Chancery Rejects Fiduciary Duty Claim Due to No Equitable Jurisdiction

Gelof v. Prickett, Jones & Elliott, P.A., No. 4930-VCS (Del. Ch., Feb. 19, 2010), read letter ruling here.

Holding

This letter decision from the Delaware Court of Chancery explains why the claims made in this case were not within its limited jurisdiction. That is, despite the claim of a breach of fiduciary duty, there was no equitable jurisdiction.

Rationale

This case describes the nuances of the limitations on the jurisdiction of the Delaware Court of Chancery. The Court determined that despite incantations of terminology that "sounds like" it would fit within the Court's equitable jurisdiction, the claims only sought a legal remedy and were not based on an equitable right. Nor was there a statutory basis for the Court to exercise jurisdiction. Thus, the case was transferred to the Delaware Superior Court, the state's trial court of general jurisdiction. The recent Chancery decision in Sokol reached a similar conclusion, finding a lack of juridisdiction based on similar facts. That case was highlighted on this blog here.

The Court "paints in shades of grey" the reasoning for this decision that clarifies those types of fiduciary duties that are not of the variety that fit within the confines of this specialty Court's jurisdiction. The distinction the Court makes is between the type of fiduciary duty that includes managing the assets of a beneficiary, and the separate form of relationship that "merely" involves trust being placed in another, such as one seeking medical or legal advice, for example.

The stereotypical fiduciary relationship over which the Court of Chancery often exercises its limited jurisdiction is that between a director of a corporation and its shareholders. This case, however, dealt with a claim of professional negligence. Although the lawyer/client relationship does have a fiduciary aspect, it is not the type of fiduciary relationship that fits within the constricted jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery.

Bottom line:

Although other cases summarized on this blog over the years have defined what types of "business" relationships create fiduciary duties, this decision focuses on the more nuanced aspect of what types of fiduciary relationships allow the Court of Chancery to exercise jurisdiction over them due to alleged claims regarding either misfeasance or nonfeasance in that relationship. In this case, the remedy sought was purely legal and the fiduciary claim was identical to the negligence claim. As the Court reasoned:

What equity polices are fiduciaries who actually take control over and make decisions regarding the assets of other persons.

Slip op at 6. The claims in this case did not involve one person taking control over and making decisions regarding the assets of another person.  In further support of its conclusion, the Court  quoted from a law review article as follows:

In any of the[] paradigmatic forms [of the fiduciary relationship], a
beneficiary entrusts a fiduciary with control and management of an asset.
Ideally, for the beneficiary, this relationship would be governed by specific rules that dictate how the fiduciary should manage the asset in the beneficiary’s best interests. In fact, however, the fiduciary’s obligations are open-ended. Because asset management necessarily involves risk and uncertainty, the specific behavior of the fiduciary cannot be dictated in advance. Moreover, constant monitoring of the fiduciary’s behavior, which would protect the beneficiary, often is prohibitively costly . . . . The fiduciary relationship exposes a beneficiary/principal to two distinct types of wrongdoing: first, the fiduciary may misappropriate the principal’s asset or some of its value (an act of malfeasance); and second, the fiduciary may neglect the asset’s management (an act of nonfeasance). Each type of wrongdoing is controlled by imposing a legal duty upon the fiduciary.


Slip op. at  7 (citing Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046-47 (1991) (emphasis added)).

UPDATE: Though not referring to this case, a recent post by Professor Ribstein here addresses several types of relationships that are referred to as fiduciary relationships.

Chancery Court Describes Disclosure Obligations and Revlon Duties of Directors in Transaction

The Washington Legal Foundation published an article here last week that is an overview I did of the recent Delaware Chancery Court decision in Wayne County Employees’  Retirement System v. Corti, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 126 (Del. Ch. 2009). The Court's opinion describes the duties of directors in the context of a contested transaction and also recites the Revlon duties of directors.

UPDATE: Professor Stephen Bainbridge, whose corporate law scholarship is often cited in Chancery Court opinions, refers to this decision here.

Chancery Court Imposes Fiduciary Duties on LLC Members

Bay Center Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, Del. Ch., No. 3658-VCS (April 20, 2009), read opinion here. This Delaware Chancery Court decision addresses fiduciary duties and related issues in an LLC context, and should be of  great interest to those lawyers who practice business litigation.

Legal Issues

This opinion is noteworthy because it denies a motion to dismiss and allows to proceed to trial, the following claims that do not often survive in the context of a dispute among members of an LLC whose relationship is defined by a formal, sophisticated LLC agreement:

  1. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
  2. Breach of fiduciary duties;
  3. Common law fraud;
  4. Aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and fraud.

Factual Background

The "alphabet soup" of parties needs to be sorted out first in order to make sense of this matter.

Plaintiff Bay Center LLC and defendant Emery Bay PKI, LLC ("PKI") formed defendant Emery Bay Member LLC ("Emery Bay") to develop a condominium project in California (the "Project"). PKI was designated as the managing member. Defendant Alfred Nevis owned and managed PKI.  The  LLC Agreement provided for PKI to manage the project. The details of the management duties were outlined in a separate management agreement that was only signed by a subsidiary of PKI called Emery Bay ETI, LLC ("ETI"). The only counterparty to that agreement was a subsidiary of Emery Bay.

Bay Center and PKI as the sole members of Emery Bay executed an LLC Agreement on November 1, 2005, providing for PKI to be the managing member. The Project was to be conducted through a number of affiliated entities, and the duties and obligations of those entites would be defined through a series of agreements. At the center of this layered structure was PKI and its sole equity holder, Nevis. Another entity, known as EB North, actually owned the property for the Project.

The day-to-day management of the Project was not defined in the LLC Agreement. Rather, those details were described in the separate Development Management Agreement, which was an exhibit to the LLC Agreement. Instead of PKI, the Development Manager was merely an affiliate of PKI, controlled by Nevis, called ETI, an entity that was not a contractual partner of Bay Center (the plaintiff).

Regardless of what entity served as the Project Manager, the court found that PKI had the power and the authority to make sure that contract was performed.

Problems with the Project

Problems began soon after the Project commenced.  Bay Center alleges that a loan that was in default was secretly renegotiated by the defendants, resulting in the diversion of cash flow from the Project, and avoiding the triggering of the Personal Guarantee of the loan that Nevis had guaranteed. After a default on the loan, a lender filed suit in California in which case a receiver was appointed for the Project. That receiver prepared a report which revealed extensive mismanagement of the Project by the defendants.

This case warrants a longer treatment due to the important legal principles stated.

The Complaint

Counts I and II are breach of contract claims against PKI and Emery Bay. Count III is offered in the alternative to Count I, and alleges that even if PKI was not obligated by the explicit terms of the LLC Agreement to ensure performance of the Development Management Agreement, the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing required it to do so.

Count IV, V and VI bring fiduciary duty claims. Count IV alleges that both Emery Bay and Nevis have fiduciary duties to Bay Center that they breached in the course of their mismanagement of the Project. Counts V and VI allege that ETI and Nevis, to the extent that Nevis does not have primary liability, aided and abetted the breaches alleged in Count IV.

Finally, Count VII alleges that both PKI and Nevis committed fraud by failing to inform Bay Center of material developments at the Project. In case Count VII fails to state a claim against Nevis, Count VIII alleges that Nevis aided and abetted PKI’s fraud. Only Counts II through VI were the subject of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In order to dismiss a claim under this standard, the court “must determine with reasonable certainty that, under any set of facts that could be proven to support the claims asserted, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief.”

The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

It is not common for this claim to prevail in most Chancery Court cases but this case is different. This Count III was brought in the alternative in the event that the court did not agree with the breach of contract arguments based on the LLC Agreement. In order to understand this Count III for the breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, it is helpful to understand the breach of contract claims. In the breach of contract claim, Bay Center argues that PKI was required to cause ETI to perform its obligations under the Development Management Agreement and to cause Emery Bay to perform its obligations under the loan documents.

Importantly, the main argument by Bay Center for breach of contract is that PKI unambiguously had the power and authority to cause performance of the related agreements which meant that PKI also had the obligation to do so. PKI’s duty to manage the affairs of the Project, according to the court, can reasonably be read to mean that PKI had the obligation to exercise its authority on behalf of the members.

The court explained how the Delaware courts have been hesitant and cautious in applying the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, especially in detailed, complex agreements. Here, however, in order to ensure that the reasonable expectations of the parties are fulfilled, the court reasoned that:

“PKI had the obligation to manage Emery Bay and the discretion to cause the Supporting Agreements to be performed. PKI was required to carry out these functions in good faith, meaning PKI could not engage in ‘arbitrary or unreasonable conduct’ that had the effect of preventing Bay Center from ‘receiving the fruits of its bargain.’ This bargain was, essentially, that in exchange for contributing the real estate to be developed, Bay Center would reap the rewards of PKI’s project management skills and efforts." (See footnotes 29 and 30.)

Moreover, the breaches by Emery Bay of the loan documents benefited PKI by diverting cash that Emery Bay was supposed to use to repay the loan which PKI would have otherwise had to fund through capital contributions. Moreover, the decision not to pursue claims against ETI was a conflicted one because Nevis, as the controller of both Emery Bay and ETI, stood on both sides of it. Thus, the court determined that Bay Center sufficiently pled that PKI had an implied duty to cause performance of the supporting agreements.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The LLC Agreement’s Treatment of Fiduciary Duties

The court began with the truism that the Delaware LLC Act gives members of an LLC wide latitude to limit or eliminate fiduciary duties. On page 18 of the slip opinion, the court reiterates several statements of  Delaware law regarding LLCs and fiduciary duties that are especially noteworthy:

1) The court stated that “in the absence of a contrary provision in the LLC Agreement, the manager of an LLC owes the traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the members of the LLC.” (See footnote 33.)

2) In addition, the court noted that “the LLC cases have generally, in the absence of provisions in the LLC Agreement explicitly disclaiming the applicability of default principles of fiduciary duty, treated LLC members as owing each other the traditional fiduciary duties that directors owe a corporation.(See footnote 33) (case citations omitted) (emphasis added)


The two foregoing statements of Delaware LLC law are extremely important for their uncommon clarity on these very important descriptions of the legal duties of members and/or managers of a Delaware LLC.

The foregoing legal principles were applied in this case for the following reasons. The court described the arguments of both parties as diametrically opposed in their interpretation of the LLC Agreement. Specifically, one party argued that the LLC Agreement eliminated fiduciary duties; but the other party argued that the same LLC Agreement preserved the traditional fiduciary duties. The court acknowledged the usual principle that in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion it could not choose between reasonable interpretations of ambiguous contract provisions at this early procedural stage; thus the court could not choose either of the opposing interpretations of the LLC Agreement.

Moreover, the court reasoned that “the interpretive scales also tip in favor of preserving fiduciary duties under the rule that the drafters of chartering documents must make their intent to eliminate fiduciary duties plain and unambiguous.” (See footnote 38) (case citations omitted.) Thus, the court ruled that the parties' LLC Agreement requires the members of Emery Bay to act in accordance with traditional fiduciary duties.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty by PKI and Nevis

The fiduciary duty analysis as applied to Nevis was more involved because Nevis himself was neither a member nor an officer of Emery Bay and “thus beyond the normal scope of those who owe fiduciary duties in the corporate context.” Rather, Bay Center’s theory of liability rested on a line of cases beginning with In Re USACafes, L.P. Litigation, 600 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1991), holding that “those affiliates of a general partner who exercise control over the partnership’s property may find themselves owing fiduciary duties to both the partnership and its limited partners.” The applicability of that doctrine in the LLC context was not contested. Rather it was argued that the limited circumstances in which that doctrine applies were not present.

The court noted that the USACafes doctrine only applied in the following circumstances: First, to have any fiduciary duties to an entity, the affiliate must exert control over the assets of that entity. That requirement was satisfied here due to the control that Nevis exerted directly over the property of Emery Bay. Second, USACafes suggests that controlling affiliates do not have the full range of the traditional fiduciary duties and focused on “the duty not to use control over the partnership’s property to advantage the corporate director at the expense of the partnership.” (See footnote 49.)

The court found that it was sufficiently pled that Nevis used his control over the assets of Emery Bay to stave off personal liability, thus benefiting himself at the expense of Emery Bay, and withstanding a motion to dismiss under the reasoning of USACafes and its progeny.

Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The court recited the elements for stating a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. The court held that because it had previously ruled that Bay Center adequately alleged that PKI and Nevis committed breaches of fiduciary duty, it found that the other requirements for stating an aiding and abetting claim have been met. (The aiding and abetting claims against Nevis were applied in the alternative. Although it was not necessary, the court addressed the count for completeness purposes.)

The Fraud Claims

Bay Center alleged that PKI and Nevis committed fraud by failing to disclose the severe problems that were developing at the Project. The court described three ways that common law fraud can be demonstrated: “1) Overt misrepresentation; 2) Silence in the face of a duty to speak: or 3) Deliberate concealment of material facts." (See footnote 52.)

Silence in the Face of a Duty to Disclose

In order to commit a common law fraud through silence, one must have a duty to speak that arises by operation of law, rather than purely by contract. (See footnote 53.) This so-called independent tort doctrine is satisfied if, in addition to a contractual duty, the party was subject to an independent duty, such as a fiduciary duty. (See footnote 54.) The court explained that “the same circumstances may give rise to both breach of contract and tort claims if the plaintiff asserts that the alleged contractual breach was accompanied by the breach of an independent duty imposed by law.” However, it was acknowledged that the general rule is that an action based entirely on a breach of the terms of a contract and not on a violation of an independent duty imposed by law requires a plaintiff to sue in contract and not in tort.

In this case however, the court considered that PKI was subject to the traditional fiduciary duties of a director of a Delaware corporation and defendants conceded that if the court found a breach of fiduciary duty that there was a basis for fraud claims. The court relied on well-settled case law for the analogous duty of a board of directors of a corporation to “disclose fully and fairly all material information within the board’s control when it seeks shareholder action,” (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992)).

Applying this principle by analogy to the fiduciaries of an LLC where they seek members’ consent, the LLC Agreement required the consent of Bay Center which necessarily required disclosure to Bay Center of any refinancing or restructuring of the loans. In this case, Emery Bay had a right to make a decision regarding the renegotiation of the loans and therefore PKI had a fiduciary duty to inform Bay Center of all material facts regarding the renegotiations. The court reasoned that because of the alleged fact that PKI failed to inform Bay Center that most of the renegotiations were taking place, PKI failed to make Bay Center aware of even the most basic facts that Bay Center was entitled to know. Thus, Bay Center sufficiently pled a fraud claim against PKI based on the failure of PKI to disclose material facts in the face of its fiduciary duty to do so. The court also noted at footnote 59 that allowing the fraud claim to proceed because of a fiduciary duty to disclose, generates a redundancy, but cites cases where that redundancy has been permitted.

Individual Liability

The court also discussed the concept that a “corporate officer can be held personally liable for the torts he commits and cannot shield himself behind the corporation when he is a participant.” (See footnote 60). This includes situations where a corporate agent participates in corporate fraud. The court referred to the “Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine,” where if a “corporate officer participates in the wrongful conduct, or knowingly approves the conduct, the officer, as well as the corporation, is liable for the penalties.” Moreover the court cited authority for the position that: “a corporate officer or agent who commits fraud is personally liable to a person injured by the fraud. An officer actively participating in the fraud cannot escape personal liability on the ground that the officer was acting for the corporation.”

The court discussed the third type of fraud theory, active concealment, for the sake of completeness. The critical distinction between active concealment and silence theories of fraud is that active concealment does not require a pre-existing duty to speak but this alternative theory of fraud was not sufficiently pled. In sum, despite the infirmity regarding active concealment, the court determined that Bay Center has pled a claim of fraud against PKI and Nevis based on their failure to disclose loan modifications when they had a duty to do so. 

UPDATE: Professor Larry Ribstein, one of the country's leading authorities on LLCs, fortunately provides his usual scholarly analysis of this case here.

COMPARISON: The North Carolina Business Litigation Report  here, describes a recent decision from the N.C. Business Court, affirmed by the N.C. Court of Appeals, that contrasts sharply with the above Delaware decision. The N.C. ruling highlighted at the foregoing link held that : (i) non-majority members of an LLC do not have fiduciary duties; and (2) managers of an LLC do not have fiduciary duties to members.

Chancery Interprets LLC Agreement that Modifes Fiduciary Duties

Kahn v. Portnoy, (Del. Ch., Dec. 11, 2008), read opinion here. 

This Chancery Court opinion deals with the important concept of the ability to modify fiduciary duties in an LLC agreement. In this derivative case involving an LLC, the LLC agreement's modification of  fiduciary duties was not clear enough to choose one reasonable interpretation over another at the summary judgment stage.

When one modifies fiduciary duties, the risk is that one will not be able to avail oneself of the mulitude of cases in the common law on the topic.

The court did, however, find that there was a lack of independence that satisfied the first-prong of the Aronson test, in part due to interlocking relationships.

The nominal defendant in this case was TravelCenters of America, which has been a party in several Chancery Court cases within the past year, as summarized on this blog here.

The court's own succinct introductory summary of the case in the opinion itself follows:

Limited liability companies are primarily creatures of contact, and the parties have broad discretion to design the company as they see fit in an LLC agreement. With this discretion, however, comes the risk—for both the parties and this Court—that the resulting LLC agreement will be incomplete, unclear, or even incoherent.
In this case, plaintiff alleges that the director defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the company by approving a transaction that was allegedly designed to benefit a director at the expense of the company. As the company in this case is an LLC, the fiduciary duties of the directors are defined in the LLC agreement. This agreement, however, explicitly imports and modifies the familiar and well defined fiduciary duties from Delaware corporate law. The result is a company whose directors are governed by a modified version of the fiduciary duties of directors of Delaware corporations. Unfortunately, the agreement in this case fails to clearly articulate the contours of these contractual fiduciary duties. The result is an LLC agreement that provides an ambiguous definition of fiduciary duties and is open to more than one reasonable interpretation.
Since I am faced with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, I am not allowed to choose between reasonable interpretations of ambiguous provisions of a contract. Accordingly, and for the reasons stated below, I must deny the motion to dismiss.
 

Chancery Rules on Statutory Trust Issues Involving Cargill and Refco

In Cargill, Inc. v. JWH Special Circumstance, LLC, (Del. Ch., Nov. 7, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Chancery Court issued a 68-page decision involving a Delaware statutory trust (formerly referred to as a business trust), and found that common law fiduciary duties would apply to a trustee as a "default rule" in light of the agreement among the parties being silent on the issue. Compared to corporate law, there are comparatively fewer Delaware decisions involving trusts created pursuant to statute, thus making this a notable decision for that reason alone. Hat tip to Delaware Business Litigation Report.  

The extensive facts described a deal in which Cargill sold a subsidiary to Refco shortly before Refco filed for bankruptcy, among other problems experienced with that company.  Procedurally, the court denied both a motion to dismiss counterclaims and a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on a complaint that sought a declaratory judgment that no fiduciary duty claims were owed.

The Delaware Statutory Trust Act , which is the basis for the entity involved in this case, is found at 12 Del. C. §§ 3801-3826. From its enactment in 1988 until its amendment in 2002, the Act was called the “Business Trust Act,” and what are now called “statutory trusts” were known as “business trusts.”

Also addressed was the concept upheld in the USA Cafes  line of cases (cited in the court's opinion), that a corporate parent of a general partner that has control over an entity may owe fiduciary duties to that entity.

There are many other important parts of this decision that should be required reading for anyone who prepares statutory trust agreements or who needs to know the latest Delaware law on the duty of trustees.

Chancery Court Dismisses Claims Against Board of Lear Corp. for Payment of Termination Fee to Bidder Led by Carl Icahn

In Re Lear Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 2008 WL 4053221 (Del. Ch., Sept. 2, 2008), read opinion here.

This is the third Chancery Court decision in about as many (business) days that addresses the issue of whether: claims against a board of directors will be dismissed based on the exculpation clause in a corporate charter as authorized by DGCL Section 102(b)(7). The results (if we were to use an analogy from sports) are: 2 to 1. That is, 2 cases involving such claims have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) and 1 decision denied a motion for summary judgment filed by the board.

Two of the 3 cases I am referring to include: (i) the instant Lear case;  and (ii) the McPadden case of Aug. 29 summarized here. The other case I refer to  is the Ryan II decision also of Aug. 29 and summarized here.

A prior decision in this case, partially granting a motion for preliminary injunction, is summarized here. See In Re Lear Corp S'hlder Litig., 926 A.2d 92 (Del. Ch. 2007).

In some ways, this opinion is akin to a scholarly law review article with practical application that also includes a court decision (after a full recitation of the particlular facts of this case.)

There is so much that can be written about this case, but let's start with a few basics. The primary complaint was that the board agreed to a termination fee of $25 million (less than 1% of the transaction price) in exchange for an increase in the purchase price by the winning bidder for the sale of the company. The plaintiffs claimed that the board knew that the shareholders would most likely not approve the merger and, therefore, by agreeing to pay a termination fee simply upon a "no vote" by the shareholders,  they breached their fiduciary duties.

The court summarized its reasoning thusly:

"Directors are entitled to make  good faith business decisions even if the stockholders might disagree wth them. Where, as here, the complaint itself indicates that an independent board majority used an adequate process, employed reputable financial, legal and proxy solicitation experts, and had a substantial basis to conclude a merger was financially fair, the directors cannot be faulted for being disloyal simply because the stockholders ultimately did not agree with the recommendation. In particular, where, as here, the directors are protected by an exculpatory charter provision, it is critical that the complaint plead facts suggesting a fair inference that the directors breached their duty of loyalty by making a bad faith decision to approve the merger for reasons inimical to the interests of the corporation and its stockholders. Where a complaint, as here, does not even create an inference of mere negligence or gross negligence, it certainly does not satisfy the far more difficult task of stating a non-exculpated duty of loyalty claim."

Although this case started out asserting Revlon claims and proxy disclosure frailties, after the merger was voted down, those claims were dismissed as moot. (Curiously, with Lear's stock now trading at about $13, the shareholders now wish they would have had voted for the offer at $37.25 per share.)

Aronson and Section 102(b)(7)

The plaintiffs skipped any attempt to satisfy the first prong of the Aronson test, and instead attempted to satisfy the second prong of Aronson by attempting to state particularized facts to establish a non-exculpated breach of fidcuicary duty by the Lear board.

Because the Lear charter contains an exculpatory provision under DGCL Section 102(b)(7), the plaintiffs cannot sustain their complaint even by pleading facts supporting an inference of gross negligence.     (continued below)

See footnote 26 citing  to the Gutman and McMillan cases for a discussion of the pleading standard that must be met to overcome the protection of Section 102(b)(7) as envisioned by the Legislature in order for Section 102(b)(7) to be of any worth. 

Several facts presented the plaintiffs with an uphill battle:

  • the board was comprised of a "super-majority" of independent directors
  • the company was freely shopped and no better offers had been made during a period of time that has been described as a frothy M & A market.
  • the board used a thorough process to determine whether to approve the merger agreement
  • the board had a sound financial basis to conclude that the $37.25 price was a good one.
  • the difference between the $1.25 per share increase in price and the $1.50 amount that "may" have increased the chance for shareholder approval, was described by the court  as "... prosciutto-thin margins [that] are indicative of tough end-game posturing, not a huge value chasm."

 In order to analyze the second prong of the Aronson pleading standard, the court recites a classic summary of the business judgment rule. See footnote 42 and related text (including a citation to a law review article by Professor Bainbridge).

In addition to discussing the important difference, especially for policy reasons, between negligence and gross negligence, the court explained the pleading hurdle that must be overcome to cross the threshold barrier of Section 102 (b)(7).

That is, to assert successfully a non-exculpated breach of fiduciary duty in this case, the plaintiff was required to plead particularized facts to support an inference that the directors committed a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty--namely, that the directlors consciously acted in a manner contrary to the interests of the company and its stockholders.

Footnote 48 cites to the Integrated Health case for its explanation that  to survive a motion to dismiss based on a Section 102 (b)(7) provision, the plaintiff must plead facts  that, if true, would imply that the Board "consciously and intentially disregarded its responsibilites". (quoting Disney).

The Hardest Question in Corporation Law (according to the court): "What is the standard of lilability to apply to independent directors with no motive to injure the corporation when they are accused of indolence in monitoring the corporation's compliance with its legal responsibilities?"

The court's answer to the question should be the focus of a separate article. Some highlights of the court's answer include the acknowledgement that : "Although everyone has off days, fidelity to one's duty is inconsistent with persistent shirking and conscious inattention to duty." (citing in footnote 57 to Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana v. Aidinoff, 900 A.2d 654 (Del. Ch. 2006)("Conscious torpor in the face of duty is disloyal behavior...."))

The court discussed the high threshold that must be met to hold a disinterested director liable for a breach of the non-exculpated breach of the duty of loyalty for acting in bad faith. Citing to the Disney decision in footnote 60 of this opinion ( see Disney, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)), the court quoted examples of the purposeful wrongdoing required, such as:

  • "intent to violate applicable positive law"
  • "intentionally failing to act in the face of a known duty to act"

Caremark should not be readily applied to review a discrete transaction reviewed by the board

The reasoning of the court to support the foregoing position was extensive, but here is a good quote from part of it: 

 " In the transactional context, a very extreme set of facts would seem to be required to sustain a disloyalty claim premised on the notion that disinterested directors were intentionally disregarding their duties."

The court also observed that even when Revlon applies, it does not change the plaintiff's burden to establish the monetary culpability of directors. That is, 

 "if a board unintentionally fails, as a result of gross negligence and not bad faith or self interest, to follow up on a materially higher bid and an exculpatory charter provision is in place, then the plaintiff will be barred from recovery, regardless of whether the board was in Revlon-land." (citing Intercargo, 768 A.2d at 502) (bold mine)

Waste: Finally, the court quickly dispatched a claim for waste, even calling it frivolous, for not coming close to satisfying the elements of this most difficult of claims in Delaware. In addition, at footnote 69, the court cited other cases where it approved termination fees contingent on a "naked no vote" of up to 1.4% compared to the termination fee in this case that was only 0.9% of the deal value.

UPDATE: Prof. Davidoff comments on the case here, and ties it in to the Ryan case (which the professor writes is being referred to in the opinion by the author of this case, politely, even if not by name, though in an apparently contrary way.)

UPDATE II:  Prof. Bainbridge provides his insightful analysis of Revlon issues  here.

Chancery Bars Claims Based on Section 102(b)(7) Exculpation Clause

 In McPadden v. Sidhu, (Del. Ch., Aug. 29, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Chancery Court found that demand was excused under Chancery Court Rule 23.1 but barred claims--by granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), against the directors despite their apparent apparent violation of their duty of due care, due to the exculpation provision in their charter pursuant to DGCL Section 102(b)(7).

 This decision comes on the same day as the Chancery Court denied an interlocutory appeal in the Ryan v. Lyondell case in which summary judgment was denied due to factual issues raised based on the limited record in the very different procedural posture of that case, despite the arguments about exculpation under Section 102(b)(7). See my blurb about the most recent decision in that case (also decided on Aug. 29) here.

Among the many more important parts of this opinion are two points that especially interest me:

  1. DGCL Section 102(b)(7)  protection is not for the benefit of officers--as compared to directors (n. 41); and
  2. The Court re-affirmed that the fiduciary duties of directors also apply to officers (n.40).

Of course, a discussion of the detailed facts in this 30-page decision are necessary for an analysis of it, but today I merely highlight a few of the key issues addressed so that you can download the whole opinion at the above link for your reading pleasure.