Four Recent Chancery Court Decisions on Electronic Discovery Issues

The Delaware Chancery Court recently issued four decisions in as many weeks on topics related to electronic discovery. These cases have been summarized already on this blog but I want to collect links to them all on one page for convenience. The cases with links to their summaries are as follows:

Grace Brothers Ltd. v. Siena Holdings, Inc., (June 2, 2009)(motion to compel directors' emails granted), summarized here.

Beard Research Inc. v. Kates, (May 29, 2009)(adverse inference and fees imposed for spoliation), summarized here.

Omnicare Inc. v. Mariner Health Care Management Co., (May 29, 2009)(ordered production of back-up tapes for deleted emails), summarized here.

Triton Construction Co., Inc. v. Eastern Shore Electrical Services Inc., (May 18, 2009)(adverse inference and fees for destruction of thumb drive and home computer), summarized here.

Chancery Court Grants Stay Requested by Special Litigation Committee Except for Production of Electronic Information

London v. Tyrrell, Del. Ch., No. 3321-CC (April 2, 2009), read letter decision here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, has provided us with the following case review.

In a interesting twist on the issue of staying discovery so the Special Litigation Committee can complete its investigation, Chancellor Chandler, in a two-page letter decision on April 2, 2009, granted a request by the Special Litigation Committee of the Board of MA Federal, Inc. d/b/a iGov to stay discovery for 120 days except for the electronic information sought by the plaintiffs in their discovery requests. While the Chancellor did not give a detailed explanation for this exception, he did mention that defendants had represented on March 17, 2009 that they were ready to begin production "on a biweekly basis beginning next week...." The Chancellor went on to state that the defendants had "postponed production of electronic documents long enough. Further delay would only prejudice plaintiffs." While this might be a tacit nod to the dynamic nature of electronic information and the potential for problems associated with preservation and production of electronic information in general, we will have to wait for more details.


 

Chancery Decides Important Electronic Discovery Issues and Conventional Discovery Issues

Kinexus  Representative LLC v. Advent Software, Inc. (Del. Ch., Sept. 22, 2008), read opinion here. In this Chancery Court decision, that decided cross motions to compel discovery, the  Court addressed important and practical issues involving electronic discovery and what the Court will accept as satisfactory responses to both interrogatories and requests for documents.

The key parts of the Court’s ruling are at least twofold: (i) The Court required the defendant to produce documents by Bates number that were responsive to each of the interrogatories from plaintiff; and (ii) Defendant was required to provide to plaintiffs “searchable ‘extracted text’ from the TIFF–formatted documents already produced, but only if plaintiffs pay for the process.”  This will be explained in more detail later in this summary.

This is the type of practical decision that provides useful tools for the toolbox of a business litigator dealing with the almost inevitable and usually unpleasant discovery disputes that arise in a typical business case.

The Court quoted from Rule 33(d) of the Chancery Court Rules as follows:

“Where the answer to an interrogatory may be . . . ascertained from the business records of the party upon whom the interrogatory has been served[,] . . .  it is a sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify the records from which the answer may be derived or ascertained.” (emphasis in Court's quote).

Next, it was emphasized that: “This court requires a specific designation of the documents pertaining to each interrogatory when Rule 33(d) is employed” (citing Andresen v. Bucalo, 1982 WL 17824, at * 3 (Del. Ch., Dec. 2, 1982)) (“Defendants must particularize the specific records from which adequate answers may be extracted and not . . . just make all of the records available for inspection.”)(emphasis added.)

In footnote 6, the court also cited to a case interpreting a predecessor to Rule 33(d)  and supporting the following aspect of the Court’s interpretation of this important rule: The rule “does not shift to the interrogating party the obligation to find out whether sought after information is ascertainable from the files tendered, but only permits a shift of the burden to dig it out once the  respondents have specified the records from ‘where the answer’ can be derived or ascertained . . . . Thus, the interrogated party must be specific in order to protect against any abusive use of the [option in the] rule . . . . " In sum, the court held that simply “making all the records available for inspection” does not constitute a proper response.

Plaintiffs also sought to compel defendants to specify the documents, by Bates number, that were responsive to each of the document requests.

The opinion referred to Court of Chancery Rule 1 that requires that all rules: “shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding.” Applying this Rule, the court reasoned that it was “unreasonable for defendant to simply produce over 288,000 documents without specifying which documents or categories of documents are responsive to each specific request.”

Plaintiffs also argued that the documents they requested should be provided “in their native format with metadata and, if not available in that format, must be in a searchable Optical Character Recognition (“OCR”) format." However, the Court observed that neither native file format nor OCR format were agreed upon as delivery formats. On this point, the Court held that:


“I decline to hold that the Court of Chancery Rules governing document production in 2005 required an OCR format or native file format, including metadata, without a particularized showing of need. Nevertheless, defendant’s proposal to provide searchable ‘extracted text’ amounts to an acceptable compromise. As such, defendants shall provide the ‘extracted text’ format to plaintiffs, but only if plaintiffs agree to reimburse all of defendant’s related expenses. Plaintiffs must pay these associated costs because they failed to timely object to the non-searchable TIFF format. It is the untimely objection that necessitates creation of the ‘extracted text’."(citing Ryan v. Gifford, 2007 WL 4259557, at * 1 (Del. Ch., Nov. 30, 2007)). [see short summary of this particular Ryan case here. Note that this is only one of several decisions in the Ryan case.]

Also note that the initial discovery requests that were the subject of this motion were, for reasons not relevant here, submitted in 2005. Query, whether the Court would reach the same result if the requests at issue were submitted in 2008.
 

Clawback Provision Honored to Avoid Waiver of Inadvertently Produced Privileged Email

In Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 2008 WL 3522445 (Del. Ch., Aug. 12, 2008), the Chancery Court denied a motion to compel an inadvertently produced communication that was an attorney/client communication. Importantly, the parties had signed a stipulated Confidentiality Order that had a "standard non-waiver and clawback" provision that allowed one party to demand the return of  a mistakenly produced document. ( A separate letter decision in this case dated  August 5, ruling on a separate issue, is available here.)

This ruling can prove especially useful in the context of electronic discovery during which massive volumes of emails and related e-data need to be exchanged over short periods of time, when it is not always possible to check for every privileged document. Thus, it is comforting to know that one can at least refer to this case where a "non-waiver, clawback provision" was upheld.

Nonetheless, the court also cited prior Chancery Court decisions to support its reasoning that simply because the privileged communication was shared at its inception with other members on the team involved with the disputed corporate transaction, such as investment bankers, that fact did not disqualify it from enjoying the protected privileged status. See , e.g., Cede Co. v. Joule' Inc., 2005 WL 736689 (Del. Ch. 2005).