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A recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision is noteworthy for its finding that the adoption of a forum selection bylaw implied consent to jurisdiction to the extent that it required lawsuits by stockholders against the company to be filed in Delaware.  See In re: Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2018-0058-JTL (consol.) (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2019).

Background:

The basic facts involved a challenge to the sale of a company that was orchestrated by the controlling stockholder who needed cash.  On the same day as the acquisition, the board of the nominal defendant approved a Delaware forum selection bylaw.  The court discussed the applicable standard of review and other topics, but the jurisdictional issues are more notable.

Key Takeaways:

·     The Court held that the controlling stockholder who appointed a majority of the board of the nominal defendant agreed to personal jurisdiction when it caused the company to adopt the Delaware forum selection bylaw—for claims covered by the forum bylaw.

·     In rejecting the parent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the Court explained that:

“on the same day that the Acquisition was approved, the Board voted unanimously to adopt a forum-selection bylaw, with the Director Defendants whom Parent controlled constituting a five-member majority of the nine-member Board.  The bylaw made the Delaware courts the exclusive forum for breach of fiduciary litigation involving the Company.  This decision holds that on the facts alleged, Parent implicitly consented to personal jurisdiction in this court for purposes of claims falling within the forum-selection bylaw.”

The court explained, however, that the better practice would be to specifically provide, when drafting contractual provisions, that personal jurisdiction is expressly agreed to in a particular form.  See footnotes 5 to 8 which provide voluminous citations to authority and learned commentary on this topic.

There are many forum-selection clause cases featured on these pages, but this decision explores an aspect of forum-selection clauses that is not often analyzed directly by Delaware courts, as compared to other nuances.

In connection with a business divorce involving several inter-related entities and two key agreements among the parties that impacted the issues disputed, the Delaware Court of Chancery in Village Green Holding, LLC v. Holtzman, C.A. No. 2018-0631-TMR (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2018), enforced the forum selection clause that selected Delaware courts, and imposed an anti-suit injunction to prevent the parties from proceeding in a separate action in Pennsylvania despite the second agreement containing a forum selection clause that selected Pennsylvania courts as a forum for disputes related to some, but not all, of the numerous entities involved in the business break-up. (The nearby photo of the Roman Forum is an appropriate graphic for this post.) Many other decisions interpreting forum clauses have been highlighted on these pages over the last 13 years.

Among the several important legal principles recited by the court in this useful opinion, are the following principles highlighted by bullet points:

  • The court reiterates the familiar prerequisites that must be satisfied in order for a preliminary injunction to be granted. See page 12.
  • On a more nuanced level, the court recites the additional criteria that need to be considered by the court when there is a request for an anti-suit injunction to prevent a party from proceeding in another forum. See page 13.
  • Also discussed by the court were the enhanced or modified prerequisites that must be satisfied for a “mandatory injunction,” which requires a greater showing than one needs for a typical injunction that seeks merely to maintain the status quo.
  • The court recites the basic principle, and cites to the seminal Delaware cases supporting the general rule, that a forum selection clause is enforceable in Delaware. See pages 15 and 16.
  • The court also refers to Section 18-111 of the Delaware LLC Act which gives the Court of Chancery specific jurisdiction to interpret the rights and duties in an LLC operating agreement. See page 18.
  • Exceptions to the enforceability of forum selection clauses, such as fraud, are also discussed. See page 20.
  • The necessary element of irreparable harm required for injunctive relief was described to be established when one is forced to litigate in a forum that is contrary to the selected forum provided for in a valid forum selection clause. See pages 20 and 21.
  • Although a separate agreement between the parties in this case provided for a Pennsylvania forum for only some of the involved entities, the court enjoined the parties from proceeding outside of Delaware regarding claims involving the parties and entities that were subject to the separate agreement that contained a Delaware forum selection clause.

The Court of Chancery opinion in the case styled In Re: Good Technology Corporation Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 11580-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 2017), provides a pithy, persuasive analysis of a binding arbitration agreement that specifically appoints a named arbitrator–but that arbitrator later recused himself.

Overview: This decision provides reasoning supported by ample citations to authority to explain why that recusal of a specified arbitrator will not nullify the binding nature of the arbitration clause.  Rather, assuming that the arbitration provision provides for the applicability of rules of an arbitration service such as JAMS or the AAA, the issue of how to deal with an unavailable name arbitrator will be treated as an issue of “procedural arbitrability”, and a successor arbitrator can be selected by the particular arbitral forum or, if the Federal Arbitration Act applies, under some circumstances a court may name a substitute arbitrator.

Holding:  In the procedural context of this case, the court granted a motion to dismiss an attempt to enforce a term sheet that should be decided by binding arbitration.  

Takeaway:  An important aspect of the decision is that a binding dispute resolution provision will not be nullified simply because the specifically named arbitrator becomes unavailable.

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Caesars Entertainment Corp., C.A. No. 10004-VCG (Del. Ch., Mar. 18, 2015).

This Court of Chancery decision is noteworthy for two main points that should be of interest to those engaged in corporate and commercial litigation in Delaware:

(i)  the court found that a forum selection clause was not broadly worded enough, even if it were incorporated by reference, to cover the claims involved; and

(ii) this opinion serves as a useful example of how typically unsuccessful in Delaware is an argument that a case should not remain in Delaware based on forum non conveniens. The court applied the Cryo-Maid factors after declining to apply the first-filed McWane doctrine due to the two cases involved being filed close enough in time so that one was not regarded as being first-filed. The other case was filed in New York.

This case is related to the Caesars bankruptcy and there are many facts that serve as important background. But two other points in particular caught my eye: The court observes that it often is called upon to apply the law of New York in commercial disputes, so that was not a prevailing factor. Also, as part of its analysis, the court referred to the proximity of New York City and Wilmington, Delaware, and that excerpt deserves to be quoted for its masterful description:

 I take judicial notice, however, that the Courthouse in Wilmington is separated from Pennsylvania Station in Manhattan by a five-minute walk and 125 miles of shiny steel rails, which may be traversed in the comfort of the business section of an Acela train in an hour and a half. In that light, litigation in Delaware is less manifest hardship than inconvenience.



Delaware_State_CapitolLegislation is being proposed to ask the Delaware Legislature to limit the ability of corporations to adopt fee-shifting provisions in their charter and bylaws, but to provide additional support for adopting forum selection clauses in those same corporate documents. The proposed legislation is available at this link. A memo describing the policy analysis on which the proposal is based has also been provided by a cross section of Delaware lawyers representing the major constituencies involved, such as shareholders, directors and corporations. Also available is a FAQ with answers to the most likely questions about the proposed bill. (Slight modifications to the proposed legislation were made after this post was published, and I would expect other amendments to be made prior to its final passage.)

Most readers are aware that the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association annually proposes amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law for the Delaware Legislature to pass, in order to refine the DGCL on a regular basis and to make sure it adapts to changes in the marketplace. My first hand experience is that those “routine” amendments are often passed by the Delaware Legislature “routinely”. This is so because the process works well and has a long track record of benefitting the state. If the proposals for amendments to the DGCL ever backfired on the legislators–as a political matter, not necessarily a legal matter, then the next proposed bill to amend the DGCL would not pass as easily the following year. That risk, however, has not come to pass for many decades, if ever.

The proposed legislation provides that if a charter or bylaw includes a forum selection clause for stockholder disputes, Delaware must be one forum that is selected. If another state is selected as a forum, Delaware must be included as an additional optional forum. Thus, a state other than Delaware cannot be selected as the exclusive forum. This would be a legislative reversal of the First Citizens decision recently decided in Chancery. The legislation does not directly address the validity of forum selection clauses that choose states other than Delaware, but the proposed DGCL amendment does not ban a permissive forum outside of Delaware as long as Delaware is also included as a permissive forum.

The proposed legislation about fee-shifting clauses and forum selection provisions in corporate charters or bylaws may be sui generis in some ways. Most amendments to the DGCL that are presented to the Delaware Legislature are not controversial and pass without debate. This one is different. The proposed legislation linked above is, in part, a result of the ATP case, styled as ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, Del. Supr., No. 534, 2013 (May 8, 2014), highlighted here on these pages, in which the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the facial validity of fee-shifting bylaws for a non-stock corporation. Many legal commentators read that decision to apply to stock corporations as well. Not everyone agreed.

Last year, before the June 30 close of the legislature’s term, legislation was proposed to prohibit stock corporations from adopting fee-shifting bylaws. The DuPont Company and other large companies as well as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce opposed the legislation that was proposed last year to limit fee-shifting bylaws. Institutional investors and shareholder-rights groups supported the proposal. Law professors lined up on both sides of the debate. In light of the short amount of time available last year before the close of the legislative session, and the strong lobbies on both sides of the issue, the legislature deferred consideration until the 2015 legislative session.

Unlike routine amendments to the DGCL, this proposed legislation confronts powerful lobbyists on both sides of the issue. Thus, this proposal may be more akin to typical legislation in which the final version of the bill that is passed is not always similar to the first version of the bill that was introduced. The only certainty about this proposed bill, is that it will generate an enormous amount of commentary and discussion. I would not expect a final outcome until the last day of the session on June 30.

If some legislation is passed that ultimately limits the ability of a corporation to adopt fee-shifting bylaws, an interesting issue will be the impact, if any, that the legislation will have on those companies that already adopted fee-shifting provisions. Generally, there is a prohibition against ex post facto laws. Stay tuned.

SUPPLEMENT: Professor Stephen Bainbridge, one of the nation’s foremost corporate law scholars, has written three commentaries already within the one business day since this proposal surfaced, including links to his prolific scholarship on the topic of fee-shifting and forum selection provisions in corporate organic documents. Each of the following titles is hyperlinked to his corresponding post: An Open Letter to the Delaware Legislature on Fee-Shifting Bylaws; Open Letter to the Delaware Legislature on Forum Selection Bylaws; Delaware Legislative Proposals on Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection Bylaws.

SUPPLEMENT II: Professor Larry Hamermesh, Director of the Institute of Delaware Corporate and Business Law, provides scholarly and insightful analysis on the issue of the potential retroactive impact of the proposed legislation on existing fee-shifting bylaws. If the proposed legislation is passed, this may be one of the first issues litigated.

My article entitled: Directors Given More Authority to Limit Multi-Forum Litigation, appeared in the November/December issue of NACD Directorship, a publication of the National Association of Corporate Directors. This regular short column discusses the recent Court of Chancery decision in City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., also highlighted on these pages, which addresses one of the leading issues in Delaware corporate litigation today: forum selection bylaws.

We previously highlighted the Court of Chancery decision that upheld a forum selection provision in corporate bylaws that required certain suits involving the internal affairs of the corporation to be filed in Delaware. Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corporation, C.A. No. 7220-CS (Del. Ch. June 25, 2013).
Professor Larry Hamermesh writes about the voluntary dismissal yesterday of the appeal of that decision by the plaintiffs, and likely ramifications of that dismissal regarding this important issue.

UPDATE: The good professor provides an update on his commentary.

Duff v. Innovative Discovery LLC, C.A. No. 7599-VCP (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 2012).

Issues Addressed: The Court of Chancery addressed the following issues in this opinion:  (1) Whether a forum selection clause providing for “sole” jurisdiction in California courts should be honored when a conflicting forum selection clause in a related agreement provided for jurisdiction in Delaware courts; (2) Whether 6 Del. C. § 18-111 provided a basis for equitable jurisdiction when the agreement that gave the Court of Chancery jurisdiction only provided for money damages; (3) Whether reformation as a remedy will be allowed when the complaint did not specifically request reformation but provided notice of the elements of that form of relief.

Brief Overview

This case arose in connection with the redemption agreements and related agreements through which two members of a Delaware LLC redeemed their interests.

One of the disputes was whether the agreement should be read to cap a total tax liability for the departing members, who each received a Schedule K-1 after the redemption closed, in an amount greater than they thought the agreement allowed.

This decision provides several useful statements of Delaware law that can be effectively highlighted with bullet points.

●          Section 18-111 of Title 6 of the Delaware Code provides for Chancery jurisdiction when agreements among members or managers and their LLC are sought to be enforced.

●          Chancery rejected the arguments that this statutory basis for jurisdiction was conditioned on equitable relief being sought, and also rejected the argument that the Court had the discretion to decline the jurisdiction if a complaint met the requirements of Section 18-111.

●          The Court also explained that the “cleanup doctrine” allows the Court to decide requests for relief that are not equitable as long as there is at least one basis for equitable jurisdiction at the time the complaint was filed.”  See footnotes 30 to 34.

●          The Court reiterated the now well-established Delaware standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as allowing a claim to proceed when there is a mere “possibility of recovery.”  See footnotes 36 to 39.

●          Even though the complaint did not specifically request reformation as a count or a remedy, the Court allowed reformation to be sought as a remedy without amendment to the complaint because the Court explained that each of the elements for reformation were contained in the complaint, even if not so named, and that gave sufficient notice to the defendant.  See footnotes 51 through 65.

●          Equally important is the ruling that a forum selection clause in one agreement that required all suits to be filed in California was not given effect because it conflicted with a forum selection clause allowing for the jurisdiction of Delaware courts in a related agreement that was incorporated by reference.

●          Delaware law was applied which holds that where one contract incorporates another contract by reference, and the forum selection language is not “crystalline,” the Court will not interpret that forum selection clause to be exclusive.  See footnote 67 through 77.

We typically focus on summarizing corporate and commercial decisions of Delaware’s Supreme Court and Court of Chancery, but today we find noteworthy a bevy of new lawsuits just filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery.

These new suits challenge bylaws in several companies that require shareholder suits to be filed exclusively in the Delaware Court of Chancery.  If suits are filed elsewhere, the company threatens to sue those shareholders to recoup fees for breach of the bylaw provision. The challenge is based on the alleged violation of due process rights because there was no mutual consent by the shareholders. The suits were filed by the highly-regarded corporate litigator Michael Hanrahan of the Prickett Jones firm in Wilmington. Among the companies sued by shareholders challenging the exclusive forum bylaw provision, in separate lawsuits, are the following Delaware corporations:

Navistar International Corp., AutoNation, Inc. Chevron Corp., SPX Corp., Superior Energy Services, Inc., Franklin Resources, Inc., Curtiss-Wright Corp., Danaher Corp., and Solutia Inc.

Friend of this blog and well-recognized corporate law expert, Professor Stephen Bainbridge, provides timely comments on these new lawsuits. Thomson Reuter’s Alison Frankel wrote an excellent article about these cases that provides a very helpful overview and also has a link to the actual complaints. Broc Romanek on his site called The Corporate Counsel.net, provides helpful observations on this development.

The concept of a forum selection clause in a corporate charter was given momentum by the dicta and citations to Delaware decisions and law review articles, in Vice Chancellor Laster’s footnote 8 in his opinion in the case of In Re Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 4578-VCL (Del. Ch. March 16, 2010), read opinion here.

Scholarship on the Topic

Corporate law scholars have written extensively about this topic and we have featured much of that scholarship on these pages. For example, Professor Joseph Grundfest of Stanford, one of the early promoters of the idea of adding a charter provision (as compared with a bylaw provision), with an exclusive forum selection clause for shareholder suits, presented a lecture in Delaware before the Bench and Bar on the issue, as discussed on these pages here . Prof. Steven Davidoff provided insights on the topic here. Ted Mirvis of Wachtell Lipton, who often litigates high-stakes matters in the Delaware Court of Chancery, has also been credited with this particular forum-selection concept, as indicated in his 2007 article available here.

Although Delaware Courts have not squarely decided the issue of a forum selection clause in a bylaw provision, that is not voted on by the shareholders, a California court struck down a provision in a case noted on these pages here. Professor Bainbridge comments on the topic here.  Prof. Brian J.M. Quinn wrote a law review article on the issue, available here.

Our post here  on this topic and related issues, includes commentary by the late, great scholar Prof. Larry Ribstein and others who have addressed the related problems with multi-jurisdictional litigation and the challenges that arise with an apparent increase in the number of non-Delaware courts deciding issues of Delaware corporate law. A ruling on these new cases by the Delaware Court of Chancery, which will likely be appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, will be a welcome addition to provide a measure of certainty on this cutting edge topic.

Supplement: Corporate attorney Claudia Allen prepared a study of Delaware forum selection clauses in charters and bylaws that is available via a post by Professor Bainbridge here. Delaware litigator Edward Micheletti has written an article on the issues of multi-jurisdictional litigation that these bylaw amendments are attempting to address. Kevin La Croix on his blog called The D & O Diary compiles articles and statistics and related sources on the various issues related to an increase in M& A/Takeover litigation here  including multi-jurisdictional aspects of that litigation here.

The Wilmington News Journal has an article co-authored by Phil Milford that examines average awards of attorneys’ fees in cases challenging deals even when it is not apparent if the shareholders are receiving a quantifiable benefit from the lawsuit.

Scully v. Nighthawk is a recent Delaware Court of Chancery case involving multi-state class action litigation, highlighted on these pages here, in which the issue was raised about forum shopping and settlements of suits in multi-state corporate cases that could be potentially collusive.

Professor Brian J.M. Quinn writes here about a short letter dated April 12, 2011 from the Court to counsel in the case, available here, in which the Court offers a mea culpa and accepts the report of the Special Counsel appointed by the Court, which concluded that there was no wrongdoing by any of the lawyers involved and the several issues raised by multi-state class actions, such as what some may describe as forum shopping, are relatively unchartered areas of the law in terms of the absence of bright-line standards in many instances.

The good professor also links to a paper he authored about the increasing trend of merger-related litigation being filed in states other than Delaware as well as the related topic of exclusive forum selection clauses. Some wags refer to the ancillary phenomenon of cases being filed outside of Delaware as "ABC" (anywhere but Chancery).