A recent Delaware Supreme Court decision should be required reading for those interested in the nuances of Delaware law on the fiduciary duties of disclosure and loyalty of a manager or a director in connection with communications with stockholders or others to whom a fiduciary duty is owed.  In Dohmen v. Goodman, Del. Supr., No. 403, 2019 (June 23, 2020), Delaware’s High Court answered a question certified from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Key Takeaways:

There is a “per se damages rule” in Delaware that covers only those breaches of the fiduciary duty of disclosure involving requests for stockholder action that impair the economic or voting rights of investors.  Importantly, this per se damages rule only covers nominal damages.  Again, for emphasis:  the per se damages rule does not apply to damages other than nominal damages.  Therefore, in order to recover compensatory damages, one who proves a breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure must also prove reliance, causation and damages.  See Slip op. at 24.

The court in its en banc opinion provides a useful overview of fiduciary duties in general, and addresses the many nuances–that change depending on the situation presented–of the duty of disclosure in particular as it relates to requests for action by stockholders or others to whom a fiduciary duty is owed.  See Slip op. at 9-10.

Brief Overview of the Case:

The procedural background of the case involved an issue of Delaware law that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified to the Delaware Supreme Court.  In other words, the Ninth Circuit asked the Delaware Supreme Court to decide an issue of Delaware law that was originally presented to the Ninth Circuit.

This gem of a 24-page opinion, which is relatively short for many Delaware opinions, was decided based on stipulated facts, which in a very simplified way, decided a claim by a limited partner in a hedge fund, who as limited partner in a limited partnership was owed a duty by the fund manager, which was structured as an LLC.  Among the claims by the limited partner was that the general partner of the limited partnership, the LLC manager, breached fiduciary duties by failing to disclose that the general partner was the only investor in the fund other than the suing limited partner, and related omissions or misrepresentations.

Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law:

In connection with its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court recited several useful truisms of Delaware law.  For example, the agreements at issue did not disclaim the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and therefore, the general partner owed fiduciary duties to the limited partners, similar to those owed by directors of Delaware corporations.  See footnotes 15 through 16.

The court recited the very nuanced and multifaceted aspects of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty that applied to communications with stockholders or limited partners.  Those duties depend on the context of the communication, and whether the communication is to an individual stockholder or to a group of stockholders.  See footnotes 18 through 32 and accompanying text.

The court described several different types of factual situations which impact the application of the duty owed in connection with communications that involve a request for stockholder action, as compared to those that might involve merely periodic financial disclosures.  The per se damages rule does not apply to the latter.

The court discussed the most important Delaware decisions involving the duty of disclosure and how it is applied in various factual circumstances.

Bottom Line:

The court explained that the per se damages rule only applyies when a director seeks stockholder action and breaches their fiduciary duty of disclosure, in which case a stockholder may seek equitable relief or damages.  That is, when directors seek stockholder action, and the directors fail to disclosure material facts bearing on that decision, a beneficiary need not demonstrate other elements of proof, such as reliance, causation or damages.  This rule only applies to nominal damages and does not extend to compensatory damages. See Slip op. at 10 through 11.