Supreme Court Decides Claim Not Covered by Arbitration Clause

Kuhn Constr. Co. v. Diamond State Port Corp., No. 124, 2009 (Del. Supr. Mar. 8, 2010), read opinion here. In this rare reversal of the Court of Chancery, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the claims at issue were not subject to arbitration based on the wording of the arbitration provision in the agreement involved.

The Diamond State Port Corp. (DSPC) and Kuhn had disputes about a construction project. DSPC sent Kuhn a notice of intent to arbitrate and a demand for arbitration. Kuhn replied by filing a complaint for injunctive relief pursuant to Section 5703(b) of Title 10 of the Delaware Code (Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act). DSPC filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Chancery granted the motion to dismiss.

The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and began its analysis with the public policy of Delaware that supports arbitration but the predicate of that policy is that the parties have clearly and expressly agreed to arbitrate. Delaware's highest court emphasized that it would not enforce a contract that "unclearly or ambiguously reflects the intention to arbitrate." The Court then discussed basic contract interpretation principles and the standard for determining if a contract is ambiguous.

There were three primary reasons for the Court's decision. First, the applicable clause in the parties' agreement did not clearly and unambiguously indicate the intention to arbitrate the claims at issue. Second, despite isolated terms that may support the view of DSPC, the contract as a whole favored Kuhn's argument that the arbitration clause was not intended to cover all claims. Third, the trial court relied on the 1968 Delaware Supreme Court case in Ruckman that it found controlling, however, Delaware's High Court determined that Ruckman neither controls nor guides the resolution of the instant dispute.

This relatively short opinion is helpful for addressing the frequent litigation that arises in connection with the "coverage" of arbitration provisions.

 

 

 

 

Delaware Supreme Court Asks New York Court of Appeals to Address Issue of New York Law; Re: Liability of PricewaterhouseCoopers

Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,  No. 454, 2009 (Del. March 4, 2010), read opinion here.

In this short ruling, the Delaware Supreme Court used an procedure provided for under the New York Rules of Court  to certify a question of law to New York's highest court, the New York Court of Appeals. This approach was based on the following finding of Delaware's highest court:  "We have concluded that a resolution of this appeal depends on significant and unsettled questions of New York law that are properly answered, in the first instance, by the New York Court of Appeals."

This matter involves an appeal from the Delaware Court of Chancery regarding the oft-cited AIG case which denied a motion to dismiss claims against the top officials of AIG for breach of fiduciary duty based on Delaware law. However, the claims against the auditor, PwC, were dismissed based on New York law. Highlights of that AIG decision (of more than 100 pages), were provided on this blog here.  See American Int’l Group, Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763, 817-22, 826-27 (Del. Ch. 2009).

The Delaware Supreme Court certified the following question to the New York Court of Appeals:

Would the doctrine of in pari delicto bar a derivative claim under New York law where a corporation sues its outside auditor for professional malpractice or negligence based on the auditor’s failure to detect fraud committed by the corporation; and, the outside auditor did not knowingly participate in the
corporation’s fraud, but instead, failed to satisfy professional standards in its audits of the corporation’s financial statements?
  

Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Chancery's Ruling on Fees for "Corporate Benefit" in Class Action; Notes Distinction in Delaware v. Federal Law on Presumptions

Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Brown, No. 240, 2009 (Del. Supr., Jan. 14, 2010), read opinion here. See blog summaries of prior Delaware decisions in this case here.

 This Delaware Supreme Court decision is the second time Delaware’s High Court has reviewed a decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery in this case regarding a request for attorneys’ fees in a class action settlement. The prior case summaries at the above link provide a more detailed factual background. A simplified statement of the case is that attorneys who pursued related litigation in California argued that they caused a higher price to be obtained in a merger, and then sought to intervene in the related case in Delaware to share in the attorneys' fees awarded.

Issues on Appeal
The key issues on appeal before the Supreme Court related to whether there was a causation between the increase in the tender offer as a result of the efforts of the attorneys for the intervenor, Alaska Electrical Pension Fund. Specifically, Alaska argued that the defendants failed to rebut the presumption to which it was entitled, and that the Court of Chancery abused its discretion when it held that the defendants established that Alaska did not in any way contribute to the higher price.

Standard of Review
The Supreme Court applied the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a denial of an application for attorneys’ fees. In addition, the Supreme Court reviewed de novo legal principles applied in reaching that decision. See footnote 10.

The Corporate Benefit Doctrine as an Exception to the American Rule
An exception to the American Rule under which litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit, is the "corporate benefit doctrine” which has been long recognized in Delaware to provide for the reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and expenses in corporate litigation. In order to be entitled to an award of fees under the corporate benefit doctrine, an applicant must show three things: (1) that the suit was meritorious when filed; (2) the action producing benefit to the corporation was taken by the defendants before judicial resolution was achieved; and (3) the resulting corporate benefit was causally related to the lawsuit. See footnote 13.

The policy reason behind the common corporate benefit doctrine is that the rule insures that, “even without a favorable adjudication, counsel will be compensated for the beneficial results they produce.”

Presumption Applicable for Causal Connection
Delaware law imposes on the defendant the burden to show that there was no causal connection that existed between the initiation of a lawsuit and any later benefit to the shareholders, when, as here, a defendant takes action subsequent to the complaint that renders the claims asserted moot. This presumption exists because it is the “defendant, and not the plaintiff, who is in a position to know the reasons, events and decisions leading up to the defendant’s action.” See footnote 16.

Under Delaware law, there are two types of presumptions. First, “conclusive presumptions” mandate that the trier of fact: “find the presumed fact from the proven fact.” See footnote 17.

Second, a “rebuttable presumption” is applied to impose on the party against whom it is directed the “burden of proving that the non-existence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.” See D.R.E. 301(a). The presumption of causation is rebuttable, but to overcome the presumption, the defendants “must demonstrate that the lawsuit did not in any way cause their action.”

See footnote 19, which notes that Delaware law differs from the Federal Rules of Evidence which require only that the opposing party produce some evidence to rebut the presumption.

Standard of Review of Factual Findings
The Supreme Court emphasized that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to deference and that “so long as the Court of Chancery has committed no legal error, its factual findings will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly wrong and the doing of justice requires their overturn." See footnote 26. The Supreme Court reasoned that because the presumption of causation was rebutted by factual findings supported by the record, the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in denying the application of Alaska for attorneys’ fees and costs.

Standard of Review for Discovery Rulings
The Supreme Court applied the standard of review of “abuse of discretion” for its review of a discovery issue in connection with a motion to compel e-mails that Alaska argued should be subject to the “at issue” exception to the attorney/client privilege.

The Supreme Court explained that the "at issue" exception to the attorney/client privilege may apply in two situations: “(1) A party injects the privileged communications themselves into the litigation, or (2) A party injects an issue into the litigation, the truthful resolution of which requires an examination of confidential communications.” See footnotes 28 through 30. However, in the end, based on Supreme Court Rule 8, the Court declined to rule on this last issue after determining that it was not fairly presented to the trial court for review prior to the appeal.

Top 5 Corporate and Commercial Cases from Delaware for 2009

Francis Pileggi and Kevin Brady have written an article highlighting the "Top 5" key corporate and commercial cases for 2009 from Delaware's Chancery Court and Supreme Court . The article, available here, first appeared in the Delaware Law Weekly. Their article about the top corporate and commercial cases in Delaware for the first six months of the year was published in the ABA's Business Law Today magazine, available here.

seal of the state of delawareA review of key corporate and commercial decisions in Delaware for each of the last four years (2005 through 2008) has appeared on this blog for the benefit of litigators and lawyers who follow these areas of Delaware law. Each of those prior annual overviews can be accessed here.

In addition to the corporate and commercial cases from 2009 highlighted in the above-linked two articles, the following Delaware decisions that did not make it into our “top 5 article” from among the 260 or so corporate and commercial decisions in 2009 that we covered on this blog, nonetheless should be of interest to those who want to keep updated on the latest corporate and commercial rulings from Delaware’s Court of Chancery and Supreme Court.

The following format merely identifies the issues addressed in other noteworthy cases from 2009 and provides hyperlinks to a fuller overview of each case as well as a link to each opinion.

Delaware Supreme Court Opinions

Gantler v. Stephens. This Delaware Supreme Court decision made it clear that fiduciary duties are also imposed on officers of corporations in addition to directors.

General Motors Corporation v. Grenier. In this opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court addresses issues related to whether or not the trial court properly allowed expert testimony after a Daubert hearing.

Olson v. Halverson. This Delaware Supreme Court decision affirmed that the statute of frauds applies to oral LLC agreements that cannot be performed within one year.

Whittington v. Dragon Group LLC. The Delaware Supreme Court establishes a bright line rule in this opinion for the creation of "contracts under seal" to which a 20-year statute of limitations applies.

Delaware Court of Chancery Decisions

Case Financial, Inc. v. Alden, No. 1184-VCP (Del. Ch., Aug. 21, 2009). Chancery Court Discusses Procedural Requirements for Parent Corporation to Pursue Claims Against Directors of Wholly-Owned Subsidiary.

Concord Steel, Inc. v. Wilmington Steel Processing Co., Inc., No. 3369-VCP (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009). Chancery Enforces Restrictive Covenant and Grants Permanent Injunction.

Duthie v. CorSolutions Medical, Inc., et al., No. 3048-VCN (Del. Ch., June 16, 2009). Chancery Court Modifies Advancement Award Based on Changed Circumstances.

eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, No. 3705-CC (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2009). Chancery Court Rejects Request for Fees and Costs Despite Granting Second Motion to Compel Discovery Against eBay. (This is only one of many pre-trial decisions in this case that was tried in December 2009).

JAKKS Pacific, Inc. v. THQ/JAKKS Pacific, LLC, No. 4295-VCL (Del. Ch. May 6, 2009). Chancery Court Denies Books and Records Demand for LLC.

Julian v. Julian, No. 4137-VCP (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2009). Chancery Court Addresses: Aiding and Abetting Fiduciary Duty of LLC Manager; Right of LLC Member to Resign; and Arbitrability. (This is one of several decisions in this matter.)

Latesco, L.P. v. Wayport, Inc., No. 4167-VCL (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). Court of Chancery Rules on Issue of First Impression: Do Fiduciary Duties Apply in the Context of a Right of First Refusal Agreement Between a Corporation and its Shareholders.

Lola Cars Int'l Limited v. Krohn Racing, LLC, No. 3379-VCN (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2009). Court of Chancery Decides Fiduciary Duty Claims Against LLC Manager and Allows Dissolution Claim to Proceed and Clarifies Standards for Member to Seek Dissolution of LLC.

Mickman v. American International Processing, L.L.C., Del. Ch., No. 3869-VCP (July 28, 2009). Chancery Court Grants Access to General Ledger and Right to Obtain Photocopies Based on Terms of LLC Agreement but Denies a Request for Attorneys’ Fees.  (A separate decision in this matter was highlighted on this blog here.)

NACCO Industries Inc. v. Applica Incorporated, No. 2541-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2009). Chancery Retains Jurisdiction over Claims of False Disclosures in Schedule 13D Filings Despite Federal Jurisdiction over Exchange Act Violations by Hedge Funds; and Allows Claim of Damages to Proceed Despite Payment of Termination Fee to Losing Bidder
 

State Line Ventures, LLC v. RBS Citizens, No. 4705-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 2, 2009). This letter decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery must be read by any Delaware lawyer serving as "local counsel", and more importantly, should be required reading for any non-Delaware lawyer (or any out of state attorney) who requests a Delaware lawyer to be his or her "local counsel". 

Stockman v. Heartland Industrial Partners L.P., No. 4227-VCS (Del. Ch. July 14, 2009). Court of Chancery Grants Advancement Rights and Allows Indemnification Claims. 
 

In Re: Trados Incorporated Shareholder Litigation, No. 1512-CC (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). Post-Berger Class Action Survives Motion to Dismiss Where Common Stockholders Received Nothing and Preferred Stockholders Received $52 Million.

Triton Construction Co., Inc. v. Eastern Shore Electrical Services, Inc., No. 3290-VCP (Del. Ch. May 18, 2009). Chancery Addressed the Duty of Loyalty and other Fiduciary Duties of Departing Salaried Employees, as well as the Duty to Preserve Electronic Data and related claims.

Wayne County Employees’ Retirement System v. Corti, No. 3534-CC (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). Court of Chancery Dismisses Fiduciary Duty Claims Regarding Vivendi Deal.

Xu v. Heckmann Corporation, No. 4673-CC (Del. Ch. October 26, 2009). Chancery Court Discusses Fiduciary Duty of Director to Disclose Information While Negotiating Release with Corporation and Whether Lack of Disclosure Could Invalidate the Release.

Five Recent Chancery Court Decisions on Electronic Discovery Issues.

Beard Research Inc. v. Kates, (May 29, 2009). Court Awards Fees For Spoliation of Evidence.

Grace Brothers Ltd. v. Siena Holdings, Inc. (June 2, 2009). Court Granted Motion to Compel Emails of Directors and Addresses Failure to Preserve

Omnicard Inc. v. Mariner Health Care Management Co.. (May 29, 2009).The Court Defines the Duty to Preserve Electronically Stored Information and Imposes Adverse Inference for Spoliation

TR Investors, LLC, et al. v. Genger, 2009 WL 4696062 (Dec. 9, 2009). The Court Imposed Harsh Penalties for Spoliation of Evidence in Violation of a Status Quo Order.

Triton Constr. Co., Inc. v. Eastern Shore Electrical Services, Inc. (May 18, 2009). The Court Addressed Spoliation of Evidence and the Duty to Preserve Evidence.

UPDATE: Professor Bainbridge kindly links to this post here, and Kevin LaCroix adds a link here after discussing his Top 10 D & O Cases of 2009.

Delaware Supreme Court Settles Split of Authority Regarding Contracts Under Seal

In a matter of first impression, the Delaware Supreme Court in Whittington v. Dragon Group, L.L.C., No. 392, 2009 (Del. Dec. 18, 2009), in a divided decision, resolved a split of authority in the Delaware trial courts regarding the requirements necessary to prove specialty contracts or contracts under seal.  Read opinion here.  The decision appealed from by the Court of Chancery was highlighted on this blog here.

Kevin Brady and Ryan Newell of the Connolly Bove firm prepared this synopsis.

Under the new bright line rule “in the case of an individual, in contrast to a corporation, the presence of the word ‘seal’ next to an individual’s signature is all that is necessary to create a sealed instrument, ‘irrespective of whether there is any indication in the body of the obligation itself that it was intended to be a sealed instrument.’

Background

In 2006, Plaintiff Frank C. Whittington, II filed suit in the Court of Chancery to enforce his alleged rights in a Delaware LLC, Dragon Group, L.L.C. (“Dragon Group”). In addition to Dragon Group, the remaining defendants included Whittington’s four siblings. With the underlying facts dating back to a settlement agreement from 2001, the Court of Chancery barred Whittington’s claims under the doctrine of laches, using the analogous three year statute of limitations for breaches of contract under 10 Del. C. § 8106.

Laches and the Statute of Limitations

The Court began its analysis with a brief summary of the doctrine of laches:

Both the doctrine of laches and statutes of limitations function as time bars to lawsuits. Unlike a statute of limitations, the equitable doctrine of laches does not prescribe a specific time period as unreasonable. Laches is an unreasonable delay by a party, without any specific reference to duration, in the enforcement of a right, and resulting in prejudice to the adverse party. An unreasonable delay can range from as long as several years to as little as one month. The temporal aspect of the delay is less critical than the reasons for it. In some circumstances even a long delay might be excused.

In referencing the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Reid v. Spazio, the Court said:

Under ordinary circumstances, a suit in equity will not be stayed for laches before, and will be stayed after, the time fixed by the analogous statute of limitations at law; but, if unusual conditions or extraordinary circumstances make it inequitable to allow the prosecution of a suit after a briefer, or to forbid its maintenance after a longer period than that fixed by the statute, the [court] will not be bound by the statute, but will determine the extraordinary case in accordance with the equities which condition it.

While statutes of limitations always operate as a time bar to actions at law, they are not controlling in equity. Indeed, the doctrine permits the Court to hold a plaintiff to a shorter period if the plaintiff should have acted “with greater alacrity, and when the plaintiff’s failure to seek equitable relief with alacrity threatens prejudice to the other party.” In citing Reid, the Supreme Court stated that there are three elements required to prove laches: (i) knowledge by the claimant; (ii) unreasonable delay in bringing the claim; and (iii) resulting prejudice to the defendant.

Analogous Statute of Limitations

In determining which statute of limitations should apply by analogy to a suit in equity, the Supreme Court stated that the general rule is that “the applicable statute of limitations should be applied as a bar in those cases which fall within that field of equity jurisdiction which is concurrent with analogous suits at law.” The Court of Chancery concluded that “Frank’s claims ultimately are predicated upon the AIP and that this action is ‘based upon a promise’ within the meaning of section 8106.”

The “Contract Under Seal” Exception

The Supreme Court noted that there is an exception to the three year statute of limitation period for “specialty contracts” or “contracts under seal.” and those contracts generally have a twenty year limitation period. In the Court of Chancery, Franks argued that the settlement agreement was a contract under seal because the word “seal” appeared beside the signature line for each signatory. Relying upon a 1993 Superior Court decision in American Telegraph Co. v. Harris Co., 1993 WL 401864 (Del. Super. Sept. 9, 1993), the Court of Chancery held that under New York law, in order for there to be a contract under seal (excluding documents of debt such as mortgages or promissory notes if they contain the most minimal reference to a seal) there must be evidence of clear intent to enter into a contract under seal. The Harris court held that “for an instrument other than a mortgage to be under seal, ‘. . . it must contain language in the body of the contract, a recital affixing the seal, and extrinsic evidence showing the parties’ intent to conclude a sealed contract. . . .’” Finding no such evidence, the Court of Chancery held that the AIP was not a contract under seal.

While the Court of Chancery applied Harris, the Supreme Court recognized that there was a split of authority in the Delaware trial courts as to what constitutes a sealed instrument, other than a mortgage or deed. Unlike Harris, the Orphan’s Court in In re Beyea’s Estate 15 A.2d 177, 180 (Orphan’s Ct. 1940), held that the mere inclusion of the word “seal” is sufficient to form a contract under seal “irrespective of whether there is any indication in the body of the obligation itself that it was intended to be a sealed instrument.”

The Supreme Court in a divided decision, decided that in the absence of legislative guidance, it would follow the ruling of In re Bayea’s Estate. In resolving the split, the Court held, “[t]he opinion in Beyea’s Estate provides a bright line standard that is easily applied. Accordingly, we hold that in Delaware, in the case of an individual, in contrast to a corporation, the presence of the word ‘seal’ next to an individual’s signature is all that is necessary to create a sealed instrument, ‘irrespective of whether there is any indication in the body of the obligation itself that it was intended to be a sealed instrument.’” As a result of the Court’s findings, the case was remanded to the Court of Chancery for reconsideration by applying the 20 year statute of limitations by analogy.


Justice Jacobs’ Dissent

Justice Jacobs in his dissent stated that the bright line created by the majority “represents an inadvisable policy choice that would frustrate the reasonable expectations of parties to many commercial contracts.” Justice Jacobs opined that the majority’s deference to a bright line standard came at the expense of another policy: “creating a period of repose from litigation after a prescribed period of time.” Unless the Delaware General Assembly abolishes the contracts under seal, Justice Jacobs believed this new rule will be troublesome. In concluding that he would have affirmed the Court of Chancery, Justice Jacobs explained:

To state it more plainly, in today’s modern commercial environment, it is unreasonable and (I submit) an inadvisable policy to subject parties to commercial contracts to the risk of litigation for twenty years without requiring at least minimally persuasive evidence that the parties intended that result. In my view, the common law rule should be that the use of the boilerplate term “seal,” without more, should be insufficient to visit twenty years of exposure to litigation upon contracting parties.


 

Oral LLC Agreements Addressed by Delaware Supreme Court

Olson v. Halverson, No. 338, 2009 (Del. Supr., Dec. 15, 2009), read opinion hereis a decision of the Delaware Supreme Court issued this week  which affirmed a Delaware Chancery Court decision that applied the statute of frauds to an oral LLC agreement. The Chancery Court decision was highlighted on this blog here.  A separate post-trial decision by the Chancery Court was summarized on this blog here.

LLC Expert Professor Larry Ribstein has already provided a scholarly analysis here, which I recommend for its insights into the key issues and policy underpinnings addressed by the Court.

The Chancery Court determined that because the oral agreement at issue could not be performed within one year, the statute of frauds prevented its enforcement. See Section 2714(a) of Title 6 of the Delaware Code.

The Supreme Court also affirmed the Chancery Court's ruling that due to a contrary written agreement among the parties, Olson was not entitled to the fair value of his interest pursuant to Section 18-604 of the LLC Act.

Delaware's High Court recognized that the Delaware LLC Act gives maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and towards that end, the LLC Act allows "written, oral or implied LLC agreements." See footnotes 23 and 24 (citing Sections 18-1101(b) and 18-101(7) of the LLC Act.)  Moreover, an LLC will be bound by its operating agreement even if it did not execute the agreement. See Section 18-101(7).

The Court's careful reasoning and statutory interpretation concluded that the LLC Act and the statute of frauds can be construed harmoniously together. The Court added that the statute of frauds does not contravene the legislative policy of giving maximum effect to LLC agreements, and there was no intent on the part of the General Assembly to remove LLC agreements from the reach of the statute of frauds. Instead, Delaware's legislature expressed its intent to allow different types of contracts. The LLC  statute does not exclude the applicability of general contract principles for LLC agreements. The Court's opinion is only 27-pages long and deserves to be read in its entirety to fully appreciate its rationale.

Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Harsh Penalties for Violations of Trial Court Orders

In Minna v. Energy Coal, S.p.A., et al., No. 267, 2009, (Del. Supr., Nov. 16,  2009), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a default judgment in eight figures and monetary penalties in substantial six figures, imposed as retribution for multiple violations of several discovery orders and related pre-trial deadlines that were flouted by the defendants in this case.

Delaware's high court has given the trial courts in Delaware, with this opinion, in a figurative (and maybe hyperbolic) sense, a "sword of Damocles" to dangle over the heads of any party who flagrantly flouts orders of the court regarding discovery and related pre-trial matters. Although one might argue that the egregious facts of this case may categorize it as sui generis, it still provides ammunition for the arsenal of any trial judge who feels that a party is not complying with his orders.

Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Trial Court's Determination of Damages Awarded for Breach of Contract and Misrepresentation, as Well as Liability on Assignor Despite Assignment

Reserves Development LLC v. Crystal Properties LLC, (Del. Supr., Nov. 4, 2009), read opinion here.  Although this is an appeal from a Delaware Superior Court decision, prior decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court and  Delaware Court of Chancery involving related aspects of this imbroglio, were highlighted on this blog here, here and here.

Background

This Supreme Court decision is one of several decisions from the Delaware Chancery Court, Delaware Superior Court as well as a prior decision from the Delaware Supreme Court involving a real estate development and multiple issues that arose in connection with various aspects of that real estate venture. In this latest iteration of the dispute involving the real estate development and its various parties, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part a decision of the Delaware Superior Court. The appellant sought a reversal of the trial judge’s reduction in damages awarded for breach of contract and misrepresentation because of an alleged error in an offset of damages. The trial judge reduced the damage award based on amounts considered overpaid.

Standard of Review

The Supreme Court reiterated the familiar rule that questions of fact are reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion and the Supreme Court will accept the trial judge’s factual findings unless they are clearly wrong. By contrast, questions of law are reviewed de novo.

Discussion

The Court observed that in a breach of contract action, the damages for the plaintiff are determined as if the parties had fully performed the contract. The Court reviewed each of the offsets made by the trial judge for such things as an overpayment that was made by Reserves for non-conforming work.

Misrepresentation Claim

The Supreme Court also affirmed a finding of personal liability for a misrepresentation claim. After reviewing the elements of a cause of action for misrepresentation, the Court found a sufficient basis for the trial court’s determination and reviewed in detail the e-mail and other evidence that was the basis for the trial court finding that a promise was made, but there was no intent to ever fulfill those promise.

Attorney’s Fees

The Court upheld the denial by the trial judge of an award of attorney’s fees. Delaware follows the American Rule that ordinarily requires litigants to pay their own attorney’s fees regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed the reasoning of the trial court despite the fact that the trial court previously awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants. While those rulings may appear inconsistent, the determination of an award of attorney’s fees is within the discretion of the trial judge. The determination of the trial judge that attorney’s fees should not be awarded on remand was not an abuse of discretion.

Judgment Entered against Assignor

The Court upheld a judgment against the assignor in part because there was no evidence, despite an assent to an assignment, that Reserves intended to accept the assignee as the sole source of liability under the contract, thus maintaining the assignor as the party liable under the agreement. The Court noted that although one can assign rights and delegate duties, one cannot assign duties. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Sections 318(1) and 318(3), comment (d).

Delaware Supreme Court Addresses Conflict of Interest Issues

In The Matter of a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware: I. Jay Katz, No. 442, 2009, (September 24, 2009), read opinion here. This decision of the Delaware Supreme Court addresses conflicts of interest in the context of  Rule 1.7(a) and 1.7(b)(4) of the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct, which relate to concurrent conflicts of interest. Most of the unpleasant background facts of this 43-page opinion are beyond the scope of this blog's focus on corporate and commercial litigation in Delaware, but the ruling and discussion by Delaware's High Court on conflict of interest principles is important in the context of business litigation, even if this case deals in part with real estate transactions.  Although the penalty imposed by the Court was based on multiple violations of several rules, Rule 1.7 was one of the rules at issue, and this rule involving conflicts is equally applicable to the litigation context. 

The attorney in this case represented both a lender and a borrower in the same loan transaction, on more than one occasion, but did not obtain the required written consents required by the current version of Rule 1.7 in Delaware. As the Court explained:

Rule 1.7(a) states, in part, that “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall  not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: … (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client… or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”

Rule 1.7(b) states that “[n]otwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing.”

By representing Cross [a client] in loan transactions in which another client (Lubach) was the lender and without having obtained Cross’ informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the concurrent representation involved in the arrangement, the Respondent violated Rule 1.7 (a) and (b).

Slip op. at  16-17.

The Court referred to a leading treatise in footnote 13 that described client loyalty as a core value of the legal profession, "perhaps equal in importance with maintaining confidentiality and diligently or zealously working to advance a client's interest."  Although the Court applied Delaware's sui generis Interpretive Guidelines to Rule 1.7 that deal with real estate transactions, the Court's general discussion of Rule 1.7's conceptual underpinning was much broader. The 1908 version of the rule was referenced by the Court as requiring the express consent of both clients over 100 years ago, and the latest revision in 2002 by Delaware specifically requires written informed consent of each affected client. See Rule 1.7(b)(4).

Notwithstanding the severe penalties imposed by the Court in this case, for what it described as "knowing" violations, the result in this case is to be contrasted with the result in a very recent decision by the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, summarized here, which also involved allegations of a violation of Rule 1.7. That Court concluded that a law firm would not be disqualified from representing a client whose U.S. office and European office were on "opposite sides" of two different matters involving the same client.

Delaware Supreme Court Interprets Delaware's Escheat Statute Regarding Escheated Shares in Company

A.W. Financial Services, S.A. v. Empire Resources, Inc., No. 55, 2009, (Del. Supr.,  Sept. 15, 2009), read opinion here. This Delaware Supreme Court decision addressed rather esoteric issues involving the Delaware Escheat Statute, so I will merely highlight in a short blurb two aspects that may have some passing interest to those who follow Delaware business litigation.

This case came to Delaware's High Court via certified questions, presented pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 41, from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The suit was instigated when stock owned by the plaintiff escheated to the state, under ambiguous circumstances, but in any event prior to the applicable statutory period.

Among the four issues decided by the Court, the two I will cursorily underscore in this short blurb are:

  1. Does the new three year period of dormancy in the amended Delaware escheat law at 12 Del. C. section 1198(9), apply retroactively in civil actions involving stocks that were escheated prior to June 30, 2008? Answer: No.
  2. When are allegations sufficient to plead that a party did not act in "good faith"--and thus is not entitled to immunity--under section 1203(b) of Title 12 of the Delaware Code?     Answer: "Good faith" under 12 Del .C. section 1203(b) is an affirmative defense, the substantive elements of which (defined in 12 Del. C. section 1203(d)), must be pleaded and proved by the defendant that claims immunity.

The opinion in this case is 35 pages long and provides a thorough analysis to explain the rationale that supports the answers to the issues addressed, though I suspect a fuller treatment of the opinion would be of limited interest to regular readers of this blog.

 

 

Delaware Supreme Court Rules on Admissibility of Expert Evidence

General Motors Corporation v. Grenier, No. 453, 2007 (Del. Supr., August 24, 2009), read opinion here.  A prior decision of the Supreme Court in this case was highlighted here.

In this opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court addresses issues related to whether or not the trial court properly allowed expert testimony after a Daubert hearing that lasted 4 days. Delaware's High Court confirmed that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daubert and its progeny are followed in Delaware regarding the admissibility of expert evidence, and that Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 regarding expert evidence is based on the federal counterpart.

This decision addresses other issues relating to jury trials in asbestos cases that are beyond the scope of this blog (that focuses on corporate and commercial litigation), and will not be covered in this short overview. Rather, I want to highlight the introductory section of the court's opinion that demonstrates why this is an important decision for those engaged in business litigation in Delaware involving the introduction of expert evidence. The following quote from the Court's opinion is instructive:

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (fn 5), the United States Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 superseded the Frye standard for determining the admissibility of expert scientific testimony. Rule 702 provides a more flexible framework under which the trial court, as “gatekeeper,” must decide “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” (fn 6)

Daubert identified several factors the trial court should consider, including “testing, peer review, error rates, and ‘acceptability’ in the relevant scientific community . . . .” (fn 7). But the trial court has “broad latitude” to determine whether any or all of the Daubert factors are “reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case . . . .” (fn 8). The trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and “[t]hat standard applies as much to the trial court’s decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion.” (fn 9). Because Delaware Rule of  Evidence 702 (fn 10)  is identical to the federal rule, this Court adopted Daubert, and its progeny, as the law governing the admissibility of expert evidence. (fn 11). 

5. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6. Id. at 592-93.
7. Kumho Tire Co, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
8. Id. at 153.
9. Id. at 152.
10. D.R.E. 702 provides: “If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will  assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”
11. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 521 (Del.1999).

This opinion is also notable for the fact that it is a rare example of the Delaware Supreme Court issuing a less than unanimous decision, in this case including a dissent from the Chief Justice.

Delaware Supreme Court Rules on D & O Coverage Issue: Affirming Decision in Favor of Carrier Who Did Not Consent to Settlement

Hilco Capital, LP v. Federal Insurance Co., No. 620, 2008 (Del., August 10, 2009), read opinion here. This Delaware Supreme Court decision addressed whether a D & O carrier's refusal to consent to a settlement was a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Delaware's High Court said no, with 15 pages of legal reasoning to support its affirmance of the trial court.

Kevin LaCroix , an expert in D & O policy coverage issues, and author of the highly regarded blog called The D & O Diary, has performed a thorough analysis of the case here that cannot easily be duplicated, so I recommend his thoughtful insights on the case for those readers who want to learn more about this decision and how it fits in with other similar decisions by courts around the country on this topic.

 

Supreme Court Affirms Court of Chancery's Decision To Certify Class and Award Attorneys' Fees

Loral Space & Communications Inc. v. Highland Crusader & Offshore Partners, L.P., Del. Supr., No. 623, 2008, (July 23, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady,  a prominent Delaware litigator, prepared the following synopsis.

The Delaware Supreme Court on July 23, 2009 affirmed the Court of Chancery’s award of $10.6 million in attorneys’ fees to stockholders’ class counsel. Class Counsel had filed a fee petition seeking $27.5 million arguing that: (1) plaintiffs’ counsel obtained a quantifiable benefit of approximately $205 million; (2) plaintiffs’ counsel obtained significant non-quantifiable benefits for the class; and (3) A&L had accepted representation of the class on a contingent fee basis. The Court of Chancery awarded class counsel $10.6 million in fees and expenses.

Background

Briefly by way of background, in 2006, Loral entered into a Securities Purchase Agreement under which its largest stockholder, MHR, would acquire $300 million in Loral convertible preferred stock which had a high dividend rate, a low conversion rate, and significant class voting rights. After the transaction closed, plaintiffs-below appellants Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P., the beneficial owner of approximately 8% of Loral common stock, challenged the transaction first by making a demand for books and records pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220 and then filing a class action lawsuit alleging direct claims against MHR, Loral, and its directors. The complaint alleged three derivative claims and one direct claim against the same defendants.

Issues on Appeal

There were two issued raised on appeal. First, Loral claimed that the trial court erred in allowing this matter to proceed as both a class and derivative action, because under Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006), “stockholders may not pursue a class action where, as here, there is a pending derivative action addressing the same alleged wrongs.” Next Loral challenged the amount of the fee petition.

The Supreme Court found no error in the Court of Chancery’s decision to certify the stockholder class because both types of claims may be litigated at the same time. With respect to the fee award, the Court of Chancery found that under Sugarland Industries, Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 149 (Del. 1980), class counsel created a “hugely substantial benefit” as a direct result of the litigation. The Supreme Court also found that the record from the Court of Chancery supported that court’s finding, and as a result, the Court of Chancery “acted well within its discretion” in the fee award.

The Supreme Court also noted that the Court in Rossette found that the same set of facts could give rise to both direct and derivative claims:

A breach of fiduciary duty claim having this dual character arises where: (1) a stockholder having majority or effective control causes the corporation to issue “excessive” shares of its stock in exchange for assets of the controlling stockholder that have a lesser value; and (2) the exchange causes an increase in the percentage of the outstanding shares owned by the public (minority) stockholders. Because the means used to achieve that result is an overpayment (or “overissuance”) of shares to the controlling stockholder, the corporation is harmed and has a claim to compel the restoration of the value of the overpayment. That claim, by definition, is derivative.

***************

But the public (or minority) stockholders also have a separate, and direct, claim arising out of that same transaction. Because the shares representing the “overpayment” embody both economic value and voting power, the end result of this type of transaction is an improper transfer – or expropriation – of economic value and voting power from the public stockholders to the majority or controlling stockholder…As a consequence, the public shareholders are harmed, uniquely and individually, to the same extent that the controlling shareholder is (correspondingly) benefitted. In such circumstances, the public shareholders are entitled to recover the value represented by that overpayment – an entitlement that may be claimed by the public shareholders directly and without regard to any claim the corporation may have.

 

 

Delaware Supreme Court Clarifies Requirements of Valid Mechanics' Liens

King Construction, Inc. v. Plaza Four Realty, LLC, Del. Supr., (July 15, 2009), read opinion here.

This 30-page Delaware Supreme Court decision explains in great detail the requirements for filing a valid mechanics' lien claim in Delaware. This short post is only intended to highlight key points. In particular, the specific issues addressed by the High Court were whether the following two elements must be stated in the claim:

 (i) that the landlord gave written consent to the tenant for the work to be performed on the property;  (Answer: yes); and

(ii) whether the statement of claim must specify the exact date that work was completed, or all materials were furnished, on the project. (Answer: yes--which means the work must be completed or materials furnished first).

The Court's opinion describes in great detail the factual background involved in this case and the statutory language that was disputed, as well as the intent of the legislature when the statute was amended. In sum, the Court relied on prior decisions by the Delaware courts to support its interpretation of the statutory prerequisites for filing a mechanics' lien and  to resolve differing interpretations between the parties.

This opinion provides important clarification on previously unsettled aspects of the statute. In order to avoid traps for the unwary, this decision is must reading for anyone filing a mechanics' lien in Delaware because it explains what the statute requires in those instances where reasonable people might have read the statutory prerequisites differently. In light of this opinion, the requirements are now clear.

Delaware Supreme Court Addresses Appropriate Remedy in Short Form Merger Where Majority Violates Disclosure Duty

Berger v. Pubco Corp., et al., Del. Supr., No. 509, 2008 (July 9, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly regarded Delaware litigator, provides the following synopsis of the case:

In a case of first impression, Justice Jacobs writing for the Delaware Supreme Court en banc resolved the differences between two Court of Chancery decisions addressing the appropriate remedy in a short form merger under 8 Del. C. § 253 where the controlling stockholder fails to disclose the facts material to an informed shareholder’s decision whether or not to elect the exclusive appraisal remedy available under section 253.

In the Court of Chancery action, 2008 WL 2224107 (Del. Ch. 2008), the Court decided that because the notice of merger did not disclose certain material facts, “the minority shareholders were entitled to a ‘quasi-appraisal’ remedy, wherein those shareholders who elect appraisal must ‘opt in’ to the proceeding and escrow a portion of the merger proceeds they received.” The Supreme Court, while it agreed with the Court of Chancery’s decision “that the majority stockholder had violated its disclosure duty,” found that the Court of Chancery “erred as a matter of law” in prescribing that specific form of remedy. The Supreme Court further found that the “quasi-appraisal” remedy did not require the minority stockholders to “opt-in” (they would automatically become members of the class) or escrow a portion of the merger proceeds they received.

Short-Form Merger

 Defendant Robert H. Kanner, Pubco’s president and sole Director, owned over 90 percent of Pubco’s shares. The plaintiff, Barbara Berger, was a Pubco minority shareholder. After Kanner decided that Pubco should “go private” Kanner effected a “short form” merger under 8 Del. C. § 253 in October 2007, where Pubco’s minority stockholders received $20 cash per share. In November 2007, the plaintiff received a written notice from Pubco, advising that Kanner had effected a short form merger and that the minority stockholders were being cashed out for $20 per share.

Disclosure Issues and the Appraisal Statute

The notice disclosed: (i) that shareholder approval was not required for the merger to become effective; (ii) that minority stockholders had the right to seek an appraisal; (iii) information about the nature of Pubco’s business; (iv) Pubco’s most recent unaudited financial statements; (v) that in the 22 months preceding the merger the open market trades in Pubco’s stock averaged a price of $13.32 per share; and (vi) the contact information where shareholders could request and obtain additional information. Pubco also attached to the notice an out-of-date copy of the appraisal statute.

“On December 14, 2007, the plaintiff initiated this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of all Pubco minority stockholders, claiming that the class is entitled to receive the difference between the $20 per share paid to each class member and the fair value of his or her shares, irrespective of whether any class member demanded appraisal.” The parties ultimately filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

Disclosure Violations Found

The Court of Chancery addressed two issues: (i) whether the notice contained disclosure violations, and (ii) if so, what was the appropriate remedy. There were two disclosure violations: distributing the wrong version of the appraisal statute, and the failure to disclose any significant details about how Kanner unilaterally determined the $20 per share merger price. The defendants argued that because this is a short-form merger, Kanner can basically do whatever he wants in terms of the price. The Court of Chancery was unpersuaded by this argument because:

the issue . . . is about materiality. In the context of Pubco, an unregistered company that made no public filings and whose Notice was relatively terse and short on details, the method by which Kanner set the merger consideration is a fact that is substantially likely to alter the total mix of information available to the minority stockholders…this does not mean that Kanner should have provided picayune details about the process he used to set the price; it simply means he should have disclosed in a broad sense what the process was, assuming he followed a process at all and did not simply choose a number randomly.


Remedy Options-- Opt-in or Opt-out

The plaintiff relied upon Nebel v. Southwest Bancorp., Inc., 1995 WL 405750 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995), where the court found that the minority shareholders should receive the difference between the merger consideration and the fair value of their shares, to be determined in a parallel appraisal proceeding in which the shareholders were not required to “opt in.” The defendants argued for the more-recent Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305 (Del. Ch. 2005), where the court required the minority shareholders seeking that remedy to “opt in” and to escrow a portion of the merger consideration they received.

The Court of Chancery followed Gilliland requiring: (i) supplemental disclosures to address the violations found by the court; (ii) a requirement that the minority stockholders follow “opt-in” procedures by providing “proof of beneficial ownership of the [Pubco] shares on the merger date; (iii) a procedure that would “replicate a modicum of the risk that would inhere if this were an actual appraisal action, i.e., the risk that the Court will appraise [Pubco] at less than [$20] per share and the dissenting stockholders will receive less than the merger consideration”; and (iv) valuation of the Pubco shares as of the date of the merger using the method prescribed by the appraisal statute.
 

Supreme Court Appeal

On appeal, while the plaintiff Berger did not contest the supplemental disclosure requirement, she did contest the “opt in” and escrow features, claiming that “as a matter of law, all minority shareholders should have been treated as members of a class entitled to seek the quasi-appraisal recovery, without being burdened by any precondition or requirement that they opt in or escrow any portion of the merger proceeds paid to them. Defendants Pubco and Kanner argued that the Supreme Court should follow Gilliland.

Standard of Review – Abuse of Discretion or De Novo

The Court of Chancery has broad discretion to craft an appropriate remedy for a fiduciary violation, which is normally reviewed on an “abuse of discretion” standard. However, the Supreme Court reviewed the matter de novo because Berger claimed that the Court of Chancery erred as a matter of law . . . “in formulating and applying legal principles” and granting summary judgment for the defendants.

Supreme Court’s Analysis

Under Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001), the Delaware Supreme Court found that where there is no fraud or illegality, the exclusive remedy for minority shareholders who challenge a short form merger is a statutory appraisal, with no “entire fairness” review. The Supreme Court noted, however, that the critical issue in this case, which was not addressed in Glassman, is the consequence for the majority stockholder’s failure to meet its full disclosure obligations.

The Remedial Alternatives

The Court discussed four possible alternative remedies – the two “quasi-appraisal” proposals made by the parties and two proposals not mentioned. The ones proposed by the parties were the “opt-in” and escrow standard and the no “opt-in” or escrow standard where the minority stockholders are automatically members. Both forms would entitle the minority stockholders to supplemental disclosure enabling them to make an informed decision whether to participate in the lawsuit or to retain the merger proceeds. Both forms would entitle those who elect to participate to seek a recovery of the difference between the fair value of their shares and the merger consideration they received, without having to establish the controlling shareholders’ personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty. The difference between the two quasi-appraisal approaches is that under the defendants’ approach (which the Court of Chancery approved), the minority shareholders who elect to participate would be required to “opt in” and to escrow a prescribed portion of the merger proceeds they received. Under the plaintiff’s approach, all minority stockholders would automatically become members of the class without being required to “opt in” or to escrow any portion of the merger proceeds.

The third alternative was the “replicated appraisal” under which the minority shareholders would receive (in a supplemental disclosure) all information material to making an informed decision whether to elect appraisal and then follow the appraisal procedures. The fourth alternative would involve no remedial appraisal proceeding and instead it would be the same as in a “long form” cash out merger under 8 Del. C. § 251, “where the legality of the merger (and the liability of the controlling stockholder fiduciaries) are determined under the traditional ‘entire fairness’ review standard.”

The Remedy – No “Opt-in” or Escrow Requirement

The Supreme Court was looking to select the remedy that “best effectuates the policies underlying the short form merger statute (Section 253), the appraisal statute (Section 262) and the Glassman decision, taking into account considerations of practicality of implementation and fairness to the litigants.” After a very detailed analysis, the decision came down to the two forms of “quasi-appraisal.” The Court noted that:

As between an opt in requirement that would potentially burden shareholders desiring to seek an appraisal recovery but would impose no burden on the corporation, and an opt out requirement that would impose a lesser burden on the shareholders but again no burden on the corporation, the latter alternative is superior and is the remedy that the trial court should have ordered.

In next holding that there was no requirement to deposit part of the merger consideration in escrow, the Court noted that:

The defendants-appellees argue that it is fair and equitable to require the minority shareholders to escrow some portion of the merger proceeds. Otherwise (defendants say), the shareholders would have it both ways: they could retain the merger proceeds they received and at the same time litigate to recover a higher amount―a dual benefit they would not have in an actual appraisal. It is true that the minority shareholders would enjoy that “dual benefit.” But, does that make it inequitable from the fiduciary’s standpoint? We think not. No positive rule of law cited to us requires replicating the burdens imposed in an actual statutory appraisal. Indeed, our law allows the minority to enjoy that dual benefit in the related setting of a class action challenging a long form merger on fiduciary duty grounds. In that setting the shareholder class members may retain the merger proceeds and simultaneously pursue the class action remedy.

**************

The appraisal statute should be construed evenhandedly, not as a one-way street. Minority shareholders who fail to observe the appraisal statute’s technical requirements risk forfeiting their statutory entitlement to recover the fair value of their shares. In fairness, majority stockholders that deprive their minority shareholders of material information should forfeit their statutory right to retain the merger proceeds payable to shareholders who, if fully informed, would have elected appraisal.

In cases where the corporation does not comply with the disclosure requirement mandated by Glassman, the quasi-appraisal remedy that operates in the fairest and most balanced way and that best effectuates the legislative intent underlying Section 253, is the one that does not require the minority shareholders seeking a recovery of fair value to escrow a portion of the merger proceeds they received.

Delaware Supreme Court Clarifies "Quasi-Appraisal Remedy"

In Berger v. Pubco Corp., Del. Supr., (July 9, 2009), read opinon here, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified Delaware law regarding the remedy for minority shareholders in a "short form" merger under DGCL section 253 when the minority shareholders are not given material information.

Marcus Montejo, a Wilmington lawyer in the Prickett Jones firm, which is the firm that prevailed in the case, provides us with the following overview of the case:

Yesterday, the Delaware Supreme Court announced for the first time the appropriate operation of a quasi-appraisal remedy when a fiduciary has failed to observe his duty of disclosure in a short-form merger. In Berger v. Pubco Corp., the court ruled that where there is a breach of the duty of disclosure in a short form merger, a quasi-appraisal remedy does not require the minority stockholders to “opt-in” or escrow a portion of the merger proceeds they received. As a result of yesterday’s ruling, minority stockholders squeezed-out in a short form merger will automatically become members of a class when the majority stockholder has failed to observe his duty of disclosure.

 In ruling so, the court rejected the Gilliland “opt-in” procedure. The court reasoned that whether the minority stockholders opted-in or opted-out of a class made no difference to the corporation. Either way the corporation would know early on who was a member of the class. By contrast, an opt-in procedure was more burdensome than opting-out for the minority stockholders and risked forfeiting the opportunity to seek an appraisal recovery. Accordingly, the court found an opt-out procedure optimal.

 The court also rejected the Gilliland escrow procedure. Although the court agreed with the corporation that the minority stockholders would enjoy the “dual benefit” of retaining the merger proceeds and at the same time litigating to recover a higher amount, the court concluded that from a fiduciary’s standpoint, this was not an inequitable result.

 Importantly, the court noted that a corporation must be held to the same strict standard of compliance and that the appraisal statute must be construed even-handedly. To this end, the court explained that “minority shareholders who fail to observe the appraisal statute’s technical requirements risk forfeiting their statutory entitlement to recover the fair value of the shares. In fairness, majority stockholders that deprive the minority shareholders of material information should forfeit their statutory right to retain the merger proceeds payable to shareholders who, if fully informed, would have elected appraisal.”



 

Delaware Supreme Court Upholds New State Law Allowing Sports Betting

In Re: Request of the Governor For An Advisory Opinion, No. 150, 2009 ( Del., May 27, 2009), read opinion here. (Revised May 29, 2009 opinion here.)

The Delaware Code provides a procedure for the Governor of Delaware to request the Delaware Supreme Court to provide an opinion on the constitutionality of any law passed by the General Assembly. It is within the discretion of the justices to decide whether to answer the question presented.

 In this decision, the Supreme Court agreed to answer the question of whether legislation allowing for sports betting in Delaware was in violation of the Delaware State Constitution. Short Answer: No violation. This 21-page opinion describes the background of the constitutional provisions involved as well as the details of the recently enacted statute that now allows for sports betting. Based on a prior experiment with sports betting in the 1970s, Delaware is one of 4 states that has been  "grandfathered" by a federal statute that otherwise bans sports betting.

Although the details of the opinion are beyond the scope of this blog, the procedure for Delaware's High Court issuing an opinion at the request of the Governor is a quintessentially Delaware phenomenon, including the speed with which the decision was briefed, argued and decided. The blog Above The Law has an article about the case here, with a humorous video clip about Delaware and links to other articles about the decision.

Interview with Delaware Supreme Court Justice Jack Jacobs

Professor J.W. Verret interviews Delaware Supreme Court Justice Jack Jacobs via The Conglomerate blog here. The interview is must reading for anyone interested in Delaware corporate law. Justice Jacobs, prior to joining the Delaware Supreme Court, sat on the Delaware Chancery Court, and has a combined 24 years of service on the Delaware bench. He is the author of many of the most important corporate law decisions issued by the Chancery Court and the Supreme Court. The interview also provides helpful insights into both the Delaware Bar and the Delaware judiciary.

Delaware Supreme Court Agrees with Deloitte in Partnership Dispute

Paul v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, Del. Supr., No. 336, 2008 (May 20, 2009), read opinion here.  This Delaware Supreme Court decision involves a dispute between Deloitte & Touche LLP and a partner that it had terminated. Delaware's High Court reviewed de novo an appeal from a summary judgment granted by the trial court.

The issue on appeal was one of contract interpretation.

Background

 The appellant was a partner in Deloitte's Boston office, in their Lead Tax Services Section. He had previously been a partner with Arthur Andersen and was part of a group of about 160 Arthur Andersen partners that had joined Deloitte in 2002 pursuant to various written agreements between and among the parties. The central factual dispute, which was interwined with the legal question of contract interpretation, revolved around: (i)  the date by which the terminated partner had to have been given notice of termination; or (ii)  the date by which the partner's termination had to have been completely effectuated.

Legal Reasoning

After reciting the basic principles under Delaware law of contract interpretation, the court parsed the language of the agreement, performed a grammatical analysis of the sentence at the core of the case, and even performed something akin to a diagram of the sentence, which some of us may remember from grammar school. The court's reasoning deserves to be excerpted verbatim:

The parties’ differing interpretations are, at bottom, a grammatical dispute. The word “specified” can act either as a verb or as an adjective. Paul advocates treating the word “specified” as an adjective describing the word “date” and the phrase “within two years after May 7, 2002” as an adjective phrase also modifying the word “date.” However, this reading ignores the remainder of the clause which includes the additional phrase “by the Committee of 6.” The only way to read the entire clause giving effect to this second phrase is to treat both as adverbial phrases describing the verb “specified,” and not the noun “date specified.” This is illustrated by removing the word “specified” from the sentence: “You shall be deemed to have severed your association with each Firm as of a date … within two years after May 7, 2002 by the Committee of 6.” While the phrase “within two years after May 7, 2002” would still make sense within the context of the sentence, the phrase “by the Committee of 6” would not. Therefore, the phrase “by the Committee of 6” describes the word “specified” by indicating who or what specifies, and the placement of the phrase “within two years after May 7, 2002” in medio indicates that it also describes the word “specified” by indicating when the specification must occur. As a result,       § 5(b) did not require the effective date of Paul’s severance to occur before May 7, 2004; instead, it required only that the Committee of 6 notify Paul of the effective date of his severance by May 7, 2004.

Accordingly, the Superior Court erred in interpreting the clear and unambiguous language of § 5(b) of the Admission Agreement.

  However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's ruling that the terminated partner could not prove damages even if a breach were found to have been occurred. In essence, the court read the contract to allow Deloitte to terminate the partner and so the partner did not have an expectancy that he would be employed for any fixed period of time. As the Delaware Supreme Court explained:

Assuming arguendo that Deloitte was in breach of the Partnership Agreements, in assessing the damages of such a breach, the non-breaching party is entitled to recover “damages that arise naturally from the breach or that were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made.”11 Contract damages “are designed to place the injured party in an action for breach of contract in the same place as he would have been if the contract had been performed. Such damages should not act as a windfall.”12  “Expectation damages are measured by the losses caused and gains prevented by defendant’s breach.”13  Paul argues that at the time of entering the Partnership Agreements, he had a clear and distinct reasonable expectation that he would remain a partner in Deloitte until he reached the mandatory retirement age of sixty-two and was therefore an employee for a defined period. Of course, as Deloitte points out, that was not the whole of Paul’s expectations, he also had a reasonable expectation that he could be severed without cause (a) within the first two years by vote of the Committee of 6; and (b) at any time by vote of the Board and approved by vote of a majority of all active parties. Thus, even after the two-year period elapsed, Paul remained subject to termination without cause—the only thing that changed was the identity of the decisive body. In addition, Paul had a reasonable expectation that he could be severed for cause at any time by vote of the Board for certain enumerated conduct. Therefore, Paul’s status with Deloitte was indefinite and not, as Paul claims, for any definable or fixed term. (citations in footnotes omitted)

 

Delaware Supreme Court Reverses Chancery Court Based on Statute of Limitations and Laches

Reid v. Spazio et al., Del. Supr., No. 199, 2008 (April 9, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his review of this decision.

Yesterday, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint  in this matter on grounds that it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by laches. The claim was also saved by a procedural "safety net" known as the "Delaware Savings Statute".

International Joint Venture Dispute Goes to U. S. Supreme Court and Back

A joint venture was formed between U.S. Russian Telecommunications LLC (“USRT”), a Delaware limited liability company, and a group of Italian companies to assist Russia in replacing its obsolete commercial satellites. There were allegations that in late 1999, the Italian companies conspired to breach the joint venture agreement in order to seize this business opportunity for themselves, through the formation of a Delaware entity, USRT Holdings LLC (“Holdings”). Reid, a minority shareholder of both USRT and Holdings, brought suit on his own behalf and derivatively on behalf of the companies in May 2001 in federal court in the Southern District of Texas.  After his case was dismissed, Reid re-filed his claims in Texas state court and through a series of dismissals and appeals, Reid took his case literally to the United States Supreme Court (which denied his petition for certiorari) in October 2006.

On April 9, 2007, Reid filed suit in the Court of Chancery, against the Italian companies, who moved to dismiss the action as time-barred. The Court of Chancery granted the motion finding that: (i) the time during which Reid could file a timely action in Delaware expired on March 10, 2007; (ii) laches also barred Reid’s claim because it would have been barred by the statute of limitations and there were no mitigating circumstances; and (iii) the length of time between the challenged conduct and the filing of the action resulted in some prejudice to defendants’ ability to present a defense.

On appeal, Reid argued that: (i) his claim is preserved by the Delaware Savings Statute, 10 Del. C. § 8118(a); and (ii) his claim is not barred by laches. Since interpreting the Savings Statute was a question of law, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed it de novo.

Are All Discretionary Appeals Encompassed Under the Delaware Savings Statute?

While Reid acknowledged that his complaint arises out of conduct that allegedly occurred in or around 1998 (well outside Delaware’s three-year statutory limitations period) he claimed that the action was still timely because it was preserved by the Delaware Savings Statute. That statute, which “reflects a public policy preference for deciding cases on their merits,” provides six exceptions to the applicable statute of limitations in certain instances where the plaintiff has filed a timely lawsuit, but is procedurally barred from obtaining a resolution on the merits.”

The dispute in this case focuses on whether all discretionary appeals are encompassed under the sixth prong of the statute which states: “if a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed on appeal or a writ of error; a new action may be commenced, for the same cause of action, at any time within one year after the abatement or other determination of the original action, or after the reversal of the judgment therein.” 10 Del. C. § 8118(a)

The Court of Chancery held that the statute was tolled during the time periods with respect to Reid’s discretionary appeals, but not the discretionary appeal to the United States Supreme Court. On appeal, Reid argued that “the grace period provided by Section 8118(a) should not commence until all appeals are resolved, including appeals as of right and those dependent upon a higher court’s discretion.” The defendants argued that “the grace period should be tolled only during the pendency of appeals as of right.”

The Supreme Court found that the Delaware Savings Statute applies to all discretionary appeals because: (i) it has a remedial purpose and is to be liberally construed; (ii) allowing a plaintiff to bring his case to a full resolution in one forum before starting the clock on his time to file in this State will discourage placeholder suits, thereby furthering judicial economy; and (iii) the prejudice to defendants is slight because in most cases, a defendant will be on notice that the plaintiff intends to press his claims.

As a result, the Supreme Court found that Reid’s claim, which was filed within six months of the conclusion of the Supreme Court appeal, was preserved and that the Court of Chancery erred in dismissing the complaint.

Laches v. Statute of Limitations

Reid also claimed that the Court of Chancery erred when it decided that his claims were barred by laches which requires: (i) knowledge by the claimant; (ii) unreasonable delay in bringing the claim; and (iii) resulting prejudice to the defendant. Although both laches and statutes of limitation operate as a time-bar to litigation, the Supreme Court noted that “[u]nder ordinary circumstances, a suit in equity will not be stayed for laches before, and will be stayed after, the time fixed by the analogous statute of limitations at law; but, if unusual conditions or extraordinary circumstances make it inequitable to allow the prosecution of a suit after a briefer period, or to forbid its maintenance after a longer period than that fixed by the statute, the [court] will not be bound by the statute, but will determine the extraordinary case in accordance with the equities which condition it.” (italics mine).

The Court of Chancery found that Reid’s claim was barred because there were no extraordinary circumstances that warranted equitably extending the time to file. The Supreme Court disagreed and in examining the issue from the opposite point of view, found that Reid’s action would be barred by the doctrine of laches “only if unusual conditions or extraordinary circumstances make it inequitable to allow the prosecution of his claim within the time allowed by law.” Apart from the length of the Texas litigation, the Supreme Court found no conditions or circumstances that would make it inequitable to allow Reid to proceed. As a result, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Chancery erred in dismissing the complaint based on laches.
 

Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Chancery's Partial Award of Attorneys' Fees

Swann Keys Civic Assoc. v. Shamp, (Del. Supr., March 26, 2009), read opinion here. This Delaware Supreme Court decision affirmed the Chancery Court's ruling that only two-thirds of the attorneys' fees of the prevailing side would be paid based on the trial court's "fee-shifting", despite the absence of submitted affidavits. The Supreme Court explained its reasoning in detail, including the point that the trial court was able to observe the work performed first-hand and, for example, the trial court found some of the defensive maneuvers of  the prevailing party to be of little usefulness, thus the full amount of fees was not granted.

The Chancery Court's decision was highlighted here.

The High Court's introductory summary of the case should be enough for the reader to decide if it includes topics that would warrant a reading of the entire well-reasoned opinion at the above link:

In this appeal from the Court of Chancery, the Swann Keys Civic Association asks this Court to reverse the Vice Chancellor’s refusal to enforce a restrictive covenant limiting the height of homes in Swann Keys to sixteen feet, six inches. On cross-appeal, Barbara B. Shamp and John E. and Judith A. Humphreys (collectively “Shamp”) assert that the Vice Chancellor erred by limiting their recoverable attorney fees to two-thirds of their actual expenses. We conclude that the Vice Chancellor correctly refused to enforce the home height limitation and that he acted within his discretion by shifting only two-thirds of Shamp’sattorneys’ fees.  Accordingly, we affirm

Unanimous Delaware Supreme Court Addresses Revlon and Caremark Issues

Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, Del. Supr. (March 25, 2009), read opinion hereSee revised opinion of  April 16, 2009 here. The Delaware Supreme Court rendered this unanimous en banc decision last evening. It was much anticipated in the corporate law world and in the few hours since its release it has already generated substantial commentary among corporate law professors and similar commentators.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, has provided us with the following review of the opinion:

In its decision on an interlocutory appeal, Delaware's High Court reversed the Court of Chancery’s July 29, 2008 decision denying summary judgment for the directors of Lyondell Chemical Company (“Lyondell”) as to the “Revlon” and “deal protection” claims and whether the directors of Lyondell acted in good faith in conducting the $13 billion sale of Lyondell.

The class action complaint alleged that the Lyondell directors breached their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and candor and put their personal interests ahead of the interests of the Lyondell shareholders. In particular, the complaint alleged that: (i) the merger price was grossly insufficient; (ii) the directors were motivated by self-interest; (iii) the process by which the merger was negotiated was flawed; (iv) the directors agreed to unreasonable deal protection provisions and (v) the preliminary proxy statement omitted numerous material facts. By way of background, the merger price represented a substantial premium over the market price and the merger was approved not only by a disinterested board but also by more than 99% of the voted shares.

Lyondell’s charter contained an exculpatory provision pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7), protecting the directors from personal liability for breaches of the duty of care, so the case turned on whether there were any shortcomings on the part of the directors to implicate their duty of loyalty, a breach of which is not exculpated. Because the Court of Chancery had found that the board was independent and was not motivated by self-interest or ill will, the focus became whether the directors were entitled to summary judgment on the claim that they breached their duty of loyalty by failing to act in good faith.

Court of Chancery Focuses on Process and Deal Protection Provisions

The Court of Chancery rejected all of the plaintiffs’ claims except those directed at the process by which the directors sold the company and the deal protection provisions in the merger agreement. In particular, whether under Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (506 A. 2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)), the directors failed to obtain the best available price in selling the company. The Court of Chancery decided that “unexplained inaction” by the Lyondell directors for two months permitted a reasonable inference that the directors may have consciously disregarded their fiduciary duties. The Supreme Court disagreed finding that there was no evidence from which to infer that the directors knowingly ignored their responsibilities, thereby breaching their duty of loyalty.

Justice Carolyn Berger writing for the Court examined the concepts of “bad faith” and “failure to act in good faith” as well as the range of conduct that might be classified as such in light of existing Delaware case law. See, In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig. (906 A. 2d 27 (Del. 2006)), Stone v. Ritter, (911 A. 2d 362 (Del. 2006) and In re Caremark Int’l Deriv. Litig. (698 A. 2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). While the Court of Chancery had denied summary judgment in order to obtain a more complete record before deciding whether the directors had acted in bad faith, the Supreme Court determined that the trial court “reviewed the existing record under a mistaken view of the applicable law.” The Supreme Court went on to note that there were three factors that contributed to that mistake: (i) the Court of Chancery imposed Revlon duties on the directors before they either decided to sell, or before the sale had become inevitable; (ii) the Court of Chancery read Revlon and its progeny as creating a set of requirements that must be satisfied during the sale process; and (iii) the Court of Chancery “equated an arguably imperfect attempt to carry out Revlon duties with a knowing disregard of one’s duties that constitutes bad faith.”

When Exactly Do Revlon Duties Arise?

In analyzing Revlon and its progeny, the Court of Chancery determined that the directors must actively engage in the sale process, and confirm that they have obtained the best available price either by conducting an auction, a market check or demonstrating “an impeccable knowledge of the market.” The Court of Chancery concluded that because the Revlon sale process must follow one of the these courses of conduct identified above and that the Lyondell directors had not followed any of the standards that the Court of Chancery extracted from Revlon and its progeny, the directors were unable to meet their burden under Revlon.

The Supreme Court disagreed noting that the problem with the Court of Chancery’s analysis was that Revlon duties arise not because a company is “in play” (such as in this case where there was a Schedule 13D filing) but rather when the company “embarks on a transaction – on its own initiative or in response to an unsolicited offer – that will result in a change of control.” In this case, that was when the Lyondell directors began negotiating the sale of Lyondell. The Supreme Court further noted that “there is no legally prescribed steps that directors must follow to satisfy their Revlon duties” and that the Lyondell directors failure to take any specific steps during the sale process could not have demonstrated a “conscious disregard of their duties.”

The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Chancery “approached the record from the wrong perspective. Instead of questioning whether disinterested, independent directors did everything that they (arguably) should have done to obtain the best sale price, the inquiry should have been whether those directors utterly failed to attempt to obtain the best sale price.” Finding that the record clearly established that the Lyondell directors did not breach their duty of loyalty by failing to act in good faith, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery and remanded the matter for entry of judgment in favor of the Lyondell directors.

SUPPLEMENT: Professor Stephen Bainbridge provides a scholarly analysis here. Dean and Professor Eric Chiappinelli provides his learned overview of the case here. Professor Gordon Smith gives us the benefit of his professorial insights here. Attorney  Bernard Sharfman of the Cohen Milstein firm has written a thoughtful article that includes a discussion of this case here.

Some of the extensive commentary on the trial court's opinion is collected here.

Supreme Court Rules on Interface between Indemnification Rights and Res Judicata

LaPoint  v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., (Del. Supr., March 12, 2009), read opinion here.  The Delaware Supreme Court in this decision addressed the procedural issues in connection with pursuing indemnification rights based on a contract in light of defenses based on res judicata and statute of limitations. Delaware's High Court reversed a decision of the Superior Court which had granted summary judgment in favor of AmerisourceBergen ("ABC"). The reversal was based on the trial court's ruling that the statute of limitations and res judicata barred the claims for indemnification.

 This decision should be read by anyone who needs to pursue an indemnification claim in Delaware based on a contractual right. In sum, the Supreme Court determined that neither res judicata nor the statute of limitations barred the indemnification claim because the cause of action did not arise until after the Chancery Court determined that the agreement was breached--at which time the indemnification obligation was triggered. That Chancery Court decision was appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed. At that point, the claim for indemnification was filed in the Superior Court. It was that  decision in the Superior Court that is the subject of this appellate opinion.

Several of the prior opinions in this case were highlighted here.

The Supreme Court found that the indemnification claim for attorneys' fees was not presented to the Chancery Court (which is contrary to the ruling of the Superior Court appealed from, granting summary judgment).

The Supreme Court traces the doctrine of res judicata back to Roman law and its implementation in English law during the twelfth century (fn 12). The essence of the doctrine, explained the court, was:

"to prevent a multiplicity of needless litigation of issues by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or cause of action which has been raised or should have been raised in a court of competent jurisdiction".

A five-part test to describe situations where res judicata would bar a claim, and which was previously enunciated by the court, was also explained (fn.18 and 19). In addition to finding that the claim of indemnification was neither raised nor adjudicated in the Chancery Court proceedings, the High Court explained the contours of Delaware's "transactional approach" to res judicata. The Supreme Court reasoned that the indemnification claim that arose after the Chancery Court determined that ABC breached the merger agreement was not part of the same "transaction". Likewise, it was not barred by the three year statute of limitations for contracts found at  Section 8106 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code.

Ryan v. Lyondell: Professor Waits for Decision on Appeal

Professor Andrew Lund opines on The Conglomerate blog here with his predictions regarding the decision expected from the Delaware Supreme Court on the interlocutory appeal that Delaware's High Court accepted in the Ryan v. Lyondell case in which the Chancery Court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment in a matter that raises key issues such as Revlon duties and the exculpation for due care claims permitted under DGCL Section 102(b)(7). The good professor also links to a related law review article he wrote.

Here is my prior blog post on the Chancery Court's decision where I also collect some of the substantial commentary that the case has already generated.

Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Chancery Court in AT & T Case Involving Stock Options

AT & T  Corp. v. Lillis, (Del. Supr., March 9, 2009), read opinion here. In a rare split decision, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled 3-2 to affirm the original decision of the Chancery Court  that was initially reversed by the Supreme Court (also a procedural rarity). 

This case involves an attempt by former officers and directors of MediaOne Corp. (the "Option Holders") to seek compensation from AT & T for the value of their stock options.

The bottom line of this procedurally quirky case is as follows: the Supreme Court originally reversed the Chancery Court and instructed it on remand not to base its decision on certain admissions made by AT & T in its pleadings that were later amended. After remand, the Chancery Court changed its orginal decision and found in favor of AT & T. Now, however, in its second decision, the Supreme Court has reasoned that the Chancery Court was right the first time and thus Delaware's High Court must affirm the original decision of the Chancery Court in favor of the Option Holders. ( Of course, the dissenting Justices in this opinion see it differently.)

The multiple prior decisions in this case have been highlighted here,  with the most recent Chancery Court opinion here, explaining in detail the procedurally unusual posture of this matter. Notably, the prior decision in this case decided by the Supreme Court was a unanimous en banc opinion highlighted here.

This opinion is must reading for any litigator that  needs to address any of the following issues:

  • lasting impact of admissions (if any) in a pleading that is later amended;
  • "the law of the case" doctrine
  • whether legal positions taken in a case have any impact on divining the parties'  intent in a contract at the time the parties entered into that contract
  • "course of conduct" as a contract interpretation principle
  • whether a position taken in a pleading, which is later amended, can be used as "course of conduct" to interpret the intent of the parties in an agreement
  • whether an admission in a pleading, later amended to withdraw the admission, can still be used as "evidence"--as compared to a legal admission. (see FN 17 in the majority opinion and FN 10 in the dissenting opinion)

 

Supreme Court Remands Post-Trial Decision for Reconsideration of a Pre-Trial Daubert Ruling on Expert Witnesses

General Motors Corporation and Ford Motor Company v. Grenier , (Del. Supr., Feb. 4, 2009), read opinion here.

This Delaware Supreme Court decision demonstrates the importance on appeal of rulings at a pre-trial Daubert  hearing. Delaware's High Court remanded the case for the judge who decided the Daubert motion to reconsider the admissibility of the expert opinions of the plaintiff’s expert. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000).

Before trial in this case, GM and Ford joined in a motion by Chrysler to exclude the testimony of plaintiffs’ experts that related to exposure to friction products causing lung disease. The motion judge conducted a four-day hearing to consider the reliability of the plaintiffs’ evidence concerning whether certain products caused the physical injuries alleged. The motion judge ultimately concluded that the “plaintiffs’ medical and scientific evidence . . . is sufficiently reliable to pass through the Daubert filter, and the proper manner by which to challenge the plaintiffs’ theories, and to expose their weaknesses, is through vigorous cross-examination of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses."

The standard of review used by the Supreme Court to analyze the motion judge’s findings of fact was: “to determine if they are supported by the record and are the product of a logical and orderly reasoning process.” In this decision, the Supreme Court determined that the trial judge made a factual error in his decision on the Daubert  motion, but the Supreme Court did not hold that there was any abuse of discretion.

Specifically, moreover, the Supreme Court determined that the characterization by the motion judge of the expert analysis was not supported by the factual record, and that the testimony of the expert at the hearing contradicted the characterization by the motion judge of the expert opinion.

The Supreme Court reasoned that an expert’s methodology must be not only reliable intrinsically but also it must be reliable as applied to the facts of the specific case. The Supreme Court remanded to the motion judge to determine whether “notwithstanding the mischaracterizations of the record, Dr. Dodson’s opinion was sufficiently reliable.” See D.R.E. 702; see also, e.g., McClain v. Metabolif International, 401 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2005).

In addition, the Supreme Court determined that a remand was necessary regarding the decision of the motion judge to allow testimony of a second expert on which the first expert relied, in order to reassess whether the opinion was “grounded in reliable science,” in connection with the association between the opinions.

In sum, the Supreme Court determined that it was unclear whether the motion judge’s characterization of his factual findings colored his ultimate decision to admit the expert opinion regarding general causation. Thus, the case was remanded for reconsideration and clarification consistent with the opinion.
 

Supreme Court Affirms Allocation of Settlement Proceeds in Class Action Against Philadelphia Stock Exchange

 Schultz v. Ginsburg and Philadelphia Stock Exchange, (Del. Supr., Feb. 3, 2009), read opinion here. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's decision in connection with the allocation of  proceeds from a settlement that ended a class action against the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. The settlement and the allocation were separately approved by the Chancery Court. 

Highlights of five (5) prior decisions in this case, which provide more background, are available here.

This appeal of the allocation of the settlement proceeds raised the following arguments (all of which were rejected):

  1. Monetary relief should be available only to those who suffered actual damage (although nonmonetary relief should be given to remedy a violation of charter provisions).
  2. The Chancellor should have created subclasses to take cognizance of competing economic interests.
  3. The Chancellor erred by not granting a larger allocation of the proceeds to the Objectors.
  4. If a larger allocation is awarded, the Objectors' counsel should be entitled to a larger portion of the attorneys' fees awarded.

Class counsel defended the allocation plan by arguing that the allocation plan appropriately valued the charter violation more than the economic dilution claims.

The appellate standard of review for these types of issues is abuse of discretion. None was found.

Initially, Delaware's High Court observed that the Chancellor appropriately considered the merits of the various claims in terms of which had a better chance of success. Also, the Supreme Court held that as a matter of law, the charter violation claims transfer to a later purchaser because the injury is to the stock and not the holder. By contrast, the economic dilution claim was personal.

Thus, the violation of the charter, a contract between the stockholders and the corporation, was a direct claim. Conversely, the dilution claim, based on the facts of this case, was likely to be considered derivative. If considered derivative, the shareholders would not be entitled to a money recovery resulting from a successful derivative action and the corporation (in which they no longer held stock) would receive the relief. There was also a concern about the barrier to relief posed by DGCL Section 102(b)(7). It was also observed by the trial court that demutualization claims, as other actions have demonstrated, "have little or no chance of succeeding".

The Court acknowledged Delaware policy that opposed the "buying of a lawsuit" but did not find that to have taken place here. Moreover, the Court distinguished the argument that "actual damages are required in order to recover money from a settlement fund". Distinguishing the case of Wit Capital Group v. Benning, 897 A2d. 172 (Del. 2006), a Rule 23(b)(3) opt out case based on New York law, the Court noted that the Wit case involved a prima facie requirement of injury under New York law. In contrast, the instant case was requesting equitable relief.

Moreover, the Court held the the Chancellor did not abuse his discretion by certifying the class without subclasses and it was appropriate under the circumstances to rely on the thorough and unconflicted process of the unbiased class representative.

Delaware's High Court also explained that the allocation to class members with a demutualization claims was appropriate. Therefore, the Court rejected any change in the share of attorneys' fees, acknowledging also that "an objector to a class action settlement is not entitled to attorneys' fees unless his efforts improved the final settlement or he conferred a benefit on the class".

Delaware Supreme Court Issues Major Ruling on Shareholder Ratification Doctrine and Duties of Corporate Officers

In Gantler v. Stephens, (Del. Supr., Jan. 27, 2009), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court, yesterday,  issued a major decision on important matters of Delaware corporate law. Delaware's High Court  for the first time confirmed and clarified that officers of Delaware corporations have the same fiduciary duties as directors of Delaware corporations.

In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified and enunciated Delaware common law on the issue of  "shareholder ratification".

In a rare reversal of the Chancery Court,  the Supreme Court determined that the breach of fiduciary duty claims in this case should be allowed to proceed, and explained why the board should not enjoy the presumption of the business judgment rule at this stage of the proceedings,  based on the pled facts (contrary to the Chancery Court's dismissal of the case, based on an earlier opinion summarized here.)

 The Supreme Court's own succinct  introductory summary to its opinion follows:

The plaintiffs in this breach of fiduciary duty action, who are certain shareholders of First Niles Financial, Inc. (“First Niles” or the “Company”), appeal from the dismissal of their complaint by the Court of Chancery The complaint alleges that the defendants, who are officers and directors of First Niles, violated their fiduciary duties by rejecting a valuable opportunity to sell the Company, deciding instead to reclassify the Company’s shares in order to benefit themselves, and by disseminating a materially misleading proxy statement to induce shareholder approval. We conclude that the complaint pleads sufficient facts to overcome the business judgment presumption, and to state substantive fiduciary duty and disclosure claims. We therefore reverse the Court of Chancery’s judgment of dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

 The distilled essence of the factual genesis of this case is the decision of the Board of First Niles Financial  to sell itself, but thereafter not taking seriously three offers that it received, and instead appearing to favor a privatization or a reclassification plan. The three basic claims in the complaint were that the board members breached their fiduciary duties to the First Niles shareholders by rejecting an offer from a potential buyer and abandoning the sale of the company.  Secondly, the claim was that the defendant directors breached their fiduciary duty of disclosure by disseminating a materially false and misleading proxy regarding the reclassification. Third, the amended complaint alleges that it was a breach of fiduciary duty to implement the reclassification plan.

The Chancery Court dismissed the amended complaint, ruling that it failed to allege facts that were sufficient to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule and for failing to establish that the proxy was materially false and misleading, as well as based on the argument that the shareholders “ratified “ the decision of the board to reclassify the shares.

The Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s grant of the motion to dismiss on a “de novo basis”  to determine whether “the trial judge erred as a matter of law in formulating or applying legal precepts.”

Although Count I of the complaint alleged that the directors breached their duties of loyalty and care by abandoning the sale of the bank in order to retain the benefits of incumbency, the trial court concluded that the Unocal  standard did not apply because the complaint did not allege any “defensive” action by the board. The trial court also determined that the entire fairness review was not applicable because the board did not interpose itself between the shareholders and a potential acquirer by means of defensive measures, and thus  the trial court applied the business judgment standard and concluded that the allegations in the complaint failed to rebut the presumption of business judgment.

The Supreme Court upheld the Chancery Court’s refusal to apply the Unocal standard because the essence of the transaction at issue was not defensive and the initial count in the complaint was based on disloyalty as opposed to defensive conduct. Nor does Count I allege any hostile takeover attempt or similar threatened external action from which it could be inferred that the defendants acted defensively, despite the allegation that they improperly delayed or sabotaged the due diligence process.

The Business Judgment Rule

Next, the Supreme Court addressed whether the trial court appropriately found that the plaintiff did not satisfy the burden of pleading facts sufficient to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule that  “in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.” (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).

Delaware’s High Court recognized that a board is generally entitled to the presumption of the business judgment rule in declining a merger opportunity because implicit in the statutory authority of the board to propose a merger, is also the power to decline a merger.

In order to determine whether the board merits the business judgment presumption, the court makes a two-part analysis. First, did the board reach its decision in the good faith pursuit a legitimate corporate interest. Second, did the board do so advisedly (see footnotes 29 to 31).

The first prong of the analysis requires that the duty of loyalty be examined. In this case, the plaintiff alleges that the directors had a disqualifying self-interest because they were financially motivated to maintain the status quo and to keep their current positions. The Supreme Court was wary of such an argument which it recognized to be tautological, to some extent, because a board decision to reject a merger proposal could always enable plaintiff to assert that a majority of the directors had an entrenchment motive. For that reason, the court explained that in addition to that argument, other facts that support a disloyal motive must be stated.

The Supreme Court determined that a sufficient showing to establish disloyalty at least at this early procedural stage was demonstrated. The court reasoned that the pled facts were sufficient to establish the disloyalty of at least three of the directors, which suffices to rebut the business judgment presumption because in this case three of the directors constituted a majority. Also, for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) there was a sufficient “director-specific analysis” to demonstrate that a majority of the board was conflicted based on specific alleged conduct from which a duty of loyalty violation can reasonably be inferred. The court recites in detail in its opinion specific facts about each individual director and why such allegations support a conflict.

Officers Share Same Fiduciary Duties as Directors

Importantly, in this decision, the Delaware Supreme Court for the first time explicitly holds, what has been implicitly stated previously and has been also acknowledged by the Delaware Chancery Court, and that is: “officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and the fiduciary duties of officers are the same of directors.” (See footnote 36, but also note footnote 37 which acknowledges that DGCL Section 102(b)(7) does not exculpate officers from liability for breaches of their duty of care in the current statutory provision.)

On the issue of whether a delay in the due diligence process was a breach of the fiduciary duty of the directors, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court. The Supreme Court explained that  on a motion to dismiss, the trial court is “not free to disregard that reasonable inference, or to discount it by weighing it against other, perhaps contrary inferences that might also be drawn,” making reference to the decision of the trial court that a delay of a couple of weeks could not be the basis for a breach of fiduciary duties.

Disclosure Violations Held Material

In addition, the Supreme Court determined that the proxy disclosures concerning the deliberations of the board about the offer that was rejected, were materially misleading. The court reviewed the materiality standard and reached a different conclusion than the trial court, thus allowing that claim to proceed.

Duty of Loyalty Claim Allowed to Proceed

Lastly, the Supreme Court also reversed the trial court’s decision on Count III of the complaint which alleged that the directors breached their duty of loyalty by recommending the reclassification proposal to shareholders for purely self-interested reasons (that is, to enlarge their ability to engage in stock buy-backs and to trigger appraisal rights). The Supreme Court reasoned that the trial court’s ruling on “shareholder ratification grounds” was in error for two reasons. First, because a shareholder vote was required to amend the certificate of incorporation, without the approving vote it could not operate to “ratify” the challenged conduct of the interested directors. Second, the claim that the reclassification proxy contained a material misrepresentation, eliminates the essential prerequisite for applying the ratification doctrine, namely, that the shareholder vote was fully informed.

Common Law Shareholder Ratification Doctrine Clarified and Enunciated

The Supreme Court recognized that the current scope and effect of the common law doctrine of “shareholder ratification”  in Delaware is unclear. Thus, in order to

“restore coherence and clarity to this area of our law, we hold that the scope of the shareholder ratification doctrine must be limited to its so-called ‘classic’ form; that is, to circumstances where a fully informed shareholder vote approves director action that does not legally require shareholder approval in order to become legally effective. Moreover the only director action or conduct that can be ratified is that which the shareholders are specifically asked to approve. With one exception, the “cleansing” effect of such a ratifying shareholder vote is to subject the challenged director action to business judgment review, as opposed to “extinguishing” the claim altogether (i.e., obviating all judicial review of the challenged action.) " 

(emphasis in italics and underlining are mine)(See footnotes 52 through 54 for supporting citations).

Moreover, yet another major judicial statement in this opinion is contained in footnote 54. Referring to the last sentence in the foregoing block quote, footnote 54 states that “to the extent that Smith v. Van Gorkom holds otherwise, it is overruled.” (488 A.2d 858, 889-90 (Del. 1985)). Of special note in footnote 54 also is the clarification that the references in this opinion only refer to the common law  doctrine of shareholder ratification and are not intended to alter the jurisprudence governing the approving vote of disinterested shareholders pursuant to Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.

Much more can be written, and much more will be written, about this very momentous decision that announces very substantial clarifying statements of Delaware corporate law. This summary is already longer than most blog posts but I look forward to linking to additional scholarly commentary by others.
UPDATE: Prof. Usha Rodrigues on The Conglomerate blog comments on the case here and  she links to her own article on the topic as well as to seminal writings on the issue by Prof. Lyman Johnson here.   The Unincorporated Business Law Prof Blog comments on the case here. Also,  Prof. Lawrence Cunningham on the Concurring Opinions blog comments, with some aggregation of other remarks about the case, here.

UPDATE II: Here is a post about the opinion on DealLawyers Blog which agrees it is an important decision.

Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal of Disclosure, Loyalty and Care Claims against Sumner Redstone In Viacom and Blockbuster Deal

 Pfeffer v. Redstone, (Del. Supr., Jan. 23, 2009), read opinion here. We are fortunate to have a review of this recent Supreme Court decision by nationally-prominent Delaware lawyer Kevin Brady.

The Delaware Supreme Court in this decision affirmed the Chancery Court's dismissal of claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) against Sumner Redstone and others, in connection with a transaction involving Viacom and Blockbuster, based on duties of disclosure, loyalty and care. The trial court's  opinion was summarized here.

 Plaintiff Beverly Pfeffer had filed a class action against the directors of Viacom (including Sumner Redstone, Chairman and CEO of Viacom), Blockbuster, National Amusements, Inc. (“NAI”) (the controlling stockholder of Viacom) and CBS Corporation in alleging that, in connection with two transactions (a special dividend and an exchange offer), the Viacom Board had breached their fiduciary duties of disclosure, loyalty, and care and that NAI had breached its duty of loyalty by making false statements or material omissions in documents distributed before an October 2004 exchange offer. Chief Justice Steele, writing for the Court, affirmed Vice Chancellor Lamb’s February 1, 2008 decision that the plaintiff had failed to show that the alleged disclosure violations were material.

By way of background, Sumner Redstone owned a controlling interest in NAI, which owned a controlling interest in Viacom, which in turn owned a controlling interest in Blockbuster. In February 2004, Viacom announced that it intended to spin off 81.5% of its interest in Blockbuster and as part of its divestiture plans it proposed two transactions: (i) a special $5 dividend paid to Blockbuster (the Special Dividend); and (ii) a offer to Viacom stockholders to exchange their Viacom stock for Blockbuster stock (the Exchange Offer).

In September 2004, Viacom issued a press release disclosing the terms of the voluntary Exchange Offer. A Prospectus later released disclosed that: (i) NAI would not participate in the Exchange Offer; (ii) there were several potential risks associated with the acquiring Blockbuster stock, including Blockbuster’s potential ability to operate with increased debt imposed by the Special Dividend; (iii) a special committee comprised of three independent directors had recommended that the entire Blockbuster Board approve the Special Dividend and the Exchange Offer; (iv) the special committee had approved the final terms of the divestiture; and (v) neither Viacom nor Blockbuster made a recommendation to stockholders about the Exchange Offer. After the Exchange Offer, Blockbuster struggled to remain profitable and eventually it had to restate its reported cash flows for years 2003 through 2005. Thereafter, plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of all former Viacom shareholders who tendered their shares in the exchange offer.

Plaintiff alleged that the Special Dividend and the Exchange Offer should be subject to entire fairness scrutiny because NAI, as the controlling stockholder of Viacom, put its interests over those of the minority shareholders and it stood on both sides of the transaction. The Supreme Court agreed with the Chancery Court in finding that the Viacom Directors had structured the deal noncoercively and had disclosed all material facts. While the Exchange Offer was made to the minority shareholders, the Board did not recommend in the Prospectus that those stockholders exchange their shares. Moreover, the Exchange Offer was voluntary and the Prospectus disclosed that NAI was not going to participate.

Plaintiff also claimed that the Viacom Directors breached their duty of disclosure in a several instances regarding: (i) Blockbuster’s operational cash flow problems: (ii) that the Viacom Board “knew or should have known” of the Blockbuster operational cash flow problems and that the divestiture would leave Blockbuster unable to meet its financial obligations: and (iii) the exchange ratio methodology and the composition of the special committee. The Supreme Court agreed with the Chancery Court that the plaintiff had failed to meet her burden.

The Supreme Court found that the Plaintiff failed to allege: (i) any basis by which the alleged reclassification of Blockbuster’s cash flow affected Blockbuster’s “earnings, total cash flow, net income or any other accounting measure;” (ii) that anyone relied on the cash flow analysis that led to the reclassification or that the announced restatement caused a market price decline for Blockbuster’s stock; (iii) that the cash flow analysis performed by a midlevel treasury manager of a subsidiary corporation would be routinely available to the Viacom directors.

With respect to the issue about disclosure of the exchange ratio, the Supreme Court agreed with Vice Chancellor Lamb’s analysis that Viacom’s method for deriving the ratio was not material because the Viacom directors did not represent that the price was fair nor recommended that the minority shareholders participate. Finally with respect to the issue of the disclosure of the composition of the special committee, the Supreme Court determined that a single reference to the special committee in the Prospectus was not material because the Prospectus did not suggest that the committee had decided anything more significant than what the full board could have decided. As the result, the dismissal of the disclosure claims was affirmed.  

Lastly, notable for its likelihood to be of broad interest, is concluding footnote 52 that refers to the duties of majority shareholders, depending on whether they use their majority ownership to direct the actions of the corporation.

Selected Key Corporate and Commercial Delaware Decisions in 2008

My annual review of selected key corporate and commercial Delaware decisions in 2008 is here. The Delaware Law Weekly published it in its current issue. (Due to its length, this week only Part I appeared and next week the second half of the article will be published.)

My short reviews for each of the last three years, are available  here, here and here.

Top 5 Delaware Cases from 2008--Rebuttal to Professor Brown

Last year,  I replied to Professor J. Robert Brown's list of the top 5 Delaware cases that, in his view, supported his negative perspective of Delaware law that remains the constant refrain on his blog called: The Race to the Bottom.

My introductory explanation from my rebuttal of last year was as follows:

... I realize that there are many more qualified experts who can rebut the professor's arguments far more persuasively than I, and I am well aware that the Delaware bench certainly does not need my help to defend it. Nor have I been anointed by anyone to take on this role. Nonetheless, having just completed a review of key 2007 Delaware corporate decisions, I offer my own humble rebuttal and a "counter-list" of 5 cases in 2007 that demonstrate that the Delaware courts take shareholder rights and the duties of directors very seriously. If any readers can think of a better "top 5" list, than the one I compiled below, I welcome comments. Here is my top 5 "rebuttal list":

Well, I just finished my 4th annual overview of selected Delaware corporate and commercial cases for  2008, which will be published soon in The Delaware Law Weekly, at which time I will also post it on these pages. I also just saw Professor's Brown list of 5 cases from 2008 that he uses to support his unabashedly unflattering views of Delaware law. Here is his list and here is his introductory post.

My cursory review of the cases I selected below (from the approximately 200 or so that I have summarized on this blog during 2008), is not as scholarly as the good professor's treatment, and I do not have the time (thankfully, due to my busy practice) to engage in extended debate (at least for the next week or so), but until someone else picks up the baton, I offer the following cases to counterbalance the list offered by Professor Brown. I invite others to suggest other cases that they would rather see in my "top 5 list".

  •  In Cargill, Inc. v. JWH Special Circumstance, LLC, (Del. Ch., Nov. 7, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Chancery Court issued a 68-page decision involving a Delaware statutory trust (formerly referred to as a business trust), and found that common law fiduciary duties would apply to a trustee as a "default rule" in light of the agreement among the parties being silent on the issue. Here is a more complete summary.
  • In Julian v. Eastern States Construction Service, Inc.,  2008 WL 2673300 (Del. Ch., July 8, 2008), read opinion here, the Chancery Court required directors to disgorge a $1.3 million bonus they had given themselves in a self-interested manner, without any independent protections, and based on their failure to satisfy their burden to demonstrate the entire fairness of their decision. Here is a more complete summary.
  •  In Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Company, (Del. Ch., July 29, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Chancery Court  found that at the procedural stage of a summary judgment motion, it would allow to proceed to trial the issue of whether the independent directors should be exposed to personal liability  for their role in the sale of the company--despite selling the company to the only known buyer for a substantial premium. A whole article could be written on this case alone, and substantial commentary has already been penned about it. An equally weighty later decision denying a motion for reargument was summarized here. The case is now on appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court.
  • In Steel Partners II, L.P. v. Point Blank Solutions, Inc., 2008 WL 3522431 (Aug. 12, 2008),  the initial complaint was filed to force the holding of a shareholders meeting (which had not taken place since 2005), pursuant to DGCL Section 211. After a stipulation was entered into for a date to hold the meeting, the defendant moved for leave of court to postpone the date of the meeting by 90 days. The Chancery Court denied the request. The request was based on allegations that the plaintiff and its CEO together own about 40% of the stock and would attempt to install their own directors and then seek to buy the company at the lowest possible price for its own investors. In addition, the postponement was requested due to an alleged conflict that the plaintiff's CEO had with the majority. The court reasoned that the best way to deal with the issues presented was to communicate them to the shareholders and let them decide, based on those facts, who they wanted as directors--instead of further delaying the exercise of the shareholder franchise, which under Delaware law is sacrosanct. The summary of the case on my blog is here.

  • London v. Tyrrell, 2008 WL 2505435 (Del. Ch., June 24, 2008), read opinion here. This Chancery Court decision explained in detail the reasons why it denied a motion to dismiss a derivative claim based on Chancery Court Rules 9(b), 12(b)(6) and 23.1. The derivative complaint alleged that the defendants caused the company to issue stock options in contravention of an equity incentive plan by setting the exercise price of the issued options at an unfairly low value.After a thorough factual background description, the court emphasized that: “the burden remains on the movant to demonstrate that the plaintiff has not met the requirements of Rules 9(b), 12(b)(6) and 23.1." (see footnote 12). Moreover, the court described in detail the demand futility analysis under  the seminal case of Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) as well as Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993). The court explained the reasons why it concluded, as succinctly as I have seen it done, that both prongs of the Aronson case were satisfied. Specifically, the plaintiff demonstrated a reasonable doubt that: (1) the directors were interested and independent; or (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.
    The first prong was satisfied because the directors had a financial interest in the challenged stock option plan and also because they stood on both sides of the transaction that was challenged. Moreover, the second prong was satisfied because the allegations rebutted the business judgment rule to the extent that the allegations supported an inference that the directors intended to violate the terms of a stockholder approved option plan. The court also dismissed the arguments under Rule 9(b) that there was insufficient particularity regarding fraud allegations which apparently relied on Sections 152 and 157(b) of the DGCL.

UPDATE: The Wall Street Journal online highlighted this post here. 

UPDATE II:   The Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog  published this post here.

UPDATE III:  Forbes. com  highlighted this post  here.

Delaware Supreme Court Polices Trial Practices of Prosecutors

Hardy v. State, (Del. Supr., Dec. 9, 2008), read opinion here. Why, one might ask, is a criminal decision on this business litigation blog? This decision is relevant to this blog to the extent it demonstrates how the Delaware Supreme Court polices, on appeal, the conduct of lawyers at trial, in connection with its consideration of trial issues during appellate review. In this case, despite what would be despicable acts if found to be true, Delaware's High Court reversed a criminal conviction for rape because the prosecutor's statements interfered with one of the important aspects of a trial-- namely, a fair, truth-seeking process.

Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Delaware Tax on Ford Motor Company

In Ford Motor Company v. Department of Revenue, (Del. Supr., Dec. 8, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the imposition of a Delaware tax on certain sales by Ford in the State of Delaware. (One might observe that Ford has not had much good news lately).

Here is a very short excerpt from the High Court's opinion describing the lower court decision it upheld:

... the Director [of Revenue for the State of Delaware] may lawfully impose an unapportioned tax on Ford’s receipts from sales of motor vehicles sold to independent dealerships located in Delaware.

The arcane minutiae of state taxation is beyond the scope of this blog, but this decision is clearly included within the broad scope of  "commercial litigation in Delaware", so I wanted to at least make passing reference to it here, and for those interested, the link to the whole opinion is above. Of course, the issues addressed in this opinion have potentially far-reaching impact on many companies across the country doing business in Delaware to the extent that this opinion deals with whether a certain state tax interferes with interstate commerce and whether that tax runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution's protection of that commerce.

Supreme Court Reverses Appraisal Opinion

In Crescent/Mach I Partners L.P. v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Texas, (Del. Supr., December 1, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court (in a rare occurrence) reversed the Chancery Court on a procedurally unusual basis in an appraisal case that was previously highlighted on this blog here. (That summary also includes links to prior opinions in the case). In a nutshell, the Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the trial court that had merely fixed a computational error pursuant to Rule 60(a). The High Court's reasoning was based primarily on the fact that the case had already been settled, so the matter was moot. The appellate opinion also includes a short explanation of the Discounted Cash Flow method of valuation (DCF) that was used by the trial court.

 The parties entered into a settlement shortly after the trial court entered a final judgment in the appraisal case and after the trial court dismissed a related fiduciary duty claim. After the settlement, one of the parties applied to the trial court under Chancery Court Rule 60 to modify what it argued was a clerical error in the computation (which was discovered by a disinterested person who was writing an article about the case). The opposing party argued that the error was substantive. The trial court relied on  In re IBP, S’holders Litig., 793 A.2d 396, 397 (Del. Ch. 2002), aff’d by Tyson Foods v. Aetos Corp., 818 A.2d 145, 148 (Del. 2003).

Delaware's High Court reasoned that:

IBP is inapposite. The IBP court’s pronouncement that judicial decisions are public documents was for the purpose of explaining why a party cannot use a settlement to seek vacatur of pre-settlement rulings. Although judicial decisions are public records, that fact cannot empower a court to modify a judgment rendered moot by settlement, even if the judgment contains errors. To hold otherwise would distort the doctrine of mootness and undercut the finality of settlements.

Also included in this opinion is a useful discussion of the impact, if any, of a recorded decision that precedes a settlement, as well as "justiciability" and "mootness" in general. Compare generally, a recent Chancery Court decision about vacatur highlighted here.

Supreme Court Addresses Issue of Immorality

In Lehto v. Board of Education of the Caesar Rodney School District, (Del. Supr., Dec. 2, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the issue of immorality in connection with upholding the dismissal of a school teacher based on what was described as immoral conduct primarily engaged in by the teacher outside of the classroom, but with a nexus to the teacher's role in both the school and the community in general.

So what relevance does this case have to this blog on corporate and commercial litigation?

The answer is that legal ethics is one of the topics covered on these pages as part of business litigation generally, and although this particular aspect of legal ethics was not addressed in any way in the court's opinion, I am confident that the discussion of the nexus between the immorality of a teacher's conduct outside the classroom and that teacher's role in the community and effectiveness as a teacher (which is discussed in this opinion), may be used by analogy in some hypothetical case in the future that might involve an issue about whether the actions of a lawyer at home or  "off the job" have any bearing on his or her fitness and qualifications to be a lawyer. See generally, for example, Rules of Professional Conduct 8.3(a) and 8.4(b)(referring to misconduct that calls into question one's "fitness as a lawyer").

Supreme Court Denies Claim Against Landowner Based on Premises Guest Statute

 Berns  v. Doan, (Del. Supr., Nov. 10, 2008), read opinion here, is a decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in which it was determined that the Premises Guest Statute barred the personal injury claim by a trespasser, as opposed to a public invitee, on another's property. This opinion by Delaware's High Court, sitting en banc, should be of interest to landowners who want to know what the applicable standard of review is that courts in Delaware will use if someone is injured on one's property, depending on whether the status of the injured party on one's property is regarded as a public invitee or a trespasser.

Supreme Court Upholds Limitations on Relief Due to Unclean Hands

 In Reserves Development LLC v. Severn Savings Bank, FSB, (Del. Supr., Oct. 21, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Chancery Court to grant only partial interim injunctive relief to a joint venture partner in a real estate development "gone bad" . The parsimonious provision of equitable relief, based on an unjust enrichment theory, pending resolution of a companion case for legal relief in Superior Court, was due to several equitable factors related to the self-help employed by the plaintiff, such as, in part, what was deemed to be unclean hands.

The decision of the Chancery Court, which provides many more details about this factually intensive case, including the denial of a Motion for Reargument, was briefly highlighted on this blog here. The High Court also upheld the denial of pre-judgment interest due, in part,  to the lack of a timely request for same either in the Amended Complaint or in the post-trial briefing.
 

Delaware Supreme Court Interprets "License" and "Assignment" in Patent Agreements

 In Motorola Inc. v. Amkor Technology, Inc., (Del. Supr., Oct. 8, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted patent agreements that turned on an interpretation of the meanings in the context of those agreements, of the words "license" and "assignment".  Key contract interpretation principles, applicable generally to many types of cases, make this a useful decision for a business lawyer's toolbox.

Delaware's High Court also applied "trade usage" to interpret ambiguous terms in the agreement. (See page 8 of slip op.) Also, the Court recognized that there is a rule of construction that specific clauses carry more weight than general clauses (see  Restatement (First) of  Contracts, Section 236, which has been renumbered to Section 203 in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts). However, that rule is only a "secondary rule" that applies only after Sections 230 and 233 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts. Section 233(b) provides that:

Where a party manifests his intention ambiguously, knowing or having reason to know that the manifestation may reasonably bear more than one meaning, and the other party believes it to bear one of those meanings, having no reason to know that it may bear another  that meaning is given to it.

Slip op. at 17.

The Court also addressed the doctrines of equitable estoppel and "the law of the case".

Delaware v. New York on Dissolution of LLCs

In Re Seneca Investments, LLC, 2008 WL 4329230 (Del. Ch., Sept. 23, 2008), is a Delaware Chancery Court decision about the unsuccessful attempt to petition the court for the dissolution of an LLC,  that I summarized briefly here.

Here is an in depth analysis of the case and a comparison on Peter Mahler's New York Business Divorce Blog  of how the New York courts may differ in their interpretation of the dissolution provisions of the LLC statute, noting that Section 18-802 of the Delaware LLC Act is very close to the analogous section of the NY LLC Act.

I am extremely grateful for the hat tip on the New York Business Divorce Blog which credited me for first summarizing the case and further described my blog as: "...  the premier online resource for coverage of the Delaware Chancery Court."

 

 

Supreme Court Clarifies Writs of Certiorari Procedures and Policy

In Maddrey v. Justice of the Peace Court 13, (Del. Supr., Sept. 5, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court provides a "Guide for Practitioners" on Writs of Certiorari. Although the High Court's scholarly treatment of this somewhat arcane--but practical and necessary--topic, is more thorough than I can cover in this short post, a helpful reminder for business litigators is that when a landlord is attempting to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent, called a "summary possession" proceeding in Delaware, the Justice of the Peace Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over such actions. The only appeal of a trial on that action is to a three-person Justice of the Peace panel. The trial options end there based on the General Assembly's statutory framework for this type of proceeding. No traditional appellate review of such a case is available.

Rather, the court discusses the limited and restricted option of a writ of certiorari which is NOT an appeal de novo. Other types of cases from the Justice of the Peace Court are often appealable de novo, however, to the Court of Common Pleas for the State of Delaware.

An erudite analysis of other applications of a writ of certiorari, and  its historic origins, is also included in this important decision that is essential reading for any Delaware lawyer who wants a complete understanding of Delaware practice and procedure, including appeals from various state agencies to the Delaware Superior Court.

Liability of Joint Tortfeasors for Pre-Judgment Interest and Contribution

Christiana Care Health Services, Inc. v. Connor, et al., (Del. Ch., Aug. 4, 2008), read opinion here,  and Encite LLC v. Soni, (Del. Ch., Aug. 1, 2008), read opinion here, are recent opinions of the Delaware Supreme Court and Delaware Chancery Court, respectively, that deal with procedural and substantive aspects of imposing liability on joint defendants.

In Christina Care, Delaware's High Court interpreted Section 2301(d) of Title 6 of the Delaware Code that relates to pre-judgment interest when a settlement demand is made in an amount less than the amount of damages awarded in a judgment. In this Supreme Court case, a pre-trial settlement offer was made to each defendant in the amount of $1.25 million each (which was not accepted) but the jury award was $2 million jointly for both defendants. Consistent with its recent ruling in Cahall v. Thomas (see summary here), regarding Rule 68 and pre-trial offers of judgment, the Supreme Court reasoned that because the $2 million judgment was a common liability of both defendants which the plaintiff could collect in full from either one, regardless of how the jury apportioned the fault, the entitlement to pre-judgment interest would apply.

 In the Encite LLC case, the Chancery Court addressed the right to contribution between joint tortfeasors, and at footnote 76 refers to cases that confirmed the right to contribution as being governed by the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Law that has as an inherent requirement that the parties are jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property. See Section 6301 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code.

Delaware Supreme Court's 1971 opinion in Sinclair Oil v. Levien, Subject of Law Review Article

Courtesy of Professor Bainbridge is a link to an article by Professor Bob Thompson on the seminal  Delaware Supreme Court decision in Sinclair Oil v. Levien, from 1971, that addressed key issues of fiduciary duty and judicial review standards. Here is an excerpt from a quote that Professor B. included in his post about the article.

Sinclair provides room for “selfish” ownership for a majority shareholder, so long as the minority shareholders receive a proportional benefit, a standard that at the time seemed to expand the discretion for majority shareholders. Viewed from a point decades later, this part of Sinclair has not proved to be a template for broader applications and other doctrines have developed to constrain the actions of majority shareholders.

Keywords: director action, judicial review of corporate action, business judgment rule, intrinsic fairness, enhanced scrutiny, controlling shareholders, fiduciary duty

UPDATE: Here is an insightful analysis by Professor Larry Ribstein of the Sinclair case highlighted in Professor  Thompson's article. A quote  from Professor R's extensive discussion of the "contract aspect of the case"  follows:

Once you’re outside of fiduciary land, as you are in Sinclair, parties in a commercial relationship can act selfishly to each other, governed by their contracts. Sometimes the contract is implied and not obvious. But the court should look hard for these contractual guideposts. The fog of fiduciary language often obscures the search. This is the basic lesson of Sinclair

Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal As Penalty for Failure to Comply with Discovery

In Hoag v. Amex Insurance Company, (Del. Supr., July 21, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the trial court's imposition of the penalty of dismissal of a complaint against a plaintiff that failed repeatedly to comply with orders compelling discovery of data that was key to the claims and defenses in the case. The Court recited in detail the multiple orders that the appellant simply failed to comply with depsite ample opportunity.

Delaware's High Court acknowledged the severity of the penalty but reasoned that it  was warranted in light of the circumstances. The opinion includes "good quotable" language about the importance to the legal system of compliance with discovery obligations.

Supreme Court Decides SEC-presented Delaware Bylaw Issue

CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, (Del. Supr., July 17, 2008), read opinion here.(Revised opinion dated August 15, 2008, available here.)

This Delaware Supreme Court  decision has been anticipated by the corporate legal world with great interest since oral arguments were heard by Delaware's High Court last week.  My post with some background can be found here.  More background discussion of prior Delaware decisions that have addressed related issues, as provided by Professor Bainbridge, can be found here.

In sum, a shareholder of CA, Inc., the trillion dollar pension fund of AFSCME, proposed a bylaw amendment that would require the company to reimburse the shareholder for expenses related to nominating a less than full slate to the board of directors.

Here are the two issues presented by the SEC to the Delaware Supreme Court in a procedure authorized last year and now used for the first time:

1. Is the AFSCME Proposal a proper subject for action by shareholders as a matter of Delaware law?

2. Would the AFSCME Proposal, if adopted, cause CA to violate any Delaware law to which it is subject?

Bottom line of the decision: Yes and yes. Although bylaws, in general,  are permissibly used to address the process and procedures related to board elections, in the particular circumstances of this case, the bylaw proposed would impermissibly restrict the managerial and fiduciary duties of the board. However, the court suggested other means by which the shareholder could achieve the same goal in a way that would be consistent with Delaware law: for example, amend the certificate of incorporation.

 Here is the court's reasoning, in part, for its affirmative answer to the first question:

The shareholders of a Delaware corporation have the right “to participate in selecting the contestants” for election to the board. The shareholders are entitled to facilitate the exercise of that right by proposing a bylaw that would encourage candidates other than board-sponsored nominees to stand for election. The Bylaw would accomplish that by committing the corporation to reimburse the election expenses of shareholders whose candidates are successfully elected. That the implementation of that proposal would require the expenditure of corporate funds will not, in and of itself, make such a bylaw an improper subject matter for shareholder action. Accordingly, we answer the first question certified to us in the affirmative.

That, however, concludes only part of the analysis. The DGCL also requires that the Bylaw be “not inconsistent with law.” Accordingly, we turn to the second certified question, which is whether the proposed Bylaw, if adopted, would cause CA to violate any Delaware law to which it is subject. (footnotes omitted).

For its affirmative answer to the second question, the court provided the following reasoning:

... the Bylaw mandates reimbursement of election expenses in circumstances that a proper application of fiduciary principles could preclude. That such circumstances could arise is not far fetched. Under Delaware law, a board may expend corporate funds to reimburse proxy expenses “[w]here the controversy is concerned with a question of policy as distinguished
from personnel o[r] management.” But in a situation where the proxy contest is motivated by personal or petty concerns, or to promote interests that do not further, or are adverse to, those of the corporation, the board’s fiduciary duty could compel that reimbursement be denied altogether.

It is in this respect that the proposed Bylaw, as written, would violate Delaware law if enacted by CA’s shareholders. As presently drafted, the Bylaw would afford CA’s directors full discretion to determine what amount of reimbursement is appropriate, because the directors would be obligated to grant only the “reasonable” expenses of a successful short slate. Unfortunately, that does not go far enough, because the Bylaw contains no language or provision that would reserve to CA’s directors their full power to exercise their fiduciary duty to decide whether or not it would be appropriate, in a specific case, to award
reimbursement at all.
(footnotes omitted)

Footnote 14 which directly addresses the issue of:  "what is the scope of shareholder action that Section 109(b) permits [regarding bylaws] yet does not improperly intrude upon the directors’ power to manage a corporation’s business and affairs under Section 141(a),"   explains exactly what the court did--and did not--decide:

 We do not attempt to delineate the location of that bright line in this Opinion. What we do
hold is case specific; that is, wherever may be the location of the bright line that separates the shareholders’ bylaw-making power under Section 109 from the directors’ exclusive managerial authority under Section 141(a), the proposed Bylaw at issue here does not invade the territory demarcated by Section 141(a).

One of the great things about covering this area of the law on this blog is that many experts in the field cover the same issues, so I can link to their scholarly analysis as a supplement (and sometimes in place of) any comments I have. A few samples of the corporate law professors who have already provided scholarly analysis of this opinion within hours of its release, are: here, here, here, here and here.

 

 

 I invite readers to tell me if they are aware of any other state's highest court that can be counted on, predictably, to render such a weighty decision within a week of hearing oral argument--and when the briefs were only submitted a mere two (2) days prior to oral argument.
 

UPDATE: As one would expect, an enormous amount of high quality commentary continues apace in the blogosphere about this case, and I may update this post or supplement it in the coming days. Also, as an aside, perhaps I will never get accustomed to it, as I am still thrilled when one of my posts is quoted by a luminary like Professor Bainbridge, as he was kind enough to do today here.

Supreme Court Reverses Summary Judgment on Negligence Claim

Hazel v. Delaware Supermarkets, Inc., (Del. Supr., July 14, 2008), read opinion here. While most of the corporate legal world is awaiting the Delaware Supreme Court's expedited decision on the SEC-related issue argued before it last week, today the court published an unrelated decision that reversed a trial court's grant of summary judgment that dismissed a negligence claim.

The decision is relevant to this blog because negligence claims "not infrequently" arise in connection with business disputes, and the de novo standard of review when a summary judgment has been granted below to dismiss a case is a useful appellate review analysis for one to be aware of generally.

Delaware Supreme Court Hears Bylaw Issue Presented by SEC

Courtesy of the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog , Professor J.W. Verret provides a summary of the oral arguments yesterday before the Delaware Supreme Court on a bylaw issue presented to the Court by the SEC. Here is a short prior post  with background on this historic "collaboration" between the SEC and the Delaware Supreme Court.

Professor Verret's post follows:

AFSCME Employees Pension Plan submitted a shareholder proposal for inclusion in CA’s proxy materials for their annual meeting scheduled to be held on September 9, 2008. That proposal sought to amend CA’s bylaws to require the company to reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred by a dissident nominating a rival slate of directors, provided that at least one nominee from the dissident slate was victorious. CA sought no-action relief from the SEC permitting it to exclude that proposal under Rule 14a-8 as illegal under Delaware law, and the SEC certified the question to the Delaware Supreme Court.

The Court’s opinion stands to re-define the nature of corporate federalism and ring in a new collaborative relationship between the Delaware Courts and the SEC. Indeed, it may encourage the SEC to include more state law carve-outs in future rule-making.

I wrote an essay (available here) on this issue in March predicting that the SEC would certify the bylaw question to Delaware soon. For more on the growing trend of shareholder democracy behind this challenge, see Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie: Majority Voting, Corporate Ballot Access, and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined (available here). For more on bylaws, see Profs. Coates and Faris’s work (Second-Generation Shareholder Bylaws: Post-Quickturn Alternatives, 56 Bus. Law. 1323 (2001) (with B. Faris)) and Prof. Hamermesh’s article (available here). Anticipating that the opinion in this difficult case might make use of dicta guidance, see also my article with Chief Justice Steele on the Delaware Guidance Function (available here).

This post summarizes a very lively oral argument in Dover, Delaware this morning. The Justices and the parties displayed a rigorous command of this intricate subject, working in a very short timeframe. It was a fascinating to watch these masters of the Delaware General Corporation Law at the height of their craft.

Arguing on behalf of Computer Associates was Robert Guiffra of Sullivan & Cromwell. His presentation focused on two key issues: first, he argued that this bylaw does not relate to an election of directors, but merely comes into play after the election, and thus is not protected by the principles in the Blasius line of cases. As a mandated payment of expenses it relates to control of the corporate treasury, part of the business and affairs of the corporation as defined in Rule 141(a). As such, limitations on the Board’s authority may only appear in its Certificate of Incorporation, not its bylaws. Second, he argued that the Board must be permitted to make a determination of whether a reimbursement was consistent with its fiduciary duty, where this bylaw mandated payment under all circumstances.

Arguing on behalf of AFSCME was Michael Barry of Grant & Eisenhofer. His presentation focused on two key issues: first, he argued that this bylaw relates to an election, implicates the shareholder franchise and Blasius review, and is not a part of the ordinary business affairs of the corporation. As such, it does not undermine the Board’s authority under section 141. He also argued that where directors are mandated to reimburse expenses, they cannot be doing so for the purposes of entrenchment, and thus cannot logically do so in violation of their fiduciary duties. He also cited Delaware’s approval of mandatory indemnification bylaws as binding precedent on this issue.

Both Counsel admitted that, though the bylaw was unclear, reimbursement of expenses for the full contest and not just for the successful nominee was anticipated. Both parties also skillfully argued that the Court need not permanently resolve any looming contradiction between section 109 and section 141(a) to rule in their favor. Section 109 of the DGCL grants shareholders the right to adopt bylaws, and section 141(a) reads that “the business and affairs of every corporation…shall be managed by…a board of directors.” Thus, the oft referenced “recursive loop” in which a bylaw adopted under section 109 might limit a board’s authority under 141(a). The Court nevertheless asked counsel’s opinion concerning the intent of the legislature in creating two conceivably conflicting sections of the code.

Questions from the Court during oral argument make any predictions difficult. The Justices pushed counsel for CA over whether the prospect of reimbursement was inextricably linked to the success of an election, and whether the bylaw would be legal if adopted by the Board. The Justices pushed counsel for AFSCME over whether there might be any circumstances under which a bylaw could force inequitable reimbursement and whether the Board’s authority to adopt bylaws was co-extensive with that of shareholders. Interestingly, Justice Berger, when she served as a Vice Chancellor, suggested in dicta that stockholders create a bylaw limiting the board’s power to amend a stockholder adopted bylaw in American Int’l Rent a Car, an opinion from 1984, which may indicate her view on whether the right to adopt bylaws is co-extensive. The Court also questioned whether the “reasonable” qualifier in this bylaw left enough room for board discretion not to reimburse wasteful expenses.

My own prediction is a substantive victory for AFSCME is possible, but the holding would be limited. If the Court allows election bylaws that mandate board action, it may require bylaws mandating board action have a “fiduciary out” clause similar to what we see in deal lock-in measures. This could be accomplished, I think, either by ruling that the bylaw is illegal only for lack of a fiduciary-out or ruling that the bylaw is legal but that a Board could ignore it if it’s fiduciary duty required it (board action which would then be critically reviewed under subsequent challenge, and the standard of that review for such a decision could be formulated in this opinion). The one thing I am most confident about is that the Court is likely to leave open the possibility to rule that other forms of bylaws, especially poison pill related bylaws, run afoul of 141(a).

Delaware Supreme Court Interprets Waiver Provision

In Rehoboth Mall Limited Partnership v. NPC International, Inc., (Del. Supr., July 2, 2008), read opinion here, (and revised opinion here), the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted a waiver provision in a lease to prevent a landlord from using it to refuse a second renewal of a lease. Most contracts have a "no waiver" provision that ostensibly allows a party to selectively enforce provisions--or stated another way, the landlord in this case reserved the right to enforce the penalties in the lease for default in the future even if those provisions were not always enforced in the past.

Delaware's High Court determined that because there were no defaults during the first renewal period, the landlord could not reach back to the original lease period to deny a second renewal. That is, the court reasoned, the "no  waiver" provision could only be applied to allow the landlord to enforce prospective defaults--as opposed to retroactively penalizing prior defaults that  were already waived.

Supreme Court Rejects Caremark Claims and other Fiduciary Claims Against LLC Managers Due to Exculpation Clause

 Wood v. Baum, (Del. Supr., July 1, 2008), read opinion here. This Delaware Supreme Court decision is an important ruling regarding the defense by LLC managers to fiduciary duty and Caremark claims against them in light of  the exculpatory terms of an LLC agreement.

Based on the exculpatory terms of the Operating Agreement and the LLC Act, Delaware's High Court summarized what the plaintiff needed to establish as follows:

Therefore, under the Operating Agreement and the LLCA, the MME directors’ exposure to liability is limited to claims of “fraudulent or illegal conduct,” or “bad faith violation[s] of the
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”

The money quote from the opinion, (which is precious "manna from heaven" in light of the relative paucity of Supreme Court decisions on liability of LLC members), follows:

Where directors are contractually or otherwise exculpated from liability for certain conduct, “then a serious threat of liability may only be found to exist if the plaintiff pleads a non-exculpated claim against the directors based on particularized facts.”13 Where, as here, directors are exculpated from liability except for claims based on “fraudulent,” “illegal” or “bad faith” conduct, a plaintiff must also plead particularized facts that demonstrate that the directors acted with scienter, i.e., that they had “actual or constructive knowledge” that their conduct was legally improper.14 Therefore, the issue before us is whether the Complaint
alleges particularized facts that, if proven, would show that a majority of the defendants knowingly engaged in “fraudulent” or “illegal” conduct or breached “in bad faith” the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We conclude that the answer is no.

The court provides a pithy summary of the demand futility tests under Aronson and Rales, and then explains the lack of particularity in the conclusory allegations in the complaint--juxtaposed against the provisions of the operating agreement requiring a showing of fraud or bad faith before the defendants could be found liable. Specifically, the court explained:

The Board’s execution of MME’s financial reports, without more, is insufficient to create an inference that the directors had actual or constructive notice of any illegality.

* * *

Delaware law on this point is clear: board approval of a transaction, even one that later poves to be improper, without more, is an insufficient basis to infer culpable knowledge or bad faith on the part of individual directors.

Footnote:  See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 498 (Del. Ch. 2003) (dismissing complaint that was “devoid of any pleading regarding the full board’s involvement in the preparation and approval of the company’s financial statements” and of “particularized allegations of fact demonstrating that the outside directors had actual or constructive notice of the accounting improprieties.”)

Other reasons the court dismissed fiduciary claims and Caremark claims are more easily quoted than summarized. The court explained its affirmance of the Chancery Court 's dismissal of the claims with the following recitation of black letter Delaware law:

Plaintiff also asserts that membership on the Audit Committee is a sufficient basis to infer the requisite scienter. That assertion is contrary to well-settled Delaware law. In Rattner v. Bidzos, for example, the Court of Chancery declined to infer that the directors had a culpable state of mind based on allegations that certain board members served on an audit committee and, as a consequence, should have been aware of the facts on which the plaintiff premised her interpretation of “SEC rules and regulations, and FSAB and GAAP standards.”19  (emphasis added).

Finally, plaintiff claims that the Board knowingly ignored “red flags.”20   Under Delaware law, red flags “are only useful when they are either waved in one’s face or displayed so that they are visible to the careful observer.”21
(emphasis added).

I will leave you with a gem from the court's opinion. I call it a gem because the "implied duty of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing" is not as fully developed in the LLC context as are common aspects of corporate law in Delaware:

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a creature of contract, distinct from the fiduciary duties that the plaintiff asserts here.22  The implied covenant functions to protect stockholders’ expectations that the company and its board will properly perform the contractual obligations they have under the operative organizational agreements.23  Here, the Complaint does not allege any contractual claims, let alone a “bad faith” breach of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Nor, as discussed above, does the Complaint contain any particularized allegations that the defendants acted with the requisite scienter (in “bad faith”).

This case is but another replay of other similar cases where the plaintiff failed to allege with particularity any facts from which it could be inferred that particular directors knew or should have been on notice of alleged accounting improprieties, and any facts suggesting that the board knowingly allowed or participated in a violation of law.24

UPDATE: Professor Larry Ribstein posts about the case here, with his customarily insightful analysis, including his observation that one of the reasons this case is important is because Delaware's High Court has now confirmed that exculpatory provisions of an LLC will be honored even when the LLC is publicly-held. That is, this case "enshrines in judicial concrete" (my words) what is already in the LLC statute--namely, unlike in corporations, fiduciary duties can be waived in an LLC. In this case, in order to avoid dismissal, the complaint had to satisfactorily allege fraud and other "higher threshold" claims, which it failed to do.

SEC Asks Delaware Supreme Court for Ruling on Delaware Law

Courtesy of Wilmington lawyer Brian Rostocki, comes a report of the first example of the SEC availing itself of a procedure authorized last year that allows the SEC to ask the Delaware Supreme Court for rulings on particular issues of Delaware law that impact the SEC. Here is a post on this blog describing the new procedure when it was authorized last year. Here is an article from Securities Law360 describing the SEC's request in more detail.

The issue that the SEC has asked for the Delaware Supreme Court to rule on  is whether companies must reimburse shareholders for the costs of an only partially successful short-slate proxy contest. AFSCME asked the SEC for its position on the reimbursement for costs that it will incur in a proxy contest for a minority of the CA, Inc. board at a shareholders' meeting scheduled for September. In turn, the SEC asked the Delaware Supreme Court for a definitive ruling on this issue of Delaware law. 

The Delaware Supreme Court may hear oral arguments on the issue next week.

The CorporateCounsel.net  Blog here provides an insightful review of the matter.

Supreme Court Decides Qualifications for Judicial Appointment

The Delaware Supreme Court was asked by the Governor of the State of Delaware, pursuant to established procedure, to answer a question of law about whether a person she wanted to nominate to a minor judicial position, was disqualified due to a drug offense committed when he was 17 years old, in light of a provision in the Delaware Constitution that disqualifies from such office persons convicted of certain types of crimes. The Governor asked for the opinion within 5 days--before a scheduled vote by the State Senate. The High Court rendered its decision one day early. Read the court's decision concluding that there was no disqualification here. The State Senate confirmed him today as a Family Court Commissioner, as reported here.

UPDATE: Here is the backstory from veteran political commentator Celia Cohen on her DelawareGrapevine site.

Supreme Court Reviews Standard to Amend Pre-Trial Scheduling Orders

In Wright v. Moore, (Del. Supr., June 17, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed yesterday the standard that applies to requests for modifications of pre-trial orders which control such things as discovery deadlines and the like. The specific issue in this interlocutory appeal was whether the trial judge abused her discretion for refusing to allow for new discovery after the Supreme Court remanded and reversed the case last year for a new trial. The court discussed the "manifest injustice" test under Rule 16(e) and found that it did apply here. Delaware's High Court also took the unusual step of ordering that the case be assigned to a different trial judge.

Supreme Court Affirms Stock Option Claims As Derivative

In Feldman v. Cutaia, (Del. Supr., May 30, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court today affirmed the Chancery Court's ruling that, based on the facts before it, a stock option-related claim was a derivative cause of action and not a direct claim.  The Chancery Court's decision was summarized here on this blog.

Delaware's High Court summarized the appeal presented to it in this case as follows:

The plaintiff-appellant, Peter Feldman, appeals from a final judgment entered by the Court of Chancery following its issuance of a Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Court of Chancery dismissed all fourteen counts of Feldman’s Third Amended Complaint finding that the claims therein were solely derivative in nature. Applying this Court’s holding in Lewis v. Anderson, 1 the Court of Chancery held that Feldman lacked standing to pursue those derivative claims following a third-party merger (the “Merger”) in which all of his stock of the nominal defendant, The Telx Group, Inc. (“Telx” or the “Company”), was cashed out.
In this appeal, Feldman’s sole argument is that the Court of Chancery erred in dismissing Count XIII of the Third Amended Complaint. In that count, Feldman alleges that he received inadequate consideration from the Merger because of stock options previously issued to three of the defendants-appellees. According to Feldman, the allocation of the Merger
consideration to those stock options directly harmed him because he was paid less for his shares in the Merger than he would have been if the options had not existed. 


Relying upon this Court’s decision in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 2 Feldman contends that his claim in Count XIII was an individual one and not derivative in nature. Feldman submits that Telx’s directors had an affirmative duty to reconsider the validity of the stock options at the time of the Merger and their failure to do so gave rise to a
separate and direct claim of harm. The appellees argue that, following this Court’s landmark decision in Tooley, except in the inapplicable limited circumstances involving controlling stockholders, described in Gentile v. Rossette 3 and Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 4 a claim that stock options have been wrongly issued to management states a claim for waste and is solely derivative in nature.


The Court of Chancery characterized Feldman’s contention that Count XIII states a direct claim as “a bootstrap argument.” The Court of Chancery concluded that the alleged diminution of Feldman’s share of the Merger proceeds in Count XIII are the same damages that flow from the alleged harm under the predicate derivative claims in those counts of the Third Amended Complaint that challenged the validity of the stock options. The Court of Chancery held that Count XIII was a creative but unsuccessful attempt to recast a derivative claim as a direct claim. We have determined that the judgment of the Court of Chancery must be affirmed.

----------------------------

1. Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 1984).

2. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004).
3. Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91, 99-101 (Del. 2006).
4. Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265, 1277-81 (Del. 2007).

Supreme Court Interprets Contractual Rights to Stock Options After Merger

AT & T Corp. v. Lillis,  (Del. Supr., May 22, 2008), read opinion here. The Delaware Supreme Court in this 34-page opinion reiterates basic contract interpretation principles under Delaware law in the context of stock option rights, including in what instances extrinsic evidence will be considered by the court.  Delaware's High Court also addresses what weight, if any, should be given to prior admissions in pleadings that are later amended, as well as the difference between a stock for stock merger and a cash-out merger. Prior Chancery Court decisions in this case denying summary judgment, as well as the opinion appealed from after trial, have been summarized here and here.

  The Supreme Court provided its own introductory overview of the case in its opinion, which I quote here in part:

A Vice Chancellor denied cross motions for summary judgment, holding that Section XVIII.A of the 1994 plan controlled the plaintiffs-appellees’ options, (4) but that the term “economic position” in that section was ambiguous. The Vice Chancellor then held a trial to consider extrinsic evidence that could aid him in interpreting that term.


Interpreting Section XVIII.A., the Vice Chancellor noted AT&T’s initial position that Wireless could not cancel the stock options and accorded “great weight” to AT&T’s initial stance. The Vice Chancellor also found that the parties’  earlier transactions, where stock options were replaced with new stock options, demonstrated that the parties intended to preserve the time value of the options in each transaction. Because Wireless did not preserve the time value of the options in the 2004 merger, he found AT&T liable for a breach of the 1994 plan. The Vice Chancellor further found that AT&T had not transferred the 1994 MediaOne plan’s obligation to Wireless and, thus, did not hold Cingular liable.


On appeal, we uphold the Vice Chancellor’s conclusion that the term “economic position” is ambiguous because both plaintiffs-appellees and AT&T present reasonable interpretations of Section XVIII.A. On the one hand, the phrase “economic position” of a stock option is broad enough to encompass the prospect that its worth will increase over time, i.e. time value. On the other hand, in a cash out merger, option holders would expect to receive only a fixed cash sum when the merger becomes effective. In that context, the “economic position” of the options would not include any future value since the options will no longer exist. Instead that term would only incorporates the right to receive the options’ intrinsic value.

To resolve that ambiguity, we must consider what the extrinsic evidence shows the term “economic position” was intended to mean in the context of a cash out merger. The Vice Chancellor concluded that that term was intended to encompass the time value of the options in any merger, including a cash out merger. Having reviewed the Vice Chancellor’s opinion, we conclude: (1) that he declined to address the difference between a cash out merger and a stock for stock merger for purposes of interpreting “economic position;” and, (2) that he declined to consider the importance of the $85 cash election in the MediaOne-AT&T merger. Because we believe the cash election in the MediaOne-AT&T merger most closely resembles the cash out merger here, we REMAND the case for the Vice Chancellor to address fully the significance of (i) the distinction between a stock merger and a cash out merger; and, (ii) the $85 cash election in the AT&TMediaOne transaction, in deciding what the contracting parties intended by their use of the term “economic position.”

We also find that the Vice Chancellor should not have given any evidentiary weight to AT&T’s supposed admission because those supposed admissions did not relate to the interpretation of the 1994 plan. Thus, the Vice Chancellor should not afford AT&T’s supposed admissions any weight on remand.

--------------------------------------

4.  There are three written opinions in this case. Lillis v. AT&T Corp., 896 A.2d 871 (Del. Ch. 2005); Lillis v. AT&T Corp., 904 A.2d 325 (Del. Ch. 2006); Lillis v. AT&T Corp., Del. Ch., C.A. No 717, Mem. Op. (July 20, 2007).

Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Class Action Settlement in Philly Stock Exchange Case

 In the Matter of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc., (Del. Supr., March 27, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court (two days ago) affirmed the Chancery Court's decision to both approve the class action settlement in the case as well as upholding the trial court's bifurcation of the settlement proceedings to address an objector's argument that the settlement proceeds were not fairly distributed among the class members. In its 44-page opinion, the Supreme Court addresses the long list of substantive and procedural objections to the settlement. Some of the objections, which the court refers to as "multitudinous" and a "plethora", were waived for not having been fairly presented to the Chancery Court, and others were rejected after careful analysis and reference, for example, to Delaware and federal cases that have allowed bifurcation to consider a settlement as a whole, and a separate proceeding to address allocation among class members. Prior Chancery Court decisions in this case were summarized here and here. One of the prior Chancery decisions in this case was cited in a recent ethics article, here, that  I published about the attorney/client relationship among class members and their lawyers.

UPDATE: For those interested in what the entrance to the Delaware Supreme Court Building in Dover looks like, below is a photo of it that I obtained free from the Internet via flickr and the Creative Commons license, by someone who is identified only as katicabogar.

Supreme Court Upholds Chancery Decision that Stock Cancellation Not Effective

In Reddy v. MKBS Company Limited, (Del. Supr., March 3, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court  (yesterday) affirmed a Chancery Court decision, summarized here,  finding that an attempt to "cancel" shares, whether via the certificates representing those shares or the shares themselves, did not comply with statutory and related requirements. Both courts also addressed the difference between "void" and "voidable" stock.  The money quote follows:

The cancellation of those shares could only be accomplished by complying with the procedure mandated by 8 Del. C. § 242—a written charter amendment, authorized by the board of directors, approved by the shareholders, and filed with the Delaware Secretary of State. Reddy concedes that those requirements are applicable to cancellations of stock, and that no charter amendment for either MKBS company was ever effected.

Directors Who Are Not Shareholders Cannot Sue Derivatively

In Schoon v. Smith, (Del. Supr., Feb. 12, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled yesterday that a director qua director may not sue fellow directors of a corporation derivatively. This may sound esoteric for some, but any time the Delaware Supreme Court decides an issue that relates to the duties and/or rights of directors of a Delaware corporation, most serious students of corporate law and Delaware litigation pull up their socks and pay attention. Three prior decisions by the Chancery Court regarding litigation between (at least some of) the parties in this case were summarized here, here and here. 

 Fortunately for me, we have the benefit of a prompt and insightful comment on the case here, that comes to us courtesy of Steven M. Haas of Hunton and Williams LLP via the Harvard Corporate Governance Law Blog.

Does a Director Qua Director Have Standing to Sue Derivatively? No, so said the Delaware Supreme Court yesterday in Schoon v. Smith. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s little-noticed ruling last year that dismissed a derivative claim brought by a director against the company’s other directors, including its controlling stockholder. The plaintiff-director, who was not a stockholder of the company, charged his fellow directors with, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. The court held that, notwithstanding the equitable origins of derivative suits, the issue of director standing today is best left to the legislature. “Although the Delaware General Assembly has the prerogative to confer standing upon directors by statute,” the court wrote, “it has not chosen to do so.” Rejecting the American Law Institute Principles that give individual directors standing to sue on behalf of their corporations, the court continued that, “[b]ecause a stockholder derivative action is available to redress any breach of fiduciary duty, we decline to extend the doctrine of equitable standing to allow a director to bring a similar action.” The court concluded, however, by leaving itself a little room to permit directors to bring derivative suits, but only where the failure to do so would result in a “complete failure of justice”—a seemingly high standard.

As a practical matter, the decision is unlikely to have much significance because most directors are also stockholders. But the decision is still significant and may draw criticism with respect to its implications for corporate governance and director duties. In particular, the court noted that the concept of being an “independent director” does not mandate “a duty to sue on behalf of the corporation.”

UPDATE: Here is a post on the case by Professor Bainbridge who was kind enough to link to this post but more importantly he provides a prescient excerpt from his treatise on Corporation Law and Economics that addresses the same issue decided by the court in this opinion.

 

Overview of Key 2007 Decisions from Delaware's Chancery Court and Supreme Court

  As I have done for opinions issued in 2005 and 2006, I have prepared a review here of key corporate and commercial decisions from the Delaware Chancery Court and Delaware Supreme Court during the year 2007. See my two prior yearly summaries here. The summary was prepared as an article that was published in the Jan. 16, 2008 edition of The Delaware Law Weekly . There is a necessary subjectivity in the cases that I selected from among the 200 or so that I summarized on these pages during 2007. It is not uncommon for the  courts' decisions to be 50 to 60 (or more) pages each, and many of the opinions could easily be (and have been) the subject of separate articles in their own right. Thus, in order to cover 20 or 30 noteworthy cases in a short article, one is limited to mostly identifying the issues raised in the decisions so that an interested reader will be directed to the full opinion. (Most of the decisions are noteworthy, but it would not be practical to include them all in a short overview. Remember, they are all still available on this blog.)  I also did not spend much time on some of the more well-known cases that have already received widespread attention.

The second link above will lead you to the 2005 overview that appeared in the publication called The Delaware Corporate Litigation Reporter, as well as the 2006 review that appeared in a Bloomberg publication called the Corporate Law Report.

UPDATE:  Fortunately for me, Prof. Bainbridge graciously linked here to my summary.

UPDATE II: Today I am doubly fortunate. Prof. Ribstein kindly linked here to my summary.

 

Supreme Court Addresses Judicial Recusal Standard

In Home Paramount Pest Control  v. Gibbs, (Del. Supr., Jan. 17, 2008), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the judicial recusal standard in the context of a hearing officer for an administrative agency. Here is the quote that recites the two-part test for recusal and the reasoning behind the rule:


The requirement that judges be impartial is a fundamental
principle of the administration of justice .... As a matter of due
process, a litigant is entitled to neutrality on the part of the
presiding judge but the standards governing disqualification also
require the appearance of impartiality.
* * *
When faced with a claim of personal bias or prejudice
under [Canon 3 C(1) of the Delaware Code of Judicial Conduct]
the judge is required to engage in a two-part analysis. First, he
must, as a matter of subjective belief, be satisfied that he can
proceed to hear the cause free of bias or prejudice concerning that
party. Second, even if the judge believes that he has no bias,
situations may arise where, actual bias aside, there is the
appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge’s
impartiality.


This Court reviews the subjective part of the ... test for abuse of discretion. We review de novo the objective determination of whether there is an appearance of bias.

Delaware's High Court Distinguishes Between Statutory Right to Vote on Merger v. Contract Right to Consent to Merger

In Matulich v. Aegis Communications Group, Inc., (Del. Supr., Jan. 15, 2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court today affirmed a Chancery Court decision, summarized here. Delaware's High Court explained the difference between a contract right of preferred shareholders to consent to a merger (see DGCL Section 212(b)), and the statutory right to vote on a merger pursuant to the short-form merger procedure in DGCL Section 253 that requires that the parent own 90% of the voting shares. The appellant shareholder argued that the short-form merger procedure was not available because the preferred shareholders had voting rights and if those  shares were included, then the parent would not have 90% of the shares eligible to vote on the merger.

 If done correctly, the short-form merger procedure in Section 253 eliminates exposure to an entire fairness scrutiny. The preferred shares in dispute were issued pursuant to a DGCL Section 151(a) Certificate of Designation and expressly withheld any voting rights from the preferred shares, as compared with "blocking approval". In those situations where the issuing document is silent on the topic, the preferred shareholders would have the same voting rights as the holders of common shares. But the court found the contractual terms here to be unambiguous and not susceptible to different reasonable interpretations, thus agreeing with the Chancery Court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

 

Overview of Key 2007 Corporate and Commercial Decisions

As I have done for opinions issued in 2005 and 2006, I have prepared a review of key corporate and commercial decisions from the Delaware Chancery Court and Delaware Supreme Court during the year 2007. See my two prior yearly summaries here. I have arranged to submit this year's overview to The Delaware Law Weekly and I should let them publish it before I post it on this blog in about a week or so. There is a necessary subjectivity in the cases that I selected from among the 200 or so that I summarized on these pages during 2007. It is not uncommon for the decisions to be 50 to 60 (or more) pages each, and many of the opinions could easily be (and have been) the subject of separate articles in their own right. Thus, in order to cover 20 or 30 noteworthy cases in a short article one is limited to mostly identifying the issues raised in the decisions so that an interested reader will be made aware of the full opinion. (Most of the decisions are noteworthy, but it would not be practical to include them all in a short overview. Remember, they are all still available on this blog.)  I also did not spend much time on some of the more well-known cases that have already received widespread attention.

The link above will lead you to the 2005 overview that appeared in the subscription-only publication called The Delaware Corporate Litigation Reporter, as well as the 2006 review that appeared in a Bloomberg publication called the Corporate Law Report.

Best wishes to all my readers and your families for a happy and healthy and fruitful New Year.

Supreme Court Allows Fees to Out-of-State Litigant in Class Action Settlement

 Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Brown, et al., (Del. Supr., Dec. 21, 2007), read opinion here. The best summary of this Delaware Supreme Court decision is supplied by the Court in the introductory paragraphs of its opinion:

"[The Court decides] ... whether an out-of-state litigant should be awarded attorneys' fees and expenses in connection with a settlement of a Delaware corporate class action. Appellant, Alaska ... had filed a class action in California, alleging substantially the same claims as those alleged in the Delaware action. The Delaware plaintiffs agreed to settle their claims after they had negotiated a $7 per share increase in the disputed transaction. Appellant did not agree to settle at that price, and the price later increased another $9 per share."

"Applying settled Delaware law, the Court of Chancery presumed that the Delaware action contributed to the initial price increase, and the court awarded fees to the Delaware plaintiffs. The Court of Chancery denied appellant a presumption of causation as to either the first or the second price increase. We hold that the Court of Chancery was correct  with respect to the first price increase. But, because appellant was the only litigant opposing the transaction at the time of the second price increase, appellant was entitled to a presumption of causation. Accordingly, we remand this matter for further consideration of the attorneys' fees and expenses, if any, that should be awarded to appellant."

The Chancery Court's decision was the subject of my short blog post here.

Penalty for Notarizing Signature Without Presence of Witness

IMO Pankowski, (Del. Supr., Dec. 4, 2007), read opinion here.  In this opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court imposed a penalty for, among many other things, notarizing a signature of a person who is not present at the time of the notarization.

Supreme Court Rejects Argument that FedEx Satisfies Statutory Requirement of Notice by Certified Mail

In Leatherbury v. Greenspun, (Del. Supr., Nov. 30, 2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled yesterday that a statutory provision that required notice to be sent by "certified mail, return receipt requested", was not satisfied by notice that was only sent by Federal Express. The statute allowed for the statute of limitations to be be tolled by 90 days after the specified statutory notice was sent. The net result of this ruling is that the complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had expired.

This is how the court summarized the holding:

 

A plaintiff may toll the running of the two-year statute of limitations for ninety days by sending a   Notice of Intent to investigate only by certified mail, return receipt requested. We further hold that the term “certified mail” does not include delivery through private carriers, such as delivery by Federal Express.

Footnote 16 in the High Court's opinion cites to cases where the Delaware courts have also invalidated service of process that was not sent via certified mail, return receipt requesed, as required by statute.

This opinion includes jewels of general statutory construction principles, and the reaffirmation by the court that it will apply the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute even if it may lead to an "unfortunate result". It will not act as a "super-legislature" by venturing beyond the boundaries of the judicial branch of government to provide allegedly necessary corrections or amplifications to a statute.

 

Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Appraisal of Preferred Shares

In Hildreth v. Castle Dental Centers, Inc., (Del. Supr., Nov. 15, 2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court ruling in an action contesting the appraisal of preferred shares  in a merger. This case did not involve the typical valuation issues in an appraisal case. The plaintiff agreed on the total merger price. The dispute was based on the fact that preferred shares, that were convertible into common shares, were treated as if they were already converted, even though the corporation failed to authorize a sufficient number of common shares necessary to cover the full number of preferred shares that could be converted into common. The plaintiff wanted the merger price to be divided only among the total of authorized shares--as opposed to the number of convertible preferred shares that exceeded the total number of authorized shares.

  Delaware's high court based its reasoning on two key points. First, despite the failure to have adequate common shares, like other contracts, the failure of one part of a contract does not invalidate the whole contract.  In addition, it was not alleged that the issuance did not comply with DGCL Section 151. Thus, the court rejected the argument that the preferred shares were void. Second, the court determined that there are many ways to value preferred shares and the method used by the merger agreement was permissible.

 

Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Franchise Tax

In Lehman Brothers Bank FSB v. State Bank Commissioner, (Del. Supr., Nov. 7, 2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court, in a 43-page decision (that includes a thorough analysis of the factual and legal issues that I will not be discussing in this short blurb), upheld the Delaware franchise tax imposed on banks. Its analysis included a discussion of the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This is a very important decision on many levels and I hope to supplement this short summary in the near future.

Delaware Supreme Court Gives Shareholders Second Chance and Reversed Trial Court for Converting Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Rule 56 Motion without Adequate Notice or Reasonable Opportunity to Reply

In Appriva Shareholder Litigation Company, LLC v. EV3, Inc., et al., (Del. Supr., Nov. 1, 2007), read opinion here,  the Delaware Supreme Court reversed two decisions of the Superior Court  that were consolidated on appeal, in connection with a dispute related to a merger.  The consolidated cases were filed by shareholders of the acquired company. The trial court, in separate decisions by different judges, determined that both plaintiffs lacked standing to prosecute their respective actions separately and were contractually obligated to prosecute their claims jointly. The opinion is 34 pages in length in its original format. It would be an appropriate subject of a bar exam question on civil procedure issues. I will highlight only a few key aspects of the ruling that should be instructive to business litigators.

Delaware's high court addressed several issues: First, the court determined that it was reversible error for the trial court to convert a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment without providing an opportunity to present pertinent evidentiary material. Moreover, the high court ruled that it was error for the trial court, sua sponte,  to convert a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment without affording the parties adequate notice or a reasonable opportunity to respond as required by Rule 56.

In addition, the court determined that it was reversible error to choose between two differing interpretations of ambiguous documents, in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In addition to incorrectly relying on only one reasonable  interpretation of the agreement in deciding a motion to dismiss, the trial court failed to allow extrinsic evidence.

 Finally, under Rule 17, upon remand, the Supreme Court ruled that if it is determined that the plaintiffs did not have standing, then they shall have an opportunity to cure any defects pursuant to that rule. The high court noted that Rule 17 states that "[n]o action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest" after a reasonable time has been allowed to permit a substitution. The court added that the purpose of Rule 17 is to "prevent forefeiture when determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made."

Statute of Limitations Tolled By Paper Filing Where eFiling Required and Requests for Admissions Not Basis for Summary Judgement

In Bryant v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc., (Del. Supr., Oct. 18, 2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court decided two procedural issues of practical importance to lawyers engaging in business litigation. First, where the statute of limitations expired on May 1, and on that date a paper copy of a complaint was filed with the court instead of having it eFiled as required, the Supreme Court held that the statutory deadline was tolled by the paper filing in light of the eFiling occuring the next day. This was so even though the Superior Court rule of civil procedure required a suit to be commenced by both a complaint and a praecipe, unlike the applicable Chancery Court rule and unlike the applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. In addition, in this reversal of the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court reasoned that Rule 36 cannot be used to decide ultimate legal issues in the case when by failing to reply withing the 30 day deadline, matters subject to a request  for admission under Rule 36 are deemed admitted.

Supreme Court Reverses Chancery on Voting Issue in Section 225 Dispute

 B. F. Rich Co. v. Gray,  (Del. Supr., Sept. 11, 2007), read opinion here, is a rare decision of the Delaware Supreme Court to the extent that it reverses and remands a Chancery Court decision.  (The Chancery Court's decision was summarized on this blog here.) There is nothing unusual about the Delaware courts applying the law of another state as this one does, but since this blog focuses on Delaware law, I do not want to spend too much time on this 31-page opinion. The law of another state was applied to determine the validity of a written consent on behalf of minors (who were residents of that other state),  in a Section 225 dispute.

 I think the Court's own summary of the case, from the opinion itself, serves my purpose here in describing enough about the case that the interested reader can download the entire opinion at the link above for his or her reading pleasure. Here is how the court summarized the case:

Two minor children, who reside in Connecticut, own 49% of the stock of a Delaware corporation. The father of those minor children voted that stock to gain operational control of that corporation without having first been appointed as guardian of his children’s estate (property). A Connecticut statute requires the appointment of a guardian of a minor’s estate where a parent receives or uses property of the minor child having a value exceeding $10,000. The value of the minor children’s shares exceeds $10,000. The sole question of substance on this appeal is whether the father’s voting of the minor children’s shares constituted a “use” of those shares within the meaning of the Connecticut guardianship statute, thus requiring the appointment of a guardian of the minor children’s estate to vote the shares. We hold that the father’s voting of those shares constituted a “use” of the shares within the meaning of that statute. As a consequence, the voting of the children’s shares by anyone other than a court-appointed guardian was invalid, with the result that less than a majority of the corporation’s shares were validly voted and the written consent action had no legal force. Because the Court of Chancery reached a contrary result, we reverse and remand.

Supreme Court Affirms Attorneys' Fee Award

In Mahani v. EDIX Media Group, Inc., (Del. Supr., Sept. 4,  2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Chancery Court awarding attorneys' fees based on a contract provision between the parties to the case. Mahani appealed based on the arguments that the trial court did not: (i) consider the reasonableness of the amount of fees, and (ii) did not give ample weight to the fact that there was only a partial victory in the trial court. The Chief Justice, writing for the Delaware Supreme Court, distinguished the contractual and statutory bases for awarding fees, and reasoned that:

...the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees and other expenses in a contractual fee shifting case “should be assessed by reference to legal services purchased by those fees, not by reference to the degree of success achieved in the litigation.”

The cases Mahani cites are inapposite because they are statutory fee shifting cases, in which the court awarded the prevailing parties’ attorneys’ fees and expenses in proportion to their success as an incentive for other attorneys to prosecute cases that enforce legislative goals. EDIX’s award for the full amount of its attorneys’ fees and other expenses cannot be considered unreasonable because the Chancellor properly weighed all the factors in DLRPC 1.5(a). The Chancellor, we believe, correctly concluded that “[t]he amount involved in litigation and results obtained [were] only two of many factors to be considered,” and, indeed, he placed considerable weight on the time and labor necessary for EDIX to prepare the case for trial.

The trial court's decision on fees was summarized on my blog here. The trial court's main opinion was summarized here, in which the Chancery Court quotes from the argot of famed rapper "50 Cent".

Legal Ethics

Here is yesterday's decision from the Delaware Supreme Court that serves as a reminder that Delaware's highest court takes very seriously its role as enforcer of the ethics rules that apply to lawyers. The case caption is: In the Matter of a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware: Joseph N. Gielata, No. 373, 2007 (Del. Supr., Aug. 28, 2007).

Executing on Judgments via Wage Attachments

In Gamles Corp. v. Gibson, (Del. Supr., August 7, 2007),  read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court discusses the procedure for attaching wages to collect a judgement as well as the date in Delaware when a judgment can expire if not collected.

Supreme Court Affirms Chancery Decision Rejecting Claims for Deepening Insolvency

The Delaware Supreme Court in a two-page Order issued on Aug. 14, 2007, (read here), affirmed the Chancery Court's Trenwick decision of last year (summarized here and  here on this blog), thus sounding the death knell in Delaware for the claim of "deepening insolvency" and casting aspersions on the concept of  "the zone of involvency". See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.,  2006  WL 2333201 ( Del. Ch. 2006).

Here is an insightful commentary by Bob Eisenbach on his Business Bankruptcy Blog about the deeper implications of this confirmation of the Chancery Court's opinion. [Query the impact of  the Supreme Court's affirmance on a federal decision (or the impact, if any, of the federal decision) that post-dated the Chancery decision and which was briefly summarized here.]

Court Bars Claims of Independent Contractor's Employee Against General Contractor

In Urena v. Capano Homes, Inc., (Del. Supr., July 17, 2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court applied the general rule that an employee of an independent contractor cannot make a claim against the general contractor for injuries suffered on a job site. There are exceptions but they did not apply here. The court also rejected a claim by an employee of the independent contractor against the general contractor for allegedly negligent selection of the independent contractor by the general contractor.

Horseplay Among Employees May Lead to Claims Beyond Worker's Comp

In Grabowski v.  Mangler, (Del. Supr., July 9, 2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court today issued an opinion that addresses a matter of importance to many businesses: horseplay  or practical jokes and the liability that may arise from employees who engage in it. This blog focuses on corporate and commercial law, but even though the topic of this case is not within the traditional confines of that subject area, employee-related issues are among the biggest concerns of many of my business clients (and thus, I trust, will be of great interest to many business lawyers).

 For the first time, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted a new test, in this opinion, to determine when a co-employee's conduct constituted horseplay of such a character that it was outside the course and scope of employment--and therefore, outside the normal rule that such conduct would be within the realm of worker's compensation. This new Delaware rule is based on the work found in volume 1A of the treatise by Professor Arthur Larson entitled, appropriately enough,  The Law of Workmen's Compensation, at section 23.01 For those interested in this topic, I commend the reading of the court's analysis and application of Professor Larsen's test, as made available at the above link.

Supreme Court Rules on Admissibility of Settlement Evidence

In Wright v. Moore, (Del. Supr., July 2, 2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the issue of admissibility of settlement evidence. Although considered in the context of a trial, most litigators at one time or another have had to confront the conundrum of dealing with at least portions of settlement discussions or settlement agreements finding their way into submissions of an opposing party that are sent to the court. But if settlement discussions or settlement agreements are inadmissible, a client will undoubtedly ask, how can the other side include a reference to them in documents filed with the court?

This opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court now provides helpful insight into the contours of Rule 408 of the Rules of Evidence (the Delaware rule is based on the federal rule), in the context of a trial, though the court's analysis will also be useful, one hopes, in the pre-trial trenches.

D & O Coverage Triggered by "Loss"

In AT & T Corp. v. Clarendon American Insurance Co., et al., ( Del. Supr., July 2, 2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Superior Court on coverage claims that were denied by the trial court and the D & O carriers based on a definition of the term "loss". Because the court based its decision on California law, and this blog is focuses on Delaware law, I will only quote from the Supreme Court's introductory summary of the case, and commend the reading of the whole case to the extent it provides insight into the court's analysis in the event that a similar issue would be addressed in the future based on Delaware law. Here is the summary of the case from the court's opinion:

 

AT&T Corp. (“AT&T”) appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing this action brought by AT&T against several insurance carriers (the “D&O insurers”).

Those carriers issued Director and Officer (“D&O”) policies insuring At Home Corporation (“At Home”) and At Home’s directors and officers. AT&T, as At Home’s largest shareholder, designated ten of its employees to serve as At Home directors.2 At Home later declared bankruptcy, and thereafter, AT&T and the At Home Directors were sued jointly and severally for billions of dollars in damages. Being insolvent, At Home could not indemnify the At Home Directors for any liability and litigation costs resulting from those lawsuits (the “Underlying Litigation”). Accordingly, the At Home Directors requested the D&O insurers to advance their defense costs. The D&O insurers refused, taking the position that the At Home Directors had not incurred a covered “Loss” under the D&O policies. The At Home Directors then turned to AT&T for assistance in paying defense costs, settlements and judgments in the Underlying Litigation. AT&T agreed to do so, in exchange for which the At Home Directors assigned to AT&T their breach of contract claims against the D&O insurers.AT&T then sued the D&O insurers in the Superior Court, both as assignee of its At Home director-employees, and as subrogee to those directors’ coverage claims against the D&O insurers for defense costs and indemnification relating to the Underlying Actions.3 The D&O insurers moved to dismiss AT&T’s amended complaint on the grounds (inter alia) that: (1) the At Home Directors had suffered no “Loss” needed to trigger the D&O coverage, and (2) AT&T could not prevail on its equitable subrogation claim, because when it indemnified the At Home Directors, AT&T acted as a “volunteer.” Applying California law, the Superior Court upheld both of the D&O insurers’ contentions and dismissed the complaint....[W]e reverse.

Directors' Duties in Bankruptcy and Limits on Creditors' Ability to Sue Directors

Prof. Larry Ribstein just published a "must read" short article here on the Harvard Corporate Governance Blog with insightful commentary on the recent Delaware Supreme Court decision in North American Catholic  Educational Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla , summarized here on this blog.   Here is the good professor's own summary of his post.

For anyone interested in the intersection of Delaware corporate law and the zone of insolvency, his analysis and the links he provides to related sources and writings on the topic, should be read by anyone who wants to know the latest thinking on the issues related to the duties of directors of insolvent companies and the rights of creditors against those directors. Coincidentally and parenthetically, I posted here earlier this week, an analysis by one of my bankruptcy partners, Dan Astin, on the contrast between recent federal court decisions in Delaware on the topic of  "deepening insolvency"  and the most recent Delaware Chancery Court decision on the issue.

Delaware Supreme Court Rules on Attorney Conduct

The Delaware Supreme Court, in two opinions published this month, addressed issues of attorney conduct that should be of broad interest.

In the case of In Re Abbott, read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the propriety of rhetorical extremes contained in a brief, that the trial court had stricken sua sponte, after concluding that the arguments crossed the line of acceptable conduct.  The Supreme Court affirmed. Delaware's high court quoted verbatim from some of the language it found objectionable and reasoned that certain conduct is so unprofessional that it becomes unethical as well, in this case violating Rule 8.4(d) which prohibits professional misconduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. (An issue not addressed by the court, but which most lawyers should ask, is whether such conduct  among lawyers as occurred in this case, outside the context of litigation, could also violate the ethical rules.)

 The  high court found that the arguments in the brief went beyond “merely” unprofessional, and that the rules were violated because the pleadings filed with the court contained “unnecessary invective and rhetoric, and were obnoxious [as well as] unnecessarily sarcastic and strident in tone.” The court noted that the duty to the tribunal takes precedence over the interests of a client. Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was quoted in the opinion saying that “incivility disserves the client because it wastes time and energy - - time that is billed to the client at hundreds of dollars an hour, and energy that is better spent working on the case than working over the opponent.” The Supreme Court cited a prior opinion of 15 years ago when it stated that “simply put, insulting conduct toward opposing counsel, and disparaging a court’s integrity are unacceptable by any standard.” The court further reasoned that “zealous advocacy never requires disruptive, disrespectful, degrading or disparaging rhetoric. The use of such rhetoric crosses the line from acceptable forceful advocacy into unethical conduct that violates the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.” Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court is now on record as ruling that disrespectful, degrading or disparaging rhetoric  violates the ethical rules that apply to lawyers. Although beyond the scope of the opinion, I mention as an aside, the truism incorporated in the rules that the assistants of lawyers are not permitted to violate the rules that the lawyers themselves are required to uphold.

Separately, this month the Delaware Supreme Court found that a Pennsylvania lawyer who did not have an office in Delaware, was still improperly "practicing law in Delaware" when she provided advice to Delaware clients and  engaged in other patterns of behavior that  "established a systematic and continuous presence in Delaware for the practice of law in violation of Rule 5.5(b)". In Re Tonwe, read opinion here. The court's penalties included a permanent prohibition against being admitted pro hac vice in any Delaware proceeding.

Duties of Directors of Insolvent Delaware Corporations

Prof. Stephen Bainbridge compiles here excerpts from his own writings, and those of others, regarding the issues addressed in the recent Delaware Supreme Court decision rejecting a direct claim by creditors against directors of an insolvent corporation in North American Catholic Programming, Inc. v. Gheewalla, summarized here on my blog. In addition, the good professor refers to the generally related Delaware Chancery Court decision in Trenwick summarized here in which the court rejected a claim for "deepening insolvency". His post is must reading for corporate and bankruptcy lawyers who need to have command of the nuances of this cutting edge topic.

Delaware Supreme Court Allows SEC To Ask Questions

The Delaware Legislature recently amended the Delaware State Constitution to allow the SEC to ask the Delaware Supreme Court to answer questions of Delaware law. Previously, Delaware's high court was only procedurally authorized to accept certified questions of Delaware law from  trial courts in Delaware and Federal Courts around the country, as well as the high courts of each state. Here is a front page article from the local paper, the News Journal of Wilmington, Delaware,  on May 19, 2007, with more background details.

UPDATE: Wow. My post was cited here by The Wall Street Journal Law Blog.

UPDATE II:  Here is a post by Prof. Gordon Smith with a link to the actual text of the amendment and his observation that this may be the most important development in Delaware law in the over 100 years since Delaware took over from New Jersey as a favored home for corporations. Also, here is insightful commentary from Prof. Stephen Bainbridge with links to his related writings on the topic as well as links to Prof. Ribstein's commentary on this key matter.

Delaware Supreme Court Rules: Creditors Have No Direct Claims Against Directors Of Corporation in Zone of Insolvency

In North American Catholic Educational Programming  Foundation, Inc.  v. Gheewhalla, (Del. Supr., May 18, 2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the Chancery Court's determination that creditors of a Delaware corporation do not have a direct claim against directors of an insolvent corporation, or one in the zone of insolvency,  for breach of fiduciary duty. Professor Bainbridge comments on this important decision here. This decision will be of great interest to both corporate lawyers and litigators as well as bankruptcy lawyers. I hope to write more on it later.

Notably, in its opinion the Delaware Supreme Court cites to the writings of Professor Bainbridge on the topic (as the Chancery Court has done as well in its opinions.) Compare the Chancery Court's Trenwick decision (no claim for "deepening insolvency") here, and the link here to the Chancery Court opinion that was affirmed yesterday by the Delaware Supreme Court. Professor Ribstein, whose writings were also cited by the Delaware Supreme Court in this opinion, has a blog post here on the opinion.

P.S. I try not to distract readers of this blog with any "off message" posts outside the limited scope of this blog, but I hope you will indulge me this small expression of joy. My youngest brother was ordained today as a priest for the Diocese of Wilmington. I am very proud of him and I hope he has many happy years ahead of him as a priest. I hope his prayers for me carry extra weight now.

Supreme Court Applies Contract Principles to Interpret Vague Terms

In Seaford Golf and Country Club v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., (Del. Supr., May 15, 2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed a trial court decision interpreting a contract. The trial court opinion was based on stipulated facts without a trial. One of the issues in the case involved the interpretation of the word "plant" (as in industrial facility),  that was not defined in the agreement and that was otherwise of uncertain meaning as it was used in the agreement. In such case, the high court observed that it was appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions. However, the parties submitted different dictionary definitions that were inconsistent, so that was not helpful. In sum, the court remanded for a fuller factual record, such as depositions of the parties who entered into the agreement in order to produce testimony as to their intent.

Supreme Court Disallows Requirement of "Non-withdrawable" Entry of Appearance

In Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., (Del. Supr., May 9, 2007), read opinion here,  the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the Chancery Court could not require an attorney to submit a "non-withdrawable entry of appearance". Though the high court was understanding of the trial court's frustration with the incredible torpor with which this case was prosecuted (or not prosecuted), and the long history of this case was replete with reasons why the trial court did not want to allow more delay due to attorneys withdrawing, the Supreme Court cited the Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct that require an attorney to withdraw in certain circumstances. Citations in the opinion to prior decisions of the Supreme Court highlight that in the many years that this case has been litigated, the merits have not been addressed. The initial claims involved a minority shareholder making claims against the majority shareholder, but due to arbitration claims in Sweden, and a stay of the litigation in the meantime, and withdraw of prior counsel, the merits have not been litigated. The case was remanded with instructions to allow an entry of appearance without ruling in advance on any possible, future motions to withdraw of counsel.

UPDATE: On May 17, 2007, the court issued a revised opinion here.

Delaware Supreme Court Clarifies Direct v. Derivative Shareholder Claims

In Gatz v. Ponsoldt, (Del. Supr., April 16, 2007), read opinion here,  the Delaware Supreme Court, en banc, reversed a decision of the Chancery Court (summarized on this blog here,  and cited as Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 2006 WL 1510467 (Del. Ch. 2006)), on the basis that the claim presented was not exclusively derivative and, therefore, could be brought directly. The prior procedural history of the case is somewhat lengthy, but most recently the Chancery Court had dismissed the case for not satisfying the pre-suit demand requirements of Rule 23.1 as required for derivative cases.

This opinion issued today emphasizes that the Chancery Court's decision was based (naturally) on "then-existing case law" but after that Chancery opinion was issued, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d. 91 (Del. 2006), summarized on this blog here, which, as the Supreme Court wrote at page 2:

 "bore importantly on the issue of whether the dismissed claims were derivative, direct or both. Having heard the parties on the impact of Rossette, we conclude that the claims before us are not exclusively derivative and could be brought directly."

Today's opinion by the High Court is 35-pages long and it deserves much more thorough discussion and analysis than the press of client matters will allow me to perform now, but I wanted to make this very important decision that came out today available for those who have the time to download and read the whole decision at the above link. I am confident that many learned colleagues and professors will provide insightful commentary soon, and I plan to link that commentary to this blog soon after it appears.

UPDATE: Fortunately, Professor Bainbridge provides here thoughtful insights on the case, including quotes and commentary about the references by the court to equity's elevation of substance over form, as compared with prior writings by Justice Jacobs (the author of this case) and Vice Chancellor Strine on the topic, as well as reference to prior Delaware cases recognizing the  "equal dignity" of different parts of the DGCL.

UPDATE II: Thanks for the learned and helpful comments by readers posted below.

Standards for Attorneys' Fees in Derivative Cases Clarified

Abrams v. Sachnoff and Weaver, Ltd. (Del. Supr., April 4, 2007), read Order here. This Delaware Supreme Court Order affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision regarding attorneys’ fees for representative plaintiffs and a separate “plaintiff’s award” but acknowledged a conflict due to the relation between the representative plaintiff and her attorneys.  Read my short summary of  the prior Chancery Court decision here.

Note also the recent amendment here  to the Chancery Court Rules of  Procedure in light of the Chancery Court decision in this case last year. The amended rules  now require an affidavit to be filed in derivative and class actions to certify that they plaintiff is not receiving any special remuneration "under the table" (my words) and that there is no conflict between plaintiff's counsel and the representative plaintiff. In the above case, the representative plaintiff's husband was a lawyer who wanted legal fees for his work on the case, and after his wife died, the husband substituted himself as the plaintiff. The Chancery Court decision and the Supreme Court's order above describe the litany of issues that such a situation raises and why those situations must be avoided.

Attorneys' Fees Awarded to Prevailing Taxpayer Based on Common Benefit Exception to American Rule

In  Korn v. New Castle County, (Del. Supr., March 30, 2007, revised April 17, 2007), read opinion here,  the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court, and  the High Court ruled that the "common benefit" exception to the American Rule would apply in Delaware to allow attorneys' fees to be awarded to a taxpayer who successfully argued that New Castle County was improperly amassing surplus funds. After suit was filed, those surplus funds were used to pay certain current expenses. The "common benefit" basis for awarding fees is often used in  business enterprise litigation where, for example, a shareholder recovers funds that benefit the entire corporation.

The court noted that the equitable principle on which the common fund exception is based, is that all members of a class should not be unjustly enriched by the efforts of one person. This exception that allows fees to be awarded, requires that: (i) the claim be meritorious when filed; (ii) the action benefit an identifiable group; and (iii) the benefit be causally related to the lawsuit. There is a rebuttable presumption that if action is taken by the defendant that moots the complaint, then the benefit was causally related to the lawsuit, as here. The case was remanded to Chancery Court for a determination of an amount of legal fees to be awarded that would be reasonable in relation to the benefit conferred.

Corporate Law Insights By Delaware's Chief Justice

Courtesy of Mark Saltzburg, a member of the Delaware Bar now working in the northern Virginia office  of the Squire Sanders firm, we have a summary of remarks made by Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Myron Steele at the Spring meeting  last week in D.C. of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association, concerning developments in Delaware corporate law and recent Delaware Supreme Court cases. Here is Mark's summary:

First, Chief Justice Steele noted that the Delaware Supreme Court had just heard argument in the Trenwick America Litigation Trust litigation that may result in a decision on whether creditors may bring a cause of action for violation of fiduciary duty where a company deepens its insolvency in a way that further damages creditors after any residual interest of shareholders is out of the picture. Typically, fiduciary duties are only owed by directors to shareholders and not to creditors. Steele noted, however, that in an earlier decision by former Delaware Court of Chancery Chancellor William Allen in the Credit Lyonnais case, the court commented that directors may owe creditors a fiduciary duty where a company is in the vicinity of insolvency.

Second, Steele discussed whether the Delaware courts will hold directors to a higher standard of judicial review based on the background and training of a director. He rhetorically asked the question of whether the Delaware courts have moved away from a group analysis of fiduciary duty. He noted that, in the recent Emerging Communications case, the court appeared to hold a director with an investment banking background to a higher standard and he noted that, in the recent Disney executive compensation litigation, the court examined the conduct of the board on a director by director basis. Steele said that neither case heralds a move away from the traditional Delaware analysis of the board as a whole. He said there is no separate standard based on the training and background of a director. He said, however, that courts would apply conceptual nuance based on the participation of a board member.

Third, Steele noted that while the Delaware courts provide for different procedural standards in litigation depending on the insider status or outsider status of directors, the Delaware courts take the view that to be an insider is a not a crime, it is a status. He noted that insiders often bring advantages to a board of strategic advice and familiarity with the business. He said that to take a different view would be to risk leaving a board bereft of those board members with the best expertise and knowledge of the business.

Fourth, Chief Justice Steele noted that, in the stock-option back-dating cases currently before the Delaware Court of Chancery (at the trial court level), the cases will likely involve issues of lack of good faith by board members involved. He noted that past Delaware jurisprudence on the issue of good faith, including the Disney case, indicate that two prongs of analysis will be important in such cases: 1) whether directors intentionally used inside knowledge in such a way as to preclude them from acting loyally and in good faith, and 2) whether directors concealed information. Steele further commented that lack of good faith, while difficult to define with precision, has evolved to mean that a director consciously disregards a known duty.

Finally, Steele noted that, in the case Stone v. Ritter (also referred to as AmSouth), the Delaware courts had embellished the oversight concept of directors' duties first enunciated in the earlier Caremark decision. He noted that the directors in the case were directors of a bank who were alleged to have failed to supervise or develop processes to monitor employee conduct which resulted in the imposition of a $50 million fine on the bank. The court dismissed the case on the grounds that no sufficient claim was plead in the complaint. Steele noted that the complaint was dismissed because it failed to allege that there was an utter failure to install an information monitoring system and because there was no evidence that directors disregarded any red flags that might amount to a conscious disregard of fiduciary duties.

UPDATE: Compare recent comments, by coincidence, just posted here by Prof. Bainbridge on both the Stone v. Ritter and Caremark cases.

UPDATE II: The good professor follows up with insightful commentary here.

Expedited Interlocutory Appeal Granted

In DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. Delaware Department of Insurance, (Del. Supr. Mar. 2, 2007), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court provides an example of how quickly it can act when the circumstances warrant. This March 2 decision reversed a decision of the trial court dated Feb. 27.

The case involves the review by the Superior Court of a decision by the Delaware Insurance Commissioner. The Superior Court refused to stay a decision of the Delaware Insurance Commissioner pending its review,  in connection with the approval of an insurance company acquisition (i.e., Arrowpoint Capital's acquisition of Royal Indemnity Co.) The Commissioner did not allow the policyholder, DaimlerChrysler,  to participate in the hearing, but the Commissioner stayed his decision in order to allow DaimlerChrysler an orderly opportunity to seek judicial relief. The Superior Court refused to stay the Commissioner's decision pending review, but did certify an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court accepted the interlocutory appeal and reversed the Superior Court. The Supreme Court ordered both a stay of the Commissioner's decision and ordered that the Superior Court conduct expedited proceedings to consider the appeal of the Commissioner's decision. In the process, the high court discussed the factors to be considered for interlocutory appeals as well as the criteria for granting a stay pending an appeal.

UPDATE: The case settled at some point after this decision was published.

Claim of Foreign Governments Rejected

In The State of Sao Paulo of the Federative Republic of Brazil v. The American Tobacco Company, (Del Supr., Feb. 23, 2007), read opinion here, (yes, that is the correct spelling of the plaintiff's name), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Superior Court's decision to reject the claim of the foreign governments of Brazil and Panama to hold tobacco companies liable for the medical costs those countries incurred to treat  and care for certain citizens of those countries due to the health problems allegedly resulting from those citizens' use of the tobacco products.

Class Member Shareholder who did not Object to Class Settlement cannot Appeal Related Order

Fitzgerald v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., (Del. Supr., Jan. 24, 2007), read decision  here .

This Supreme Court Order dismissed the appeal by someone who was not a party to the proceedings below. The appellant filed an appeal from the October 25, 2005 order of the Chancery Court which enjoined a class of plaintiff shareholders from prosecuting an action pending in the Superior Court of California, the claims in which were released by a Delaware class action by the October 25, 2005 order. The appellant, despite notification, did not object to the settlement and the settlement hearing both on and prior to the October 25, 2005 order approving the settlement. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that he should be permitted to appeal the Court of Chancery judgment on the sole ground that he was a member of the plaintiff class affected by the decision below, even though he did not object to the settlement. 

The Supreme Court noted that a non-party to an action generally has no standing to take an appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court despite the fact that the non-party may have an interest in the outcome of the litigation (citing Townsend v. Griffith, 570 A.2d 1157, 1158 (Del. 1990) and Bryan v. Doar). The Bryan case was summarized on this blog here.

 

Claim Interpreted Under D & O Policy

In AT & T v. Farady Capital, (Del. Supr., Feb. 5, 2007), read opinion here , the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted the word "claim" in the context of a policy affording certain coverage for directors and officers. The high court reversed and remanded a ruling by the Delaware Superior Court, directing the trial court to apply the term "claim" to each cause of action as opposed to deeming the entire litigation collectively as one claim. The opinion did not include any determination about how the decision would apply to several causes of action that were based on the same set of operative facts.

Removal of LLC Member Affirmed

Niagra Falls Holding LLC v. Eureka VIII, LLC (Del. Supr., Jan. 19, 2007), read decision here .

This one-page Order from the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision in this matter which was summarized here. The summary at the foregoing link to the Chancery Court opinion provides more detail of course, but in sum, the trial court removed one of two 50% owner/members of an LLC as a remedy for that member's breach of the LLC Agreement.

Dram Shop Liability: Province of Legislature

In Shea v. Matassa, (Del. Supr., Feb. 1, 2007), read opinion here , the Delaware Supreme Court refused to create dram shop liability by common law. That is, they determined that it was the province of the legislature to create liability for retail sellers of alcoholic beverages  who serve inebriated patrons who then cause harm due to their intoxication. The court reached the same conclusion regarding similar issues surrounding social hosts' liability for serving alcohol. The court discusses the many public policy issues involved and the arguments on both sides--which are beyond the scope of this blog. However, to the extent it may be considered business litigation as it impacts on the liability of some businesses, it was appropriate to mention it on this blog.

Moore on Unocal

Former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Andrew G.T. Moore, the author of the landmark Unocal decision that addressed defenses available to a board of directors in respone to hostile takeovers, has published an article with his current insights on the topic. Hat tip to Prof. Larry Ribstein for highlighting the article. Here is a link to Larry's post on it as well as a link to the article itself: Ideoblog: Moore on Unocal. You can download the article here. The full cite to the case is: Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

Among other prior references on this blog to takeover defenses and the Unocal case are the recent post about Professor Bainbridge's article on the topic here.

Expert Testimony Barred Due To Limited Pre-Trial Disclosure

In Sammons v. Doctors For Emergency Services, P.A., (Del. Supr., Dec. 6, 2006), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed important matters of pre-trial practice and trial procedure that will serve as a useful standard for trial lawyers. Several issues were addressed (not all of which I will cover in this short blurb), but especially helpful for its practical utility is the high court's analysis of pre-trial disclosures required as a prerequisite for an expert witness to be called at trial.

In sum, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's restriction of an expert's trial testimony to the scope of the expert report that was previously produced by the expert in discovery and pursuant to the Rule 16 scheduling order. The court reasoned that to allow expert testimony more expansive than the report produced would defeat the purpose of pre-trial deadlines and would be unfair to the other lawyers who were relying on the scope of that report to prepare for trial. In this case there was no effort to amend the Rule 16 scheduling order, nor was there any apparent attempt to supplement the prior replies to discovery so as to notify the other counsel of the newly expanded scope of testimony. The expanded scope of the expert's opinions were disclosed for the first time at a deposition, several months after the deadline for producing expert reports. One defense counsel did not attend the deposition because he was relying on the limited scope of the expert report that apparently was not expected to impact his client. The court found such reliance on the report to be reasonable and held that an opponent should not be required to wait for the deposition of the expert to be made aware of the substance and scope of that expert's opinions that are to be presented at trial.

In essence, this opinion strongly supports the enforcement of pre-trial deadlines in scheduling orders and it emphasizes the importance of the expert report produced before trial. Although this decision was based on the Superior Court rules, it can be used by analogy, at least, in Chancery Court.  (The state court rules in Delaware are based on the federal rules, but Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is different in some respects.)

The Delaware Supreme Court reasoned:

The purpose of the Rule 16 scheduling order and discovery deadlines are to improve the efficiency of trials. The expert identification deadline assists the parties in conducting useful discovery of expert’s opinions. Pursuant to Rule 26, the expert disclosure statements should identify the expert’s opinions and the basis for those opinions so that the opposing party can properly prepare for depositions and trial. Here, Sammons did not properly and timely disclose Dr. Bridges’s opinion regarding causation and failure to diagnose sepsis before the expert disclosure date mandated by the trial judge’s scheduling order. Contrary to Sammons’s assertion, she did not cure the discovery deficiency simply by disclosing Dr. Bridges’s opinion regarding a failure to diagnose sepsis and causation during a deposition scheduled by another party for discovery purposes.

Further, Sammons’s counsel neither moved to amend the Rule 16 scheduling order upon a “showing of good cause,” supplemented their original expert disclosure to expand Dr. Bridges’s opinion nor contacted DFES counsel to notify him of Dr. Bridges’s expanded opinion before the scheduled deposition. Without notice of the proposed expanded expert opinion to be proffered, DFES was entitled to rely on Sammons’s disclosure. DFES could fairly assume it to be an accurate statement of the expert’s anticipated opinion at his deposition as well as later at trial. DFES relied on Sammons’s expert disclosure statement, and did not attend the deposition.

Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he granted Family Practice and Dr. Sobel’s motion to restrict Dr. Bridges’s trial testimony.

See also Duncan v. Newtown & Sons, Co., 2006 WL 2329378 (Del. Super. 2006).


Delaware Supreme Court on Good Faith: Not a Stand-Alone Fiduciary Duty

In Stone v. Ritter, (Del. Supr., Nov. 6, 2006), the Delaware Supreme Court  yesterday clarified its position on whether "good faith" is a separate stand-alone duty, in the same way as loyalty and due care are. Read opinion here.

Prof. Gordon Smith suggests that the court "drove a stake" in the concept of a stand alone duty of good faith. See his comments here. The money quote from the Delaware High Court's decision as selected by Gordon follows:

It is important, in this context, to clarify a doctrinal issue that is critical to understanding fiduciary liability under Caremark as we construe that case. The phraseology used in Caremark and that we employ here—describing the lack of good faith as a "necessary condition to liability"—is deliberate. The purpose of that formulation is to communicate that a failure to act in good faith is not conduct that results, ipso facto, in the direct imposition of fiduciary liability. The failure to act in good faith may result in liability because the requirement to act in good faith "is a subsidiary element[,]" i.e., a condition, "of the fundamental duty of loyalty." It follows that because a showing of bad faith conduct, in the sense described in Disney and Caremark, is essential to establish director oversight liability, the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of loyalty.

This view of a failure to act in good faith results in two additional doctrinal consequences. First, although good faith may be described colloquially as part of a "triad" of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty. Only the latter two duties, where violated, may directly result in liability, whereas a failure to act in good faith may do so, but indirectly. The second doctrinal consequence is that the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith. As the Court of Chancery aptly put it in Guttman, "[a] director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation's best interest."

Several weeks ago after an all-day seminar on the concept of good faith in Delaware jurisprudence,  I blogged here  about some members of the panel who rejected the view of good faith as a stand-alone duty. It appears that, after the opinion of yesterday, they were prescient.

UPDATE: Prof. Eric Chiappinelli has also commented on the case. His comments are here.

Supreme Court Rules: Trustee Has No Standing To Appeal

In Bryan v. Doar, (Del. Supr., Nov. 6, 2006), read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that a bankruptcy trustee did not have standing to appeal a decision of the Chancery Court in light of the trustee abjuring substitution under Rule 25(c) as a formal party in the case at the trial level. In addition, the trustee lacked standing to appeal because of his decision not to intervene as a party at the trial level. 

The case started in 2000 as a claim against directors of Ingersoll International, which later went into bankruptcy. After the Plan of Liquidation was approved, and the stay lifted, the creditor trustee was empowered to prosecute the lawsuit. If the trustee decided not to pursue the lawsuit, the Plan allowed the original plaintiffs to pursue it.  The Chancery Court granted a Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute.

The trial court found that failure to prosecute the case for 7 months after the Plan was confirmed was unreasonable and prejudicial. In ordering the dismissal, the Chancery Court also noted that the trustee and the original plaintiffs were acting in concert with the same attorney. The trustee tried to pursue the appeal in his own name, and the original plaintiff decline the opportunity to file a separate appeal. The court relied on precedent that a non-party does not have standing to appeal.

Delaware Supreme Court Interprets New York Law

In  Rohn Industries, Inc. v. Platinum Equity, LLC, (Del. Supr., October 20, 2006), read opinion here , the Delaware Supreme Court addressed a contract interpretation question that applied New York law. It is not uncommon for Delaware courts to apply the law of other states. This case involved the appeal of a judgment entered after trial, based on a finding that one party's subjective good faith was an adequate basis to terminate the contract in light of a clause that allowed termination if the party had a good faith belief, prior to closing,  that it would be subject to asbestos liability. In sum, the Supreme Court found that there was also a requirement based on contract law principles, including the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, that there be an objectively reasonable basis for the party to believe it would be subject to liability, in order for the good faith belief to suffice.

Section 220 Demand Requires "Credible Basis" of Wrongdoing

In Seinfeld v. Verizon Communications, read opinion  here, the Delaware Supreme Court  on September 25 provided clarification for the requirements of DGCL Section 220. Describing what the court referred to as well-settled prerequisites that must be satisfied before a shareholder can successfully demand books and records of a corporation, the high court affirmed the Chancery Court's decision denying inspection.

The Chancery Court decision was summarized on my blog  here . This was a long and expensive fruitless  fight for a shareholder who was seeking data to support a claim that some Verizon executives received excess compensation and/or were paid more than provided in their contract. See also another recent decision summarized  here ,  that denied inspection under DGCL Section 220 due to the request being overly broad. The Supreme Court often instructs litigants to use DGCL 220 to obtain details before filing a complaint, but this case is a good example that a demand under Section 220 is not a simple matter and can be a costly and unproductive exercise if not done carefully and correctly.

Here is a key quote from the court's decision:

We reaffirm the well-established law of Delaware that stockholders seeking inspection under section 220 must present “some evidence” to suggest a “credible basis” from which a court can infer that mismanagement, waste or wrongdoing may have occurred. The “credible basis” standard achieves an appropriate balance between providing stockholders who can offer some evidence of possible wrongdoing with access to corporate records and safeguarding the right of the corporation to deny requests for inspections that are based only upon suspicion or curiosity.

 

 

Pond Not Attractive Nuisance

 This blog focuses on business litigation and related topics. To the extent businesses are often landowners concerned with liability based on real estate they own, the following opinion is notable.

 In Butler v. Newark Country Club,  read opinion  here , the Delaware Supreme Court very recently issued an opinion of importance to landowners who might be subject to claims from children who trespass and are then injured on that property. This decision involved an 8 year old who drowned when thin ice gave way on an irrigation pond at a country club where the unfortunate youngster was trespassing.  Here is the money quote from the Supreme Court's affirmance of the Superior Court:

The Superior Court held that [Defendant] NCC owed no duty to protect Jeremiah from falling through the ice on its irrigation pond because the pond was not an artificial condition within the meaning of the attractive nuisance doctrine and because it was a danger that children should reasonably understand.

Exclusion of Expert Witnesses Upheld

In Bowen v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., read opinion here , the Delaware Supreme Court , in a opinion issued only a few days ago, upheld the exclusion by the trial court of experts who did not meet the Daubert  test. Analyzing Daubert and  Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 the court recognized that decisions to bar experts are often case dispositive. The court listed the applicable factors that the trial court needs to apply as a gatekeeper, as follows:

Consistent with Daubert, we apply a five-step test to determine the admissibility of scientific or technical expert testimony. The trial judge must determine whether:

(1) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill experience, training or education; (2) the evidence is relevant; (3) the expert's opinion is based upon information reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field; (4) the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and (5) the expert testimony will not create unfair prejudice or confuse or mislead the jury (citing Tolson v. State, 900 A.2d 639, 645 (Del. 2006)). The party seeking to introduce the expert testimony bears the burden of establishing its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence.

 

Effect of Dismissal Without Prejudice and Related Issues

In Haddock v. Zimmerman, read online here, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the following issues of importance to business litigation practitioners (and granted an unusual reversal of an interlocutory judgment of the Chancery Court):

(i) Unless clearly stated in the order, a dismissal "without prejudice" does not automatically allow one to file an amended complaint (See generally Chancery Court Rule 15aaa.);

(ii)  A "dismissal without prejudice"  is a final judgment for purposes of appeal (but not for purposes of res judicata);

(iii) If a new disinterested board of directors is installed after the original complaint is filed but before the amended complaint is filed, a determination of the issue of whether "demand is excused" under Chancery Court Rule 23.1 (and in light of DGCL Section 141(a)),  is at least in part based on whether the counts of the complaint at issue are "validly in litigation" as that phrase is defined.

Here is the money quote:

"dismissal without prejudice and without explicit leave to amend operates as a final judgment. We approve the Court of Chancery’s rationale in Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222 (Del. Ch. 1990). 

We further hold that, for purposes of determining whether demand is required before filing an amended derivative complaint, the term “validly in litigation” means a proceeding that can or has survived a motion to dismiss. This latter holding requires us to reverse the interlocutory order of the Court of Chancery and to remand this matter for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion."

Offer of Judgment Must Be Apportioned To Each Party

In Cahall v. Thomas, read opinion here , the Delaware Supreme Court determined that Rule 68 does not allow for costs to be awarded if an offer of judgment was jointly made to 2 parties without apportioning the amount of the offer between them. The court reasoned that: "Superior Court Civil Rule 68 provides that where a timely offer of judgment is not accepted prior to trial and the 'judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.'”

In sum, the court determined that the joint parties should not be required to figure out what amount each would receive from the offer, in order to effectuate the purpose of the rule.

Claims Are Both Derivative and Direct, says High Court

In Gentile  v. Rossette, read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court, in a rare reversal, disagreed with the Chancery Court's view of a claim as derivative only. The Court summarized it this way:

The issue presented on this appeal is one purely of law: can SinglePoint’s former minority stockholders bring a direct claim against the fiduciaries responsible for the debt conversion transaction complained of, or is such a claim exclusively derivative? We hold, for the reasons discussed herein, that the claim is not exclusively derivative and can be brought by the (former) minority shareholders directly.

 The complaint included dilution claims, but a subsequent merger eliminated the standing needed for a derivative suit.  The Court explains in great detail the factual background as well as the applicable legal analysis involved and concluded that some claims, such as the one in this case, can be both derivative and direct claims. The categorization of such claims can often mean the difference between being barred from pursuing the claims, as a practical matter due to the requirement of pre-suit demand, or having standing to bring such claims. For anyone who admits to some lack of ease (at least until this case) in determining the distinction between the 2 categories of claims, there is some intellectual comfort in knowing that the smartest people entrusted with making these determinations can have honest disagreements about them.
 My summaries of the trial court decision and the interlocutory appeal decision can be found here.

Delaware State Constitution Interpreted

In the decision styled: In re: Opinion of the Justices,  read online here, the Delaware Supreme Court answered a legal question presented by the Governor of Delaware. This is a well-grounded but seldom used Delaware exception to the general prohibition against advisory opinions. Based on a scholarly analysis of the Delaware Constitution the high court  found that the county was exempt from a residency requirement in the Constitution that applied to some state officials. The opinion is also  a useful guide to statutory construction in general, and for those interested in history, gives some added insight into why Delaware required that certain positions be held by  Delaware residents. When one realizes that Delaware was, once upon a time, part of the "three lower counties" of  the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and in pre-colonial times the Governor of Pennsylvania could appoint Pennsylvanians for Delaware public positions, the existing  requirement is more understandably viewed as important at the time that Delaware gained its "independence" from Pennsylvania. In fact, Delaware still celebrates the day it won independence from Pennsylvania and this case is an indication that it is still a key aspect of Delaware politics and public policy.

Dismissal Too Draconian A Penalty For Discovery Flaws

In Lehman Capital v. Lofland, read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that dismissal of a complaint with prejudice was too harsh a penalty, based on the facts of the case, for failure to comply with a discovery order and related pre-trial failings. After recounting an almost nightmarish pre-trial morass of missed deadlines, difficult client relationships, and lack of pre-trial preparation, Delaware's high court determined that less punitive sanctions would be more appropriate. The Court also provided specific examples of other less harsh penalties that the trial court could have employed. The Court held that sanctions were appropriate for failure to comply with the rules of discovery and lack of compliance with orders of the court, but there was an absence in the record of sufficient willfulness or conscious disregard on the part of the client as opposed to counsel.

The Court emphasized the distinction between failure to comply with trial court orders that are based on the "willful or conscious disregard" of the client--compared with lack of compliance due to omissions of the lawyer. The case was remanded with instructions that the trial court enter judgment in the amount of an "offer of judgment" (that was made but not replied to by the plaintiff). In addition the Court, based on Superior Court Rule 37(b)(2) ordered the trial judge to award attorneys' fees to the defendant, including the fees for the appeal, and that the trial judge should determine what portion of those fees should be paid by the client and what portion should be paid by the attorney. 

Supreme Court Affirms Chancery Opinion on Stock Issuance

In Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., read opinion  here , the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's decision of earlier this year that validated the issuance of preferred stock with preemptive rights as well as the board's approval of the contested transaction in light of the business judgment rule. The Court analyzed and interpreted the Certificate of Incorporation and Section 144 of the DGCL involving safe harbors for interested transactions. Here is a summary  on this blog of the trial court's decision and a link to the full trial court's decision.

Supreme Court Affirms Contract Interpretation and Application of Preincorporation Agreement Doctrine

In Lorillard  Tobacco Co. v. American Legacy Foundation, read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's reading of a contract that memorialized the settlement between the nation's largest tobacco companies and 46 states. The Chancery Court's decision was summarized on this blog here (with links to the original opinion and the denial of a motion for reargument). As in the trial court, a key issue  on appeal was whether "vilification" and "personal attacks" took place in violation of the agreement. Both courts cited to many court decisions for discussion of those terms in the context of contract interpretation to support the finding no violation of the settlement agreement.

Importantly, Delaware's High Court also affirmed the Chancery Court's application of the "doctine of preincorporation agreements". This doctrine allows the promoter of a corporation to enter into agreements that bind the nascent corporation. If the corporation accepts the benefits of those contracts,  they will be enforceable against the corporation. This gave standing to the tobacco companies to enforce the agreement against the non-profit foundation established in connection with the settlement agreement despite the foundation not being a signatory to the agreement.

Independent Contractor v. Employee

In Falconi v. Coombs & Coombs, Inc., read opinion here, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed an issue of interest to many business lawyers--including business litigators: When is a worker an independent contractor as opposed to an employee. This decision was made in the context of a worker's compensation claim but the analysis, including a discussion of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 220, arguably has wide application in many other contexts. Among other notable aspects of this case was that "employee status" was found, despite the employer's use of an IRS Form 1099 for the worker's pay, which is commonly used as a factor in favor of independent contractor status.

Supreme Court Imposes Attorneys' Fees for Bad Faith Conduct During Litigation

In Dover Historical Society, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Commission, (Del. Supreme, July 10, 2006) (read opinion online   here ), the Delaware Supreme Court continued its tradition of enforcing high standards of conduct in litigation matters. In this case the state's high court reviewed the denial of attorneys’ fees by the Superior Court in an appeal involving a developer who destroyed a historical building that was the subject of litigation. The litigation in the trial court was  pursued by the local city  in order to preserve the historical building that the developer sought to demolish. The court determined that the bad faith exception to the American rule applied (the American rule being that each side normally pays for its own fees, win or lose.)

 The noteworthy aspect of this opinion is that the imposition of fees as an exception to the American rule was based on conduct that was not by the lawyers directly and not necessarily a part of what is  "conventionally viewed" as core court proceedings. Here is the money quote from the decision: 

That construction of the bad faith exception (to require that the offensive conduct take place in the court proceeding itself) is, in our view, overly narrow. [The party's ] destruction of the buildings was a direct (albeit highly improper) response to the appellants’ filing their second petition. It is difficult to imagine conduct more abusive and disrespectful of the judicial process, than a party’s intentional destruction of the very subject matter that the lawsuit seeks to protect and preserve. Although that behavior is atypical of the conduct normally found to invoke this exception (and thankfully so), nonetheless it constitutes bad faith."  Bad faith has been found to exist (inter alia) in cases where “parties have unnecessarily prolonged or delayed litigation, falsified records, or knowingly asserted frivolous claims[,] . . . mis[led] the court, alter[ed] testimony, or chang[ed] position on an issue.”(internal citations omitted)



 

 

Delaware Investigates Class Action Firm

Today's Sunday News Journal in Wilmington reports that the Delaware Supreme Court's Office of Disciplinary Counsel is investigating the Milberg Weiss firm to the extent that any of the allegations for which it was indicted involved cases filed in the Delaware Chancery Court. The article also mentions that the firm's Wilmington, Delaware office will be closing on August 1. Here is the link: delawareonline: The News Journal. High court investigates law firm

Equitable Fraud Found But No Fiduciary Relationship and No Commercial Frustration of Contract

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Insurance Company, download file, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed claims that have now been reviewed twice each by the trial and appellate courts in Delaware. The high court reversed the Chancery Court's decision that dismissed an amended complaint.
The Supreme Court found that the amended complaint adequately alleges a claim of fraud in pleading that AIG sold Wal-Mart a product that was an economic sham designed to create enormous tax deductions and that AIG did so knowing that their product was flawed and without disclosing that those flaws jeopardized the favorable tax treatment that formed the basis of the deal. Page 8 of the decision, which is available at the above link, provides the three citations to the three prior reported decisions.
Although reversing the trial court, the Delaware Supreme Court did agree with the Chancery Court that Wal-Mart failed to state a claim under the doctrine of commercial frustration which excuses future performance under a contract only as follows:
"where, after a contract is made, a party's principle purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or circumstances indicate to the contrary."
In addition, the Supreme Court agreed with the Chancery Court that there was no fiduciary duty and no fiduciary relationship created by the transaction between the parties,as the court defined them, and cited to authorities discussing when a fiduciary relationship would be created, despite labels such as "agent". In this instance, the court agreed that the relationship with the insurance company and Wal-Mart was a "normal, arm's-length business relationship."
The Supreme Court also discussed the law of equitable fraud.
(see below link for completion of summary).

Continue Reading...

Duty Of Insurance Agent/Broker Addressed

In Windom v. Ungerer, download file, the Delaware Supreme Court a few days ago issued an opinion that addresses an issue of great practical usefulness to business litigation practitioners. The case involved a football league that was sued for an injury to a player. After suit was filed the league discovered that they had no commercial liability insurance. The player obtained a default judgment against the league and the league assigned their rights to the insurance company for the injured player, Windom. Windom then sued the insurance agents for the league. The original agent was an exclusive agent for Nationwide who had provided coverage initially but after a number of years Nationwide refused to renew the policy. At that time the original agent referred the league to a "general agent" to determine if that agent could find another insurance company that would provide coverage.
Though there was discussion among the parties of a presumption that the new insurance company, Pawtucket, would provide coverage, Pawtucket eventually returned the premium check and determined that they would not provide coverage. The dispute in this case arose because the general agent simply mailed the declination notice to the "property address" for the league, as opposed to the separate "mailing address" that was listed in the documents. The league said they never received the notice of declination of coverage. The agent had no proof of mailing or proof that the league received the mail he said that he sent.
When is a mailed letter presumed to be received, and who is an insurance broker?
The Supreme Court decided these issues and affirmed summary judgment for the Nationwide agent, finding that he was a mere "messenger" and not a "broker" tasked with finding new insurance for the league as that term is defined in the statute.
The court reversed, however, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor or the "general agent".
The Supreme Court reasoned that summary judgment in favor of the general agent was not appropriate due to a material issue of fact as to whether the presumption that a postage-paid envelope that is mailed to the proper address would be received by the addressee, should be rebutted based on the facts of the case. The determination of that factual issue impacts on the resolution of the issue of whether the manner in which the mail was sent fulfilled the admitted duty of the general agent to properly inform the league that their insurance coverage was declined (which coverage the agent assumed a duty to seek).
These "bread and butter" quotidian issues come up in many different contexts in the business world and it is helpful to have a Supreme Court decision that deals with them.

Disney Affirmed

The Delaware Supreme Court today affirmed the Chancery Court decision in the Disney case. Here is a link to download the 91-page decision in the unanimously affirmed case styled: In Re: The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation. A tidal wave of insightful commentary is expected to come soon via the blogs of corporate scholars such as Professors Larry Ribstein; Gordon Smith and Steve Bainbridge. Here is the initial "teaser" post by Prof. Bainbridge:
ProfessorBainbridge.com: Disney Affirmed. One of the great things about blogs of corporate law professors is that we will now get expert analysis on a seminal, benchmark decision like Disney in a matter of hours and days from the time the decision is made public, instead of waiting weeks and months until the trade journals and law reviews of yesteryear circulated their articles.

Liquidated Damages Upheld and Wage Act Interpreted

The recent Delaware Supreme Court decision in Delaware Bay Surgical Services, P.A. v. Swier, download file, addressed the statutory interpretation of "wages" as they apply to the claim of a doctor for unpaid wages under the Delaware Wage Act. The court also analyzed the claim for liquidated damages under an Employment Agreement and clarified Delaware law that although such contract provisions are not enforceable as a penalty they will be granted if the amount of liquidated damages in the agreement is a good faith estimate of actual damages from early termination of employment. The Supreme Court also confirmed that in Delaware, when an employee leaves an employer with an employment-related debt, the employer may deduct the amount from final wages if the employer has reasonable grounds to dispute the amount due to the employee. Thus, under the Delaware Wage Act, no statutory penalties such as attorneys' fees and doubling of the amount due would be payable to the good doctor who had prevailed on that claim in the trial court.

Supremes Dismiss Breach of Loyalty and Disclosure Claims; and Judicial Notice Examined

In In Re: General Motors (Hughes) Shareholder Litigation, download file, the Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the Chancery Court dismissing a lengthy complaint that alleged a long list of claims in connection with the spinoff by GM of its wholly-owned subsidiary, Hughes. The claims included: the breach of the duty of loyalty and unjust enrichment in the payment of a special dividend by Hughes to GM; the breach of the duty of loyalty and failing to deal fairly with GM shareholders; the breach of the duty of loyalty and manipulating the shareholder vote; breach of the duty of disclosure; and the aiding and abetting of a breach of fiduciary duty.
The Chancery Court's opinion in essence held that the effect of shareholder ratification was to maintain the presumptions of the business judgment rule.
In affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the court also discussed the application of "judicial notice" under Delaware Rule of Evidence 201(b), as well as under what circumstances a court may consider matters outside of the complaint in a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In upholding the denial of discovery on the Motion to Dismiss the Supreme Court determined that the Chancery Court may properly consider facts that are otherwise subject to judicial notice without affording the plaintiff an opportunity to take discovery where the plaintiff has no good faith basis for challenging the authenticity or the legitimacy of an extraneous fact.

Rejection of Forum Non Conveniens as Basis to Dismiss

The Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court and determined that despite the parties and the witnesses being based in Florida, and the application of Florida law, the Cryo-Maid factors did not justify dismissal of a claim based on forum non conveniens. The case of Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., download file, dealt with minority claims relating to a cash-out merger. The trial court's decision was summarized previously on my blog here.

Disney Opinion Predictions

Gordon Smith comments on the upcoming decision expected soon from the Delaware Supreme Court in the Disney case. Here is the link:
Conglomerate Blog: Business, Law, Economics & Society

Bank of New York held Liable for Civil Conspiracy to steal business from credit agency and Interference with Agency's Prospective Contractual Relationships

In a decision of great importance to businesses who jealously protect their confidential information and who must guard against employees taking that information to compete against them, the Delaware Supreme Court in a recent decision provided some additional ammunition for those businesses to protect themselves from thieving employees. The case of Empire Financial Services, Inc. v. The Bank of New York , download file, involved a key employee from a credit agency who did business with the Bank of New York. The trial court found that the Bank of New York engaged in a conspiracy with that key person at the credit agency. The conspiracy involved a plan that the Bank of New York would transfer business to the new agency that the key person be joining (if the Bank would transfer their business.) Notably, this plan was hashed while the key employee was still at the agency doing business with the Bank of New York. Before he left, the key person wanted to make sure he could bring the business to his new employer. Part of the plan was that proprietary and confidential data would be stolen from his old employer. In sum, prior to his departure from the credit agency, the key person had an informal agreement with his counterpart at the Bank of New York to transfer business to a new credit agency, which involved the unauthorized taking (theft) of confidential and proprietary information to a new credit agency. Although the agreement between the "old" credit agency and the bank was terminable at will, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the tortious conduct could be characterized as "wrongful interference with a prospective contractual relationship".
This tort is available instead of contract damages even when a business relationship is terminable at will, and requires proof of: (1) the reasonable probability of a business opportunity; (2) the intentional interference by defendant with that opportunity; (3) proximate causation, and; (4) damages resulting from the loss of benefits of the relation including interference that consists of: (i) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation; or (ii) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.
(As an aside, on a social level, we all have at least heard of--if not actually met--nefarious persons who engage in these types of torts in a social context as opposed to a business context. Iago in Shakespeare's Othello comes to mind. Although, I am not aware of a tort for interfering with "social relationships". ) The court relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 766 and also Section 766B.
The court defined the requirements for conspiracy and emphasized the point that a conspiracy "need not be expressed in words and may be implied and understood to exist by mere conduct." Lastly, on a side issue, the court noted the very limited review allowed by courts of a decision by an arbitrator in binding arbitration.
UPDATE: In its second decision in this case, available here, the Delaware Supreme Court remanded the case once again to the Superior Court.

Depositions in Delaware

Christine Hurt refers in her Conglomerate blog post to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Paramount from 1994, that included an extensive addendum which set forth the standard of conduct that will be enforced in depositions conducted in Delaware cases--even if the depositions are taken out of state by attorneys only admitted pro hac vice. Her post also includes a video involving an updated deposition with the attorney who was the subject of the Delaware Supreme Court's scorn in that opinion: Here is the link:
Conglomerate Blog: Business, Law, Economics & Society

Disney Decision by Delaware Supreme Court

Prof. Ribstein posts about his prediction of the result expected soon from the Delaware Supreme Court in the appeal of the Chancery Court's decision in the Disney case, involving the $140 million payment to Michael Ovitz of a severance package after one year of less than stellar performance. In light of Ribstein's prior prediction of the Chancery Court opinion, (see my post linking to his prior prediction: http://www.delawarelitigation.com/chancery-court-updates-186-preview-of-disneyovitz-decision.html ), his current post is worth reading by anyone interested in what will undoubtedly become (regardless of the result) an oft-quoted decision by the Delaware Supreme Court in the area of fiduciary duty; executive compensation; limitations on the powers of a CEO, and related topics. A search on this blog using the word Disney will uncover many related posts. Here is the link to Larry's insights into what he expects the Delaware Supreme Court to do in this case:
Ideoblog: Is Disney about to be reversed?

UPDATE: Prof. Bainbridge has a responsive post at this link:http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2006/04/will_the_delawa.html
UPDATE II: Prof. Ribstein replies to the response by Prof. B. here: http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/04/the_impending_d.html

Attorneys' Fees in Trust Litigation

In the case styled: In the Matter of the Unfunded Insurance Trust Agreement of Emilio M. Capaldi, Deceased, download file, an order of the Delaware Supreme Court reviews a Chancery Court opinion and addresses the issue of attorneys' fees in trust litigation.

Judgment Not Appealable Pending Application for Fees

In Wellington Homes, Inc. v. State of Delaware, Ex Rel. M. Jane Brady, download file, the Supreme Court made clear, in an order, that a judgment of the Superior Court was not final and not appealable while a claim for attorneys' fees was still pending. This case involved claims against a developer resulting in a jury verdict against the developer for statutory penalties brought on behalf of the State by the Delaware Attorney General for alleged construction defects and related complaints.

Arbitrability Issue Addressed by Supreme Court

The Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion on March 14 that is must reading for anyone who drafts or needs to interpret an arbitration clause in an agreement governed by Delaware law. In James and Jackson LLC v. Willie Gary LLC, download file, Delaware's highest court affirmed the trial court and with pithy reasoning addressed the issues of: (i) who decides arbitrability if the agreement incorporates the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA); and (ii) based on the terms of the specific agreement at issue, whether the claims raised were governed by the arbitration clause. The Court determined that based on the terms of the particular agreement involved, the parties intended that the trial court determine the threshold issue of arbitrability, and that likewise injunctive relief should be decided by the trial court. CAVEAT: If the parties to an agreement simply incorporate the rules of the AAA without more, one should be aware that the AAA will likely be empowered to not only decide the issue of arbitrability, but the AAA will also be the forum to dispense equitable relief. FULL DISCLOSURE: The author of this blog argued the winning side in the expedited appeal and in the trial court--whose decision was summarized here. I would have reported both opinions as important decisions nonetheless, even if I lost (though not with as much cheerfulness.)
UPDATE: Steve Jakubowski of The Bankruptcy Litigation Blog kindly references me and this decision in his post today. Prof. Larry Ribstein also comments on the case here.

Standard for Damages in Disclosure Claims Clarified

The Delaware Supreme Court clarified (a few days ago) several of its prior decisions in connection with what damages are available for a breach by the board of directors of their disclosure obligations, especially in connection with proxies. In the case of In Re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Shareholder Litigation, download opinion, the Supreme Court addressed the partial appeal of a trial court decision that rejected disclosure claims due, in part, to the absence of provable damages. The aspect of the Chancery Court opinion that was not appealed from, dismissed claims based on a failure to plead demand futility under Chancery Court Rule 23.1. The case arose from the merger between J.P Morgan Chase and Bank One.
The Chancery Court's decision was summarized last year on my blog here. Plaintiffs argued that violation of the duty of disclosure, without more, automatically entitles the affected shareholders to a damages recovery. They relied on footnote 27 of Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5,12 (Del. 1998).
The plaintiffs also relied, incorrectly according to the Court, on its prior decisions of In Re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319 (Del. 1983) and Louden v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 141 (Del. 1997).
The defining quote in the case is as follows:

Therefore, Tri-Star stands only for the narrow proposition that, where directors have breached their disclosure duties in a corporate transaction that has in turn caused impairment to the economic or voting rights of stockholders, there must at least be an award of nominal damages. Tri-Star should not be read to stand for any broader proposition. (emphasis in original)

This clarifies and in some ways rejects the original, less complete, footnote 27 in Malone v. Brincat that some read as a per se rule requiring at least nominal damages for any violation of disclosure duties. The above quote was a "revision" of footnote 27 in the Malone case, to add more complete language from the Louden case that was referred to in a more terse way in the original footnote, and to make it clear what the Supreme Court intended to say.

Class Requirements Not Met

In WIT Capital Group, Inc. v. Benning, download file, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that under applicable New York law, the plaintiffs did not satisfy the "injury in fact" or "fact of harm" requirement and therefore could not satisfy the predominance of common issues of law or fact requirement under Delaware Superior Court Rule 23(b)(3). Therefore the case could not proceed as a class action.

Legal Ethics and Technology

For a good source on the intersection of technology and legal ethics, check Ben Cowgill's recent post, with his promise of more to come on the topic. Here is the link:
'Ben Cowgill on Legal Ethics'

No Adverse Inference Warranted for Lost Evidence


In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Midcap, download file, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred in giving the jury a missing-evidence adverse-inference jury instruction because it failed to initially determine that the defendant had intentionally or recklessly destroyed the relevant documents. The adverse instruction was based at least in part on the testimony by the defendant that the evidence at issue "could not be located."

Waiver of Right to Partition Implied

In Libeau v. Fox, download file, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part a Chancery Court decision that interpreted an agreement among three friends for co-ownership of a beach house. The Chancery Court ruled that the parties effectively agreed to waive their statutory right to a partition of the property and based on the record presented at trial, the trial court determined that the agreement would expire upon the death of the last of the three original owners. However, the Supreme Court determined that reformation of the agreement that expressed the intent of the parties did not extend to changing the form of ownership from a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship to a tenancy in common. The Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the trial court in determining that one can waive partition rights without an explicit disclaimer.
Rather, such an agreement need only contain a procedure for the co-owners to sell their interest in a manner that is inconsistent with the later maintenance of a partition action.
Specifically, when a contract provides an exit mechanism that is subject to certain conditions and when the filing of a partition action would allow an exiting party to escape those conditions, the exiting party's decision to sign the contract constitutes a waiver of the statutory right of partition. Lastly, the court noted that such agreements are not inconsistent with public policy which allows for reasonable restrictions on the transferability of real property.

Business Judgment Rule and Disney Appeal

Prof. Bainbridge posts about a recent short article he wrote summarizing the Business Judgment Rule ("BJR") in light of oral argument last week in the Disney case before the Delaware Supreme Court, and a related New York Times article referring to the BJR as esoteric. In his short article, Prof. Bainbridge argues that the BJR should not be esoteric and he tries to summarize the rule in a way that should be understood by all directors.

Contract Interpretation: Specific Term Prevails Over General

The Delaware Supreme Court, in DCV Holdings, Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., download file, reviewed a trial court ruling on claims that the seller should be responsible for antitrust violations and other claims that arose after the closing, based on allegations of common law fraud, as well as the indemnification clause in the agreement of sale. The court reviewed the elements of common law fraud, which it found were not met, reviewed the terms of the contract, and relied on the basic principle of contract interpretation that the more specific parts of a contract prevail over more general language. The court found that the seller specifically negotiated for a "knowledge qualifier" that limited its liability for those matters which it was unaware of at the time of the sale, in connection with its indemnification obligations. In upholding the trial court, the Supreme Court reviewed the standard for review of factual determinations and also noted that its review of the trial court's application of law to factual determinations is de novo.

Commentary on Disney Oral Argument

The Conglomerate Blog's Online Forum on the Disney oral argument today before the Delaware Supreme Court is the legal equivalent of an "all you can eat buffet" for anyone interested in the Business Judgment Rule and related issues regarding the duties of directors and officers of corporations. It is "must reading" for anyone interested in this area of corporate law. Whatever "The Supremes" decide in the Disney case, their opinion will be a "seminal case" that will be required reading for anyone who wants to be familiar with basic corporate law principles.

Disney at Delaware Supreme Court Today

Prof. Ribstein notes his views on the Disney oral argument today before the Delaware Supreme Court with a link to the Conglomerate blog's online forum today regarding the Disney oral argument.
The Disney decision by our Supreme Court will be closely watched by those interested in corporate law worldwide. For someone like me whose blog focuses on summarizing corporate and commercial cases from the Delaware Supreme Court and Chancery Court, I am fortunate to have the benefit of referring to blogs by corporate law professors like Professors Larry Ribstein, Gordon Smith, Steve Bainbridge, and others, who also write about these same cases and issues. By virtue of their positions in academia, they are not constrained by the billable hour requirements of a private practitioner like myself, who might not have as much time to discuss each case in the scholarly detail that they do. Of course, writing scholary commentary about these cases and related issues is part of their job, and by enabling me to link to their commentaries, readers of my blog receive much greater insights than they otherwise would. Lucky for me that their many interests include topics on which this blog focuses.

Delaware Supreme Court's Review of Disney Decision

As referred to recently, The Conglomerate Blog will have an online forum regarding the Jan. 25 oral argument at the Delaware Supreme Court in the appeal of the Disney case. Larry Ribstein announces today at his Ideoblog that he will prepare an "opinion" based on what he predicts the Delaware Supreme Court will decide, just as he wrote an "opinion" prior to Chancellor Chandler's trial court opinion (based on his prediction of that decision.) This is fascinating stuff for anyone interested in these issues.

Disney Oral Argument

The Conglomerate blog reports that oral argument in the Disney case is set for January 25 in the Delaware Supreme Court. As he did with the trial court decision by Chancellor Chandler, Gordon Smith will be organizing on his Conglomerate blog an online forum or symposium with other experts, regarding the oral argument, which will be webcast. Prior posts on this blog regarding the trial court's decision in Disney can be found here and here.

Request for Attorneys' Fees Denied

Generally, I summarize court opinions only on this blog, and not decisions that are designated merely as orders of the court, but a recent Order of the Supreme Court contains citations to cases and has a discussion of recent Delaware law on a topic near and dear to most attorneys: fees awardable by the court. In P.J. Bale, Inc. v. Rapuano, download file, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the decision from the bench of the Chancery Court in which it was determined the there was not a basis to apply the "bad faith" exception to the American Rule that each party bears its own fees.

No Conflict between SEC and Delaware Law

A few days ago, the Chancery Court ruled that the DGCL requirement that a company hold an annual shareholders' meeting, was neither in conflict with nor pre-empted by an SEC requirement that audited financial statements be made available prior to the meeting (in light of the company's claim that those statement would not be available for the meeting). New Castle Partners, L.P. v. Vesta Insurance Group, Inc., download pdf file. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's ruling within hours of the decision being appealed, though I do not have a link yet to that decision. At an ABA meeting yesterday in Washington of the Business and Corporate Litigation Committee of the Business Law Section, there was a panel discussion on the current "tension" (according to some) between federal regulations (e.g., Sarbanes Oxley) and state law on corporate governance. Thus, the Vesta case of a few days ago was timely. Chief Justice Myron Steele was on that panel yesterday, and he noted that the affirmance of the Chancery Court in Vesta was an example of how the Federal Law and Delaware Law are both focused on the same goal--though they may approach it in different ways. He referred to Professor Steve Bainbridge's presentation at the recent Annual F.G. Pileggi Distinguished Lecture in Law as an example of someone who recognized that aspect of Delaware corporate law. Alan Beller, SEC Director, Division of Corporate Finance, was on the panel with the Chief Justice at the seminar, and agreed (in his personal capacity, he was quick to emphasize), with the result in the Vesta case.
By coincidence, I also came across yesterday, while at the seminar, a post at a blog called Little Caesar's Daily R & R, referring to an article in The Economist, that described several other instances during the last 100 years where there was a possible threat by the Federal government to "federalize" corporate law, but those predications never (yet) materialized.
UPDATE: Prof. Ribstein posts here with a more scholarly analysis of the Vesta case and links to prior writings of Chief Justice Steele on related issues, as well as links to Ribstein's prior writings on the topic addressed in the Vesta case.
UPDATE II (Nov. 21): Materials made available at the seminar referenced above also included an article, here, that Vice Chancellor Strine recently wrote on a related topic.
UPDATE III (Nov. 22): Professor Bainbridge promises to write more about the issue in the Vesta case.
FINAL UPDATE (Nov. 25): Delaware Supreme Court Order affirming the Chancery Court decision in Vesta, within hours, is available here.

Supreme Court Rules on Advancement of Fees

Yesterday, the Delaware Supreme Court placed another nail (perhaps the final nail?) in the coffin of defenses to a claim for advancement of fees. In Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, download pdf file, the court rejected defenses of laches, unclean hands, undue financial hardship and several other defenses in light of the company's belief that the officer seeking advancement of fees to defend himself in lawsuits hid assets (to make it unlikely he could ever repay the company if required to do so). The company also argued that the actions for which the former officer was sued were not done in his "official capacity" because he was allegedly enriching himself personally through the behavior for which he was being sued. Bottom line: when based on bylaws or other mandatory advancement provisions, a company may have no defense to a claim for advancement. Under the DGCL, this is a separate and summary proceeding with limited, if any, discovery, and is not subject to the same considerations as a claim for indemnification. (Also separate, though related, is the "third leg of the stool", D & O Insurance.) The public policy behind these decisions, as explained yesterday by Vice Chancellor Noble at the ABA meeting in Washington, D.C., of the Business Law Section's Business and Corporate Litigation Committee, is to encourage qualified people to serve on boards without undue fear of depleting or exposing their personal assets due to the high cost to defend suits in which they are named as a party. One must also keep in mind that "fees on fees" are an entitlement to one who prevails on a claim for advancement of fees. This decision is certain to be a high-water mark on this issue.

Business Need Not Serve Everyone

The Delaware Supreme Court recent reversed a decision of the Delaware Human Relations Commission and agreed with the actions of a business in refusing entry to a dog. The business, a casino and race track called Dover Downs, refused admission to a dog who accompanied a disabled person (a prospective customer) where that person would not answer questions about the training of the dog or what assistance the dog was capable of providing to the customer who claimed to be disabled. The decision was based on the Delaware Equal Accommodations Law, as well as the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act. Thompson v. Dover Downs, Inc., download pdf file.

Preferred Stock has No Right to Dividends

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court in ruling that the holder of preferred shares has no absolute right to dividends, in Shintom Co., Ltd. v. Audiovox Corporation, download pdf file. I have a post here that describes in more detail the reasoning in the earlier Chancery Court decision, and its interpretation of DGCL Section 151.

Attorneys Fees in Derivative Case

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a Chancery Court decision that awarded only about 20% of the amount requested for attorneys' fees in a derivative case, despite a settlement agreement that allowed for payment of $1.2 million. The decision decribes the factors considered by the court in approving fees, regardless of the agreement of the parties on a specific amount of fees. O'Malley, et al. v. Jeffries, et al.,download file.

Statutory Interpretation

The Delaware Supreme Court recently ruled in Cantinca v. Fontana , download pdf file, on a statutory interpretation issue of first impression. Specifically, the issue was whether in a civil action for negligence, a state statute barred evidence of conduct that was claimed to constitute a violation of a county ordinance, which would be negligence per se. The trial court held that Section 6636 of Title 16 of the Delaware Code prevailed over a different standard in the county code. The court disagreed that the state provision preempted the counterpart in the New Castle County Code. In Delaware, the state and its political subdivisions are permitted to enact similar provisions and regulations as long as the two regulations do not conflict. Where a conflict exists between a state statute and a local ordinance, the statute must always prevail. However, the test for determining a conflict and preemption analysis is whether the state statute was intended to be exclusive. Legislative intent to make a state statute exclusive of any regulation of the same subject matter by a political subdivision may be expressed or implied. Unlike the trial court, the Supreme Court here determined that no exclusivity intent, either expressed or implied, can be found in the statute at issue. The county code allowed the admission of a smoke detector violation, but the state statute did not. In light of the Supreme Court determining that the two provisions could co-exist, the case was remanded to the trial court.

Supreme Court Protects Identity of Writer on Blog

The Delaware Supreme Court yesterday issued a decision that may have nationwide impact in the blogosphere. In John Doe No.1. v. Cahill, download pdf file, the court refused to require the disclosure of the identity of someone whose anonymous post on a blog was alleged to be defamatory. The standard that the court used was that there first must be enough evidence of a defamation claim to survive a motion for summary judgment on that claim.
The Wilmington News Journal deserves credit for a story publicizing the case. The article described the decision as a victory for free speech.

Update on Appeal of Disney Case

Gordon Smith reports that oral argument for the appeal of Chancellor Chandler's Disney decision is expected to be heard by the Delaware Supreme Court in December or January with a decision to be rendered within about 60 days thereafter.

Supreme Court Awards Attorneys' Fees

In Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., Inc. v. Dobler, et al., download file, a Delaware Supreme Court decision, the Chancery Court's ruling in an appraisal action was upheld. The trial court ruled that the company's valuation expert at trial was rejected due to that expert's flawed theoretical model and his failure to refer to relevant data. However, the Supreme Court reversed to the extent that it remanded with instruction that the trial court grant an award of attorneys' fees and costs to the petitioner due to the bad faith conduct of the company in litigation including false testimony, failure to produce discovery (including destruction of computers). Also, it appeared that an expert witness at trial seemed to force his analysis to fit a predetermined conclusion. This is the second recent case where the Delaware Supreme Court has awarded attorneys' fees for conduct during litigation that falls below the standard required by Delaware courts. It is also referred to as the bad faith exception to the American Rule regarding each party bearing its own attorneys' fees. The other recent Delaware Supreme Court case was Kaung v. Cole.

Reverse Merger Not Subject to Transfer Tax

A recent Delaware Supreme Court decision includes a useful primer on statutory interpretation principles as well as an analysis of why it allowed a reverse merger of existing LLCs to transfer ownership of real estate without being subject to local and state real estate transfer taxes. The decision in Acadia Brandywine Town Center, LLC v. Acadia Brandywine Holdings, LLC, download pdf file, will undoubtedly be addressed in the next session of the Delaware General Assembly, but in the meantime, it may be of interest to those who can avail themselves of the relatively underutilized Series LLC. To my knowledge, the Series LLC is unique to Delaware law. Here is a short article about the Delaware Series LLC. Download file.

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Though not strictly a case dealing with corporate or commercial law, the recent Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Dunlap v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,download pdf file, reaffirmed the contract principle, often used in business cases, of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court made clear that when applicable, this "duty" will continue to be enforced.

Supreme Court Rules on Advancement Issue

The Delaware Supreme Court recently affirmed the Chancery Court's ruling on advancement of litigation expenses for a former officer, but in Kaung v. Cole National Corporation, download pdf file, the court held that the nature of a summary proceeding for advancement is too limited to address the related but distinct issues of indemnification or recoupment of amounts voluntarily advanced. The court also spent considerable time in the opinion to reaffirm the importance to the Delaware Courts of civility in legal proceedings. In affirming the Chancery Court's shifting of fees against the plaintiff for "bad faith" tactics, the Supreme Court directly put lawyers "on notice", as it has in past cases, that it would continue to affirm the imposition of fees against lawyers who engage in "abusive litigation tactics", including inappropriate conduct by parties themselves during their depositions.
UPDATE: Here is my post about the Chancery Court's decision after remand.

Revised Technicolor Decision by Supreme Court

In a prior post, I noted the recent Delaware Supreme Court decision in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., one of the longest running cases in Delaware corporate law. A few days ago, the court revised its decision, and the opinion can be found here.

Recent Delaware Supreme Court Cases

Two recent cases were handed down by the Delaware Supreme Court:
Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen and Qualcomm, Inc. v. Texas Instruments, Inc. Both cases are available on the Court's Website.

In Homestore, ruling on a Motion to Stay Pending Appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reviews the rationale behind the statutory framework of Section 145(e), which provides for advancement of indemnification payments. The court

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Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Internal Affairs Doctrine

Tip of the hat to Professor Larry Ribstein for his recent post about the May 5, 2005 opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court affirming a recent Chancery Court decision upholding the internal affairs doctrine to apply Delaware law to the issue of voting different classes of shares of a Delaware corporation, as referenced in a recent post of mine.

Trustee Responsible for Mistaken Payments

In Chavin v. PNC Bank, Delaware, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled on April 28, 2005 that expenses incurred by the trustee of a trust, though in good faith, were based on mistaken assumptions and should not be paid for by the trust. This is contrary to the general rule that litigation costs incurred by a trustee to defend or preserve the trust are paid for by the trust. The court had previously ruled 2 years ago on issues related to beneficiaries of the trust. See 816 A.2d 781 (Del. 2003).

Cede & Co. v. Technicolor VI--Sixth Appeal Remanded Again

On May 4, 2005, the Delaware Supreme Court, in what has been called the "sempiternal appraisal action" thoroughly recorded in the annals of Delaware corporate law, decided Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc., for the sixth time that it has been appealed from the Court of Chancery.
Law review articles have been written about the prior decisions and it is a challenge to condense the latest decision into a short post on a blog. The opinion includes citations to the prior decisions. After a 31-page discussion, and commending the trial court for its careful analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, but remanded so that the judgment could conform to the "law of the case" which required a 15.28% discount rate and a prejudgment interest rate of 10.32% compounded annually.

Internal Affairs Doctrine Makes Delaware Law Apply

The recent Chancery Court decision of Examen, Inc. v. VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996, read opinion here, involved the issue of whether California law or Delaware law applied to the stockholder vote of a company incorporated in Delaware but whose headquarters and primary place of business are in California. If California law applied, the holder of preferred shares would vote as a separate class and would have been able to block a merger. If Delaware law applied, all shareholders would vote together and the merger would likely be approved by the holders of common shares. In granting a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Vice Chancellor Lamb relied on a long line of Delaware Supreme Court cases as well as a United States Supreme Court case for the seminal principle that the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by the law of that entity's state of incorporation. Several days after the decision, Chancellor Chandler denied a stay pending appeal of the decision based on a 4-part test. In sum, the court denied a stay pending appeal due to a balancing of equities and the unlikelihood of success on appeal.
The Delaware Supreme Court shortly thereafter affirmed the decision to apply Delaware law. Read that opinion here.

Supreme Court Affirms Chancery Court in Hollinger case

On April 19, 2005, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Chancery Court in Black v. Hollinger International, Inc., read opinion here.
The Chancery Court had ruled that bylaw amendments made by Lord Black, as a controlling shareholder, were invalid because they had an inequitable purpose and an inequitable effect, due inter alia, to their goal of stripping an independent committee of the board of its power. See trial court decision at 844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004). A special committee of the board sued Lord Black, as the board chairman, for breach of his fiduciary duties.
The lower court also ruled that Black violated his fiduciary duties for several reasons, including preventing the board from considering a strategic opportunity; using confidential data to further his own interests; and not making full disclosure to other board members about his conduct when full disclosure was expected. The court below also ruled that Black violated an agreement with his company and that the Rights Plan complied with Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.. The trial court was further affirmed in its decision that the Rights Plan did not rise to the level of disenfranchisement of shareholders such that it ran afoul of the Blasius standard.

Book and Records Inspection Denied

The recent Delaware Supreme Court decision of Weinstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Orloff, discusses the recent amendment to Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law regarding the right of a stockholder in a parent corporation to inspect the books of a subsidiary. In the first interpretation of the recent amendment of Section 220(b)(2), the court determined that unless the parent is capable of compelling the subsidiary to produce the documents, the stockholder of the parent corporation is not entitled generally to inspect the books and records of that subsidiary. The case discusses the analysis that needs to apply to a determination of the categorization of an entity as a subsidiary and the determination of whether a parent corporation has control for purposes of the statute.

Recent Delaware Supreme Court Decision Clarifies

The independence of a member of the board of directors of a company has always been an important issue under Delaware law, but the issue has gained increasing national importance based on the recent requirements for the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq-listed companies, as well as the recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In addition to the fact that most NYSE companies are incorporated in Delaware, the issue is critical for purposes of filing a derivative action against a corporation because as a practical matter, if a majority of the board is deemed independent, and presuit demand is required, claims against a corporation may never go to trial.

In Beam v. Stewart, the Delaware Supreme Court on March 31, 2004 analyzed whether presuit demand needed to have been made on the board of directors of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., or whether a majority of the members of that board were independent, and therefore, requiring a presuit demand prior to filing a derivative action against the company.

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