally recognized the ability to waive even constitutional rights.
  • Footnote 16 cites to many scholarly articles, and muses about the public policy aspects of the unilateral adoption of provisions in constitutive documents, such as forum selection clauses in Bylaws. Early in the opinion, at footnote 7, by comparison the Court waxes philosophical about the concept of the corporation as a nexus of contracts–as compared to it being viewed as a creature of the state. The latter view has implications about the exercise of one state’s power in relation to other states, especially when private ordering may be seen as private parties exercising state power by proxy.

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Chancery Clarifies Nuances of Section 220 Stockholder Demand for Inspection Rights

A July 2020 Delaware Court of Chancery opinion provides insights into nuances of DGCL Section 220 as it relates to the rights of stockholders to inspect corporate books and records, and deserves to be in included in the pantheon of Delaware decisions on this topic. It must be read by anyone seeking a complete understanding of Delaware law on Section 220. In Woods v. Sahara Enterprises, Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0153-JTL (Del. Ch. July 22, 2020), the Court provided warmly welcomed clarity about important nuances of DGCL Section 220 with eminently quotable passages for practitioners who need to brief these issues. See generally overview of takeaways from 15 years of highlighting Section 220 cases, and compare a recent Delaware Supreme Court decision about contract-based rights to inspect corporate books and records.

This short overview will only provide several of those worthy passages in the format of bullet points.

Among the more noteworthy aspects of this notable decision are the following.

  • A consequential aspect of this jewel of a decision is the instruction by the Court that there is no basis in Delaware law to require a stockholder demanding corporate records under Section 220 to explain why the stockholder wants to value her interest in the company–in order to satisfy the recognized proper purpose of valuation. See Slip op. at 11; and 14-15.
  • The Court provided an extremely helpful list of many recognized “proper purposes” needed to be shown to satisfy Section 220. See Slip op. at 8-9.
  • The Court also recited several examples of what showing is recognized as sufficient to satisfy the “credible basis requirement” to investigate mismanagement pursuant to Section 220. See Slip op. 18-19.
  • An always useful recitation of the basic elements of the fiduciary duty of directors of a Delaware corporation and the subsidiary components of the duty of loyalty and care, are also featured. See Slip op. at 20.
  • The Court categorized the specific requests for documents in this case as follows: (i) formal board materials; (ii) informal board materials; and (iii) officer-level materials. Then the Court expounds on the different focus applicable to each category.
  • Notably, after quoting the actual document requests, the Court found that some of them were overly broad–but the Court edited and narrowed some of the requests before concluding that the company was required to produce the Court-narrowed scope of documents.

Bonus supplement: Prof. Bainbridge, a nationally prominent corporate law scholar, provides learned commentary on this case and Section 220 jurisprudence generally. Readers should recognize the good professor as the prolific author who scholarship has been cited in Delaware Court opinions.

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*Francis G.X. Pileggi is the managing partner of the Delaware office of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, and the primary author of the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog at

**Chauna A. Abner is a corporate and commercial litigation associate in the Delaware office of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP.

This post was prepared by Frank Reynolds, who has been following Delaware corporate law, and writing about it for various legal publications, for over 30 years.

The Delaware Supreme Court recently endorsed a ruling that invalidated a fired QLess Inc. CEO’s “boardroom coup” because he violated his fiduciary duty by using affirmative deception to regain his position and corporate control–even though he did nothing technically illegal in an “ambush” directors’ meeting, in Bäcker, et al. v.Palisades Growth Cap. II, L.P.,  No. 156, 2020 opinion issued (Del. Supr. Jan. 15, 2021).

The high court’s en banc opinion rejected an appeal by ex-CEO Alex Bäcker and his director appointee father Riccardo of a Chancery Court decision that they had misused a temporary 2-1 board majority created by recent director resignations to unfaithfully trick their way to power.

The Supreme Court’s opinion is noteworthy for its unanimous rulings that:

  • The Chancery Court’s finding of affirmative deception was not clearly erroneous.
  • The Court of Chancery did not impose an equitable notice requirement for regular board meetings.
  • Appellants failed to properly raise an equitable participation defense in the Chancery Court, and
  • The Court of Chancery did not exercise its equitable powers to grant relief for a de facto breach of contract claim because there was a viable, separate breach of duty charge.


In 2009, Appellant Alex Bäcker co-founded QLess Inc., a privately held Delaware corporation headquartered in California that produces and licenses a virtual queue management system that reduces the time retail customers must wait in line for services. He served as CEO for ten years until forced out in 2019 amid employee charges that he created a toxic work environment.

But the court record said he remained the majority common stock shareholder with the power to name two directors to a five-member board and when two directors of that board unexpectedly resigned before a November 2019 board meeting, he seized an opportunity to hijack the appointment of new CEO/director Kevin Grauman.

At the beginning of that board meeting, before the installation of Grauman as a director, Alex and his father held a 2-1 majority and suddenly sprung a surprise agenda on the board, voting to fire Grauman and restore Alex as CEO. They were able to accomplish this coup by deceiving the third director into believing they supported Grauman.

The Chancery Court ruling

Palisades Growth Capital II, L.P., the majority holder of QLess preferred stock, filed suit asking the Chancery Court to invalidate Bäcker’s actions and after a paper trial, the court found the defendants breached their fiduciary duties as QLess directors. The court found that the Bäckers affirmatively deceived Palisades director appointee Jeff Anderson–the third director–into attending the November meeting, creating the necessary quorum. Palisades Growth Cap. II, L.P. v. Bäcker, 2020 WL 1503218 (Del. Ch. Mar. 26, 2020).

“After having affirmatively represented to [the board] that Defendants supported Grauman’s appointment to the Board, keeping mum as they planned their ambush was inequitable,” the Chancery Court said.

The appeal

On appeal, the Bäckers argued that the Court of Chancery erred by relying on clearly erroneous interpretations of evidence and applying incorrect legal standards to invalidate the actions that the Bäckers took at the November 15 board meeting.

Writing for the unanimous high court, Justice Tamika Montgomery Reeves said, “‘Whether . . . an equitable remedy exists or is applied using the correct standards is an issue of law and reviewed de novo,’ but . . . ‘application of those facts to the correct legal standards . . . are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.’”

The finding that the Bäckers deceived Anderson was not clearly erroneous

At bottom, the determination of whether the Bäckers’ conduct was deceptive was a factual one, the Justice wrote. “Unlike the mixed questions of fact and law that the Bäckers identify, the court did not need to consider legal principles to determine whether the Bäckers tricked Anderson.”

The finding of affirmative deception was not clearly erroneous

This Court has long recognized that “inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible,” the high court held. “Under Delaware law, “director action[s] [are] ‘twice-tested,’ first for legal authorization, and second [for] equity.” That’s why stockholders can entrust directors with broad legal authority precisely – “because they know that that authority must be exercised consistently with principles of fiduciary duty.”

Anderson’s attendance and actions at the meeting not preclude equitable relief

“Nothing in the case law that the Bäckers present suggests that Delaware law tolerates deception related to regular board meetings, and we can think of no good reason why deception would be allowed for regular board meetings, but forbidden for special board meetings,” the Justices said.

No extracontractual relief was provided under the voting agreement

The Bäckers argued that If the fiduciary claims relate to obligations that are expressly treated’ by contract, then the court must review those claims as breach of contract claims and any fiduciary duty claims will be dismissed. But the justices said, “This bootstrapping case law only requires dismissal where a fiduciary duty claim wholly overlaps with a concurrent breach of contract claim,” and that is not the case in this matter.

A recent post on the well-read blog of Prof. Stephen Bainbridge, our favorite corporate law scholar whose many publications are cited in Delaware court decisions, linked to an article that lawyers and other followers of Delaware corporate law should be interested in, by an eminent Delaware corporate litigator, on the topic of how much weight should be given to bench rulings, sometimes referred to as transcript rulings, from the Delaware Court of Chancery. As a matter of Delaware practice, such rulings are often cited in briefs and even appear in published opinions of Delaware courts.

A recent Delaware Court of Chancery opinion interpreted related agreements that included forum selection clauses that were conflicting.  In Mack v. Rev Worldwide, Inc., C.A. No. 2019-0123-MTZ (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2020), the court addressed forum selection provisions in two related agreements which the court treated as one because they were incorporated by reference.

The court was asked to decide whether Delaware was the proper forum when one of the forum selection clauses required courts in Texas to address certain issues–and the other forum selection provision provided for a California court to hear disputes.

Key Takeaways:
● The court recited the well-established Delaware law about the enforceability of forum selection clauses generally.  Slip op. at 15 to 17.
● The court also addressed Rule 12(b)(3) motions challenging venue and whether arguments required to be made in an initial Rule 12 motion are waived if all the grounds for such motions are not explained, as well as the impact of a second motion under Rule 12 in connection with an amended complaint.  The court explained why those arguments would generally not be waived, even if all the grounds for such a motion were not recited in the original motion.
● The court also observed that in some instances non-signatories to a forum selection clause may also be bound by it.
● The court reasoned that unlike the typical situation where conflicting forum selection clauses choose Delaware and another forum, in this instance competing forum selection clauses both required litigation in states outside of Delaware. Therefore, the court determined that because neither of the parties chose Delaware, a court in one of the other two forums selected would need to decide which of them would address the merits of the case.