The Delaware Court of Chancery recently issued an epic decision that serves as a mini-treatise on several topics of importance to corporate and commercial litigators including: (1) interpretation of material adverse change clauses or material adverse effect clauses in merger agreements; and (2) the meaning and application of the phrase “commercially reasonable efforts” or “reasonable best efforts” often found in merger agreements.
The opinion in Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), will be firmly ensconced in the pantheon of the most notable decisions of Delaware courts and could easily be the subject of a full-length law review article. But for purposes of a blog post that merely attempts to highlight the key issues addressed by the court, so that interested readers might review the entire opinion if relevant to their practice, I will focus on several key aspects of the decision only.
The procedural context in which this decision was written, was expedited proceedings in which two parties to a merger agreement sought competing rulings on the meaning of the agreement. On the one hand, the seller argued that the merger agreement should be specifically enforced. The buyer, however, filed a counterclaim that sought a ruling that it properly terminated the merger agreement based in part on the occurrence of a material adverse effect or a material adverse change, as defined in the agreement. The purchaser prevailed in its argument that it properly terminated the agreement.
Notably, a 5-day trial was held with nearly 2,000 exhibits. A total of 16 witnesses testified, and 54 deposition were lodged. The trial was held less than 3 months after the complaint was filed. This 246-page opinion was issued less than one week after the final post-trial briefs and oral argument were completed.
The detailed facts on which the court’s reasoning and conclusion are based are described in the first 110 pages of this decision. It would be a challenge to do the facts justice in a brief overview, but for purposes of providing the highlights of the legal principles in the case, suffice it to say that the court provided exhaustive detail about each of the factual aspects of the parties’ dispute and why one party sought to enforce the merger agreement and one party successfully argued that it was justified in terminating the merger agreement prior to closing.
Highlights of Legal Principles and Analysis by the Court:
Material Adverse Change Clauses:
- In a comprehensive and scholarly analysis, the court surveys the law on Material Adverse Change (“MAC”) provisions or Material Adverse Effect (“MAE”) provisions in merger agreements, including prior cases that discuss them and copious footnotes are provided with reference to specific percentages, for example, that are necessary in determining whether a MAC clause or a MAE clause should be triggered. See pages 117 to 204. The court refers to a MAC clause and a MAE clause as synonymous.
- This decision is thought to be the first Delaware opinion upholding the termination of a merger agreement due to the occurrence of a MAC/MAE.
Key Treatise Cited:
- Notable is the court’s reference in footnote 558 to the many Delaware decisions that cite to the Kling and Nugent treatise on M&A agreements and M&A practice as an authoritative source for issues relating to merger agreements, such as MAC/MAE clauses and post-closing indemnification provisions.
Is Delaware Pro-Sandbagging—or Not?
- Importantly, the court discusses whether Delaware should be considered a “pro-sandbagging” state as it relates to the enforcement of representations in contracts when one party might know prior to closing that the adverse party’s representations are not accurate. See footnote 756 to 767 and accompanying text. But cf. Eagle Force Holdings LLC v. Campbell, in which the Delaware Supreme Court declined to affirmatively decide the issue, but questioned whether Delaware was a pro-sandbagging state. 187 A.3d 1209, 1236, n. 185 (Del. 2018); id. at 1247 (Strine, C. J. & Vaughn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This case was previously highlighted on these pages.
- Also noteworthy is a robust explanation, with citations to many authorities, that describe the factors that must be considered to determine when the breach of a contract is material. See pages 208 to 211.
Commercially Reasonable Efforts and Reasonable Best Efforts:
- In what may be the most comprehensive analysis in a Delaware decision of the meaning of the phrase “commercially reasonable efforts” and similar phrases such as “reasonable best efforts,” the court discussed the meaning of these contractual standards and their variations, as well as how they should be interpreted and applied. See pages 212 to 220.
- The court compares the differences, if any, between these similar standards, with citations to treatises, cases and articles that discuss them. See pages 213 and 214, as well as footnotes 788 to 800.
- See generally Professor Bainbridge’s analysis of this topic with citations to many authorities. (The corporate law scholarship of Professor Stephen Bainbridge is often cited by Delaware courts.) See also several Delaware decisions highlighted on these pages that also discuss the topic.
- In its analysis of this topic, the Court of Chancery cites to the Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Williams Companies v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., highlighted on these pages. The Delaware high court explained in that decision that it: “did not distinguish between” the two phrases, “commercially reasonable efforts,” and “reasonable best efforts,” but rather the court described those phrases as both imposing “obligations to take all reasonable steps to solve problems and consummate the transaction.” (quoting Williams, 159 A.3d at 272). See also footnote 808, and accompanying text.