IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CATHY BUCH,

Plaintiff,

•

v. : Civil Action

: No. 10933-VCL

DAVID FILO, SUSAN M. JAMES,
MAX R. LEVCHIN, MARISSA A.
MAYER, THOMAS J. MCINERNEY,
CHARLES R. SCHWAB, H. LEE
SCOTT, JR., JANE E. SHAW,
MAYNARD G. WERB JR. HENRIOUE

MAYNARD G. WEBB, JR., HENRIQUE : DE CASTRO, and YAHOO! INC., :

:

Defendants.

Chambers

Leonard L. Williams Justice Center 500 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware Friday, May 26, 2017 10:08 a.m.

- - -

BEFORE: HON. J. TRAVIS LASTER, Vice Chancellor

- - -

TELECONFERENCE RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXPEDITE PROCEEDINGS AND THE COURT'S RULING

-----CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

500 North King Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
(302) 255-0521

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    APPEARANCES: (via telephone)
 2
            PETER B. ANDREWS, ESQ.
            DAVID M. SBORZ, ESQ.
 3
           Andrews & Springer LLC
                  -and-
 4
           ALEXANDER ARNOLD GERSHON, ESQ.
           MICHAEL A. TOOMEY, ESQ.
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           of the New York Bar
           Barrack, Rodos & Bacine
 6
              for Plaintiff
 7
           KATHALEEN ST. J. MCCORMICK, ESQ.
            JORDAN ETH, ESQ.
 8
            Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor LLP
                  -and-
 9
           MARK R.S. FOSTER, ESQ.
           of the California Bar
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           Morrison & Foerster, LLP
              for Defendants David Filo, Susan M. James,
11
             Max R. Levchin, Marissa A. Mayer,
              Thomas J. Mcinerney, Charles R. Schwab,
             H. Lee Scott, Jr., Jane E. Shaw,
12
             Maynard G. Webb Jr., and Yahoo! Inc.
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            STEPHEN P. NORMAN, ESQ.
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            TYLER J. LEAVENGOOD, ESQ.
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              for Defendant Henrique de Castro
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           RAYMOND J. DICAMILLO, ESQ.
           NICHOLAS R. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ.
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           Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A.
                  -and-
           JENNIFER L. CONN, ESQ.
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            of the New York Bar
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            Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
              for Defendants Susan M. James, Max R.
20
             Levchin, Marissa A. Mayer, Thomas J.
             McInerney, and Maynard G. Webb, Jr.
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23
    (Continued)
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1	APPEARANCES CONTINUED:
2	ANDREW DUPRE, ESQ. McCarter & English, LLP
3	-and- JACK B. JACOBS, ESQ.
4	Sidley Austin LLP -and-
5	SARA B. BRODY, ESQ.
6	KEVIN R. RUBINO, ESQ. of the California Bar
7	Sidley Austin LLP for Interested Party Special Litigation
8	Committee of Board of Directors of Yahoo! Inc.
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- THE COURT: All right. I'm going to start over. This is Travis Laster speaking.
- Let me apologize in the first instance
 for keeping you all waiting. Sounds like I wasn't at
 least keeping some people waiting who were belated
 like I was.
- So what I'd like to know is who is
 going to be presenting. I'd like a Delaware person to
 tell me who is going to be presenting for the
 plaintiff.
- MR. ANDREWS: Your Honor, this is

 Peter Andrews from Andrews & Springer. Arnold Gershon

 will be presenting. I believe he just got

 disconnected. That's what you were hearing when it

 said he left the conference. So I apologize. If we

 give him one second, through the roll call, I assume

 he will pick back up.
- ELECTRONIC OPERATOR: The caller
 Arnold Gershon and Mike Toomey has joined the
 conference.
- 21 THE COURT: Right on cue.
- All right. So I have the same request for a Delaware counsel from the defendant, tell me who is going to be presenting for their side.

MS. McCORMICK: Good morning, 1 2 Your Honor. This is Katie McCormick from Young 3 Conaway. And on behalf of Yahoo! Mark Foster from 4 Morrison & Foerster will be presenting. 5 THE COURT: Okay. And I know that the 6 defendant directors filed something short. Who from 7 Delaware is on for them and who will be speaking for 8 them if there is a need to add anything? 9 MR. DICAMILLO: Good morning, 10 Your Honor. It's Ray DiCamillo. Also on the line 11 from my office is Nick Rodriguez and Jennifer Conn 12 from Gibson Dunn & Crutcher. We don't expect to have anything to say, but if we do either Ms. Conn or I 13 14 will take the lead on that. 15 THE COURT: All right. Great. Thank 16 you. 17 All right. Mr. Gershon, why don't you 18 go ahead. 19 MR. GERSHON: Okay. Thanks, Your 20 Honor. Good morning. 21 This is a motion to expedite 22 proceedings in connection with a motion for 23 preliminary injunction. And the standards governing a

motion to expedite, whether the movant has a colorable

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claim and faces the prospect of immediate irreparable harm, we submit that we fit both requirements.

The claim is colorable in that this

Court sustained the complaint last year. And the

argument made by the respondents on this motion that

the claim is not colorable is the fact that a special

litigation committee has submitted a report concluding

that the misdisclosure was not material. Our view

is -- our position is that a special litigation

committee report does not overrule a Court's decision.

There is a procedure under Zapata against Maldonado to determine the effect of subsequent reports, but that proceeding has not yet happened, and so the report is just more like argument from another party.

On the subject of the imminent harm, the harm will occur on June the 8th if the proxy statement is not supplemented to include corrective disclosures, which was something that the Court commented on at the hearing on the motion to dismiss.

And the misdisclosure concerns severance pay of one of the officers. And coming up next month, the stockholders are asked to vote on the severance pay of at least one officer who was on the

- 1 | board at the time of this disclosure complained of.
- 2 And this is exactly the sort of thing where the
- 3 disclosure would be important. So the harm is
- 4 imminent.
- 5 It would be irreparable because once
- 6 | the meeting goes by, the stockholders will never have
- 7 another chance to vote on the compensation of these
- 8 officers, as the CEO, Marissa Mayer, is resigning from
- 9 the company, resigning from the board, anyway, when
- 10 | the transaction closes. And so this is the last
- 11 | chance that the stockholders of Yahoo! will ever get
- 12 | to vote on her compensation.
- 13 Therefore, we submit that the motion
- 14 to expedite should be granted.
- 15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
- Mr. Foster.
- 17 MR. FOSTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
- 18 Good morning.
- 19 First I'd like to address plaintiff's
- 20 | argument that there's a colorable claim. There is not
- 21 | a colorable claim asserted on this proxy. Plaintiff's
- 22 | own motion points out that when shareholder action is
- 23 | requested, the proxy must provide all material
- 24 | information bearing on that decision. The proposal

1 | then presents it to shareholders to vote on.

There is one thing that is not in dispute today. That is, there is nothing that is alleged to be false or misleading in any manner about the proxy that was issued in connection with the upcoming vote. Plaintiff's counsel did not address that argument. That's the lead argument that we presented in our brief. The reply brief didn't touch on that either.

There's not a colorable claim related to this coming proxy and the vote that is in less than two weeks. There is therefore, on that basis alone, no reason to expedite proceedings and have a preliminary injunction motion in connection with this vote.

Second, as plaintiff's counsel pointed out, the standard requires an immediate irreparable harm. There is no threat of immediate harm. The only harm here has already transpired.

The alleged harm that transpired occurred three years ago. Since that time, plaintiff filed their complaint in April 2015. Two say-on-pay votes have happened since then. At no time did plaintiff attempt to expedite the remedy that she now

1 | seeks. Those two votes passed.

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Plaintiff's response presented in their reply brief filed last night said that she needed to wait until after this Court ruled to find that she stated a conceivable claim. That does not make any sense. Plaintiffs routinely come to this Court to expedite proceedings before a motion to dismiss is adjudicated. But even accepting plaintiff's argument, that decision was rendered last July, right about the same time that this Verizon transaction was announced.

A couple months later, on

September 6th, Yahoo! issued its preliminary proxy.

In that proxy, it announced that there would be a say-on-pay vote tied to the Verizon transaction. She has had over 250 days since that time to expedite proceedings. There's absolutely no reason why that needs to be done now, let alone on an emergent basis.

Her delay is reason enough to deny the motion.

In her papers, she referenced some recent settlement communications that she -- her counsel initiated with us as if it's an excuse for why she didn't bring this motion earlier.

On May 5, she contacted us to propose

a settlement. And of course, we considered that, as it is our ethical obligation to do. But that is not an excuse for her late-game fire drill today.

What this all amounts to is an attempt by plaintiff to get an early summary judgment motion on a disclosure claim relating to a 2014 proxy disclosure that has no bearing on the 2017 proxy disclosure.

Discovery, substantial discovery, and document production was complete in January. If she thought the time for a remedy was this vote, she could have moved for an early summary judgment motion in January or February or March or April. Instead, she waited until May, prejudicing the ability of Yahoo! and the other defendants to present their defense on the merits.

There is absolutely no basis and no precedent for using this as an opportunity to get an expedited remedy where there is absolutely no dispute that the proxy is not challenged on the basis of falsity.

For these reasons, we ask the Court to deny the motion to expedite.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. DiCamillo, do

MR. GERSHON: Thank you, Your Honor.

As to whether we are challenging the right proxy statement, this Court stated at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that one way to resolve the issue of the disclosure in this case was, and I quote from the Court, "You might want to take into account, when you are voting for somebody today, that when you were voting for something two years ago, when they went out to describe someone's compensation to you, they [described it] in ... a misleading way."

This is exactly what the Court suggested and the reason why we make this challenge to the current special meeting proxy statement.

As to the argument that we should have done it earlier, challenging the disclosure in 2015 and 2016, according to Mr. Foster, there, too, we had no quibble with the proxy statements for 2015 and 2016. If he is saying that we could have challenged it then, then there is no reason why we can't challenge it now.

And furthermore, we relied on the discovery that we got after we survived the motion to dismiss, and we incorporate that discovery into the motion that we've made. And we quote specifically from various documents that we have.

And indeed, we note that the directors were seeking a way to minimize the effect of the extraordinary severance given to Mr. de Castro and that they were questioned by a number of stockholders about it.

And we cite an e-mail in our motion for preliminary injunction where Mr. Webb wrote an e-mail saying, "Hard to believe we got a hall pass on this one," speaking of the comments of Institutional Shareholder Services on their disclosure concerning severance.

Finally, the delay. We were criticized for causing undue delay and criticized this morning for having divulged settlement discussions, which, according to Mr. Foster, we initiated.

First of all, you don't get to keep settlement discussions confidential when you have to challenge a contention of undue delay, which we've had to do. And second of all, it's unfortunate that

- 1 Mr. Foster was not on that phone call where settlement
- 2 | was first discussed. It was not we who broached it.
- 3 | It was Jonathan Dickey, and he's not here today to
- 4 hear what I have to say and speak to it.
- 5 Therefore, we submit that the motion
- 6 for expedition should be granted.
- 7 THE COURT: All right. Thank you,
- 8 everyone, for your presentations this morning, as well
- 9 as your written submissions. I know a lot of work
- 10 | went into those, particularly on the defense side.
- 11 You all presented me with a sizeable volume of
- 12 material.
- I am denying the motion to expedite.
- 14 | A decision on a motion to expedite is ultimately a
- 15 discretionary ruling. The plaintiff has to show both
- 16 | a colorable claim and a threat of irreparable harm.
- I am really not sure that this claim
- 18 is colorable. What we're talking about is an advisory
- 19 | say-on-pay vote in connection with a transaction. The
- 20 claim is based on the details of the de Castro
- 21 | compensation from several years ago.
- 22 I understand that what the plaintiff
- 23 | is saying in terms of how this could figure in.
- 24 | Indeed, as Mr. Gershon points out, I previously made

this observation. If someone has made incorrect
disclosures to you in the past or has made a decision
that you think is questionable in the past, you very
well could want to know that when making a decision

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today.

To the extent that is hard for anyone on the defense side to understand, think about how you evaluate judges. I am sure that when you --

ELECTRONIC OPERATOR: The caller, Kevin Rubino at Sidley, has left the conference.

that your case has been assigned to me, you sometimes think, oh, this guy made such-and-such a decision several years ago, and I'm not really sure I want him on my case. So this is not really a hard concept to grasp, but I think that here, the connection is more attenuated because of the passage of time and because of the different issues.

Also, quite frankly, I was thinking about this type of relief as some type of post-adjudication remedy. It seems to me that because we're talking about intent and knowledge and belief, the likelihood that I would issue some type of ruling on this indirect disclosure issue as part of a

1 preliminary injunction is remote. I could even add an 2 adverb to "remote."

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Similar considerations infect the analysis of irreparable harm. There's just not, I don't believe, a sufficiently strong link between the underlying analysis of misdisclosure and what is going on right now, particularly in the context of what we have right now.

My view is also colored by the fact that anyone who is alive and remotely cognizant of business news has to be aware of the volume of discussion around Yahoo! and its process and various things going on there. I don't know what the truth of any of that is, and I'm not suggesting that I have any strong feelings about it. But what I do think, in light of that, is that the de Castro disclosure, in the context of what is already a boiling soup of issues surrounding Ms. Mayer and Yahoo! and things of that nature, is likely to be a disclosure of relatively minimal importance.

Again, is it something that could be remediable? Yeah, I think it could be remediable. Is it something where I understand the logic of the linkage? Yes. I've already told you that. But in

terms of balancing things out, this is not a situation
that calls for any type of expedited proceeding to

potentially stop the type of votes that we are talking
about on the basis of the type of claims that we are

talking about.

 $\label{eq:soforall_those} \mbox{So for all those reasons, I am denying} \\ \mbox{the application.}$

I am also going to take the motion for preliminary injunction out of my queue because it's just not going to happen in light of my ruling on the motion to expedite.

So the next point in this case is to deal with the special litigation committee's motion.

I guess it's the company's motion based on the special committee report. People should figure out a schedule for doing that and moving forward.

Thank you, everyone, for getting on the phone. I hope you all have a good Memorial Day weekend and get to spend some time with your families. And from the plaintiff's side, if there's any virtue to my decision, it's that you don't have to now go rushing off to conduct expedited discovery and can actually spend some time with your families, which, frankly, in the grand scheme of life, is more

1 <u>CERTIFICATE</u>

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3 I, JEANNE CAHILL, RDR, CRR, Official 4 Court Reporter for the Court of Chancery of the State 5 of Delaware, do hereby certify that the foregoing 6 pages numbered 3 through 17 contain a true and correct 7 transcription of the proceedings as stenographically 8 reported by me at the hearing in the above cause 9 before the Vice Chancellor of the State of Delaware, 10 on the date therein indicated.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand at Wilmington, Delaware, this 30th day of May, 2017.

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16 /s/ Jeanne Cahill

Jeanne Cahill, RDR, CRR
Official Chancery Court Reporter
Registered Diplomate Reporter
Certified Realtime Reporter

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