Chancery Court Dismisses Class Action Allegations of Overpayment in Recapitalization Transaction on Standing Basis But Disclosure Claims Allowed to Proceed

 Dubroff, et al. v. Wren Holdings, LLC, et al., Del. Ch., No. 3940-VCN (May 22, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly-respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his following review of this Delaware Chancery Court decision.

On May 22, 2009, Vice Chancellor Noble granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss a class action involving a contested recapitalization plan that resulted in dilution of equity.

By way of background, the plaintiffs, two former minority shareholders of Nine Systems Corporation (“NSC”), brought a purported class action against NSC and other individuals and entities that included former directors and former shareholders, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties. During 2001 and early 2002, the entity defendants had made a series of loans to NSC. In August 2002, NSC carried out a recapitalization transaction (the “Recap”) by written consent of the holders of a majority of NSC’s stock (primarily the entity defendants) by which the entity defendants converted the preferred debt they each held into preferred stock. Before the Recap, the entity defendants collectively owned 56% of NSC’s stock and after the Recap their holdings increased to almost 80%. The other shareholders’ equity, including the plaintiffs’, decreased from approximately 44% to 22%.

Four years later in November 2006, Akami Technologies announced that it was acquiring NSC. In the NSC proxy statement there was a listing of NSC shareholders as well as the number of NSC shares each held. This was the first time that the plaintiffs became aware of their equity dilution. As a result, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to the minority shareholders, and that the individual defendants aided and abetted breaches by the entity defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that: (i) the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claims because their claims are derivative and the plaintiffs were no longer stockholders of NSC; (ii) the defendants did not fail to disclose material facts; and (iii) the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine of laches.

Plaintiffs’ Standing Issue —Direct, Derivative or Both

In his analysis, Vice Chancellor Noble noted that claims regarding corporate overpayment such as in the case of a recapitalization are normally derivative claims because the harm goes solely to the corporation. And under the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1046 (Del. 1984), for a plaintiff to have standing to assert a derivative claim, the plaintiff must be a stockholder at the time of the alleged wrongdoing and must maintain his/her stockholder status in the corporate entity throughout the litigation. There is, however, an exception to the general rule.

In Gentile v. Rosette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006), the Delaware Supreme Court held that claims based upon equity dilution can be both direct and derivative in certain circumstances. Vice Chancellor Noble, in quoting Gentile and Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004) noted that:

[a] breach of fiduciary duty claim having this dual nature arises where: (1) a stockholder having majority or effective control causes the corporation to issue “excessive” shares of its stock in exchange for assets of the controlling stockholder that have a lesser value; and (2) the exchange causes an increase in the percentage of the outstanding owned by the controlling stockholder, and a corresponding decrease in the share percentage owned by the public (minority) shareholders.

Thus, under Gentile and its progeny, “where a controlling shareholder causes the corporate entity to issue more equity to the controlling shareholder at the expense of the minority shareholders,” the shareholder’s claim can be both derivative and direct.

In this case, the plaintiffs lost their standing to bring derivative claims because they lost their stockholder status when NSC was acquired by Akami Technologies. In an effort to couch their claim as a direct claim under Gentile, the plaintiffs tried to show that the entity defendants collectively formed a controlling shareholder group. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Court found that their claims under Gentile failed as a matter of law because “the Complaint states in conclusory fashion that the [e]ntity [d]efendants ‘controlled the NSC board of directors,’ but the Complaint is devoid of any facts demonstrating an agreement or that the [d]efendants were tied together in some legally significant way”. Moreover, in what might have been the death knell for plaintiffs on this issue, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, “the plaintiffs conceded that there were no facts in the Complaint from which the Court could infer that an agreement existed”. As a result of a lack of standing to bring a direct claim, Vice Chancellor Noble granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the substantive claim regarding the Recap.

The Disclosure Claims

The plaintiffs also challenged the sufficiency of the notice sent to inform them of the Recap. Because the Recap was accomplished by written consent of the majority stockholders, there was neither a vote nor a solicitation of the plaintiffs’ approval. While the Court noted that “Delaware case law has not addressed the question of whether the notice required by 8 Del. C. § 228(e) triggers a fulsome disclosure akin to that required when stockholder approval is being solicited”, he did not need to address that issue here because the plaintiffs had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty so the motion to dismiss the disclosure claims was denied.

Laches

Finally, the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of laches because they were on “inquiry notice” that interested parties converted their shares long before the plaintiffs brought their action. The Court rejected this argument, however, because the plaintiffs were not told that about the dilution until years after the notice was sent and the information that the plaintiffs did receive about the Recap informed them that “senior debt converted in the Recapitalization ‘was raised from existing investors.’” The defendants did not inform them that the “existing investors” were also members of NSC’s board of directors.

 

Top 5 Delaware Cases from 2008--Rebuttal to Professor Brown

Last year,  I replied to Professor J. Robert Brown's list of the top 5 Delaware cases that, in his view, supported his negative perspective of Delaware law that remains the constant refrain on his blog called: The Race to the Bottom.

My introductory explanation from my rebuttal of last year was as follows:

... I realize that there are many more qualified experts who can rebut the professor's arguments far more persuasively than I, and I am well aware that the Delaware bench certainly does not need my help to defend it. Nor have I been anointed by anyone to take on this role. Nonetheless, having just completed a review of key 2007 Delaware corporate decisions, I offer my own humble rebuttal and a "counter-list" of 5 cases in 2007 that demonstrate that the Delaware courts take shareholder rights and the duties of directors very seriously. If any readers can think of a better "top 5" list, than the one I compiled below, I welcome comments. Here is my top 5 "rebuttal list":

Well, I just finished my 4th annual overview of selected Delaware corporate and commercial cases for  2008, which will be published soon in The Delaware Law Weekly, at which time I will also post it on these pages. I also just saw Professor's Brown list of 5 cases from 2008 that he uses to support his unabashedly unflattering views of Delaware law. Here is his list and here is his introductory post.

My cursory review of the cases I selected below (from the approximately 200 or so that I have summarized on this blog during 2008), is not as scholarly as the good professor's treatment, and I do not have the time (thankfully, due to my busy practice) to engage in extended debate (at least for the next week or so), but until someone else picks up the baton, I offer the following cases to counterbalance the list offered by Professor Brown. I invite others to suggest other cases that they would rather see in my "top 5 list".

  •  In Cargill, Inc. v. JWH Special Circumstance, LLC, (Del. Ch., Nov. 7, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Chancery Court issued a 68-page decision involving a Delaware statutory trust (formerly referred to as a business trust), and found that common law fiduciary duties would apply to a trustee as a "default rule" in light of the agreement among the parties being silent on the issue. Here is a more complete summary.
  • In Julian v. Eastern States Construction Service, Inc.,  2008 WL 2673300 (Del. Ch., July 8, 2008), read opinion here, the Chancery Court required directors to disgorge a $1.3 million bonus they had given themselves in a self-interested manner, without any independent protections, and based on their failure to satisfy their burden to demonstrate the entire fairness of their decision. Here is a more complete summary.
  •  In Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Company, (Del. Ch., July 29, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Chancery Court  found that at the procedural stage of a summary judgment motion, it would allow to proceed to trial the issue of whether the independent directors should be exposed to personal liability  for their role in the sale of the company--despite selling the company to the only known buyer for a substantial premium. A whole article could be written on this case alone, and substantial commentary has already been penned about it. An equally weighty later decision denying a motion for reargument was summarized here. The case is now on appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court.
  • In Steel Partners II, L.P. v. Point Blank Solutions, Inc., 2008 WL 3522431 (Aug. 12, 2008),  the initial complaint was filed to force the holding of a shareholders meeting (which had not taken place since 2005), pursuant to DGCL Section 211. After a stipulation was entered into for a date to hold the meeting, the defendant moved for leave of court to postpone the date of the meeting by 90 days. The Chancery Court denied the request. The request was based on allegations that the plaintiff and its CEO together own about 40% of the stock and would attempt to install their own directors and then seek to buy the company at the lowest possible price for its own investors. In addition, the postponement was requested due to an alleged conflict that the plaintiff's CEO had with the majority. The court reasoned that the best way to deal with the issues presented was to communicate them to the shareholders and let them decide, based on those facts, who they wanted as directors--instead of further delaying the exercise of the shareholder franchise, which under Delaware law is sacrosanct. The summary of the case on my blog is here.

  • London v. Tyrrell, 2008 WL 2505435 (Del. Ch., June 24, 2008), read opinion here. This Chancery Court decision explained in detail the reasons why it denied a motion to dismiss a derivative claim based on Chancery Court Rules 9(b), 12(b)(6) and 23.1. The derivative complaint alleged that the defendants caused the company to issue stock options in contravention of an equity incentive plan by setting the exercise price of the issued options at an unfairly low value.After a thorough factual background description, the court emphasized that: “the burden remains on the movant to demonstrate that the plaintiff has not met the requirements of Rules 9(b), 12(b)(6) and 23.1." (see footnote 12). Moreover, the court described in detail the demand futility analysis under  the seminal case of Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) as well as Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993). The court explained the reasons why it concluded, as succinctly as I have seen it done, that both prongs of the Aronson case were satisfied. Specifically, the plaintiff demonstrated a reasonable doubt that: (1) the directors were interested and independent; or (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.
    The first prong was satisfied because the directors had a financial interest in the challenged stock option plan and also because they stood on both sides of the transaction that was challenged. Moreover, the second prong was satisfied because the allegations rebutted the business judgment rule to the extent that the allegations supported an inference that the directors intended to violate the terms of a stockholder approved option plan. The court also dismissed the arguments under Rule 9(b) that there was insufficient particularity regarding fraud allegations which apparently relied on Sections 152 and 157(b) of the DGCL.

UPDATE: The Wall Street Journal online highlighted this post here. 

UPDATE II:   The Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog  published this post here.

UPDATE III:  Forbes. com  highlighted this post  here.

Chancery Interprets LLC Agreement that Modifes Fiduciary Duties

Kahn v. Portnoy, (Del. Ch., Dec. 11, 2008), read opinion here. 

This Chancery Court opinion deals with the important concept of the ability to modify fiduciary duties in an LLC agreement. In this derivative case involving an LLC, the LLC agreement's modification of  fiduciary duties was not clear enough to choose one reasonable interpretation over another at the summary judgment stage.

When one modifies fiduciary duties, the risk is that one will not be able to avail oneself of the mulitude of cases in the common law on the topic.

The court did, however, find that there was a lack of independence that satisfied the first-prong of the Aronson test, in part due to interlocking relationships.

The nominal defendant in this case was TravelCenters of America, which has been a party in several Chancery Court cases within the past year, as summarized on this blog here.

The court's own succinct introductory summary of the case in the opinion itself follows:

Limited liability companies are primarily creatures of contact, and the parties have broad discretion to design the company as they see fit in an LLC agreement. With this discretion, however, comes the risk—for both the parties and this Court—that the resulting LLC agreement will be incomplete, unclear, or even incoherent.
In this case, plaintiff alleges that the director defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the company by approving a transaction that was allegedly designed to benefit a director at the expense of the company. As the company in this case is an LLC, the fiduciary duties of the directors are defined in the LLC agreement. This agreement, however, explicitly imports and modifies the familiar and well defined fiduciary duties from Delaware corporate law. The result is a company whose directors are governed by a modified version of the fiduciary duties of directors of Delaware corporations. Unfortunately, the agreement in this case fails to clearly articulate the contours of these contractual fiduciary duties. The result is an LLC agreement that provides an ambiguous definition of fiduciary duties and is open to more than one reasonable interpretation.
Since I am faced with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, I am not allowed to choose between reasonable interpretations of ambiguous provisions of a contract. Accordingly, and for the reasons stated below, I must deny the motion to dismiss.