Frank Reynolds, who has been covering Delaware corporate decisions for various national publications for over 40 years, prepared this article.

The Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery recently allowed a Regions Bank investor to continue her derivative Caremark suit against bank directors to recover the $191 million dollars Regions paid federal banking regulators for three years of charging illegal overdraft fees, in Brewer v. Turner Jr. et al, C.A. No. 2023-1284-KSJM (Del. Ch.Sept.29, 2025).

One month later, Chancellor Kathaleen McCormick denied a petition by defendant directors to certify an interlocutory appeal of several major issue rulings in her September opinion.  She found that at best, defendants had provided only “soft support” for one of the eight key factors that could qualify a decision for immediate appeal.  Brewer v. Turner Jr.et al, C.A. No. 2023-1284-KSJM (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2025).

In her September opinion denying the directors’ motion to dismiss for failure to plead demand futility, Chancellor McCormick found that a majority of board saw but did not properly act on red flag Caremark warnings that Regions Bank’s overdraft fees violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, which tightened scrutiny of consumer transactions involving any “unfair, deceptive or abusive act or practice”.  She said the board allegedly continued the practice for three years so they could develop replacement revenue sources.  In re Caremark Inl. Inc. Deriv. Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).

An “unusual” Caremark claim

Chancellor McCormick ruled that 14 of the 22 directors who had served on the board during the three years the overdraft practice continued faced liability for breaching their duty and thus could not objectively evaluate the merits of the suit, so the plaintiff passes the pre-suit demand test as to those defendants.   She also noted that the case was unique in that it included a whistleblower claim by Region’s former general counsel re overdrafts.

She did not find that the directors who only served after the bank discontinued the overdraft practice or before it began had any conflicting liability and they were dismissed.

Background

Regions shareholder Katherine Brewer filed a derivative breach of duty suit on behalf of all investors in the bank and its parent company alleging that the bank’s board failed to heed warnings from federal banking regulators that its overdraft practice was illegal. She claimed the directors exposed Regions to liability by keeping the allegedly manipulative practice in effect while they sought replacement revenue streams.  She asked the court to hold the directors liable for the $191 million consent agreement with banking regulators.

The consent order that Regions agreed to in 2022 came in one of the most recent of a series of enforcement actions to settle claims brought by the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau targeting deceptive and manipulative practices affecting customers.  Several large regional banks, including Bank of America, Wells Fargo and JP Morgan Chase agreed to consent orders regarding its overdraft practices.  Bank of America, for example, paid $410 million to settle banking regulators’ overdraft violation claims, the court said.

Regions Bank, an Alabama-chartered regional bank operated by Regions Financial Corporation, which is incorporated in Delaware and based in Alabama, learned of the regulators’ investigations of illegal overdraft practices –including theirs –but decided to continue it until they could replace those fees with other revenue streams, the court said.  The Chancellor noted that Regions’ Board has both a Risk Committee and an Audit Committee—each of which are responsible for monitoring risk associated with federal regulations – and that in 2018, Regions established a Customer Transparency Working Group to review the Company’s overdraft practice.

No “straight-faced” info system charge

She concluded that in keeping with the Caremark ruling, Regions had the proper reporting systems to keep the board informed about risks that were central to its business, but for three years the board did not properly respond to the reported red flags by halting the illegal overdraft practice.  Hiring a law firm and forming a working group of directors to access the adequacy of the bank’s response was insufficient, because “Merely hiring an attorney in response to a red flag, does not provide the absolution Defendants seek,” she ruled.

A risk leading to corporate trauma

Moreover, the Chancellor said, plaintiff’s pre-suit demand argument was supported by:

*The firing of and whistleblower suit settlement with a deputy counsel who had warned that continuing the illegal overdraft practice was a risk (which the court identified as “plaintiff’s most powerful red flag”

*The fact that the working group had no power to stop or change the overdraft practices.

*The board’s apparent failure to discuss repeated warnings from Senators and regulators-although that charge was not in itself a red flag.  The defendant demand directors knew that regulators viewed the overdraft practice of manipulating the posting of withdrawals to generate fees was illegal was a known risk to Region’s core business, but they kept it in effect for financial reasons.

No overdraft involvement proof = D&O dismissal

Plaintiff alleged that later-arriving director defendants who came aboard after Regions halted its overdraft scheme should have investigated those wrongs and charged its authors damaged the business.  But the Chancellor dismissed those defendants ruling that those later directors did not breach their fiduciary duties by failing to investigate and charge the other directors for their handling of the overdraft issue.

She said she dismissed charges against all Regions officers because the plaintiff did not defend those charges in any briefing in response to assertions by those defendants that none of the allegations in the complaint establish a claim.

Not an “exceptional” appeal

In her October order, the Chancellor said her decision boiled down to the Regions directors’ insufficient support under Supreme Court Rule 42 for the three of eight factors which could be the basis of immediate appeal of an issue of material importance that merits appellate review before a final judgment because none were “exceptional.”  She found that:

“Factor B” – which asserted that the September opinion conflicted with the “settled law” of other Chancery Court rulings as to demand futility requirements, was insufficient because the standard for conducting this inquiry at the demand futility stage is well balanced, requiring that the plaintiff plead facts with particularity, but also requiring that this Court draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Factor (G) asks whether interlocutory review could terminate the litigation. “This factor is rarely dispositive; were it so, then it would be appropriate to certify all decisions denying motions to dismiss in whole or in part,” the Chancellor said. “This factor does not weigh in favor of interlocutory appeal here in any event.”

Factor (H) asks whether “[r]eview of the interlocutory order may serve considerations of justice.” But although “Defendants advance a floodgates argument”, casting the Opinion as likely to “sow uncertainty” because it supposedly departs so dramatically from Delaware law,” regarding the standard of proof for Caremark claims.  “Not so,” the Chancellor said. “The approach of the Opinion has been deployed repeatedly since Marchand,” referring to the most recent guidepost ruling on Caremark claims.  Marchand v. Barnhil, 212 A.3d 805, 821 (Del. 2019).

 Yet Caremark claims remain “among the hardest claims to plead and prove.”  Since Marchand, this court has dismissed nearly 80% of derivatively pled Caremark claims,” Chancellor McCormick concluded.

My 9th Edition as Editor-in-Chief of the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Law Monitor published by The National Review is now available.

We collect articles from around the country, by practitioners and academics, about the latest developments on the titular topic.

In a recent bench ruling, the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed an issue that it acknowledged had not been squarely decided by the court in a prior published decision: corporate counsel’s role and scope of engagement for a two-member deadlocked board. In Kundrun v. AMCI Group, LLC, C.A. No. 2025-0570-LM-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 2025), in a transcript ruling and an Order encapsulating the decision, the court considered exceptions to a Magistrate’s Final Report and held that counsel for the company must remain neutral as between the two equal owners of the LLC who also comprised the two-member board of directors.

Key Background Facts

Defendant AMCI Group, LLC (the “Company”) was governed by an agreement (the “LLC Agreement”) that structured the governance of the LLC in a manner similar to a corporation to the extent that it provided for the board of directors (the “Board”) to exercise authority collectively over the business and affairs of the Company as its sole manager.

The LLC Agreement established an officer position, for one of the two equal owners who was also one of the two members of the Board, Hans Mende, with the title Executive Chairman. He was given authority over day-to-day operations of the business with the full powers of the Board—within that scope of authority limited to day-to-day operations. But outside that scope of authority he did not exercise the full powers of the Board, nor could he act on other matters where the operating agreement specifically required action by the Board.

The litigation involved requests for information by Fritz Kundrun who was one of the two directors comprising the Board, and one of the Company’s two equal members.

The court explained that some types of books and records actions might fall within the day-to-day operations of an entity, but an action, such as this one, by one of two directors who was also a 50% member does not.

The court reasoned that because the specific issues in this litigation fall outside the day-to-day operations of the Company, Mende lacked authority as Executive Chairman to address them on his own.

Highlights of the Order

  • Company counsel cannot take instructions from Mende or from officers who report to Mende. Order at 2.
  • The court also ruled that although the full Board can give instructions to Company counsel, which currently requires joint action by both Kundrun and Mende, the Board is deadlocked on governance issues that include whether and to what extent Kundrun can obtain the information in his capacity a director.
  • The court held that the Board is also deadlocked as to whether the Board as sole manager will seek the information.

Key Rulings

  • The court ruled that because the Board is deadlocked, Company counsel cannot take direction from the Board on those matters relating to the request for information by one of the two directors. The court also reasoned that Company counsel cannot side with one faction of the other,  citing to In re Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc., 2022 WL 552653 at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2022). See Order at 3.
  • The court also ruled that Company counsel must carry out any order from the court and that it must comply with discovery requests relating to matters such as what documents or information exist and the burden associated with providing that data. Id.
  • The court held that Company counsel must provide neutral, complete, and accurate responses to requests about the basic information requested.
  • The court explained that: “Otherwise, Company counsel must remain neutral in this action. Company counsel cannot take a position adverse to either Kundrun or Mende.” Id.
  • The court concluded that although this matter is styled as a dispute involving Kundrun and the Company, it is actually between Kundrun and Mende. The court allowed Mende and his personal counsel leave to intervene for purposes of defending the proceeding, citing to Engstrum v. Paul Engstrum Asssocs., Inc., 124 A.2d 722, 723-24 (Del. Ch. 1956).
  • Other cases that address similar issues but that did not involve identical facts include: Kalisman v. Fridman, 2013 WL 1668205 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2013); In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015); Hyde Park Venture P’rs Fund II, L.P. v. FairXchange, LLC, 292 A.3d 178 (Del. Ch. 2023); and In re Information Management Services, Inc. Deriv, Litig., 81 A.3d 278 (Del. Ch. 2013).

Highlights of the Transcript Decision

Many of the court’s rulings involved an interpretation of the LLC Agreement, including the following:

  • Referring to one of the two board members, the court observed that: “Mende isn’t the company. The Board is the company.” Transcript at 108:13-14.
  • The Vice Chancellor interpreted the LLC Agreement in the following manner: “the company is a series LLC that established a manager-managed structure in which a board of directors acts as the sole manager for the LLC and its series with a delegation of authority to conduct day-to-day matters to a senior officer.” Tr. 88:22-89:3.
  • The Vice Chancellor further explained that: “I draw that inference from the following language in the operating agreement. It states, ‘As a general rule, governance is a company-level responsibility and in particular is the responsibility of the company’s board of directors.’ It further states, ‘The board of directors, acting as a body, will manage the business and affairs of the company, and unless the members of any particular series agree otherwise, “the series.”’ It then says, ‘The board collectively acts as the statutory manager of the company, and each company managed series under Delaware law, but no single director has the authority in that capacity to bind the company or any company-managed series unless the board has explicitly empowered him or her to do so.’” Id. at 91:10-24.
  • The Vice Chancellor reasoned that: “Just as in the general corporate context, the officers are going to have a lesser and more limited scope of authority than the board, which has plenary authority over the entity.” Id. at 92:20-24.  Further, the Vice Chancellor also found: “The provision is then saying that within that scope of authority, the officer can also exercise board powers, but only within the day-to-day operation of the business.” Id. at 95:20-23. 
  • The court further opined that: “The fact that Mende has control over the day-to-day operations as executive chairman doesn’t make him the company.” Id. at Tr. 106:19-21.
  • The Vice Chancellor, importantly, held: “there’s even a deadlock over whether directors can get information because Mende supposedly won’t go along with his fellow director in exercising managerial information rights. I pause to say that I’m deeply skeptical of that argument. It seems to me that just as the board acting as a whole can exercise board-level authority to tell a company or its officers to provide information to the board, so too here the manager can exercise manager-level authority to tell the entity to provide information to the board/manager. I don’t think that inherently means that the director, who is one of the two human components of the manager, is frozen out of exercising a director-level information right simply because of that structure. I don’t think it makes sense as a governance model, and I do think that the settlement agreement is inconsistent with that assertion.”  Id. at 107:1-18.
  • The Vice Chancellor elaborated that Kundrun is entitled to “information about the day-to-day management of the business” and noted that Mende could assert privilege or the work product doctrine regarding Mende’s own personal counsel.  Id. at 110:13-22. 
  • But the court otherwise found that there was a limited privilege and work product concern for “the period of time when … [corporate counsel] have been operating in the belief that they could represent the company in active litigation.”  Id. at 110:23-111:8.

Over the last 20 years these pages have highlighted a few hundred or so decisions regarding the challenges of seeking corporate records, in both the corporate and LLC context–even for directors and managers. Although this ruling is most noteworthy for its solution for a deadlocked board, and the role of counsel for the deadlocked board, it also provides an example of why asserting a right to seek business books and records by a member/manager or shareholder/director is not for the fainthearted and is not as simple, or inexpensive, an exercise as it may seem to those not well-versed in the intricacies and nuances of enforcing those rights.

Postscript: The author was co-counsel for Kundrun in this matter. Other counsel are listed in the transcript ruling linked above.

The Delaware Court of Chancery recently dismissed a complaint based on false allegations verified as true in a complaint, as well as fabricated documents and misrepresentations to the court, in Govette v. Bongiovani, C.A. No. 2019-0139-NAC (Del. Ch. Oct. 15, 2025).

Although this case might involve extreme facts, and enunciates basic principles that might seem too obvious to require emphasis, still this opinion remains noteworthy for underscoring fundamental precepts on which the litigation process depends.

Candor is the overarching theme buttressing the fundamental principles that this decision explains. The plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with prejudice based on the following wrongful actions:

  • Making knowingly false allegations in a verified amended complaint.
  • Attaching fabricated documents to the amended complaint.
  • Testifying falsely at his deposition and at an evidentiary hearing, and,
  • Evidencing a lack of candor in declarations submitted to the court.

These transgressions, many of which were admitted at a later stage of the case, were proven by clear and convincing evidence and violated Court of Chancery Rule 3(c) in connection with false allegations in the amended complaint, and false documents attached thereto. The court concluded that it was compelled to dismiss the complaint based on Rule 41(b).

Background

  • The plaintiff founded the company involved and managed it initially but then gave up some stock ownership in connection with subsequent investors joining the company. The founder did not observe corporate formalities and did not maintain records of his stock ownership. He attempted to address his lack of documentation to establish his stock ownership by making misrepresentations and creating false documents, as well as testifying untruthfully in a deposition and at a court hearing.
  • The defendants were able to prove through a digital forensic expert that the documents created by the plaintiff were drafted with software that was unavailable on the date that the plaintiff claimed that the documents were created. An initial motion to dismiss was denied in order to allow discovery into the factual basis for the false allegations and false documents.
  • Notably, the court observed that in these circumstances a second motion to dismiss was not barred.

Highlights

The most memorable legal principles articulated in this decision that have the most widespread applicability for corporate and commercial litigators, as well as litigators in general, include the following key points.

  • In response to an argument that the renewed motion was untimely, the court noted that the motion to dismiss was filed within the ten days required to respond to an amended complaint under Rule 15(a)(6). Specifically, under Rule 6, when computing any time period that is less than eleven days, the intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded from the time computation.
  • Dismissal for “failure of the plaintiff to comply with” the Chancery rules, may be filed without any time limitation under Rule 41(b). See footnote 50.
  • The court explained that a litigant violates Rule 3(c) when they include “false allegations verified as true in a pleading.” That violation is not a mere technicality because: “it undercuts the integrity of the judicial process.” Slip op. at 14.
  • The court has the inherent authority to police and penalize serious abuses of the judicial process including “a party’s lack of candor.” Id. at 15. (emphasis added) See also footnote 86.
  • The plaintiff admitted that he fabricated documents and filed false allegations to “make a better case” for himself.
  • The impact of untrue or inconsistent statements on the credibility of a witness such as a “determination that a party has been untruthful, of course, affects the credibility of his whole testimony and lying on one issue invariably impairs one’s chances on prevailing on any other disputed point.” Footnote 94.
  • The court also underscored that: “When a witness makes inconsistent statements, it becomes fodder for impeachment and an issue to consider when evaluating the witness’s credibility.” Id.
  • The court reasoned that: “When a plaintiff comes to this court seeking equity, they are expected to do equity by the other parties to the case and to the court itself, by being candid.” Slip op. at 19. (emphasis added).
  • The court cited prior decisions where dismissal was warranted under Rule 41(b) when pleadings “contain false allegations verified as true.” Slip op. at 20 and footnote 109.
  • The court explained that the plaintiff evidenced a lack of “the candor required by those who resort to the judicial process.” Id. at 20. (emphasis added)
  • The court cited to prior decisions which found that a lack of candor and false statements warrant the admittedly harsh sanction of dismissal because, as in this matter, such transgressions mean that such a party: “forfeited his right to equity by his own inequitable conduct.” Footnote 114.
  • The court buttressed its reasoning by observing that the lack of candor by the plaintiff directly allowed this litigation to continue, which forced the defendants to engage in repeated and time-consuming efforts to uncover the full extent of his falsities and contributed to the years-long delay in resolving this case. Slip op. at 21.
  • The court provided public policy reasons for its decision by insisting that the plaintiff’s “recurrent lack of candor, . . . committed a wrong against this institution and threatened the integrity of this court . . .. And, allowing the “plaintiff to proceed with this suit would encourage other parties to play fast and loose with the truth when speaking to this court.” Slip op at 21 and footnotes 117 and 118. (emphasis added)
  • The court quoted from prior decisions which relied on basic principles such as: “When a party knowingly misleads a court of equity in order to secure an unfair tactical advantage, it should forfeit its right to equity’s aid. Otherwise, sharp practice will be rewarded, and the tradition of civility and candor that has characterized litigation in this court will be threatened.” Also: “The court is so jealous in guarding itself against such misuse that it will sua sponte apply the  maxim whenever it discovers the unconscionable conduct.” See footnote 119.
  • The court concluded that if it excused the misconduct in this case, it would “have unacceptable negative policy ramifications for future proceedings.” Slip op. at 23.

I’m attending today a symposium hosted by the above center at the University of Delaware, organized by the center’s head, Prof. Larry Cunningham. The title is: “Boardroom Legacy: Weinbergs of Goldman Sachs & The Evolution of Courtroom Governance”.

The impetus of the convocation is the 1948 Princeton senior paper of John Weinberg, that has never previously been published, which provided intellectual insights on corporate governance that played a key role beginning in the middle of the last century, and has continuing relevance today. After his Princeton days, he became the chairman of Goldman Sachs, and it is his name graces the corporate center where the symposium is being held.

The program and materials are available at this link. Highlights of the day featured panels and presentations that included insights on:

  • The history of corporate governance
  • Directing with AI: Corporate Governance, AI Governance, and the Board
  • Board composition
  • Reflections on Integrity, Diligence, and Profit in the Director’s Role
  • Keynote speech by former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine, Jr.

The Court of Chancery recently explained who must receive notice in order to satisfy the requirements of 6 Del. C. § 18-110, which provides a summary procedure for LLCs, similar to § 225 for corporations, to determine the proper manager of an LLC. In HREF Senior Worthington LLC v. Conroe WN LLC, C.A. No. 2024-1148-MTC (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2025), the court explained that one of the parties with a potential claim to the disputed office did not receive notice. The company at the center of the § 18-110 claim was never served with the complaint, and no other form of notice was distributed.

The court explained the reasons why it was necessary to give that party notice in this proceeding. Because it did not receive notice, even though the court stated that it had nearly completed its opinion after an expedited trial in this matter, the court required the parties to provide that proper notice before it would be able to issue its final decision.

In the meantime, the court did the parties the courtesy of explaining its reasoning for the “draft” decision. Specifically, the court described the unusual procedural posture as follows: “So that all can proceed as efficiently as possible, I will do the parties the courtesy of sharing what my draft opinion currently holds . . . .” Slip op. at 4.

This letter ruling provides a cornucopia of important principles and procedural requirements for § 18-110 cases that I will merely highlight.

Highlights

  • The court noted that § 18-110 (a) requires that the limited liability company involved be named as a party. See footnote 3.
  • The issue presented to the court in this case was whether HREF Senior Worthington LLC (“HREF”) was the sole manager of HoldCo, the LLC involved.
  • But this case marched forward without notice to a purported member of the entity involved, that the defendants argued was also a HoldCo co-manager. That member was MStar Conroe, LLC (“MStar”).
  • The court observed that no summons was ever sought for or issued to HoldCo, the complaint was not sent to HoldCo’s registered agent, and no other form of notice was distributed in a way that would reach MStar.
  • The court underscored that a § 18-110 proceeding is in rem, not in personam.
  • Although all claimants to the disputed office did not need to be served with process because the court’s jurisdiction is based on its power over the res, see footnote 11, unlike in personam actions, service of process in an in rem action does not create personal jurisdiction. Slip op. at 3.
  • A judgment based on § 18-110 does not require that all claimants to the disputed office be subject to in personam jurisdiction in order for the court to make an authoritative adjudication on the question of who holds the office. See footnote 12.
  • Nonetheless, service is a means of giving notice and an opportunity to be heard to those who might lose their property. A party with a potential claim to the res who does not receive adequate notice is not bound by the results of the litigation. Therefore, the court must be satisfied that all such parties have received notice before it can rule. See Slip op. at 4 and footnote 15.
  • The problem presented at this juncture, which the court realized while preparing its post-trial opinion, and which apparently the parties did not address, is that a member of the LLC whom defendants argue is a co-manager of the LLC, did not receive any notice of this dispute as to whether HREF is the sole manager of HoldCo.
  • The court held that HREF is HoldCo’s sole manager.
  • The court included in its reasoning the truism that § 18-402 of the LLC Act “mandates that management shall be vested in the manager who shall be chosen in the manner provided in the limited liability company agreement.” Slip op. at 5.
  • The court parsed the terms of the agreement which were “undisputably triggered” to provide for HREF to be the sole manager. Slip op. at 5. See also footnotes 18 and 19. The court rejected the reasoning of the defendants that the “purpose clause” overrode other provisions in the agreement regarding how the manager of the LLC was chosen. Slip op. at 7.
  • After explaining the procedural conundrum and the reasoning to support the “draft decision,” the court concluded with the following sentence: “The matter is back in your hands.”

A recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision interpreted the Delaware Rapid Arbitration Act (“DRAA”), about which there is a relative paucity of published opinions. See OBI Pharma, Inc. v. Biosion, Inc., C.A. No. 2025-0965-KSJM (Del. Ch. Sept. 26, 2025).

This short letter ruling addressed an issue regarding the appointment of a panel of three arbitrators. An agreement between the parties required disputes to be resolved pursuant to arbitration under the DRAA,10 Del. C. § 5801, et seq. The relevant agreement did not provide a procedure for the selection of a panel of three arbitrators. Because the parties could not agree on who to select as arbitrators, they submitted a list of six arbitrators to the court, all of whom were qualified under § 5805(b) of the DRAA. The court picked three persons from that list.

Highlights

  • The court observed that in 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted rules that govern the procedure in arbitrations under DRAA. Those rules are available on the Court’s website.
  • The court noted that under DRAA Rule 9, its letter ruling officially commenced the arbitration pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 5805(b).
  • Rule 9 also provides that the appointed arbitrators must file with the Court of Chancery and serve upon the parties, a written notice of acceptance of appointment as an arbitrator and set forth their email address, postal address, telephone and fax numbers, as well as the form in which written submissions to the arbitrator shall be made. The court waived the obligation to provide fax numbers.
  • This letter ruling and order are noteworthy for two reasons: (1) it shows that “somebody” is using the DRAA; and (2) it provides guidance regarding procedural issues that arise under the DRAA.

Recent developments in AI allow for summaries of court decisions without the need, in theory, for much human input. So, what is the usefulness of blogs by lawyers (such as this one–now in its 20th year) that cover a particular legal topic if AI can do so much of the work? The answer is: insights of the author, for example based on experience, that can highlight nuances and noteworthy aspects of a decision not self-evident within the four corners of the decision itself, e.g., what parts of the decision would have the most widespread application or usefulness, or topics not previously covered in the same way or to the same extent by prior cases.

The father of blogging for lawyers, Kevin O’Keefe, is the owner of LexBlog, which is a company that provides technical support and consulting for lawyers who write blogs. He suggests humanizing a blog perhaps by including details on the blog’s author and expressing one’s personality or personal perspective in what would otherwise be dry legal writing, as one way to distinguish blogs with content primarily created by AI.

Here goes my attempt at that approach. I recently attended the Red Mass, sponsored by the Diocese of Wilmington’s St. Thomas More Society, which is an informal group of lawyers and a few judges (but not affiliated with a national public-interest law firm with a similar name based in Chicago). The Red Mass traces its origins to the 1200s in France. It soon spread to other European countries. It began in this country in the 1800s. Historically, the Red Mass was held at the beginning of the judicial year, and its purpose is intended to invoke divine guidance for those in the legal profession. For example, the Red Mass in Washington, D.C., has been attended by members of the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts, as well as many members of the bar and holders of high political office.

Also attending the recent Wilmington Red Mass were the Knights of Malta, a group which traces its origins to about the year 1100. Members such as myself have attended the Red Mass since it began in Wilmington many years ago.

My membership in any group or attendance at any event is not a determining factor in my highlights of court decisions, or commentary on these pages about legal ethics issues and related matters, which I have been providing on this blog for the last 20 years, but perhaps this post is an example of the types of personal input that would be difficult for AI software to prepare or to create without substantial human involvement.

In a postscript to a recent ruling from the bench, a vice chancellor of the Court of Chancery made a thoughtful observation about her concerns regarding an apparent change in the tradition of civility among members of the Delaware Bar. In a Law.com article that discussed the observation, yours truly was quoted.

An overview of the article with my quotes and a link to the article itself is available here.