Court of Chancery Rejects Forum Non Conveniens Motion and Allows Delaware Class Action to Proceed

 Rosen v. Wind River Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 4674-VCP (Del. Ch., June 26, 2009),  read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides the following synopsis of this case.

In this decision, the Court of Chancery, in a putative class action regarding an all-cash, all-shares tender offer for the shares of Wind River Systems, Inc. (“Wind River”), declined to stay or dismiss the Delaware action in favor of various California actions (the “California Actions”) even though the earliest of the California Actions was filed 12 days before the Delaware Action.

Coast-to-Coast Battle

On June 4, 2009, Wind River announced a merger with a subsidiary of Intel Corporation. By June 16, 2009, four suits had been filed in California Courts challenging the merger and disclosures made in Wind River’s 14D-9. Only limited discovery had started. On June 16, Plaintiff Rosen filed an individual and derivative action in the Court of Chancery challenging the merger. The following day Rosen filed a motion for preliminary injunction and for expedited proceedings. Wind River then filed a motion to dismiss or stay the Delaware action. The Court of Chancery granted the motion to expedite and set the hearing on the preliminary injunction for July 7. The California court expedited those actions and set a hearing for the preliminary injunction for July 8.

Forum Non Conveniens Versus McWane

Defendants argued that under McWane, the California actions were first-filed and the Delaware action should be stayed or dismissed. Plaintiff responded by arguing that a forum non conveniens analysis should apply because the Delaware Action was filed in relatively the same time period as the California Actions. The threshold question was whether the Court should apply a McWane or forum non conveniens analysis. Citing his 2008 decision in In re Bear Stearns, 2008 WL 959992 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008), Vice Chancellor Parsons held that in the case of class actions the “appropriate approach is something akin to a forum non conveniens analysis.”  Where the delay in filing the class action is prejudicial, the forum non conveniens presumption may be rebutted.

Holding

Here, the Court found that there was no prejudicial delay. The California actions had not progressed far beyond the Delaware action. In addition, the Court noted that in light of the events from the announcement of the merger to the filing of the 14D-9, Rosen’s delay was minimal and in line with the Court’s “long expressed . . . ‘public policy interest favoring the submission of thoughtful, well-researched complaints – rather than ones regurgitating the morning’s financial press.’”

Applying the forum non conveniens analysis, the Court noted that none of the factors “severally or jointly, as applied to the facts and circumstances of this action, demonstrate the kind of hardship that would cause this Court to stay or dismiss the Delaware Action.” The Court did note that the applicability of Delaware law, even for issues that were neither “cutting-edge [n]or terribly novel issues of Delaware corporate law,” weighed heavily in favor of denying the motion.


 

Court of Chancery Grants Summary Judgment on Claims for Unjust Enrichment and Conversion in Embezzlement Case

B.A.S.S. Group, LLC v. Coastal Supply Co., Inc., No. 3743-VCP (Del. Ch. June 19, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides the following synopsis for this opinion.

Vice Chancellor Parsons addressed cross motions for summary judgment in an action where after embezzling funds from his employer, defendant Coastal Supply Co., Inc., John M. Burkett used the funds to form B.A.S.S. Group, LLC (“BASS”) with his friend Joseph H. Webb, III. With the funds, BASS purchased real estate. When BASS discovered the embezzlement, it fired Burkett. It also entered into an arrangement for Burkett to transfer the property back to Coastal.

Webb brought an individual and derivative action to nullify the transfer and seek other relief for breaches of fiduciary duty by Burkett. Coastal counterclaimed for, among other things, unjust enrichment, conversion, and restitution in the form of a constructive trust over the property. BASS and Webb moved for summary judgment to void the transfer. Coastal moved for summary judgment on its claims for unjust enrichment and conversion. The Court granted Coastal’s motions and denied the rest.

Voiding the Transfer; Authority -- Actual or Alleged

The Court considered whether (1) Burkett had authority to transfer the property and whether (2) Burkett received consideration for the transfer. The determination for whether Burkett acted with actual authority hinged upon whether he acted in “good faith” as set forth in a power of attorney section of the BASS LLC agreement. Under that provision, Burkett was authorized to make such a transaction provided he acted in “good faith.” With no context-specific definition for good faith in the agreement and with disputed facts as to Burkett’s state of mind when transferring the Property to Coastal, the Court denied BASS and Webb’s summary judgment motion.

The Court also considered whether Burkett acted with apparent authority, but noted that factual discrepancies also existed here. The record failed to indicate the actions of BASS or Webb that Coastal relied upon in forming its alleged belief as to Burkett’s authority. Notably, prior to obtaining the deed, Coastal had no knowledge of Webb’s membership in BASS or of the contents of the BASS LLC agreement.

The analysis regarding whether valid consideration was paid for the Property was also fraught with factual discrepancies. Unresolved in the record was whether the de minimis consideration of $10 was paid and whether consideration had been exchanged as a result of the restitution agreement, to which BASS was a party. Therefore, BASS and Webb’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of invalid consideration was denied.

Unjust Enrichment

Much of Coastal’s counterclaim for unjust enrichment required little discussion: BASS was enriched by the embezzled funds; Coastal was thereby impoverished; both the enrichment and impoverishment were causally related by the embezzlement; and both the enrichment and impoverishment arose without justification. Yet Webb contended he and BASS were innocent parties and as such they should not be penalized for what Burkett did. The Court was unpersuaded because: (i) Burkett’s actions as a member of BASS are imputed to the entity as an officer, director, or manager of an entity; and (ii) Delaware law permits restitution even when the recipient is innocent of wrongdoing.

For a constructive trust to be a remedy, it must be imposed “upon specific property [or] identifiable proceeds of specific property, and even money so long as it resides in an identifiable fund to which the plaintiff can trace ownership.” Here, the Court imposed a constructive trust because: (i) the embezzled funds could be traced to the Property (Burkett testified that the funds ultimately went from Coastal to Burkett’s personal bank account and finally to a cashiers check that was issued to the seller of the Property); and (ii) BASS, as the recipient of the funds, was not a bona fide purchaser (Burkett’s knowledge that the funds were embezzled was imputed to BASS).

The Court also noted that “Delaware courts consistently imputed to a corporation the knowledge of an officer or director of the corporation acting on its behalf.” The Court went on to state that “I see no reason why the rule would be different for a member of an LLC who has management rights.” Interestingly, the Court identified one outstanding issue: which party would be entitled to any profit made on the sale of the Property beyond the amount owed Coastal to make it whole.

Conversion

To succeed on its summary judgment motion for conversion, Coastal had to prove that: (i) it had a property interest in the Property; (ii) it had the right to possess the Property; and (iii) the Property was converted by BASS. The Court found that Coastal was entitled to a damage award equal to the embezzled funds “plus interest at the legal rate from the date those funds were contributed to BASS.”

 

Chancery Court Dismisses Claims by Amazon.com in Connection with Issuance of Shares by Basis Technology Corporation

Amazon.com, Inc. v. Hoffman, No. 2239-VCN (June 30, 2009), read opinion here.

In this letter decision, the Chancery Court grants a Motion to Dismiss claims that Amazon.com, Inc. brought against Basis Technology Corporation in connection with the preferred shares that Amazon.com owns in Basis. Amazon.com claimed that the directors breached their fiduciary duties, as well as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on the terms of the Certificate of Incorporation as a result of the issuance of additional shares that allegedly circumvented an anti-dilution provision that Amazon.com had negotiated. The Certificate of Designation in the Certificate of Incorporation (the "Charter")  included anti-dilution protection for Amazon.com by which the conversion price that would apply to the right of Amazon.com to convert its preferred shares into common shares would be adjusted in favor of Amazon.com if any new stock was issued at a price lower than $1.36 per common share.

The Charter included a Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory clause to protect its directors against monetary liability for breach of the duty of care. The court did not find any basis to question their loyalty and good faith, thus, allowing them to enjoy the protection of that Charter provision.
 

The court also rejected the argument that the issuance of new stock was a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court reasoned that simply because the applicable documents did not expressly address what would happen if shares were issued at a price equal to or greater than $1.36 per share, does not mean that the “expectation of the parties [if shares of common stock were issued for $1.36 per share or more] was so fundamental that it is clear that they did not feel a need to negotiate about them.”  Thus, the court dismissed the amended complaint, although Amazon was allowed leave to amend.

 

Chancery Court Grants Expedited Proceedings for a Preliminary Injunction Application in Challenge to Merger Agreements Involving EMC, Data Domain and NetApp, Inc.

Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of The City of Detroit v. Bernal, No. 4663-CC (June 25, 2009), read letter decision here. This Chancery Court decision provides a useful guide for the standard that will be applied to a motion to expedite proceedings. It also provides insight into the types of facts that may warrant injunctive relief in the context of a three-way contest for control when Revlon duties are triggered.

Overview

In this short letter that followed oral arguments on the same day, the Chancery Court provides a reasoned decision for granting a motion for expedited proceedings in connection with a motion to enjoin certain provisions of a merger agreement between Data Domain and NetApp, Inc. The plaintiff alleged that the merger agreement contained “deal protection mechanisms” such as a “no solicitation clause” and a termination fee. The board also entered into a voting agreement whereby they pledged to vote their shares, representing approximately 20% of Data Domain's outstanding shares, in favor of the NetApp merger. The plaintiff also alleged that the officers and directors of Data Domain would receive benefits separate and apart from the Data Domain shareholders such as indemnification from liability for matters arising from the completion of the merger, and for some individuals, positions with the company after the merger.

On June 1, EMC launched an all-cash tender offer for Data Domain at a price of $30 per share. On June 3, NetApp increased the cash component of its merger consideration which raised the overall value of its offer to $30 per share, but left all deal protection measures in place. The Data Domain board has stated that it is unable to negotiate with EMC because of the deal protection provisions of the merger agreement and if it failed to reject the EMC bid, Data Domain would be at risk of losing the NetApp bid.

Analysis to Determine whether Court will Grant Expedited Proceedings

The court explained that in deciding whether to grant expedited proceedings, the court must determine:

“Whether in the circumstances the plaintiff has articulated a sufficiently colorable claim and shown a sufficient possibility of a threatened irreparable injury, as would justify imposing on the defendants and the public the extra (and sometimes substantial) costs of an expedited preliminary injunction hearing.”

In this case, the plaintiffs have alleged that the directors violated their Revlon duties by not maximizing the sale price of the enterprise. This duty is triggered based on the allegations that the deal results in a change of control because the majority of the shareholders are being paid off with cash, and the preclusive deal protection measures deter other bidders and in any event the directors failed to inform themselves about the possibility for greater value to be obtained through the EMC bid.

At this early stage in the proceedings, in order to determine whether the motion to expedite should be granted, the court need only determine if the plaintiff has “stated a sufficiently colorable claim to justify proceeding on an expedited schedule.” (emphasis in original.) In determining whether there was a sufficiently colorable claim, the court recognized that Revlon does not require a certain blueprint that the board must follow, however, the board must exercise its duties in order to obtain the maximum price reasonably available. The court found that the plaintiff alleged facts that state a colorable claim that the Data Domain board is “favoring one bidder over others, thereby deterring bids from third parties that could provide greater value to Data Domain shareholders.”

Legal Analysis

In addition, importantly, the court emphasized that:

“On a motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff does not have to overcome the hurdle of an exculpatory provision that, as permitted by 8 Del. C. Section 102(b)(7), exculpates directors from personal liability from monetary damages  for certain breaches of fiduciary duty.” (emphasis in original.)

The court also found a “sufficient likelihood of irreparable injury” because by deterring potential bidders, such as EMC, with deal protection measures, the resulting harm from such deterrents would be “incalculable,” (which is the word used by the court). Moreover, the court explained that it would be impossible to “unscramble the eggs” (the court’s phrase), by attempting to unwind the merger once it has been completed.

Finally, the court reasoned that injunctive relief may be the only relief reasonably available to shareholders for certain breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with the sale and control transaction, “particularly where the company has adopted a provision exculpating its directors from personal liability from monetary damages for breach of the duty of care.” (citing Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243-244 (Del. 2009) (recognizing the significant burden that a plaintiff faces to show that the board acted in bad faith by failing to reasonably inform themselves or otherwise carry out their fiduciary duties in a sale of control)).

Thus, the court concluded that in cases such as these, the only realistic remedy shareholders may have for certain breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a sale of control transaction may be injunctive relief. The court scheduled a preliminary injunction hearing to be held in this case on August 13th at 10:00 a.m. in Georgetown, Delaware, scarcely two months after the complaint was filed in this case.  

Chancery Court Resolves Objections of Class Members Excluded from Class Action Settlement Involving Chicago Board Options Exchange

CME Group, Inc. v. Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., No. 2369-VCN (June 25, 2009), read opinion here. See several prior Chancery Court decisions in this case summarized here, including the court's approval of the Stipulation of Settlement in this class action. See, e.g., CME Group, Inc. v. Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., 2009 WL 1547510 (Del. Ch., June 3, 2009).

This most recent decision in this case addresses objections by those who were excluded from participating in the benefits conferred under the settlement because of their failure to comply strictly with the settlement’s conditions for eligibility.

The court placed the objections into five categories: (1) objectors who submitted untimely settlement claim forms; (2) objectors who failed to transfer their CME shares by the deadline--due to an oversight or error; (3) objectors who fell under both of the foregoing two categories; (4) objectors who were excluded based upon a determination by Class Counsel that they did not “beneficially own” the requisite shares needed to qualify; and (5) one miscellaneous objector.

The court reasoned that as part of its duty to “exercise its own business judgment as to the fairness of the settlement", it must also fulfill a corollary to that duty which is to “insure that the stockholders who are entitled to participate in the settlement are given a reasonable opportunity to file for and receive what is due to them.”

The court determined that whether the applicable standard for missing a filing deadline is either “excusable neglect” or “substantial compliance,” in either case the court found that the reasons for the missed deadline by those who wanted to participate was due to excusable, inadvertent error. (citing Mendich v. Hunt Int’l Res., Inc., 1981 WL 7629, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1981)).

The court reviewed each of the other categories of objections in careful detail, and in general applied equitable principles to the extent that those who were excluded due to clerical errors or understandable administrative oversights were allowed to participate.


 

Chancery Court Awards Partial Fee Amount Requested due to Litigation that was only Partially Responsible for Changes in Contested Deal

 In re: BEA Systems, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. 3298-VCL (June 24, 2009), read letter decision here.  A prior Chancery Court decision in this case was summarized here.

 This short 2-page letter decision addressed a request for attorneys' fees in a case that arose out of the acquisition of BEA Systems by Oracle Corporation. The case was filed in early 2008 but was dismissed by stipulation on grounds of mootness in January of 2009 while reserving jurisdiction to consider this current fee application. The basis for the fee request was that, after the complaint was filed, the company made two changes to is proxy materials to deal with misstatements pointed out in the complaint.. Since the changes were presumably a result of litigation efforts, it was argued that the right to recover fees following the mootness dismissal should be granted based on the line of cases originating with Chrysler v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 386-87 (Del. 1966).
The court found, however, that most of the time and costs spent on the litigation produced no benefit, especially in light of the fact that the court had rejected the large majority of claims at an initial hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction. Therefore, recognizing the imprecision involved, the court attributed “one quarter” of the time and costs spent as being attributable to the claims that resulted in the benefit. The court relied on the affidavits of counsel for fees at their normal hourly rate, and “applying a reasonable risk premium of 50%” calculated a fee award, with costs, of  $81,297.
 

Chancery Court Dismisses Case Against Directors of Delaware Corporations and Several Foreign Corporations

Lisa, S.A. v. Juan Jose Gutierrez Mayorga, No. 2571-VCL (Del. Ch., June 22, 2009), read opinion here.

Overview

This Chancery Court decision involves a 1992 sale of shares in a group of family-owned corporations organized under the laws of Guatemala and El Salvador. The plaintiff is a Panamanian corporation. The defendants are a Panamanian corporation, a Barbados corporation and two Delaware corporations. Also named is a Guatemalan national and resident, who is an officer and director.

The court concluded that the Delaware courts lack personal jurisdiction over any of the defendants other than the Delaware entities. Moreover, the court concludes that a number of the counts in the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against either of those Delaware entities and that, in addition, all claims against them must be dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens.

Legal Analysis

The court discusses the burden that the plaintiff must bear to show a basis for the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants when a motion to dismiss is filed under Chancery Court Rule 12(b)(2). The court explained that in addition to showing some statutory basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, the plaintiff must additionally establish that the exercise of jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants comports with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In rejecting the request for jurisdictional discovery (see case citation at footnote 19), the court also explained why there was not a basis for jurisdiction under either the general long arm statute at Section 3104 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code, nor was there jurisdiction pursuant to Section 3114 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code that relates to jurisdiction over officers and directors of Delaware corporations.

This decision provides a helpful discussion of the statutory and public policy basis for imposing jurisdiction under Sections 3114 and 3104, and the court explains why neither of those statutes allow for the imposition of jurisdiction in this case and why therefore the motion to dismiss was granted.

Moreover, the court explained that:  “where, as here, Delaware courts have jurisdiction over but a few of the interested parties, and there is a court in another jurisdiction capable of exercising jurisdiction over all of the interested parties, this court has dismissed the action for improper venue.” Parenthetically, the court considered testimony that the plaintiff did not want to use the courts in Guatemala based on alleged corruption in those courts. However, the court observed that the record only referred to alleged corruption in the criminal courts of Guatemala as opposed to the civil courts in that country. Nevertheless, the court concluded that based on forum non conveniens the court reasoned that the case should be dismissed.
 

Chancery Court Awards all Fees Requested as Reasonable based on Terms of an Agreement but Rules that "Expenses" are not covered by "Costs" Term in Agreement

 Ivize of Milwaukee v. Compex Litigation Support, No. 3158-VCL (June 24, 2009),  read letter decision here.  The recent prior decision of the Chancery Court in this case was summarized here.

 In its prior opinion, the court determined that the Asset Purchase Agreement involved in this case had been breached, and as provided in the agreement, the court awarded the full amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees requested, as entitled to the prevailing party, even though the court rejected the damages theory of the prevailing party. The court reasoned that the expert fees were also to be covered even though the legal argument on which the expert’s report was based was rejected by the court. (See footnote 8 for supporting caselaw). Where as here, there is a fee shifting provision in an agreement entitling the prevailing party to attorneys’ fees, the court still analyzes the reasonableness of fees based on Rule 1.5(a) of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Responsibility, as well as the following factors:

“The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and the experience, the reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.” (citing Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., 2005 WL 789065, at * (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2005)).

Importantly, however, the court did not agree that all of the “expenses” were covered because the agreement that entitled the prevailing party to attorneys’ fees only specified that “costs” associated with the litigation would be covered. The problem with that language in the agreement is that the terms “costs” and “expenses” have distinct meanings under Delaware law. The definition of “costs” under Court of Chancery Rule 54 and under Delaware caselaw interpreting agreements between parties has been held to exclude items such as “photocopying, transcripts, travel expense and computer research.” (citing Comrie v. Enterasys Networks, Inc. 2004 WL 936505, at * 4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2004)).

On the other hand “expenses” has a definition that is recognized in Delaware to be much broader. One lesson that can be learned from this case is that when drafting agreements that are intended to “shift fees and expenses,” if the prevailing party hopes to be covered for costs and expenses if she prevails, then the agreement should not be limited to reimbursement of merely "fees and costs" alone, but rather the term "expenses" should be used as well as a more inclusive description.

 

Delaware Chancery Court Amends Rules

The Delaware Chancery Court has amended Rule 173 regarding remote hearings, available here, as well as Rule 3 regarding filing fees for expedited proceedings and other court filings, available here.

Chancery Court Rejects Claims by AIG v. Co-Conspirators Based on In Pari Delicto Doctrine

In Re American International Group, Inc., Consolidated Derivative Litigation;  American International Group, Inc. v. Greenberg, Del. Ch., No. 769-VCS (June 17, 2009), read opinion here.

A recent prior decision by the Chancery Court in this case was highlighted here.  That decision  was over 100-pages long. So by comparison, this 40-page decision might be considered relatively brief.

Issues Addressed

In this decision granting a Motion to Dismiss, the Chancery Court in this derivative suit brought on behalf of American International Group, Inc. addressed the following question:

May AIG sue its co-conspirators for the harm that AIG suffered as a result of the two alleged, illegal conspiracies involving AIG and those third-party conspirators?

Answer: No

The first conspiracy allegedly involved AIG engaging in an illegal bid-rigging conspiracy to carve up the market for certain insurance contracts and this conspiracy also allegedly involved the insurance broker Marsh & McLennan and the insurer ACE, Limited. A second alleged conspiracy involved General Re Corporation which allegedly involved writing fake insurance contracts for Gen Re so that AIG could inflate its loss reserves and make AIG thus appear healthier than it actually was and inflating AIG’s stock price.

Procedural History

In the prior recent decision linked above, the Chancery Court found that the plaintiffs had stated well plead breach of fiduciary duty claims against certain AIG officers who were allegedly involved in the conspiracies at issue in this motion as well as other illegal activities. See In Re: Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 799 (Del. Ch., 2009) (“AIG I”). In that decision, the Chancery Court allowed AIG to sue its own directors, officers and employees for the damage they caused to AIG by having the corporation engage in illegal acts. The court summarized its prior ruling in this case thusly:

In an earlier opinion in this action, this court addressed the motions to dismiss brought by PricewaterhouseCoopers and several former-AIG officers and employers. 5

In that previous decision, this court held that the Complaint survived dismissal as against challenge by insider defendants Hank Greenberg, Edward Matthews, and Thomas Tizzio and that the Complaint stated well-pled claims of breach of fiduciary duty against those defendants. 6  The Complaint also adequately alleged fraud and conspiracy claims against Tizzio. 7

By contrast, this court held that New York law governed the claims against AIG’s auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and that New York law’s approach to the doctrine of in pari delicto barred AIG from recovering against PricewaterhouseCoopers. That holding was driven by the court’s choice of law analysis and did not reflect whether AIG could have maintained such a suit under Delaware law.

Finally, in that decision, this court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction over certain AIG officers and employees who had allegedly engaged in improper behavior before 10 Del. C. § 3114 was broadened to cover certain corporate officers.
Because none of the acts relevant to the illegal conduct pled in the Complaint occurred in Delaware and none of those defendants was a Delaware resident, this court could not exercise jurisdiction over them.

I now address the motions to dismiss brought by the third parties who allegedly conspired with AIG to commit illegal acts. The relevant allegations in the Complaint center on two separate courses of illegal conduct: the Fake Reinsurance Conspiracy and the Bid-Rigging Conspiracy. (some footnotes omitted).

5 See generally AIG I, 965 A.2d 763.
6 Id. at 799.
7 Id. at 807


In that prior ruling, Chancery Court did not need to address the doctrine of in pari delicto as a bar to suing third-party co-conspirators because “the doctrine does not have force in a suit by a corporation against its own officers and employees. When a corporation sues insiders for their faithless behavior in causing the corporation to break the law, there is no logical reason why the corporation cannot recover. . . . To hold otherwise would be to let fiduciaries immunize themselves through their own wrongful, disloyal acts.”

Thus, the court explained that the instant motion presented a related, but separate, question: “To what extent may a corporation like AIG recover from its co-conspirators for the damage the corporation suffered due to its own illegal conduct?”

Legal Analysis

In this decision, the Chancery Court determines that AIG may not seek an accounting for the damages it suffered as a result of its engagement in two illegal conspiracies from the third-party co-conspirators.

The court recognized that the issue in this case is governed by the doctrine of in pari delicto, the primary purpose of which is to prevent courts from the unproductive determination of apportioning fault between or among wrongdoers. The court engages in a scholarly and lengthy analysis of the public policy underpinnings of the in pari delicto doctrine, reaching back to Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and venerable treatises on equity from the 19th century.

For anyone interested in all of the contours and public policy reasons behind the in pari delicto doctrine and its exceptions, this opinion is must reading.

The court provides thorough reasoning for the conclusion that AIG should not be permitted to sue its co-conspirators. However, the court also makes it clear that the plaintiffs have already benefited from one exception to the doctrine as follows: “It is generally accepted that a derivative suit may be asserted by an innocent stockholder on behalf of a corporation against corporate fiduciaries who knowingly caused the corporation to commit illegal acts and, as a result, cause the corporation to suffer harm.” (citing In Re HealthSouth Corp. S’holders Litig., Inc., 845 A.2d 1096, 1107 (Del. Ch. 2003)) (“It is because corporations must act through living fiduciaries such as Scrushy that the application of the in pari delicto doctrine has been rejected in situations when corporate fiduciaries seek to avoid responsibility for their own conduct vis-a-vis their corporations.”)

The court explained that the best approach is to apply the doctrine to prevent claims is as follows:

“[When] a corporation like AIG is alleged to have engaged in concerted illegal activity with third parties for that corporation’s own benefit, that corporation may not recover against its third party co-conspirators. This does not leave stockholders without a remedy. Within each corporate family, stockholders may use derivative suits to seek relief from their corporation’s own faithless fiduciaries for the harms suffered by their corporation. But the boundaries for recovery matter; they make stockholders and managers realize that the corporation will not be able to shift the costs of its own illegal conduct to third parties. This encourages the adoption and implementation of effective law compliance and monitoring programs, and it protects the judiciary from having to insure the ‘fair and equitable’ distribution of the gains and losses of concerted illegal activity.”

Delaware Chancery Court Determines Ownership of Patent Based on Dispute Between an Employee Scientist and his Former Employer

Sinomad Bioscience Limited v. Immunomedics, Inc., No. 2471-VCS (Del. Ch., June 16, 2009), read opinion here.

Overview

This 50-page Chancery Court decision addresses in great detail the intellectual property rights involved in patent disputes between a biopharmaceutical company and its former employee. I will merely highlight the issues addressed in this case because the court applies New Jersey law to all the legal issues and thus the core of this decision is outside the scope of this blog which of course is obsessed with Delaware corporate and commercial law. This opinion reads in some respects like a science textbook and discusses in excruciating detail the minutiae of the scientific aspects of the patent dispute including such things as DNA sequence and other very technical scientific terminology and processes regarding the biotechnology involved. The main reason why I include this case, however cursorily, is because it is an indication of the types of intellectual property and patent related disputes that the Chancery Court handles.

Issues Addressed

The issues that were decided based on New Jersey law should be of interest generally to any business that employs highly trained and highly educated individuals who develop patents or other intellectual property during the course of their employment. The issues discussed and decided by the Delaware Chancery Court, applying New Jersey law, include the following: (i) the enforceability of restrictive covenants; (ii) misappropriation of trade secrets; (iii) implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (iv) the law of unfair competition.

Of great interest to most employers who attempt to confirm their ownership of intellectual property developed by their employees, will be the court’s finding in this case that:  a very sophisticated biotechnology patentable discovery was developed after the employee left the company--despite a presumption, pursuant to a written agreement, that any patent developed within one year after the termination of employment belonged to the employer.


 

Chancery Court Rules on Media Access to Court Records

 In re Nat’l City Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 4123-CC (Del. Ch. June 5, 2009), read decision here.

 In this short letter decision, the Chancellor discusses the public policy reasons behind Chancery Court Rule 5(g) which deals with those situations when a document filed with the court may be placed “under seal.” This letter decision involved a request by certain news organizations for access to documents filed under seal and the court explained in this case the interface between the public policy reasons between Rule 5(g) and the general practice of making filings with the court available to the public.

 

Chancery Court Denies TRO Request from Bidder who was Denied City Contract

Holley Enterprises, Inc. v. The City of Wilmington, No. 4619-VCS (Del. Ch. June 5, 2009), read letter decision here.

This short Chancery Court letter decision provides a useful summary of the standard that must be satisfied before a temporary restraining order is granted--an important instrument to have in the toolbox of the those who handle business litigation in Delaware. The temporary retraining order (TRO) was requested in this case by an unsuccessful bidder for a City contract. The statutory argument revolved around the determination of the “lowest responsible bidder” to whom the City contract was awarded.

The letter opinion discusses the prerequisites for a TRO and why they were not satisfied in this case. The court also provides a practical discussion of the statutory standard for a “lowest responsible bidder” and the discretion that governmental agencies have in determining who satisfies that statutory standard. Also of practical usefulness to Delaware contractors at both the City, County and State level are citations to authority that describe the very broad range of discretion that governmental agencies have in awarding a bid. See cases cited at footnote 9. In this particular case, the contractor involved was the subject of an indictment based on allegations in connection with public contracts in Delaware, Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Thecourt explained why this was relevant under the circumstances of this case.

In addition to reciting prior decisions that explain why courts are reluctant to second guess the decisions of governmental agencies in awarding contracts, in this particular case the court interpreted the City code as giving the City discretion to consider factors that were not expressly included in the City code when determining who a responsible bidder was. The court gives the government agency, and in this case the City, broad leeway in making these decisions and will not overturn them unless they are deemed to be arbitrary or capricious.

Arbitrary and capricious is generally equated with unreasonable or irrational behavior and is not the result of a deliberative process, and is in disregard of the facts and circumstances. The court reasoned that the decision of the City in this situation was neither arbitrary nor capricious in denying the bid award to the plaintiff.

In sum, the TRO request was denied because the contractor was unlikely to succeed on the merits and the harm to the contractor by denying the TRO would be minimal compared to the risk that the City would suffer and the harm to public safety, as well as the prejudice to contractors already awarded related contracts if the court were to grant the TRO. .
 

Litigating LLCs

Professor Larry Ribstein, a leading authority on LLCs, has written an article regarding litigation involving LLCs. Here is a link to his article entitled: Litigating in LLCs.

Chancery Court Modifies Advancement Award Based on Changed Circumstances

Duthie v. CorSolutions Medical, Inc., et al., No. 3048-VCN (Del. Ch., June 16, 2009), read opinion here.  A prior Chancery Court decision in this advancement case, which also provides more background facts,  has been summarized on this blog here.
 

Overview

This Chancery Court decision discusses in detail the conceptual and public policy basis for an important aspect of the right to advancement. In particular, a prior decision in this case recognized that the right to advancement includes the right to have legal fees advanced for purposes of pursuing affirmative defenses, mandatory counterclaims, and other “good offense” aspects of an effective defense to claims made against an officer or a director to whom advancement rights must be provided. The prior decision at the above link  provides details regarding the multiple litigations in multiple fora that the parties in this matter have engaged in. Footnote 1 in the instant decision provides citations to court rulings in several jurisdictions that have been rendered in this case.

Key Part of Ruling and Background

The important nugget to be taken from this relatively short letter decision is that the right to advancement can be modified based on changes in factual circumstances involved when a prior order granting advancement rights was made. Specifically, in this case, the court had ordered advancement rights to be provided in order for the plaintiff in this matter to pursue affirmative claims that the court determined were defensive in nature and were for purposes of responding to and offsetting claims that were pending against the plaintiff in a separate forum. See Duthie v. CorSolutions Medical, Inc., 2008 WL 4173950 (Del. Ch., Sept. 10, 2008)(link is above for this case). More specifically, the court held that the right to advancement included fees incurred in connection with a defamation action that was filed by an accused director. That action also included claims for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and violations of ERISA that were affirmatively made in response to the alleged retaliation by  the ex-director's employer via the improper termination of health care benefits and allegedly defamatory statements made against the director to whom the advancement rights were owed.

Reasoning

In sum, in this most recent ruling in this case, the Chancery Court relied on the representation that the defendants did not intend to bring any other actions against the ex-director. It was those suits against the ex-director which had been the genesis of the affirmative claims for which the court ordered advancement, and based on the fact that the justification for the advancement of fees and expenses incurred in pursuing the affirmative claims no longer existed, the court agreed to modify its prior award and amend the prior decision granting advancement, such that the court concluded that the plaintiffs are no longer entitled to advancement of fees and expenses associated with their affirmative claims.

The court reasoned that no threat now exists, thus the defamation claims that were pursued as a defense are no longer a direct response to, nor negation of, any claims against the plaintiffs. In order to be defensive, the court reasoned, and thus subject to advancement, the “affirmative claims must be responsive to some actual threat,” but the threat here is ended, thus the court emphasized that there could be no right to advancement of fees and expenses for affirmative claims that were designed to defeat a threat that no longer existed. See Donahue v. Corning, 949 A.2d 574, 579 (Del. Ch. 2008) (see summary here); Zaman v. Amedeo Holdings, Inc., 2008 WL 2168397, at * 37 (Del. Ch., May 23, 2008) (see summary here). The court also clarified in footnote 10 that the doctrine of the “law of the case” does not prohibit the court from modifying a prior award when the facts on which the prior decision was made have materially changed.

Conclusion

The prior award of advancement for the costs of affirmative claims was modified.

Chancery Court Approves Settlement of Class Action and Awards Attorneys' Fees

Gatz v. Ponsoldt, No. 174-CC (Del. Ch., June 12, 2009), read opinion here

Prior decisions in this case by the Delaware Supreme Court and Chancery Court were summarized here and here on this blog.

Overview

This short letter decision by the Chancery Court approved attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of 33% of the settlement  fund plus expenses in connection with the settlement of a class action on behalf of shareholders of Regency Affiliates, Inc. Three complaints alleged breaches of fiduciary duties in connection with a recapitalization plan and related transactions which reduced the ownership of  public shareholders from approximately 61% to approximately 40%, as well as allegations about unreasonable compensation. The Delaware Supreme Court previously ruled in this case that the claims of the plaintiffs were direct in nature.

In January 2008 the parties reached an agreement in principal to settle and executed a memorandum of understanding in April 2008. In December 2008 the parties sought approval of the settlement and a hearing was held in Chancery Court on March 16, 2009, after which the court asked for further briefing to clarify the position of the parties. The settlement agreement calls for defendants to pay $3 million plus interest. In exchange for the cash payment. Defendants received a dismissal of this action and a release of all class member’s claims relating to or arising from the settlement or the action.

Analysis

The Chancery Court observed that it is required to exercise its own sound judgment in deciding whether to approve a class action settlement as fair and reasonable. In doing so, the court must weigh and consider “the nature of the claim, the possible defenses to it, and the legal and factual obstacles facing the plaintiff in the event of a trial.”

One of the obstacles faced by plaintiff was whether their claims would be subject to the entire fairness standard or the less demanding business judgment rule. In order to succeed in having the entire fairness standard applied, the plaintiffs would have to establish that the CEO dominated and controlled the parties on both sides of the transaction and further that the appointment of a special committee to overview the recapitalization was sham and not sufficient to shift the burden back to plaintiffs to show that the recapitalization was unfair.

The court stated that the plaintiffs faced difficult hurdles to achieve success but were nonetheless able to obtain a cash settlement of $3 million. The court observed that the plaintiffs’ claims “lacked a significant probability of success on the merits” and thus the monetary benefits obtained were reasonable in light of the obstacles that they faced, thus allowing for a conclusion that the settlement was fair and reasonable.

Attorneys’ Fees

The court explained that the policy of Delaware was to insure that “even without a favorable adjudication, counsel will be compensated for the beneficial results they produced.” (citing Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Baron, 413 A.2d 876, 878 (Del. 1980))(emphasis an original). The court emphasized that such a policy exists in order to promote the policy of providing professional compensation when such suits are meritorious. However, the court acknowledged that it must make its own independent determination of reasonableness of fees and the court recited the five Sugarland factors that it considers in determining whether a fee is reasonable. The court emphasized that it has consistently noted that the most important factor in determining a fee award is the size of the benefit achieved.

The court concluded its reasoning by emphasizing that the shareholders would not be “paying themselves” and that the settlement fund would not be a “circular transfer (minus attorney’s fees)” but rather the settlement was an actual benefit to the shareholder class that was allegedly harmed by the recapitalization transaction because “of the shareholder class that brought this lawsuit, Regency maintains that no more than 27%, and as little as 7% remain as Regency shareholders. Accordingly, as much as 93%, and not less than 73%, of the proposed settlement payment will be borne by non-class members.” 
 

Chancery Court Dismisses Seller's Claims Against Buyer's Controlling Shareholder in Failed Merger

In James Cable, LLC, v. Millennium Digital Media Systems d/b/a “Broadstripe”, et al.,  No. 3637-VCL (June 11, 2009),  read opinion here, Vice Chancellor Lamb was faced with what has become an “all-too-familiar” fact pattern given the state of the economy recently.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his following review of this case.

A company, after signing an asset purchase agreement (“APA”) (wherein it agreed to sell substantially all of its assets to another company), sees its valuations fall, leading to disputes between the parties. The buyer refuses to close, citing alleged breaches by the seller, and the seller files a lawsuit. Thereafter, the buyer files for bankruptcy, following which the claims against the buyer are stayed pursuant to the federal bankruptcy code.

While that is what occurred in this case, in an interesting twist, the seller also filed suit against the buyer’s controlling stockholder (which was not a party to either the APA or any written agreement to provide funding) “in an attempt to reach the deeper pockets of that company.” In particular, the seller claimed that the controlling stockholder promised both parties that it would provide funding for the transaction. While the case was stayed when the buyer filed for bankruptcy, the case proceeded against the controlling stockholder.

The Allegations

The plaintiff, James Cable, and the defendant, Broadstripe, own and operate cable television systems and provide internet services. Highland Management is the controlling ownership of Broadstripe. In its amended complaint, James Cable claimed that Highland Management:  (i) tortiously interfered with the APA by refusing to provide funding and by directing Broadstripe to repudiate the APA; (ii) engaged in civil conspiracy with Broadstripe to dishonor the APA; (iii) acted in bad faith in an attempt to insulate itself from its alleged obligation to fund the transaction; and (iv) breached an agreement with Broadstripe to provide funding for the transaction (of which James Cable was a third party beneficiary). James Cable also argued that based upon Highland’s statements/promises regarding funding, it was entitled to recover on a promissory estoppel theory. Highland Management filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the allegations were conclusory and unsupported by specific facts. The Court agreed and granted the motion.

Tortious Interference and Conspiracy Claims

In addressing this issue, the Court stated that in order to succeed on its claim, James Cable had to allege “(1) a valid contract, (2) about which the defendants have knowledge, (3) an intentional act by defendants that is a significant factor in causing the breach of the [contract], (4) done without justification, and (5) which causes injury.”

The Court went on to note that Delaware law “shields companies affiliated through common ownership from tortious interference with contract claims when the companies act in furtherance of their shared legitimate business interests” (citing Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 652 A.2d 578 (Del. Ch. 1994)). The Court also noted that to overcome the “affiliate privilege” a plaintiff had to adequately plead that the defendant “was motivated by some malicious or other bad faith purpose.” (citing Allied Capital Corp. v. GC-Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020 (Del. Ch. 2006)).

While the Court recognized that James Cable alleged that Highland acted in bad faith when it directed Broadstripe to repudiate the APA, the Court, in finding that James Cable failed to provide any well pleaded factual support for its conclusory allegations, stated:

James Cable does not adequately allege facts to support an inference that Highland had any obligation to fund. To the contrary, the amended complaint and the exhibits attached thereto show that the parties negotiated a transaction where the responsibility to arrange financing fell on Broadstripe’s shoulders. James Cable does not sufficiently allege any purpose behind Highland’s actions outside of an economic interest it shared with Broadstripe. Accordingly, Highland’s alleged actions related to Broadstripe’s repudiation of the APA, taken as true for the purposes of this motion to dismiss, are protected by the affiliate privilege and are insufficient to state a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations.

James Cable also argued that Broadstripe and Highland conspired to tortiously interfere with the APA. However, because civil conspiracy is not an independent claim and there must be underlying wrongdoing (which the Court dismissed), the Court found no basis for the civil conspiracy claim.

Promissory Estoppel Claim

James Cable argued that Highland was liable on a promissory estoppel theory because Highland made statements to James Cable to induce it to enter into the APA. The Court disagreed finding that James Cable failed to show that there was a “real promise” that was “reasonably definite and certain.” The Court noted that some of the alleged promises were made by Broadstripe, some were made after the APA was signed and some were made by Highland but “those did not amount to a real promise.” The Court went on to state that:

In sophisticated merger and acquisition activity with large amounts of money at stake, such as here, the parties typically reduce even seemingly insignificant matters to writing. Parties generally include an integration clause, like the one found in the APA, that expressly states the written agreements compose the entire understanding of the parties. Section 5.5 of the APA states that Broadstripe (not Broadstripe and Highland) had the financial capability necessary to fund the purchase price. If James Cable could have convinced Highland to fund the deal, Highland’s obligations would likely have been extensively negotiated and reduced to writing with a substantial amount of detail.

Breach of Contract/Third Party Beneficiary Claim

James Cable also alleged that Broadstripe and Highland entered into a contract for the benefit of James Cable whereby Highland agreed to provide funding to enable Broadstripe to consummate the APA. Unfortunately, the Court found that James Cable failed to allege any facts (other than the supposed existence of the contract to support its third party beneficiary claim. In particular, the Court noted that James Cable failed to identify the “bargain” or any “consideration” Broadstripe provided to Highland to induce it to enter into a funding agreement. As a result, that claim was dismissed.

 

 

Four Recent Chancery Court Decisions on Electronic Discovery Issues

The Delaware Chancery Court recently issued four decisions in as many weeks on topics related to electronic discovery. These cases have been summarized already on this blog but I want to collect links to them all on one page for convenience. The cases with links to their summaries are as follows:

Grace Brothers Ltd. v. Siena Holdings, Inc., (June 2, 2009)(motion to compel directors' emails granted), summarized here.

Beard Research Inc. v. Kates, (May 29, 2009)(adverse inference and fees imposed for spoliation), summarized here.

Omnicare Inc. v. Mariner Health Care Management Co., (May 29, 2009)(ordered production of back-up tapes for deleted emails), summarized here.

Triton Construction Co., Inc. v. Eastern Shore Electrical Services Inc., (May 18, 2009)(adverse inference and fees for destruction of thumb drive and home computer), summarized here.

Chancery Court Applies Laches to Prevent Claim Brought Within Applicable Statute of Limitations

Whittington v. Dragon Group, L.L.C., No. 2291-VCP (Del. Ch., June 11, 2009), read opinion here.

Among the several prior decisions of the Chancery Court in this case, the two most recent have been summarized on this blog and are available here.

Overview

This Chancery Court decision is one in a series of Delaware decisions involving a dispute among family members of ownership in a Delaware business entity. The present case arises from the different interpretation of a court order entered over five years ago which attempted to resolve one of the intra-family squabbles. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is not a member of the entity, while the plaintiff seeks a judicial order to compel the defendants to recognize his interest in that entity. The court concluded that the plaintiff was barred by laches from seeking relief because he unreasonably delayed the filing of his complaint for over two years and during that period of time the entity involved extinguished liabilities and the defendants undertook certain risks that were not shared by the plaintiff.

The decision provides an extensive definition and rationale for the concept of laches and why the equitable defense of laches does apply in this case.

Examination of the Equitable Defense of Laches

Of particular note is the concept that laches can be applied to prevent a claim that is filed within the applicable statute of limitations when equitable relief is sought. For example, the court explained that where, as in this case, a claim for specific performance requiring a party to perform its contractual duties is filed, it invokes a “stricter requirement for prompt action by the plaintiff, and a plaintiff may not wait the full period of three years set forth in 10 Del. C. Section 8106 to seek such relief.” (See footnote 44. See also footnotes 42, 43 and 45.)

When applying a bar of laches to a claim that was filed within the statute of limitations, there must be either procedural prejudice, for example where a delay prevented a party from calling a crucial witness who has become unavailable; or substantive prejudice, such as when a party suffers a financial detriment by relying on the failure of the plaintiff to seek relief in a timely manner. (See footnotes 46 and 47.) The court also discussed the concept of “inquiry notice” which exists when a plaintiff becomes aware of “facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery of injury. A plaintiff is expected to act with alacrity once he has reason to suspect that his rights have been violated, and a statute of limitations runs from the point at which the plaintiff, by exercising reasonable diligence, should have discovered his injury.” (See footnotes 49 and 50.) The court found that even under several alternative findings of facts, that the plaintiff simply waited too long to pursue his claims and that it would be inequitable to permit such a delay even if the claim was filed within the applicable statute of limitations.

The court also rejected an argument that the alleged unclean hands of the defendants, based on the facts of this case, prevented the use of laches as a defense. (See footnote 54.)

In sum, the court emphasized that for the applicability of laches, “the length of delay may be less important than the reasons for it. . . . Additionally, the touchtone of the laches inquiry is whether an inexcusable delay leads to an adverse change in the conditions or relations of the property or parties.” (See footnotes 56 and 57.)

Conclusion

In closing, the court quoted the well known equitable maxim that: “equity aides the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.” After an exhaustive description of the facts, the court reasoned that the specific injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff required him to act with more alacrity than would apply if he were requesting monetary damages, and in this case it would be inequitable to ignore the “sluggishness in bringing his claims.”


 

Court Appoints a Neutral Arbitrator based on Interpretation of Arbitration Provision that Original Umpire Selected by the Parties was Disqualified

Firemen’s Insurance Company of Washington, D.C. v. Birch Pointe Condominium Association, Inc., No. 4313-VCP (Del. Ch., May 29, 2009), read opinion here

This short letter decision involves interpretation of an arbitration provision in an insurance policy.

Procedural Background

This case was originally filed in the Superior Court of Delaware, which, sua sponte, determined that it did not have jurisdiction and therefore the case was transferred to the Chancery Court pursuant to Section 1902 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code. The basis for the transfer was that the Superior Court determined that the Court of Chancery was vested with exclusive jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator when the method of appointment set forth in an agreement to arbitrate fails for any reason. See footnote 4 (citing 10 Del. C. Section 5702 and 5704 of the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act). Moreover, the court determined that the inherent equitable jurisdiction of the Chancery Court includes the power to enforce arbitration agreements (case citations omitted). The court made its ruling based on the standard under Rule 12(c) for a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Reasoning and Conclusion

The sum and substance of this short letter decision is that an arbitration clause involved in this insurance coverage dispute provided that each party was required to pick an impartial appraiser and those two appraisers would pick a neutral umpire. The issue arose because one of the parties picked a partial appraiser and that partial appraiser was one of the two who picked a neutral umpire. The issue was whether the umpire that was picked by the partial appraiser was disqualified because the partial appraiser, who was later replaced with an impartial appraiser, was disqualified. The court determined that the partial appraiser was chosen in violation of the arbitration provision and was therefore not authorized to join in the selection of a neutral umpire. The bottom line is that the court chose a neutral umpire on its own and thus granted judgment on the pleadings for the plaintiff.

 

Chancery Court Approves Class Action Settlement Regarding Chicago Board Options Exchange

CME Group Inc. v. Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., No. 2369-VCN (Del. Ch., June 3, 2009), read opinion here. Prior Chancery Court opinions in this case were summarized on this blog here.

 This action began in order to establish the economic and trading rights of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago (“CBOT”), now under the auspices of CME Group, Inc., as Exercise Members or Exercise Member Delegates of defendant Chicago Board Options Exchange (“CBOE”). CBOT established and financed the CBOE, which as a national securities exchange, is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).

Procedural Background

The prior Chancery Court decisions in 2007, linked above, denied an application for injunctive relief and also stayed this action pending a decision by the SEC about whether the Certificate of Incorporation of CBOE should be interpreted to the effect that the demutualization of CBOT resulted in the loss of Exerciser Member status.

On January 22, 2008, the SEC approved the CBOE’s interpretation that no person could qualify as an Exerciser Member of CBOE after the CBOT-CME merger.

The SEC decision of January 2008 also indicated that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction in this case to decide the state law issues among the parties, which were generally understood to involve breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims. In February 2008, the plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint against CBOE and certain of its former directors. Shortly before summary judgment motions were scheduled to be argued in June 2008, the parties reached an agreement in principle resolving this litigation. A Stipulation of Settlement was submitted to the court in August 2008 and a Scheduling Order was thereafter entered which certified a temporary class, directing the sending of notices, and established the procedures for a hearing on the settlement and for making any objections to the settlement.

Issues Addressed by the Court

1) Whether this action should be certified as a class action;
2) Whether the settlement is fair and reasonable as between the plaintiff class and the defendants;
3) Whether the allocation of the settlement proceeds among the putative class members is fair and reasonable; and,
4) Whether the requirements imposed in order to qualify for receiving distribution of the settlement proceeds are fair and reasonable.

Without reciting the intricate factual details and overlapping claims in this 30-page decision, I will focus on the more noteworthy legal issues.

Class Certification

The court reviewed the requirements of Chancery Court Rule 23(a) which provides the four criteria that must be satisfied for certification of a class: (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. The court reviewed the facts of this case and found that these prerequisites were easily satisfied. The court also reviewed the requirements of Chancery Court Rule 23(b) that must be satisfied by parties seeking certification of a class and the court found that the certification of a mandatory (i.e., non-op-out) class is appropriate under both Chancery Court Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2).

Adequacy of a Settlement

The court acknowledged that in approving a settlement of this nature, the court is not in a position to resolve the merits of the dispute, but rather, the court must assess the nature of the claims asserted and the defenses that might be raised in opposition and then apply its own business judgment to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable. The court observed that there was no objection to the sufficiency of the settlement and that the objections filed related primarily to allocation.

Structural Objections

The court addressed the many objections that related to the following three categories:
1) Objections dealing with class membership cut-off and eligibility dates;
2) Objections to the verification procedures established to assure that participating members satified various requirements of Group A Settlement Class Members;
3) Objections to the allocation of value as between Group A Settlement Class Members and Group B Settlement Class Members; and
4) An objection to the scope of the release requested by CBOE.

The court addressed each of the substantive objections in turn and overruled them. Regarding allocation, the court noted that an allocation plan must be fair, reasonable and adequate (citing Schultz v. Ginsburg, 965 A.2d 661, 668 (Del. 2009)). The court observed there was no mathematical model to yield the proper division of proceeds among class members where the class members are not situated in exactly the same fashion. As part of approving the settlement, the court determined that the allocation was also fair and reasonable.

The Release

The issues regarding the release included the fact that certain person would be bound by the release although they would receive no consideration. The court cited authority at footnote 41 for the position that receiving no consideration is not necessarily a sound basis for objecting to a settlement because a party funding a settlement reasonably can expect to put all claims relating to the subject matter of the litigation (both real and theoretical) behind it.

Brief Postscript

In a final section of the opinion entitled “Brief Postscript,” the court concluded that: “This was a difficult matter.” Nonetheless, the court explained that it was “in no position to reach any conclusion other than that the Settlement, including its allocation plan, was, in the words of Schultz, ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’”
 

Court Grants Motion to Compel Director Emails After Company Fails to Preserve or Collect That Information

 Grace Brothers, Ltd. v. Siena Holdings, Inc., et al., No. 184-CC (Del. Ch., June 2, 2009), read letter decision here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his following review of this letter decision.

On June 2, 2009, Chancellor Chandler in granted plaintiff’s motion to compel emails among defendants directors on an expedited basis. This action was filed in January 2004 by Grace Brothers challenging a reverse stock split by Siena as a violation of 8 Del. C. § 155. Grace Brothers asked Sienna to produce emails among members of Siena’s board of directors and Sienna not only refused to produce the emails, it said that “there was no need for the board of directors to search for the emails.” Sienna not only failed to identify or locate this information, it failed to preserve this information and it failed to meet its burden of showing that Grace’s document requests were improper or “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative.”

Siena argued that it didn’t have to collect and produce the directors’ email because the company had already produced the relevant emails when they produced the sender-side versions. Additionally, Siena argued that “its process of asking the directors about their document retention and email communication practices was sufficiently reasonable to determine if the directors had unique copies of any emails already produced from other sources. It concluded that the directors did not have any unique copies.”

The Court disagreed with Siena’s position and found that this request would not: (i) be overly burdensome; (ii) result in great expense for Siena; (iii) be duplicative; and (iv) harass Siena. The Court granted the motion to compel this production in an expedited fashion given the impending June 15 trial date.


 

Chancery Court Issues Major Decision on Duty to Preserve Electronically Stored Information and Imposes Adverse Inference as Penalty for Spoliation of Evidence

Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, No. 1316-VCP (Del. Ch., May 29, 2009), read opinion here.

This is One of Three Chancery Court Decisions  Decided in May 2009 that Address Electronic Discovery Issues

This Chancery Court decision by Vice Chancellor Parsons is one of three Chancery Court cases decided in May that address important aspects of electronic discovery and describe the penalties for not upholding the duty to preserve electronically stored information (ESI). See also  Triton Construction Co. v. E. Shore Electric Services, Inc., summarized here on this blog; and Omnicare v. Mariner Health Care Management Co., another Chancery Court decision issued in May 2009 that addressed when ESI will be deemed not “readily accessible” such that costs of production will be shifted, summarized here. This decision in this Beard Research case is a magnum opus of sorts on the important issue of ESI especially to the extent Vice Chancellor Parsons provides the clearest statement of the law on this topic that I recall in a Chancery Court opinion, and to the extent that it provides a cautionary tale for those attorneys and clients who do not have their “ESI house in order.”

Overview

This decision procedurally came before the court on the Motion for Sanctions of plaintiff for alleged spoliation of evidence. In particular, the plaintiffs argued that the laptop of an ex-employee was irretrievably altered after a duty to preserve relevant information from that laptop had arisen. By way of remedy, the plaintiffs urged the court to grant a default judgment in their favor for tortious interference with business relations and misappropriation of trade secrets. Alternatively, the plaintiffs requested an adverse inference that the destroyed evidence contained information that would favor their claims, in addition to the imposition of attorneys’ fees and costs.

The court declined to enter a default judgment but granted a request to draw an adverse inference based on the missing evidence, but the court did order that the ex-employee and his new employers reimburse the plaintiffs for the reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in prosecuting the motion for sanctions.

Background

The parties in this case were companies that provided outsourcing services, such as chemists, for the chemical industry. A variety of claims were made against several former employees and their subsequent employers. One of the former employees was named Dr. Michael Kates. Kates left the employment of the plaintiffs and went to work for a competitor but continued to use a laptop which he had used while working for the plaintiffs, which contained proprietary information he obtained while working for plaintiffs.

In June, 2005 plaintiffs served their discovery requests and they specifically requested documents kept in electronic form, including e-mail communications. Nonetheless, in October 2005, Kates deleted key files from his laptop and “emptied” the computer’s trash in the recycle bin. In both December of 2005 and August 2006 he reformatted the hard drive and reinstalled system software, with the understanding that reformatting the hard drive or installing a new operating system would delete the old data.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel in May of 2006 and another in December of 2006. Based on the second Motion to Compel, the court directed the IT expert for defendants to meet with plaintiffs to discuss a method and means of searching the computers and databases in June 2007.

In October 2007, defendants’ counsel notified counsel for plaintiffs that the defendants had “nothing on their personal computers” and further advising them that access to any computer would require a court order.

Motion to Compel Inspection of Laptop

In July 2008, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel requesting that the laptop of Kates be turned over to them so that it could be searched by the IT expert of plaintiffs. The day before the hearing on that third Motion to Compel, Kates “defragmented the hard drive and computer” before being ordered by the court to produce the laptop, and after being told by his lawyer that he would likely be required to produce his laptop.

The IT expert for plaintiffs conducted a forensic investigation which concluded that key data was deleted and sent to the recycle bin the day before the hearing on the Motion to Compel, and that more than 11,000 files were deleted previously on the laptop.

In October 2008 the Motion for Sanctions for spoliation of evidence was filed by plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs’ Arguments

Plaintiffs argued that the destruction of the laptop of Kates constituted spoliation of discoverable material in the face of a duty to preserve potentially relevant evidence. The defendants made several feeble replies to these arguments, including that the deletions were performed in order to keep the laptop operational, and that the reason the information was deleted on the eve of the hearing on the Motion to Compel was to avoid revealing embarrassing personal information.

Legal Rulings

The court cited substantial authority for the following statement of Delaware law: “A party in litigation or who has reason to anticipate litigation had an affirmative duty to preserve evidence that might be relevant to the issues in a lawsuit.” See footnotes 62 through 64. (citing, e.g., the Sedona Guidelines.) The court observed that whether a person has reason to anticipate litigation depends on the facts and circumstances that may lead to a conclusion that litigation is imminent or should be expected, but a court may sanction a party who “breaches this duty by destroying relevant evidence or by failing to prevent the destruction of such evidence.”

The court described in great detail three specific actions where Kates disregarded his duty to preserve data: (1) The deletion of files from the original hard drive of the laptop in November of 2005; (2) The installation of a new hard drive in December of 2007; and (3) Tampering with the laptop and deletion of files in July 2008.

The court's advice to counsel on e-discovery matters from the opinion deserves to be quoted verbatim:

In complex commercial litigation today, virtually all discovery involves electronic discovery to some extent. It also is well known that absent affirmative steps to preserve it, at least some electronically stored information (“ESI”) is likely to be lost during the course of litigation through routine business practices or otherwise. These realities counsel strongly in favor of early and, if necessary, frequent communications among counsel for opposing litigants to determine how discovery of ESI will be handled. To the extent counsel reach agreements recognizing and permitting routine destruction of certain types of files to continue during litigation, the Court has no reason to object. Conversely, if the parties do not focus on the handling of e-discovery in the early stages of a case, the Court is not likely to be sympathetic when, for example, one party later complains that stringent measures were not instituted voluntarily by her adversary to ensure that no potentially relevant information was lost. Rather, instead of holding a party to a stringent standard that might have been appropriate if established earlier in the case, the Court probably will apply an approach it deems reasonable, taking into account the insights provided by the case law and some of the guidelines and principles developed by various respected groups that have studied the challenges of electronic discovery.  66

66  See, e.g., Conference of Chief Justices, Guidelines for State Trial Courts Regarding Discovery of Electronically Stored Information (2006), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/images/EDiscCCJGuidelinesFinal.pdf ; The Sedona Principles: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production (2005), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=SedonaPrinciples200401.pdf; Sedona Guidelines.

The court expressed its outrage that in July 2008 Kates brazenly ran a disk-cleanup program on the new hard drive on the eve of the hearing on the Motion to Compel. The court emphasized that it “cannot condone such flagrant disregard for the discovery rules in a party’s obligation to preserve potentially relevant evidence.”

What Sanctions are Appropriate for Failure to Preserve Evidence

Chancery Court Rule 37(a)(4), entitled “Expenses and Sanctions,” and Rule 37(b)(2), both provide a basis for penalties in this area. In addition, the court has the power to issue sanctions for discovery abuses under its inherent equitable powers, as well as the court’s inherent power to manage its own affairs. (See footnote 70.) In order to impose a default judgment, the spoliator must have acted “willfully or in bad faith and intended to prevent the other side from examining the evidence.” (See footnote 78). The court explained why the facts did not warrant such a severe remedy in this case.

Adverse Inference

The court explained the prerequisites based on recent Delaware Supreme Court precedent for the penalty of drawing an adverse inference against a spoliator of evidence. The standard for drawing an adverse inference is as follows:

An adverse inference instruction is appropriate where a
litigant intentionally or recklessly destroys evidence, when it
knows that the item in question is relevant to a legal dispute
or it was otherwise under a legal duty to preserve the item.
Before giving such an instruction, a trial judge must,
therefore, make a preliminary finding that the evidence shows
such intentional or reckless conduct. (citation from footnote 83 omitted).

Where Does an Adverse Inference in Chancery Court Get you?

After determining the different requirements for drawing an adverse inference had been satisfied, the court then analyzed in careful detail exactly what specific adverse inferences can be drawn based on the spoliation of specific evidence by Kates. Importantly, the court emphasized that an adverse inference is “not substantive proof” and not a substitute for the proof of a fact necessary to the party’s case. In addition, in order to obtain an adverse inference, a party must offer more than “mere speculation and conjecture that a particular document existed.” To that end, the court noted that by definition an e-mail has both a sender and a receiver. Even if the e-mails were destroyed by the sender, in this case the plaintiffs received discovery responses from the likely receiver of the e-mail and no incriminating e-mails from that party were received.

The court regarded as reckless the failure of Kates to fulfill his obligation to preserve potentially relevant evidence on the laptop and the adverse inference drawn was that there was relevant information on the laptop that would have shown confidential information of his former employer as part of a PowerPoint that Kates presented to a competitor.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

In order to impose monetary sanctions, the court “need only find that a party had a duty to preserve evidence and breached that duty. Essentially, this means that negligence alone may be sufficient to support the imposition of monetary sanctions.” See footnote 94. The court reserved some of its harshest language to justify the imposition of attorneys’ fees in this case. In particular, the court was troubled by the waste of time and resources suffered by the plaintiffs’ counsel and the court regarding a Motion to Compel the original hard drive. The court emphasized that it was only after the court read the opening brief on the motion did the defendants admit in their answering papers that the original hard drive had been replaced already.

The court added that: “The vexatiousness of Kates’ conduct was compounded further by his undisclosed deletion of numerous files from the new hard drive before the July 2008 hearing.” The court added that: “Kates’ intentional deletion of information in July 2008 was egregious and demonstrates a callous disregard for proper discovery in this court.” Therefore, the court awarded plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees and expenses, including expert fees, associated with the Motion for Sanctions and imposed those amounts jointly and severally against Kates and his new employers. The expenses included those associated with the inspection of the laptop.

Together with the Triton and Omnicare v. Mariner cases also decided in May 2009, the Chancery Court is providing helpful guidance to practitioners on cutting edge electronic discovery issues and “cautionary tales” to avoid ESI traps for the unwary.

 

Chancery Court Compensates Lead Plaintiff in Class Action Against Boston University

Oliver v. Boston University, No. 16570-VCN (Del. Ch., May 29, 2009), read letter decision here. Prior opinions in this case by the Chancery Court were summarized here on this blog. This latest decision addresses a few open issues after the approval of a class action settlement.

Issues Addressed and Decided

  1. Award to Lead Plaintiff. The court awarded $40,000 to the lead plaintiff for the estimated 2,000 hours that the lead plaintiff spent to help class counsel pursue the action on behalf of the class. The court observed that: "Awards to representative plaintiffs should be rare. Only in exceptional cases should such an application be granted." (see footnote 1). The court reasoned that this was one of the "unusual circumstances in which compensation of the lead plaintiff is appropriate" because he (i) was deposed extensively; (ii) attended each day of trial; (iii) helped with document review and located a key document from a large set of documents; and (iv) his background brought a degree of knowledge and expertise to the task.
  2. Shifting of Attorneys' Fees. The court refused to shift fees based on allegations of bad faith conduct on the part of defense counsel during the course of the litigation, nor did the court find sufficient merit to an argument that there was a conflict among defense counsel. (see footnotes 3, 4 and 6).
  3. Settlement Proceeds Not Being Fully Disbursed. The court determined that the attorneys' fees would be based on the total settlement amount even if the total proceeds were not completely disbursed. There was an issue, however, of not being able to identify all the shareholders to whom the settlement was to be disbursed. The court noted that leftover, unclaimed settlement funds often are given to charity. Based on the facts of this case, the court explained the basis for its reasoning for allowing Boston University, as a charity, to retain any  leftover settlement funds.
  4. Costs and Expenses. The court awarded costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) and an additional amount for expenses not covered by the settlement.
  5. Structuring and Funding of the Settlement. Although the amount of the judgment was $2.8 million, and it was not disputed that interest should accrue from 1998, because it took seven years to bring the case to trial, the court did not impose interest to start on attorneys' fees until beginning with the year 2004. Moreover, the court allowed the defendants to fund the judgment on an "as due" basis in light of the likelihood that a substantial portion might revert back to Boston University in the end.

 

 

The Death of the Wolf Block Law Firm

Prof. Larry Ribstein has a thought-provoking and insightful post here about the recent demise of the former powerhouse law firm of Wolf Block. The good professor's analysis should be required reading for any partner of a law firm. It describes how tenuous the economic model of the modern law firm is, and how thin a line exists between a profitable law firm and one that fails.

Court Grants Cross-Motions to Compel Discovery But Refuses to Shift Costs to Requesting Party to Pay for Restoration of Emails on Backup Tapes

Omnicare, Inc. v. Mariner Health Care Management Co., No. 3087-VCN (Del. Ch., May 29, 2009), read opinion here.

This case review is brought to us by Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator.

On May 29, 2009, Vice Chancellor Noble issued a decision granting cross-motions to compel in  this matter. For those readers who are interested in large complex discovery disputes, especially one involving electronic information with traditional problems of “scope” and “volume,” this case may be of interest to you. While the scope of the discovery issues in dispute were somewhat “run of the mill” for a case involving a contract dispute between a nursing home operator and a pharmaceutical supplier, the Court put the volume/scale of the dispute in context with words like “large,” “numerous,” “complex,” “data-intensive,” “massive,” “burdensome” and “voluminous” (and that was only in the “Introduction” to the Opinion).

There were two issues in the Court’s analysis of the electronic information discovery dispute that are rare for the Court of Chancery to discuss (indeed, this may be the first opinion from the Court that addresses “electronically stored information or “ESI”, a defined term in the Federal Rules of Civil procedure). Those issues deal with cost-shifting and “Back-up Tapes.”

By way of background, Omnicare brought this action to compel performance of an alleged contractual obligation to guarantee the payment of approximately $100 million that the defendants (and their affiliates) owed under certain provisions (the “Guarantee Provisions”). Omnicare sought injunctive relief and damages to “remedy, among other things, [d]efendants’ alleged ongoing breaches of their agreement to provide Omnicare and/or its pharmacies with 10-days advance written notice of any facility transfers and to ensure that any new lessee, manager, transferee or other operator of transferred facilities enters into successor agreements with Omnicare’s pharmacies.” Omnicare also asserted causes of action for fraudulent transfer and alter ego/veil piercing.

Cross-Motions to Compel

Omnicare sought the production of the following six categories of information: (1) specific billing errors defendants identified, the basis for disputing the amounts; and the specific billing errors that the Defendants objected to within 60 days of the date of the invoice; (2) information regarding transfers of facilities; (3) financial information “tailored to Omnicare’s claims for fraudulent conveyance, alter ego and veil piercing”; (4) documents sufficient to identify individuals with any direct or indirect ownership interest in any of the defendants; (5) documents containing certifications and other statements made to the government regarding goods and services received from Omnicare and provided to Medicare patients; and (6) email on backup tapes for certain periods for which no email is available due to the automatic deletion program Defendants had in effect prior to September 2007 (“Backup Tapes”). Defendants sought production of the following four categories of information: (1) contracts that relate to Omnicare’s standing or right to assert its claims in this Case; (2) “affiliate” level information and documents; (3) certain information and documents related to “most favorable pricing” and “Medicaid pending” elements of the billing dispute; and (4) information and documents showing prior investigations, charges, complaints or lawsuits regarding the billing process utilized by Omnicare or Omnicare pharmacies.

Vice Chancellor Noble reviewed and discussed in detail each of the topics in dispute and in the end, he granted both parties’ motions to compel the information that each sought.

Cost-Shifting and Backup Tape Analysis

The Court then turned to the issue of emails and “all of Defendants’ email for approximately three years … from 2003 to 2005 has been automatically deleted.” Apparently, in order to review and produce the emails from periods during which all email was automatically deleted, the Defendants would need to restore the 2004 and 2005 backup tapes. The parties disagreed about who should pay for this restoration estimated to be between $22,000 and $40,000.

The general rule is that the responding party bears the expenses associated with producing electronic information sought in discovery, but the Court, “in the exercise of both its inherent equitable powers and the wide discretion to manage discovery under Court of Chancery Rule 26, may act to alter this norm when appropriate.”

Vice Chancellor Noble noted the dearth of Delaware law on the subject of ESI, cost-shifting, backup tapes and restoration of email so he turned to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were amended in 2006, to address the discovery of data that is “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”

After analyzing the multi-factor approach employed in the Court in the Southern District of New York in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, the Vice Chancellor decided not to shift costs of production. In reaching that decision, the Court determined that “[d]efendants have not adequately demonstrated that the ESI in question is not reasonably accessible. Simply because the ESI is now contained on Backup Tapes instead of in active stores does not necessarily render it not reasonably accessible.” Interestingly, the Court commented on Omnicare’s argument concerning records management policies noting that:

Omnicare’s attempt to demonstrate impropriety in Defendants’ data retention policy and its implementation is unpersuasive. The better approach is proposed by the Defendants. Production should first be from Defendants’ active stores in order to assess the likelihood of finding relevant and discoverable data on the Backup Tapes. If that is productive, then it becomes more likely that recovery from the Backup Tapes would be fruitful and processing of the Backup Tapes at Defendants’ expense would be appropriate.


For those of you interested in some of the more subtle issues raised by discovery and ESI, Vice Chancellor Noble made some interesting observations in a couple of footnotes. Footnote 32 references a Duke Law Review article dealing with various tests that courts have used to determine when cost-shifting is appropriate. Footnote 34 discusses the language in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“not reasonably accessible due to undue burden or cost”), the leading Federal Case in this area, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, and the issue of the cost necessary for the producing party to carry its burden of demonstrating ESI as not reasonably accessible or to justify cost-shifting.

 


 

Court Modifies Prior Determination of Fair Value in Appraisal Action But Does Not "Second-Guess" the Plain Meaning of the Contract

In re Appraisal of Metromedia International Group, Inc.,  No. 3351-CC (Del. Ch., May 29, 2009), read opinion here. Prior opinions by the Chancery Court in this case have been summarized here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us the following review of the case.

On May 29, 2009, in response to petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the Court’s April 16, 2009 Opinion, Chancellor Chandler in a compact six-page opinion, modified his prior decision to conclude that the fair value of the preferred shares on the date of the merger was $47.47 for each preferred share instead of the $38.92 per share he originally found.

On April 16, 2009, in a post-trial decision in a consolidated appraisal proceeding, Chancellor Chandler addressed the issue of appraisal of preferred shareholder’s stock and the “primacy of contract” as a measure of fair value. The Chancellor found that the fair value of Metromedia International Group, Inc.’s (“MIG”) preferred shares on the merger date was $38.92 for each share. The petitioners had sought a valuation in a range from $67.50 to $79.76 per share while MIG claimed that the highest value should have been $18.07 per share.

In the motion for reconsideration, the Court again went through a complicated analysis of the various sections of the certificate of designation trying to determine which Section would be applicable in fixing the fair value of the preferred shares (the details of the Court’s analysis are too voluminous to be summarized here). The question came down to whether the preferred holders could receive the $29.40 accumulated and accrued dividends in addition to the $18.07 per share conversion price. MIG argued that if a preferred holder exercised its option to convert and also received the accumulated and accrued dividend payment of $29.40, it had “double-dipped” in the payment of the unpaid dividends. The Court, while not disputing MIG’s interpretation, noted that was the deal MIG struck:

[M]y role in this case is to interpret the contract, not rewrite it to yield a result MIG thinks more to its liking. If MIG drafted a contract that allowed for slight doubledipping, then that is the deal it struck. I will not second guess the plain meaning of the contract simply because one party complains it yields a slightly more favorable result for stockholders. My conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the party complaining about the double-dipping is the party that wrote the language in dispute.

The Chancellor determined that the value for each of MIG’s preferred shares was $47.47 ($29.40 + $18.07).
 

Delaware Chancery Court Requires Party to Submit to Terms of Forum Selection Clause Despite that Party Being a Non-Signatory; Based on Equitable Estoppel

Weygandt v. Weco, LLC, Del. Ch., No. 4056-VCS (May 14, 2009), read opinion here

Issue Presented

The question in this case is whether a non-signatory defendant can be required to appear in a forum chosen in an agreement executed by an affiliate.

In this Chancery Court decision, the court determined that a party was subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Delaware courts based on a forum selection clause in an agreement that the party was not a signatory to, but which an affiliated party was a signatory to, based on equitable estoppel.

Background

The factual background involves the negotiated sale of an aviation repair business in California. The sale of the business included a contemporaneous lease agreement for the premises on which the purchased business was located. As a condition to closing for the purchase of the business, the lease agreement was entered into for the premises which the business occupied.  

The lease agreement was entered into by the owner of the building where the business was located, which was a different entity than the owner of the business but the same person controlled both entities. The Asset Purchase Agreement for the business contained a forum selection or “consent to jurisdiction” clause providing for exclusive personal jurisdiction over any party to the agreement in any state or federal court sitting in Delaware. The lease agreement, however, did not contain a consent to jurisdiction clause. The court reasoned that the sale of the business was to be paid for in two ways: (i) the basic purchase price of the business, and (ii) the stream of lease payments from the lease for the premises on which the business was located.

Legal Analysis

The court reiterated that on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a basis for the exercise by the court of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.

The court rejected the applicability to these facts of the general rule that “agreements that are part of the same transaction are construed together.” However, the court did find applicable the equitable estoppel theory which many cases have applied to hold that a non-signatory was bound by a forum selection clause based on a three part test. First, the forum selection clause must be valid. Second,  the defendants need to be either third-party beneficiaries or “closely-related” to the relevant contract. Third, the claim must arise from the status of the defendant as closely-related to the agreement that contains the forum selection clause.

The purpose of the third prong of the three-part test is that the agreement containing the forum selection clause must also be the agreement that gives rise to the substantive claims brought by or against a non-signatory in order for the forum selection clause to be enforceable against a non-signatory. (See footnotes 13 to 15 and 18.)

The rationale for the cases that have enforced forum selection clauses against non-signatory parties are based on the principle that a third-party beneficiary or closely-related party can not enjoy the benefits of an agreement without accepting its obligations. See Capital Group Cos. v. Armour, 2004 WL 2521295 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2004). See also cases collected at footnote 17.

Importantly, it is not only third-party beneficiaries, but also parties who are “closely related” to the agreement at issue that are estopped from avoiding the obligations of an agreement from which they benefit. Thus, even if an agreement expressly disclaims any third-party beneficiaries, a “closely-related party” to the agreement can still be bound by its terms even if not a signatory. See Capital Group, 2004 WL 2521295, at *6.

A party will be considered “closely related” to an agreement for purposes of binding a non-signatory if: (1) she receives a direct benefit from the program; or (2) it was foreseeable that she would be bound by the agreement. (See footnotes 18 and 19.)

Direct Benefit

In the instant case, the landlord, who was a non-signatory to the purchase agreement which contained the forum selection clause, received a direct benefit from the purchase agreement because the buyer of the business would not have entered into the lease agreement with the landlord if it was not buying the busines--and the lease was not only part of the “consideration” paid for the business, but was also a condition precedent to the purchase of the business.

Foreseeability

When a control person agrees to a forum, it is foreseeable that the entities controlled by that person which are involved in the deal will also be bound to that forum. See cases collected at footnote 25. The rationale for binding such entities rests on the public policy that forum selection clauses “promote stable and dependable trade relations” and it would be inconsistent with that policy to allow entities through which one of the parties chooses to act, to escape the forum selection clause. See cases collected at footnote 26.

If the purchaser of the business in this case was excused from buying the business because of fraud or falsity of representations and warranties, it would have no business reason or legal obligation to enter into the lease agreement which it needed only to operate the business. Thus, it was foreseeable that a dispute involving the purchase agreement and the lease agreements would have to be brought in Delaware because of the forum selection clause in the purchase agreement.

Conclusion

Any contrary result would allow for duplicative and inefficient litigation in multiple forums and undermine the benefit of predictability that was provided to the purchaser by agreeing to a forum clause in the purchase agreement. Thus, the court found that the landlord was equitably estopped from asserting that the Delaware court lacked jurisdiction.

This opinion will be helpful for the many transactions which involve multiple agreements--all of which do not contain a forum selection clause. What this agreement does not directly address, however,  is those situations where there are multiple agreements in the transaction which have different forum selection clauses, although there are other decisions that have addressed such situations.


 

Chancery Court Splits Fees in Cablevision Class Action Between Lawyers for Related New York Suit and Delaware Counsel

In Re Cablevision/Rainbow Media Group Tracking Stock Litigation, No. 19819-VCN (May 22, 2009), read opinion here.

This Chancery Court decision resolved a dispute regarding the amount of fees and the division of fees between class counsel in a Delaware shareholders’ suit that challenged the exchange by Cablevision Systems Corporation of its then-outstanding tracking stock and certain assets of its Rainbow Media Division for Cablevision common stock. Shareholder actions challenging the transaction based on the adequacy of the consideration were filed in Delaware and later in New York. The allegations in both actions were similar although the New York action contained additional claims.

Procedural background

According to the court, the Delaware case “did not proceed with any great dispatch. It was the better part of two years before the Delaware plaintiffs began to move forward with their litigation here. The plaintiff in the New York action did take discovery but that case was eventually confronted by a stay of that action.” The plaintiff in the New York case moved to intervene in the Delaware action to seek a stay of the Delaware action in favor of the New York action. The Delaware Chancery Court directed counsel for both the Delaware plaintiffs and the New York plaintiff to “work together to pursue cooperatively the interests of the class. Apparently that request was not implemented.”
The proposed settlement that would also include the New York action was for payment to the class of $8.25 million, inclusive of attorneys’ fees. The proposed settlement supported a fee award of 30% of the common fund recovery.

Objections to Class Action Settlement

However, the New York plaintiff made known its objections to the proposed settlement and succeeded in negotiating an increase of $1.5 million in the settlement proceeds to a total of $9.75 million. The plaintiff in New York asserted that the Delaware plaintiffs settled “on the cheap and that its ability to negotiate an even greater settlement was severely hampered as a result.”
Nonetheless, the Chancery Court approved the settlement of a payment of $9.75 million. The court regarded this as a fair and reasonable amount under the circumstances as a settlement.

Issue: How to Split Fees Among Class Counsel

The only issue was the question of attorneys’ fees in terms of the total amount and how those amounts would be divided between counsel. Counsel for the Delaware plaintiffs sought an award of 30% of the $8.25 million. However, counsel for the New York plaintiff urged the court to reduce the total award to $1.75 million (thus increasing the amount to be distributed to the class) and then divide that amount equally between counsel for Delaware plaintiffs and counsel for the New York plaintiff.

Court's Reasoning

The court acknowledged that there was no “bright line test” to apply in this situation. The court explained why it decided that an award of 22.5% of the fund would be an appropriate amount for attorneys’ fees which would result in a total award of fees and expenses of $2,193,800 (with expenses for both Delaware and New York counsel approximating $195,000).

The court acknowledged the difficulty in allocating attorneys’ fees among lawyers for plaintiffs pursuing substantially similar claims in different jurisdictions. The court recited the standards generally for awarding attorneys’ fees in class actions and recognized that the attorneys for the New York plaintiff were able to secure an additional $1.5 million for the settlement. In sum, the court awarded 22.5% of the initial $8.5 million recovery to the Delaware plaintiffs “reduced from the additional amount paid to the class from what would have been fees paid to the Delaware plaintiffs if the proposal of the 30% fee award from the common fund had been approved.” Thus, the bottom line is that the Delaware plaintiffs were awarded $1,717,000 in fees and expenses and the New York plaintiff was awarded $476,800 in fees and expenses.

 

 

Chancery Court Dismisses Class Action Allegations of Overpayment in Recapitalization Transaction on Standing Basis But Disclosure Claims Allowed to Proceed

 Dubroff, et al. v. Wren Holdings, LLC, et al., Del. Ch., No. 3940-VCN (May 22, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly-respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his following review of this Delaware Chancery Court decision.

On May 22, 2009, Vice Chancellor Noble granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss a class action involving a contested recapitalization plan that resulted in dilution of equity.

By way of background, the plaintiffs, two former minority shareholders of Nine Systems Corporation (“NSC”), brought a purported class action against NSC and other individuals and entities that included former directors and former shareholders, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties. During 2001 and early 2002, the entity defendants had made a series of loans to NSC. In August 2002, NSC carried out a recapitalization transaction (the “Recap”) by written consent of the holders of a majority of NSC’s stock (primarily the entity defendants) by which the entity defendants converted the preferred debt they each held into preferred stock. Before the Recap, the entity defendants collectively owned 56% of NSC’s stock and after the Recap their holdings increased to almost 80%. The other shareholders’ equity, including the plaintiffs’, decreased from approximately 44% to 22%.

Four years later in November 2006, Akami Technologies announced that it was acquiring NSC. In the NSC proxy statement there was a listing of NSC shareholders as well as the number of NSC shares each held. This was the first time that the plaintiffs became aware of their equity dilution. As a result, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to the minority shareholders, and that the individual defendants aided and abetted breaches by the entity defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that: (i) the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claims because their claims are derivative and the plaintiffs were no longer stockholders of NSC; (ii) the defendants did not fail to disclose material facts; and (iii) the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine of laches.

Plaintiffs’ Standing Issue —Direct, Derivative or Both

In his analysis, Vice Chancellor Noble noted that claims regarding corporate overpayment such as in the case of a recapitalization are normally derivative claims because the harm goes solely to the corporation. And under the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1046 (Del. 1984), for a plaintiff to have standing to assert a derivative claim, the plaintiff must be a stockholder at the time of the alleged wrongdoing and must maintain his/her stockholder status in the corporate entity throughout the litigation. There is, however, an exception to the general rule.

In Gentile v. Rosette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006), the Delaware Supreme Court held that claims based upon equity dilution can be both direct and derivative in certain circumstances. Vice Chancellor Noble, in quoting Gentile and Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004) noted that:

[a] breach of fiduciary duty claim having this dual nature arises where: (1) a stockholder having majority or effective control causes the corporation to issue “excessive” shares of its stock in exchange for assets of the controlling stockholder that have a lesser value; and (2) the exchange causes an increase in the percentage of the outstanding owned by the controlling stockholder, and a corresponding decrease in the share percentage owned by the public (minority) shareholders.

Thus, under Gentile and its progeny, “where a controlling shareholder causes the corporate entity to issue more equity to the controlling shareholder at the expense of the minority shareholders,” the shareholder’s claim can be both derivative and direct.

In this case, the plaintiffs lost their standing to bring derivative claims because they lost their stockholder status when NSC was acquired by Akami Technologies. In an effort to couch their claim as a direct claim under Gentile, the plaintiffs tried to show that the entity defendants collectively formed a controlling shareholder group. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Court found that their claims under Gentile failed as a matter of law because “the Complaint states in conclusory fashion that the [e]ntity [d]efendants ‘controlled the NSC board of directors,’ but the Complaint is devoid of any facts demonstrating an agreement or that the [d]efendants were tied together in some legally significant way”. Moreover, in what might have been the death knell for plaintiffs on this issue, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, “the plaintiffs conceded that there were no facts in the Complaint from which the Court could infer that an agreement existed”. As a result of a lack of standing to bring a direct claim, Vice Chancellor Noble granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the substantive claim regarding the Recap.

The Disclosure Claims

The plaintiffs also challenged the sufficiency of the notice sent to inform them of the Recap. Because the Recap was accomplished by written consent of the majority stockholders, there was neither a vote nor a solicitation of the plaintiffs’ approval. While the Court noted that “Delaware case law has not addressed the question of whether the notice required by 8 Del. C. § 228(e) triggers a fulsome disclosure akin to that required when stockholder approval is being solicited”, he did not need to address that issue here because the plaintiffs had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty so the motion to dismiss the disclosure claims was denied.

Laches

Finally, the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of laches because they were on “inquiry notice” that interested parties converted their shares long before the plaintiffs brought their action. The Court rejected this argument, however, because the plaintiffs were not told that about the dilution until years after the notice was sent and the information that the plaintiffs did receive about the Recap informed them that “senior debt converted in the Recapitalization ‘was raised from existing investors.’” The defendants did not inform them that the “existing investors” were also members of NSC’s board of directors.

 

Delaware Chancery Court Rejects Challenge to Atmel's Poison Pill

Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System v. Laub et al., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 4161. The Delaware Chancery Court ruled from the bench on May 19, 2009 in this matter involving a contested Poison Pill of Amtel Corporation in connection with a merger proposal. The complaint filed with the court is available here. Courtroom View Network has a video of the oral argument on May 19, 2009 available here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, has compiled an overview of the court's ruling from the bench, though no written decision from the court is yet available as of this posting. Bloomberg has an article about the ruling here.

On Tuesday, May 19, 2009, after a hearing in the Court of Chancery, Chancellor Chandler ruled that Atmel Corporation's changes to its Poison Pill takeover defense were not improper. The conflict arose when a group of Atmel stockholders filed a class action against Atmel's directors and officers seeking to invalidate the amendments to the Poison Pill. The plaintiff claimed "bad faith breaches of fiduciary duty" by Atmel's Board of Directors and senior management in response to a merger proposal from Microchip Technology Incorporated and ON Semiconductor Corporation when the Board amended the company's Poison Pill to make it "significantly more onerous and potentially preclusive and destructive to shareholder value, without regard to proportionality or to how such a drastic measure could conceivably benefit Atmel shareholders." No written ruling has been issued by the Court as of this posting.

Atmel's pre-existing Poison Pill precluded a hostile tender offer from closing if the bidder acquired more than 20% of Atmel's outstanding shares. Atmel's directors amended the pill to, among other things, decrease the percentage from 20% to 10% and change the definition of beneficial ownership" which according to the plaintiff's complaint "effectively accelerated the rate at which Microchip, ON Semi and their "Affiliates" and "Associates" will reach the 10% threshold necessary to trigger the Poison Pill."
 

Chancery Court Addresses Duty of Loyalty and Other Fiduciary Duties of Departing Salaried Employee; Duty to Preserve Data; and Panoply of Related Claims

Triton Construction Co., Inc. v. Eastern Shore Electrical Services, Inc., Del. Ch., No. 3290-VCP (May 18, 2009), read opinion here.

 This 76-page Delaware Chancery Court opinion contains many statements of Delaware law that are of practical importance to both businesses and their lawyers, regarding issues that arise in connection with “important employees” leaving and competing against their former employer. The decision describes the elements of several workhorse causes of action for corporate and commercial litigators.

The court's analysis and application of the prerequisites for these claims (that should be familiar to all commercial/corporate litigators), can be viewed as basic tools that should be in the toolbox of every business litigation lawyer. Instead of describing the extensive factual background contained in this lengthy decision, I will highlight the key facts and then address what I think are the 13 or so most important legal rulings contained in the court's opinion.

Very Brief Factual Background

Triton Construction Co. is a Delaware non-union commercial electrical contractor. Defendant Tom Kirk was an employee of Triton from 2004 through 2007. He was hired as an estimator and a project manager, a full-time salaried position. Kirk was privy to confidential information about Triton’s overhead, labor rates, material costs, equipment costs, profit, salaries and general financial information which he discussed with Triton executives on at least a weekly basis. Defendant Eastern Shore Electrical Services, Inc. is a non-union commercial electrical contractor that competes directly with Triton for some of the jobs it bids. Beginning in November 2005, Kirk also began to work part-time for Eastern, offering his estimating services at the same time he maintained a full-time position at Triton. Neither Kirk nor Eastern ever informed Triton of the part-time job at Eastern. Following Kirk’s resignation from Triton, he was hired full-time to work at Eastern.

Procedural History

In October 2007 Triton filed a Verified Complaint requesting injunctive and other relief and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The court granted the TRO and in November 2007 the court also granted a stipulated Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. A four-day trial was held in March 2008 and extensive post-trial briefing and argument followed. The court also considered a Motion for Contempt due to a violation of the preliminary injunction. The court granted that Motion for Contempt with an award of attorneys’ fees incurred in that motion only.

The court described the evidentiary standard applicable in this case which was proof by a preponderance. In essence, this meant that Triton must merely prove that “it is more likely than not that it is entitled to relief.” (See footnote 23.)

Issues Addressed

1) Spoliation of Evidence and Duty to Preserve Evidence. The court considered a claim that Kirk intentionally destroyed evidence, including electronically-stored data, and a request for an adverse inference against Kirk as a result. The court accepted expert testimony on this point and found that Kirk installed a wiping program on his computer thereby making certain files irretrievable. The court did not find credible the denials of Kirk that he used the wiping program. The court also noted that Kirk never produced his home computer or thumb drive; and found not believable that Kirk “no longer owned either of them.”

The court acknowledged the Delaware law which imposes an affirmative duty “to preserve evidence [which] attaches upon the discovery of facts and circumstances that would lead to a conclusion that litigation is imminent or should otherwise be expected.” (See footnote 39.)
In order for an adverse inference to be drawn, Delaware requires a determination “that the party acted intentionally or recklessly in failing to preserve the evidence.”
(FN 40.) The court found that Kirk either intentionally or recklessly destroyed or failed to preserve evidence relating to this litigation at a time when he knew such litigation was imminent or otherwise to be expected.
Thus, the court found an adverse inference to be appropriate based on the inference that Kirk either destroyed or discarded his thumb drive and home computer or recklessly failed to fulfill his duty to preserve that potential evidence.

2) Fiduciary Duties of an Employee. Did Kirk as an employee owe a fiduciary duty to his employer, Triton? The court observed that under “fundamental principles of agency law, an agent owes his principal a duty of good faith, loyalty and fair dealing. These duties encompass the corollary duties of an agent to disclose information that is relevant to the affairs of the agency entrusted to him and to refrain from placing himself in a position antagonistic to his principal concerning the subject matter of his agency.” (FN 43 and 44.) The court emphasized that these “hallmark principles of agency law apply to traditional corporate fiduciaries, such as officers and directors, and to key managerial personnel.” (emphasis added.) (FN 48.)

The court explained that because Kirk was not a “key managerial employee” he did not owe the same general duties as a corporate officer or director, but he still owed fiduciary duties to his employer based on the principles of agency law.

 The law enunciated in this opinion regarding fiduciary duties as applied to a salaried employee (who in this case was expressly found not to be a "key manager"), is so important to businesses and their lawyers, and so rarely explained to the extent this opinion expounds on it, that it warrants a "block quote" with original footnotes. Note also in the quote that follows, the "carve-out" that gives an employee a privilege (exceeded in this case) to make plans to leave.

3) Did Kirk breach his fiduciary duty of loyalty (as an employee)? 

Under Delaware law, the relationship of agent to principal does not of itself give rise to fiduciary duties.56  A fiduciary relationship generally requires “confidence reposed by one side and domination and influence exercised by the other.”57  Nevertheless, where an agent represents a principal in a matter where the agent is provided with confidential information to be used for the purposes of the principal, a fiduciary relationship may arise.58  For example, if an employee in the course of his employment acquires secret information relating to his employer’s business, he occupies a position of trust and confidence toward it, and must govern his actions accordingly.59  The resulting relationship is analogous in most respects to that of a fiduciary relationship.60 (emphasis added).

Here, Triton gave access to its confidential information to Kirk, including during its Thursday morning meetings. Such information included its labor rates, volume, profit margins, equipment costs, material costs, leasing costs, existing contracts, and customer information. This information was not publicly available to other contractors, and was considered confidential by Triton. Defendants contend that the disclosure of this information does not give rise to fiduciary duties as contemplated in Brophy v.Cities Service Co. because the information does not constitute trade secret information. This argument misses the mark, because Brophy does not hold that the purloined information must be a trade secret. Fiduciary duties may arise, according to Brophy, when an employee acquires secret information relating to his employer’s business. Whether or not the information rises to the level of a trade secret, an employee has a fiduciary duty to safeguard that information, or at least, not disclose it to a competitor, if the information is secret and the employee has acquired it in the course of his employment.61 (emphasis added).

I infer from the evidence in this case, including the information Kirk failed to preserve, that Kirk used Triton’s confidential information for his own and Eastern’s benefit without Triton’s consent. In most cases, the bids Kirk worked on for both Triton and Eastern in connection with the thirteen overlapping projects were similar, with Eastern’s bid being slightly below Triton’s.62 Kirk also performed takeoffs for Triton and used them in his work for Eastern on the same projects.63 As discussed in more detail infra at Section II.D.5, because I find Kirk used Triton’s confidential information in his work preparing bids for Eastern, a competitor, he breached his fiduciary duty to Triton.

[Were Kirk's Actions Within Limited Privilege of Employee to Plan for Next Job?]

Although employees do enjoy a privilege allowing them to make preparations to compete with their employer before their employment relationship ends, that privilege is not without limitations. Under some circumstances, the purported exercise of the privilege may breach the employee’s fiduciary duty of loyalty.64 For example, an employee may be denied the protection of the privilege when they have misappropriated trade secrets, misused confidential information, solicited the employer’s customers before cessation of  employment, conspired to effectuate mass resignation of key employees, or usurped a business opportunity of the employer.65 Ultimately, the determination of whether an employee has breached his fiduciary duties to his employer by preparing to engage in a competing enterprise “must be grounded upon a thoroughgoing examination of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”66

Even if Kirk did not misappropriate trade secrets or attempt to engineer the exodus of Triton employees, I conclude that he breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty by performing similar work for Eastern in direct competition, at times, with Triton over a prolonged period of time. (emphasis added)


56 Prestancia Mgmt. Group, Inc. v. Va. Heritage Found., II LLC, 2005 WL 1364616, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2005). Fiduciary duties will arise, however, in the context of an agent/principal relationship when “there is an element of confidentiality or a joint undertaking between the principal and agent. The hallmark of this form of special principal/agent relationship is when matters are peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent.” Metro Ambulance, Inc. v. E. Med. Billing, Inc., 1995 WL 409015, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995) (citations omitted).
57 BAE Sys. N. Am. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2004 WL 1739522, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 3, 2004) (quoting Gross v. Univ. of Chi., 302 N.E.2d 444, 453-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973)).
58 Ramsey v. Toelle, 2008 WL 4570580, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2008).
59 Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7 (Del. Ch. 1949).
60 Id.

61 See id. at 7-8 (“A fiduciary is subject to a duty to the beneficiary not to use on his own account information confidentially given him by the [principal] or acquired by him during the course of or on account of the fiduciary relation or in violation of his duties as fiduciary, in competition with or to the injury of the beneficiary . . . .”). See also EDIX Media Group, Inc. v. Mahani, 2006 WL 3742595, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 12, 2006) (“Not all confidential information is a trade secret.”).
62 T. Tr. at 253-56, 270, 282.
63 Id. at 392.
64 Sci. Accessories Corp., 425 A.2d at 964-65.
65 Id. at 965 (citing cases).
66 Id. (citation omitted).

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Chancery Grants Stay of LLC Dissolution Pending Appeal

Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, Inc., C.A.No. 3017-CC (May 15, 2009), read opinion here.

Prior Chancery Court decisions in this case have been summarized on this blog here.

Kevin Brady, a well respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his following review of this case.

 Court Permits Stay Pending Appeal without Bond

On May 15, 2009, Chancellor Chandler granted defendant’s motion for a stay pending appeal of an Order dissolving Genitrix LLC and liquidating its assets; and he waived the requirement that the defendant post a bond pending the outcome of the appeal. 

The Court did not provide any details as to why the LLC was being dissolved and its assets liquidated, (but prior decisions at the link above provide more background facts to this case). The Court, instead, focused on the legal basis for stay and Chancery Court Rule 62(d), which provides that stays pending appeal and cost bonds shall be governed by Supreme Court Rule 32(a) which gives the Court the discretion to grant or deny such application, and by Article IV, Section 24 of the Constitution of the State of Delaware. Section 24 states that there “shall be no stay of proceedings in the court below unless the appellant shall give sufficient security to be approved by the court below or by a judge of the Supreme Court.”

Supreme Court’s four-factor test in Kirpat Favors Stay

Turning next to the Supreme Court’s four-factor test in Kirpat, Inc. v. Del. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n., 741 A.2d 356, 357-58 (Del. 1998), Chancellor Chandler noted that he had to consider: (1) a preliminary assessment of likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal; (2) whether the petitioner will suffer irreparable injury if the stay is not granted; (3) whether any other interested party will suffer substantial harm if the stay is granted; and (4) whether the public interest will be harmed if the stay is granted. While the Supreme Court in Kirpat stated that the Court must balance “all of the equities involved in the case together,” it also noted that if the last three factors “strongly favor interim relief, then a court may exercise its discretion to reach an equitable resolution by granting a stay.”

In analyzing the factors, Chancellor Chandler found that the weight of the last three factors “tips in favor of granting the stay….” With respect to Factor 2, the Chancellor found that that irreparable harm existed in that his Order “mandates dissolution of Genitrix and the selling of its assets” and that once that dissolution is complete, “it is difficult (and costly) to unwind these transactions and as a result Segal and Genitrix will suffer a significant and perhaps unrecoverable loss:” With respect to Factor 3, he found that the stay would inflict substantial harm to other parties in that “ (1) the managing directors of Genitrix are hopelessly deadlocked to the point that Genitrix cannot undertake a significant action, (2) the dissolution and liquidation process will take a substantial amount of time, and (3) the condition of Genitrix is static and will not further deteriorate with delay, there is little economic harm that will be suffered by petitioner by granting the stay.” Finally, with respect to Factor 4, the Court found no evidence of any harm to the public interest if a stay was granted.”

No Bond Required

While the Court found that the “primary purpose of a bond is to protect the appellee from losing the benefit of the judgment through the delay or ultimate non-performance by appellant, [s]ince Genitrix’s assets and business affairs are currently being managed by a liquidating receiver and since there is little economic harm that could befall petitioner by delay, [the Court] conclude[d] that the purpose for requiring the bond in this case does not apply.”

 

Chancery Dismisses Derivative Complaint Per Rule 23.1

Green v. LocatePlus Holdings, Corp. et al., C.A. No. 4032-CC (May 15, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a well respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his following review of this Chancery Court decision.

On May 15, 2009, Chancellor Chandler granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, but he did so with some words of advice for the pro se plaintiffs. He “strongly encourage[d] plaintiffs to obtain counsel to assist them in properly obtaining access to LocatePlus’ books and records, and in adequately articulating their allegations.”

This case involves a transaction where defendant corporation LocatePlus allegedly diluted the value of LocatePlus’ common equity. In March 2007, LocatePlus issued a $6 million secured convertible debenture to Cornell Capital Partners L.P. (“CCP”) which allowed CCP to convert the outstanding principal into shares of common stock of LocatePlus at a fixed conversion price of $0.314 per share. Shortly after the debentures were issued, the company issued approximately 7.4 million additional shares allegedly to pay off outstanding corporate debt. As a result of the share issuance, plaintiffs claim that their interest in LocatePlus was wrongfully diluted from 5% to 3% and they filed a direct action against LocatePlus and the director defendants.

Direct v. Derivative Claim and the Tooley Test

The defendants challenged plaintiffs’ actions arguing that under Delaware law, these types of allegations (with certain exceptions involving controlling shareholders that not applicable here) are derivative not direct claims, citing Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A. 2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004). In discussing the Tooley decision and the Supreme Court’s test to determine whether a stockholder can bring a direct claim, Chancellor Chandler noted that: “[t]he Court held that the distinction between derivative and direct claims ‘must turn solely on the following questions: (1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?’ In other words, “[t]he stockholder must demonstrate that the duty breached was owed to the stockholder and that he or she can prevail without showing an injury to the corporation.”

Dilution Claim Here is Derivative; No Demand Made

Chancellor Chandler found that the plaintiffs in this action had made conclusory allegations in their amended complaint that they were directly harmed by the dilution of stock. He noted that “[p]laintiffs failed to allege specific facts or even explain how the dilution harmed them directly or how the harm they suffered differed from the harm suffered by LocatePlus itself or the other holders of LocatePlus’ stock.” In short, there were no allegations to show that the plaintiffs were harmed independent of the company. As a result, the Chancellor concluded that plaintiffs’ claims were strictly derivative and that the plaintiffs had to comply with the requirements of Rule 23.1. He went on to note that “[t]he right of a stockholder to prosecute a derivative suit is limited to situations where either the stockholder has demanded the directors pursue a corporate claim and the directors have wrongfully refused to do so, or where demand is excused because the directors are incapable of making an impartial decision regarding whether to institute such litigation.” And since plaintiffs had not made a demand upon the board of directors of LocatePlus to pursue their claim, the plaintiffs were required to show why demand should be excused. Chancellor Chandler noted:

Rule 23.1(a) provides that “[t]he complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.” In addition, to determine demand futility the Court must exercise its discretion in deciding whether “a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independent [or] (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.” [citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253 (Del. 2000) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984)).] Plaintiffs have failed to comply with this pleading standard. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs have not alleged that demand is excused or pled with any measure of particularity facts that would demonstrate that the Director Defendants are not disinterested or independent, or that the dilution was not a proper exercise of the board’s business judgment. Indeed, plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that the Director Defendants caused the dilution to enrich themselves is insufficient to meet the standard under Rule 23.1. Plaintiffs fail even to allege how the dilution in exchange for financing from CCP was not in the best interests of LocatePlus.

In addition to the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 23.1, the Chancellor found that plaintiffs had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for an inspection of books and records under 8 Del. C. § 220 (among other things, the plaintiffs failed to set forth any purpose for their inspection, failed to send their letters under oath and they failed to provide proper evidence of beneficial ownership.)
 

 

Chancery Rejects Claims of Departing Member of LLC Who Co-Founded Hedge Fund

Olson v. Halvorsen, No. 1884-VCL (Del. Ch., May 13, 2009), read opinion here

Two prior Delaware Chancery Court opinions in this case were previously summarized here.

This most recent iteration of a bitter dispute between three co-founders of a hedge fund addressed whether a departing member of an LLC was only entitled to the limited amount of compensation covered by an oral agreement among the members, which excluded any deferred compensation. The court found that the departing member was bound by the oral agreement and was therefore not entitled to an equity interest that may otherwise have been available under the LLC Act. Other claims were also raised and rejected as listed below.

Legal Issues Addressed by the Court

The panoply of legal issues addressed by the court included: (i) breach of contract; (ii) breach of fiduciary duty; (iii) civil conspiracy; (iv) right to fair value of departing LLC member per Section 18-604 of the Delaware LLC Act; (v) unjust enrichment; (vi) accounting; (vii) equitable estoppel;  and (viii) promissory estoppel.

Legal Analysis

The court discusses each of the elements of each of the above claims, and why each of them was found wanting, but I will only focus on a few notable points in this summary.

One of the prior decisions in this case linked above made the important legal ruling that an oral operating agreement for an LLC is enforceable, as here, if "...it is possible that it could be completed in the span of one year." (see footnote 31 in the instant case)(emphasis in original).

The court cited to Section 18-1101(a) of the LLC Act for the principle that there can be no liability of an LLC manager for breach of fiduciary duty based on a good faith reliance on an operating agreement. In this case, that section was applied to the oral operating agreement of the parties to reject the fiduciary duty claims. The court also held that the departing member was limited by the oral agreement to his accrued compensation as opposed to "fair value" that he may have sought, in the absence of a contrary agreement, pursuant to Section 18-604 of of Title 6 of the Delaware Code (the Delaware LLC Act).

Delaware Chancery Court Rules on Amylin "Poison Put" Provision; Finds No Violation on Duty of Care Issue; and Provides Instruction to Lawyers Advising Boards on Complex Documents

San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin  Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 4446-VCL (Del.Ch., May 12, 2009), read opinion here. This Chancery Court decision addressed the issue of "poison puts" or a provision in an indenture that would have triggered an obligation of the company, and a right of noteholders,  that allowed the holders of the notes to put their notes to the corporation at face value if a majority of the board changed control. This would have required Amylin to pay out $915 million in cash which was about $100 million more in cash than Amylin had available. The genesis of the case was an attempt by dissident shareholders to put a new majority of directors on the board.

[N.B.: On May 13, a Notice of Appeal was filed.]

Holding

The court rejected the arguments of the indenture trustee and held that: "... construed in accordance with generally applied standards, the provision is properly understood to permit the incumbent directors to approve as a continuing director any person, whether nominated by the board or a stockholder, as long as the directors take such action in conformity with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and in accordance with their normal fiduciary duties."

 I will only focus on that part of the opinion that dealt with the application of Delaware law by the court on the fiduciary duty of care in light of New York law being applied to the interpretation of the indenture document.  However, for a discussion of the background facts and a general discussion of the case, see Prof. Gordon Smith's summary here which includes his closing tribute to the opinion's author, Vice Chancellor Lamb, whose terms expires soon (and he is not seeking reappointment).

A prior post here linked to an extensive background discussion of the case by Prof. Davidoff  soon after it was filed.

Expedited Proceedings. Trial Less Than Six Weeks from Original Complaint and Less than One Month From Fourth Amended Complaint

A quintessentially Delaware aspect of this case is the procedural celerity with which the case was decided, measured from the date the case was filed and put at issue. The purported class action complaint was filed on March 24, 2009. In early April a second and third amended complaint were filed. On April 16, a fourth amended complaint was filed. A pretrial conference was held on May 1 and a one-day trial was held on May 4 at which argument was also presented on cross-motions for summary judgment.  On May 6, two days after the close of the record, the indenture trustee asked the court to decline to rule, based on new facts, arguing that the issues are no longer ripe. On May 12, the Chancery Court issued its 28-page decision.

Key Points in Ruling on Fiduciary Duty of Care

 The issue decided by the court on this topic was whether the board or its delegate committee, breach the duty of care (i.e., was grossly negligent) in failing to learn of the existence of a provision in the indenture which triggered a right of noteholders to call the note if a majority of the board changed control?

The court ruled that "The answer must be no." In addition to explaining its ruling, the court provided instruction and advice to lawyers advising boards in similar situations.

(1) Reasoning for Ruling on Why Duty of Care Not Breached

 The court explained its rejection of the claim that board breached its fiduciary duty of care by not being aware of the provision that called for a default if the same directors did not continue in office, while noting that the directors relied on experienced counsel and that they should not be expected to read every word of a 98-page indenture. The actual language of the opinion is quoted below:

The board retained highly-qualified counsel. It sought advice from Amylin’s management and investment bankers as to the terms of the agreement. It asked its counsel if there was anything “unusual or not customary” in the terms of the Notes, and it was told there was not. Only then did the board approve the issuance of the Notes under the Indenture. This is not the sort of conduct generally imagined when considering the concept of gross negligence, typically defined as a substantial deviation from the standard of care.

The plaintiff argues that the board’s questioning if there was anything “unusual or not customary” in the Indenture was insufficient. But the way in which the board inquired into the material terms of the Indenture cannot be equated with gross negligence in failing to inform itself.45  Certainly, no one suggests that the directors’ duty of care required them to review, discuss, and comprehend every word of the 98-page Indenture.

(2) Instruction to Counsel Advising Boards regarding Long, Complex Documents that May Impinge on Shareholder Franchise

This decision provides somewhat practical instruction to both boards and the lawyers advising boards to be especially careful when approving terms in agreements that could interfere with what in Delaware is sacrosanct: the shareholder franchise (e.g., the right of shareholders to vote for and select directors) -- regardless of whether or not such language is deemed "customary" (which can mean different things to different parties), The actual excerpt from the opinion on this point follows:


This case does highlight the troubling reality that corporations and their counsel routinely negotiate contract terms that may, in some circumstances, impinge on the free exercise of the stockholder franchise. In the context of the negotiation of a debt instrument, this is particularly troubling, for two reasons.

 First, as a matter of course, there are few events which have the potential to be more catastrophic for a corporation than the triggering of an event of default under one of its debt agreements. Second, the board, when negotiating with rights that belong first and foremost to the stockholders (i.e., the stockholder franchise), must be especially solicitous to its duties both to the corporation and to its stockholders. This is never more true than when negotiating with debtholders, whose interests at times may be directly adverse to those of the stockholders. Outside counsel advising a board in such circumstances should be especially mindful of the board’s continuing duties to the stockholders to protect their interests. Specifically, terms which may affect the stockholders’ range of discretion in exercising the franchise should, even if considered customary, be highlighted to the board. In this way, the board will be able to exercise its fully informed business judgment.

Chancery Court Denies Books and Records Demand for LLC

JAKKS Pacific, Inc. v. THQ/JAKKS Pacific, LLC, Del. Ch., No. 4295-VCL (May 6, 2009), read opinion here.

 Pursuant to Section 18-305 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (6 Del. C. Section 18-305), the plaintiff in this case sought an inspection of the books and records of an LLC. The complaint was filed on January 16, 2009. A one-day trial was held on March 31, 2009. The post-trial briefing concluded on April 27, 2009. One should note the procedural speed with which this matter was decided.

In sum, the court explained that there was not a “proper purpose” as required for a books and records demand. The stated purposed was recounted on page 8 of the slip opinion, but the court “drilled down” to determine that the “real purpose” was not “reasonably related to the specific interests of the member making the demand.” The court found that after trial, the plaintiff did not establish, by a “preponderance of the evidence” the existence of a “proper purpose” for inspection. (citing Somerville S. Trust v. USV Partners, LLC, 2002 WL 1832830, at *5, (Del. Ch.))  At page 10 of the slip opinion the court explained that it will not simply take the “stated proper purpose” at face value. Rather, it will require evidence to support that proper purpose. That requirement was not met in the case. For example, although the court stated that in most circumstances a valid purpose for a demand would be to value the interest one had in a company, in this case the court determined that such a stated purpose was largely meaningless since the valuation was the subject of a previous arbitration, the decision for which was expected at any time.
 

This decision provides a helpful example of the substantial amount of time and money that can be spent in a books and records demand case--only to "come up dry".

Motion for Summary Judgment on Dissolution Granted But Request for Appointment of Liquidating Trustee Denied Based on Terms of LLC Agreement

In Re Nextmedia Investors, LLC, Del. Ch., No. 4067-VCS (May 6, 2009), read opinion here.

This Delaware Chancery Court opinion includes instructive recitations of Delaware law on a topic of relevance to all those who labor in the field of business litigation. A key focus in this case was to address in what situation it is appropriate for a court to grant summary judgment regarding the interpretation of a contract, and the corollary standards to determine in what circumstances:  “the plain language of the relevant terms of the LLC Agreement gives rise to only one reasonable meaning . . .”

The central issue in this case turned on whether the consent of the petitioners was needed in order to amend the LLC Agreement to extend the date of the dissolution that was provided for in the original LLC Agreement.  The court ruled that the agreement was unambiguous that such consent was required. However, the LLC Agreement granted certain parties authority to appoint a liquidating trustee and the court determined that it would have to wait until after full discovery and a trial,  before the court could determine that there was a sufficient basis to prevent the appointment of a liquidator pursuant to the agreement of the parties, which altered the default rule for the appointment of a liquidating trustee pursuant to Section 18-803 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (at Title 6 of the Delaware Code).
 

Chancery Court Enjoins Arbitration as Time-Barred

Argyle Solutions, Inc. v. Professional Systems Corporation, Del. Ch., No. 4382-VCN (May 4, 2009), read opinion here.

 This Chancery Court decision interpreted a soon-to-be-outdated provision of the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act. In particular, on April 2, 2009 the Governor of Delaware signed into law legislation that will require arbitrators to resolve “in the first instance” questions related to whether an arbitration proceeding was commenced on a timely basis (as opposed to petitioning the Chancery Court for a determination about the timeliness of an arbitration forum selection). See 10 Del. C. Section 5703(b) and Section 5703(c). Compare Section 5702(c).

However, because that new statutory provision does not become effective until July 2, 2009, the Chancery Court in this decision determined that the demand for arbitration was initiated beyond the applicable six months provided for in the agreement between the parties, and thus a preliminary injunction was granted to enjoin the arbitration proceeding. Of course, the court also recited the prerequisites for the granting of a preliminary injunction which it found to be satisfied.
 

Chancery Court Grants Motion in Limine Precluding Defendants from Raising Arguments Deemed Waived

Julian v. Eastern States Construction Service, Inc., Del. Ch., No. 1892-VCP (May 5, 2009), read opinion hereSee prior Chancery Court decisions in this case summarized on this blog here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his following review of this case.

On May 5, 2009, Vice Chancellor Parsons, in a unique procedural setting, granted a motion in limine based on the doctrines of judicial estoppel and waiver precluding defendants from arguing against the applicability of an amended agreement. The opinion is notable for two reasons -- it is a motion in limine, an unlikely procedural posture for a Chancery Court opinion, and second, the motion was made at a unique point in the litigation – the Court had bifurcated the issues for trial, it had already held one trial and a second was about to start.

By way of background, this is a dispute among three Julian brothers, Gene, Francis and Richard, who owned three separate but related businesses, one of which was Eastern States Development Company (“ESDC”). All three companies are governed by stockholder agreements. Eventually the brothers’ relationship soured and Gene resigned but when he did an issue arose as to whether Gene, as an ESDC stockholder, was required to sell his ESDC stock back to ESDC pursuant to the operative ESDC agreement—the First Amendment to Agreement of Stockholders of ESDC (“2005 Amendment”). Gene did not want to sell his stock so he filed suit in January 2006.

In May 2007, Gene filed a motion in limine to bifurcate the proceeding and exclude until the second trial any evidence of the value of the ESDC stock. The Court granted the motion and stayed discovery on those stock valuations until after the first trial. The Court also stated that “an issue for the first portion of this litigation could be if somebody thinks that some provision other than what I just read under the contract [i.e., the 2005 Amendment] or just referred to governs how you determine the price, then we ought to . . . hear what that argument is, because it’s a contract interpretation kind of view.”

After the first trial, the Court determined that Gene was required to sell his ESDC stock to ESDC. The defendants calculated the stock price pursuant to the terms of the 2005 Amendment and on August 1, 2008, ESDC issued a check to Gene for $4,059,500 to purchase his ESDC stock. After the payment, however, a dispute arose as to the proper valuation of the ESDC stock. The parties filed motions to determine the value of the underlying properties of ESDC and the defendants, for the first time argued that three affirmative defenses require them to use the valuation procedure set out in the initial Agreement, not the 2005 Amendment: unclean hands, equitable estoppel, and unjust enrichment. The defendants argued that Gene “knew of his pending retirement during the 2005 Amendment negotiations, he did not disclose that fact to his brothers and, therefore, should not be permitted to benefit from the 2005 Amendment.” Gene filed a second motion in limine to prevent Defendants from raising these defenses at this time.

In his motion, Gene argued that the defendants were attempting to rescind the 2005 Amendment in the second phase of the bifurcated trial and that they should be precluded from raising the defenses of unclean hands, equitable estoppel, and unjust enrichment in the second phase of the bifurcated proceeding. The Court agreed finding that it did not grant final judgment pertaining to Gene’s ESDC stock in the first phase and “retain[ed] jurisdiction to determine the precise value of that ESDC stock if the parties cannot agree on that value.”

Judicial Estoppel

Defendants argued that they could rely on the Initial Agreement as opposed to the 2005 Amendment because they “did not take a legal position in the first phase of the bifurcated proceeding that is inconsistent with the[ir] equitable argument.” Gene responded by stating that the defendants expressly relied upon the 2005 Amendment throughout these proceedings and, so they should be judicially estopped from taking a position contrary to their previous position. The Court agreed with Gene, stating that

 “[d]efendants’ current position of not applying the 2005 Amendment is clearly inconsistent with their prior position that the 2005 Amendment controls. If I accepted Defendants’ position, it also would mean that [d]efendants, even if unintentionally, misled this Court in the first portion of this litigation as they continuously applied the 2005 Amendment throughout this action and only now seek its rescission.”

The Court went on to state that: “[d]efendants argued in favor of the 2005 Amendment throughout this action, never mentioned, until November 21, 2008, that the 2005 Amendment should not apply, and caused the Court to issue an opinion stating that the 2005 Amendment applies. For all of these reasons, [d]efendants are judicially estopped from arguing that the 2005 Amendment should not apply to the ESDC property valuations based on unclean hands, equitable estoppel, or principles of unjust enrichment.”

Waiver

Gene argues that Defendants have waived their right to argue for rescission of the 2005 Amendment because “they acquiesced in and affirmed the application of the Amendment before, during, and after the first trial.” In order to succeed, Gene had to prove that the defendants “were aware of the grounds they now advance to avoid the 2005 Amendment, and of the underlying facts, and knowingly relinquished their right to argue that the Amendment should be rescinded on those grounds.” The Court found that because the defendants “knew the relevant facts at the time of the first trial and made no effort to present their challenges to the 2005 Amendment then or even to put Gene or the Court on notice that they intended to assert such a defense at any time, [d]efendants have waived their right to argue that the valuation provisions of the Initial Agreement should be used instead of those in the 2005 Amendment.”

 

Live Clip of Chancery Court Trial Today on Poison Put Issue

San Antonio Fire and Police Pension Fund v. Bradbury is a case that is being tried today in Delaware Chancery Court regarding "poison puts" involving the Amylin company. We previously highlighted the case here. The folks at Courtroom View Network are providing a "live feed" of  the proceedings today and tomorrow. A free audio/video clip of the examination of a witness, Professor Michael Roberts of the Harvard Business School, that was conducted this morning is available here. The Offical Activist Investing Blog has a helpful overview of the case here. 

Chancery Dismisses Fiduciary and Unjust Enrichment Claims Based on Terms of Contract

Nemec v. Shrader, No. 3878-CC, and Wittkemper v. Shrader, No. 3934-CC (consolidated cases)(Del. Ch., April 30, 2009), read opinion here.

The factual basis of this Chancery Court decision involves shareholders who had signed agreements that governed the redemption of their shares. They filed suit when their company had redeemed their shares shortly prior to the corporation being acquired.

The court dismissed claims that directors breached their fiduciary duty in connection with the redemption of shares, as well as dismissing unjust enrichment claims, based on the reasoning that formal contracts controlled the issues and that the directors were entitled by the terms of  the contract to redeem the shares involved. As the court  explained:

"... the relationship between plaintiffs and Directors is governed primarily by contract  under the Stock Plan. According to Delaware law where a dispute “relate[s] to obligations ‘expressly treated . . .’ by contract[, it] will be governed by contract principles.”  If the “fiduciary claims relate to obligations that are expressly treated” by contract then this Court will review those claims as breach of contract claims and any fiduciary claims will be dismissed."

By contrast, recent Chancery Court decisions summarized on this blog here and here, explain situations where both contract claims and torts claims may proceed (or fiduciary claims and contract claims may proceed),  in the same case, unlike the ruling in this matter.

Moreover, even if the court allowed the fiduciary claim, it would fail based on the court's reasoning that if the directors are acting in the best interests of all shareholders and the company, they are not liable simply because some shareholders fare better than others (citing Gilbert v. El Paso, 1988 WL 124325, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1988), aff’d, 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990)).

A claim based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was summarily dismissed based on the familiar reasoning of many Delaware cases that the court will not provide terms that the parties themselves failed to negotiate as part of their agreement.

In addition, the court cited settled Delaware law that rejects claims for unjust enrichment when the claims are covered by the express terms of a controlling agreement between the parties.

Chancery Awards $1 as Nominal Damages for Breach of Contract; No "Knowledge-Qualifier" for Representation Clause

Ivize of Milwaukee, LLC v. Compex Litigation Support LLC, and  Ivize of Kansas City, LLC v. Compex Litigation Support LLC, No. 3158-VCL and 3406-VCL (consolidated)(Del. Ch., April 27, 2009), read opinion here.

This Delaware Chancery Court case arises out of the unhappy purchase of a litigation support company. The buyer discovered after the closing that the key employees that were responsible for the largest part of the business that he purchased, had left to form a new company the day after the closing. The essence of the lawsuit was for breach of contract--of the Asset Purchase Agreement, especially relating to the representations that between the date of the Asset Purchase Agreement and the closing, the business would operate “in the usual and ordinary course of business.”  Importantly, the court found that the purchaser did not require as part of the agreement that key employees would remain, nor did the purchaser make as a condition of the purchase that the key employees would sign non-competition agreements.

An important discussion at page 22 of the opinion and at footnote 38, rejected the argument of the defendant that there was a “knowledge-qualifier” to the representations. The court noted that the “default rule” is that representations of a company are not limited by “knowledge” of the representatives of a company unless expressly so restricted in the document. Thus, the default rule is that a representation “must be true at the time it is made to avoid a breach, regardless of who knew whether the representation was true or not.” (See citation at footnote 34.)

The court provided instruction to drafters of Asset Purchase Agreements as follows: “to avoid confusion, practitioners should clearly define which individuals’ or groups of individuals’ knowledge is included in the Purchase Agreement’s definition of knowledge.”

In sum, the court found that although a breach of contract was established, because no damages were proven, only nominal damages in the amount of $1 were awarded. There is a helpful discussion of the requirements for proving damages. In this case the valuation opinion offerred at trial was based on the value of the goodwill of the key employees of the business, which the Asset Purchase Agreement did not ensure would be included in the purchase, and therefore the expert on damages provided an opinion that could not be relied on by the court.



 

Chancery Court Denies (Barely) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute But Imposes Penalty on Plaintiff's Counsel

Tooley v. AXA Financial, Inc., et al., No. 18414-CC (Del. Ch., April 29, 2009), read opinion here .

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his following analysis of this recent ruling.

In this Chancery Court decision, Chancellor Chandler denied (but just barely) defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute pursuant to Court of Chancery Rules 41(b) and (e). In so doing, His Honor had some harsh words for the plaintiff. 

Background

In 2002, Plaintiff, Patrick Tooley, a former shareholder of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. (“DLJ”), brought this class action on behalf of minority shareholders who tendered their shares in a tender offer to Credit Suisse Group for $90 per share. In short, the complaint “rests upon the assertion not that the merger consideration was unfair, but that it was received 22 days later than initially agreed because of a wrongfully granted extension."See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 2003 WL 203060 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 2003).

From 2002 through mid-2005, the case bounced back and forth between filings of complaints and amended complaints and motions to dismiss. On May 13, 2005, in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the Court held that:

“although plaintiff did not have an enforceable expectancy interest in sale proceeds, plaintiff had ‘overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule’ by presenting ‘facts suggesting (barely) that the defendants received an unjustified benefit to the exclusion and detriment of plaintiffs.’”

From mid-2005, other that some modest discovery from defendants, nothing of any significance happened until January 2009 when the Chancellor sent a letter to counsel requesting an update on the status of the case. In his response, Plaintiff apologized for the delay and said that his co-counsel changed firms and he was not aware that the defendants had not fulfilled their discovery responsibilities. Plaintiff moved to compel in February and in March defendants moved to dismiss.

Legal Analysis

Court of Chancery Rule 41(b) authorizes a defendant to move for dismissal of an action “[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute.” Rule 41(e) provides that the Court may, upon its own motion or that of any party, and after reasonable notice, dismiss a case “wherein no action has been taken for a period of 1 year, unless good reason for the inaction is given.” While the Court was comfortable that the inactivity has covered over a year, and that the lack of prosecution of the case “pushed the limit,” Chancellor Chandler was not comfortable dismissing the case. He stated:

I therefore decline to dismiss this case, for substantially the same reasons as this Court articulated in In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P., namely “(1) a preference for resolving decisions on the merits; (2) a desire to proceed cautiously in light of the due process issues that are unique to a class action; and (3) deference to the fact that, while their efforts may have been dilatory in the past, at the time of the Rule 41 motion, the Plaintiffs appear to have resumed diligent prosecution of their claims.” While I am convinced that the factors on which the Court based its decision in Cencom also warrant denying the motion to dismiss in this case, I must note that the circumstances of this case push the limit of the Court’s willingness to decline to exercise its discretion to dismiss under Rule 41. Indeed, the Court’s decision today and the Court’s decision in Cencom should not be seen as creating a “safe harbor” that would allow class action plaintiffs to fail to diligently prosecute actions and then avoid dismissal under Rule 41. To the contrary, if the requirements of Rules 41(b) or (e) are met, it is within the discretion of the Court to order dismissal.

Court Imposed Penalties on Plaintiff’s Attorneys

In an unusual move, the Chancellor also sanctioned plaintiff’s counsel personally because:

plaintiff’s dilatory conduct occasioned this motion to dismiss and result[ing] in the unnecessary imposition of costs on defendants. Plaintiff and his attorneys have failed to provide any good reason for their dilatory conduct. Accordingly, and in light of the fiduciary nature of class actions and the unique responsibility of class action counsel, I conclude that it is appropriate that plaintiff’s attorneys personally pay to defendants the costs (including attorneys’ fees) that defendants incurred in pursuing this motion to dismiss. If plaintiff’s attorneys are not willing to pay these costs, the Court will revisit the question of whether plaintiff’s attorneys are qualified to represent the class.

 

Chancery Court Grants Limited Reargument of Metromedia Appraisal Decision

In Re Appraisal of Metromedia International Group, No.3351-CC (Del. Ch., April 28, 2009), read letter decision here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his following review of this Delaware Chancery Court case:

Chancellor Chandler granted Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's April 16, 2009 post-trial appraisal decision where the Court determined that the fair value of respondent's Metromedia International Group, Inc. preferred shares on the merger date was $38.92 per share.  The original opinion of April 16 was highlighted on this blog here.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Chancery Court Rule 59(f) and the Court noted that in the briefing, the Respondent had "gloss[ed] over the fact that it agreed with petitioners that the $7.91 conversion price ... should be inserted into Section 8(a) to calculate the conversion ratio." The Court permitted the parties one week to submit up to a 10-page brief focused on "how they initially analyzed the interaction between Sections 8(g), 8(a), and 5 to come to the conclusion that the conversion price in Section 5.1 ($7.91) should be substituted into the conversion formula in Section 8(a) to yield a ratio of 10.038." The Chancellor noted that he did not "grant this opportunity lightly" but that he believed that the issue was "ripe for reargument" on a narrow issue.

 

Chancery Court Orders Company to Hold Shareholders Meeting per DGCL Section 211

Opportunity Partners, L.P. v. Transtech Service Partners, Inc., No. 4340-VCP (Del. Ch., April 14, 2009), read opinion here.

This Chancery Court decision granted a petition pursuant to Section 211 of the DGCL to compel a shareholders meeting that had not been held for more than 13 months. The right to force a company to hold an annual shareholders' meeting is a basic and clear-cut statutory right under the DGCL, and though there were rather convoluted and detailed facts that form part of this 16-page decision, the court made it clear that the right to compel a stockholders' meeting under Section 211 does not allow for much "wiggle room" (my phrase).

The court rejected the purported defense of "questionable goals" that, according to the company,  the petitioner allegedly had for calling the meeting. Nonetheless, that argument  factored into the court's analysis of the timing of the meeting and how many days after the court's ruling, the meeting would be required to be held.

Chancery Grants Creditor a TRO to Bar Fraudulent Transfers of Debtor

Mitsubishi Power Systems Americas, Inc. v. Babcock & Brown Infrastructure Group US, LLC, et al.,(April 24, 2009), read revised letter decision here.  The  Chancery Court heard a motion for temporary restraining order on April 22, 2009 by telephone conference, and issued this written decision on Friday, April 24, 2009. (The letter opinion was issued that day, and revised over the weekend). The actual TRO order is here. The TRO was granted to prevent potentially fraudulent transfers.

Background

 Mitsubishi Power Systems Americas, Inc. ("MPSA") is engaged in the manufacture and sale of, among other things, the manufacture of wind turbines for electrical power. The Babcock defendants are part of an investment group based in Australia. One of its subsidiaries, BBIG, entered into a pair of agreements with MPSA to manufacture wind turbines ("TSAs"). MPSA required another Babcock subsidiary, BBIPL, to guarantee the obligation of BBIG under the TSA. Progress payments were due on the TSAs which BBIG failed to make, and MPSA claims nearly a billion dollars in damages.

BBIPL experienced financial difficulties and agreed on February 6, 2009 to sell its assets and those of its subsidiaries, and provide those proceeds to its senior secured lenders ("Agreed Asset Sales Program"). However, the security of those lenders does not extend to the assets of BBIG. In March 2009, the Babcock parent entity in Australia had been placed into administration, the rough equivalent in the U.S. of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. During the foregoing period, the parties were trying to reach an amicable resolution.

On April 8, 2009, MPSA learned from a trade publication the Babcock was selling assets on or about May 8, 2009, that would result in the dissipation of assets that would be available to satisfy creditors of BBIG (including MPSA). The next day, April 9, 2009, MPSA filed suit in Chancery Court alleging that BBIG engaged in fraudulent transfers to affiliates of certain assets for less than fair market value, made improper distributions under Section 18-607(a) of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, as well as claiming breach of contract.

Procedural Matters

In addition to the complaint on April 9, MPSA filed a motion for preliminary injunction and a motion for expedited proceedings in order to develop a record in time for a ruling on the motion by a proposed sale date. The expedited schedule, that was granted, call for all discovery to completed in less than one month, on May 6 (two days prior to the expected sale sought to be enjoined).

Expedited discovery began on April 13. The parties were only able to agree to a short-term "Status Quo Order" that expired on April 22, thus on April 20, MPSA moved for  a temporary restraining order, seeking to enjoin any transfers by the Babcock entities outside of the normal course of business, with the exception of assets sold for fair market value. For those proceeds, MPSA sought to have them held in escrow.

Legal Analysis

 The court discussed the procedural distinction made between applications for a TRO compared to a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., footnote 7.  The court reasoned that :

(i) MPSA stated a colorable claim for breach of contract;

(ii) Importantly, the court ruled that: "The threat of a fraudulent transfer will constitute irreparable harm warranting injunctive relief" (citing The Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the "DUFTA"); 6 Del. C. section 1307(a)). Thus, in order to establish imminent, irreparable harm, MPSA needed to establish a colorable claim that  BBIG intended to engage in one or more fraudulent transfers in the future, and the court found that they did.

In order to find a colorable claim of a fraudulent transfer, the court reviewed the definitions in Section 1305 of the DUFTA as well as the definition of "insolvency" under Section 1302 of the DUFTA. Because BBIG's assets appeared to be about $60 million and it owed MPSA about $86 million--and was not able to pay MPSA as its bills became due, there was a presumption that BBIG was insolvent. In addition, the court noted that if BBIG is in fact insolvent, 'any future transfer to BBIG's parent entities, as insiders, on account of preexisting intercompany debt would be fraudulent per se." (see footnote 15, citing 6 Del. C. section 1305(b)).

The court also observed that "because a defrauded creditor may seek recovery not only from the transferor but from a transferee as well" (see footnote 20), MPSA may seek to enjoin transfers to BBIPL and related entities through which the funds passed.

(iii) The third  prerequisite for issuing a TRO, the "balance of the equities", was satisfied, because as to BBIG alone, the court was:

 "convinced that the equities of a temporary restraint against upstream transfers falls in MPSA's favor. Such a restraint would not prohibit BBIG from engaging in asset sales to third parties for fair value. It simply requires that the proceeds of such sales be placed in escrow pending further consideration of these claims on a motion for preliminary injunction."

Chancery Court Dismisses Derivative Complaint Pending Report of Special Committee

FLI Deep Marine, LLC v. McKim, No. 4138-VCS (Del. Ch. March 24, 2009), read opinion here.

This Chancery Court decision explains the importance of determining whether or not pre-suit demand is appropriate prior to filing a derivative suit. In this case, for reasons unexplained, demand was made on the board prior to a derivative suit being filed. The court explained that once demand on the board was made, the plaintiff was barred from claiming that pre-suit demand was excused, and once a special committee was appointed, the court was required to dismiss the case without prejudice pending the findings of the special committee.

The court also explained that there was no specific time-period for a special committee to complete its investigation. Once a shareholder makes a demand on a board, it must allow a reasonable time for the board to investigate and respond to a claim prior to a shareholder filing suit. The problem is that there is no predetermined deadline that can be imposed on the special committee regarding the amount of time that it may take in order to complete its investigation and reply to the demand.
 

Chancery Consolidates Related Actions Pursuant to Rule 42

Bank of America v. Steel Partners II (Offshore) Ltd. ; and  Archstone Partners, L.P. v. Lichtenstein , (consolidated cases), Del. Ch., (April 21, 2009), read opinion here.

This Delaware Chancery Court letter ruling involved several actions that were filed to enjoin a proposed restructuring transaction. The court granted a Motion to Consolidate pursuant to Chancery Court Rule 42, based on common issues of fact and law, and to avoid unnecessary costs and delay. The court reasoned that coordinating discovery and briefing on the injunction motion would avoid duplicative efforts.

 

Chancery Court Rules on Testamentary Capacity and Donative Intent in Will Dispute

Sloan v. Segal, No. 2319-VCS (Del. Ch. April 24, 2009), read opinion here.

For anyone who wants to read a depressing story of a family whose mother was estranged from two of her sons for the last 20 years or so of her life, and after her death, those two sons fought over the estate of their mother with a third son, this is the “soap opera” of a case for you. Also addressed by the Chancery Court in this opinion are the legal issues of testamentary capacity and donative intent.
 

Chancery Court Rejects Request to Dissolve LLC

In Re: Arrow Investment Advisors, LLC, Del. Ch., No. 4091-VCS (April 23, 2009), read opinion here.

This Chancery Court decision dismissed a petition seeking a dissolution of an LLC pursuant to Section 18-802 of the Delaware LLC Act. Although each year brings more case law interpreting this statute, there is still a comparative paucity of decisions interpreting this section of the LLC Act; thus, this ruling is helpful for purposes of determining when the court will grant a judicial dissolution under the applicable statutory standard.

Prerequisites for Seeking Judicial Dissolution of an LLC

Section 18-802 gives the court the discretion to order judicial dissolution of an LLC  when one demonstrates that: "it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with [the]limited liability agreement." This opinion collects and discusses the Delaware decisions that have discussed this statutory dissolution standard (which reasonable people can easily differ about regarding its application.) See footnotes 10,12,13,14,15, 20, 23, 24 and 28.

Anyone who is involved in the analysis of whether a Delaware LLC can be judicially dissolved  upon the request of only one member or manager, needs to read this decision. In essence, the court reasoned, in part,  that although the member seeking dissolution:

...might be disappointed that he has been ousted from the management of the company, disagree with the tack its current managers are taking, and wish to take his capital out of the company, these are not circumstances from which I can reasonably infer that it has become impracticable for Arrow to provide a return for its investors....

Reasoning for Denying Dissolution

In sum, at the risk of oversimplifying the extensive factual and legal analysis that the opinion provides, the request for dissolution was rejected, and the motion to dismiss the petition was granted, because the LLC agreement had a very broad "purpose clause" that  the LLC was still operating within, and it was not enough that the original business plan was not being followed, nor that the minority member was unhappy with the management or direction of the company.

Even with a broad purpose clause, however, in theory the court explained that dissolution is still possible if it can be established that perpetuation of the entity would be "obviously futile and would not result in business success." (See, e.g., case cited in footnote 20)

Procedurally, the court also observed that asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty as part of  the petition for dissolution in this case did not strengthen the arguments for dissolution. Moreover, the petitioner did not follow the derivative procedures required for the fiduciary claims that were made. Lastly, as a procedural matter, dissolution proceedings are narrow in scope and usually do not include ancillary claims. See footnote 28.

Statute of Limitations May Not Be Tolled by Section 220 Demand

Sutherland v. Sutherland, Del. Ch., No. 2399-VCL (April 22, 2009), read opinion here. This is a two-page letter decision that is part of a long line of cases in this ongoing internecine battle among shareholders in a family business. The seven (7) prior Chancery Court decisions in this case have been summarized on this blog here.

This ruling, in the context of a motion for clarification of a prior decision, addresses a limited issue: Whether a demand for books and records under DGCL Section 220 tolls the statute of limitations for claims brought after the documents are obtained. Answer: "It depends". See, e.g., Orloff v. Shulman, 2005 WL 3272355 at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005). The specific basis for the motion was whether the prior ruling was limited to the context of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, as opposed to ruling on the statute of limitations "on the merits". Bottom line: The issue will be addressed at trial.

COURT GRANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF FAMILY OWNED BUSINESS DISPUTE

Stevanov v. O’Connor, No. 3820-VCP(Del. Ch., April 21, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his summary of this Delaware Chancery Court decision as follows:

Vice Chancellor Parsons granted in part and denied in part defendant - ex-husband’s motion for summary judgment with respect to his ex-wife’s claims for equitable and compensatory relief based on causes of action relating to breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, and fraud. While on its face, this is not your typical Court of Chancery case, the devil and the jurisdictional basis are in the details of this 40-page opinion.

Since the facts are long, complicated and “fuzzy” to quote the Vice Chancellor, what follows is a relatively brief overview. The dispute between the former spouses arises out of two failed intertwined relationships grounded in statutes -- a marriage and a corporation. It’s a typical “boy meets girl, they get married, form a company,(he gets 80%, she gets 20% equity interest) they get divorced, and then they fight about splitting the assets and liabilities.”

The couple got married in 1990 and formed a corporation in 1992 to fabricate and manufacture air pollution equipment (the “Company”). The parties then bought land personally and leased it back to the Company. As a condition of some loans for the Company, the banks required guarantees and mortgages from the parties. Then, “things get fuzzy.” The ex-husband apparently arranged for a contract that the Company had with one of the Company’s major customer to be transferred to a new business run by the husband, but owned by his son from a different marriage (the Air Clear Contract”). In 2003, the parties got divorced. Two years later the Company was sued in federal court in South Dakota and a large default judgment was entered against the Company.

In January 2005, the Family Court entered an Order with a series of factual findings and legal determinations including approving the husband’s new business venture based on the apparent insolvency of the Company. The Family Court also awarded the wife 55% and the husband 45% of the marital assets. Thereafter, the husband terminated the lease agreement for the land, terminated the wife’s employment with the Company, and stopped paying debts of the Company including franchise taxes.

The ex-wife filed her complaint in June 2008 alleging: (i) breach of fiduciary duty; (ii) conversion of jointly owned assets; (iii) unjust enrichment; and (iv) fraud. She also sought an accounting. The ex-husband counterclaimed seeking (i) damages; (ii) an accounting for lost income and property: (iii) a determination that her conduct has been in breach of  fiduciary duties, imposition of an equitable lien upon all interests in an entity he purchased after they were divorced as well as a constructive trust upon all assets improperly removed from the company by her, and all financial accounts into which any monies improperly removed from the company were deposited. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed.

Vice Chancellor Parsons discussed in great detail a multitude of topics related to the allegations including direct vs. derivative claims, laches, statute of limitations, preclusion, collateral estoppel, fraud, and conversion. In the end, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the ex-husband with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claims based on actions that occurred before the Family Court entered its January 2005 Order or that occurred before the complaint was filed with respect to certain contracts mentioned in the Family Court Order. The Court also granted summary judgment on the claim for conversion for those portions of that count that were based on the use of the land purchased individually by the parties in September 1995, and on the fraud claim.
 

Chancery Court Imposes Fiduciary Duties on LLC Members

Bay Center Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, Del. Ch., No. 3658-VCS (April 20, 2009), read opinion here. This Delaware Chancery Court decision addresses fiduciary duties and related issues in an LLC context, and should be of  great interest to those lawyers who practice business litigation.

Legal Issues

This opinion is noteworthy because it denies a motion to dismiss and allows to proceed to trial, the following claims that do not often survive in the context of a dispute among members of an LLC whose relationship is defined by a formal, sophisticated LLC agreement:

  1. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
  2. Breach of fiduciary duties;
  3. Common law fraud;
  4. Aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and fraud.

Factual Background

The "alphabet soup" of parties needs to be sorted out first in order to make sense of this matter.

Plaintiff Bay Center LLC and defendant Emery Bay PKI, LLC ("PKI") formed defendant Emery Bay Member LLC ("Emery Bay") to develop a condominium project in California (the "Project"). PKI was designated as the managing member. Defendant Alfred Nevis owned and managed PKI.  The  LLC Agreement provided for PKI to manage the project. The details of the management duties were outlined in a separate management agreement that was only signed by a subsidiary of PKI called Emery Bay ETI, LLC ("ETI"). The only counterparty to that agreement was a subsidiary of Emery Bay.

Bay Center and PKI as the sole members of Emery Bay executed an LLC Agreement on November 1, 2005, providing for PKI to be the managing member. The Project was to be conducted through a number of affiliated entities, and the duties and obligations of those entites would be defined through a series of agreements. At the center of this layered structure was PKI and its sole equity holder, Nevis. Another entity, known as EB North, actually owned the property for the Project.

The day-to-day management of the Project was not defined in the LLC Agreement. Rather, those details were described in the separate Development Management Agreement, which was an exhibit to the LLC Agreement. Instead of PKI, the Development Manager was merely an affiliate of PKI, controlled by Nevis, called ETI, an entity that was not a contractual partner of Bay Center (the plaintiff).

Regardless of what entity served as the Project Manager, the court found that PKI had the power and the authority to make sure that contract was performed.

Problems with the Project

Problems began soon after the Project commenced.  Bay Center alleges that a loan that was in default was secretly renegotiated by the defendants, resulting in the diversion of cash flow from the Project, and avoiding the triggering of the Personal Guarantee of the loan that Nevis had guaranteed. After a default on the loan, a lender filed suit in California in which case a receiver was appointed for the Project. That receiver prepared a report which revealed extensive mismanagement of the Project by the defendants.

This case warrants a longer treatment due to the important legal principles stated.

The Complaint

Counts I and II are breach of contract claims against PKI and Emery Bay. Count III is offered in the alternative to Count I, and alleges that even if PKI was not obligated by the explicit terms of the LLC Agreement to ensure performance of the Development Management Agreement, the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing required it to do so.

Count IV, V and VI bring fiduciary duty claims. Count IV alleges that both Emery Bay and Nevis have fiduciary duties to Bay Center that they breached in the course of their mismanagement of the Project. Counts V and VI allege that ETI and Nevis, to the extent that Nevis does not have primary liability, aided and abetted the breaches alleged in Count IV.

Finally, Count VII alleges that both PKI and Nevis committed fraud by failing to inform Bay Center of material developments at the Project. In case Count VII fails to state a claim against Nevis, Count VIII alleges that Nevis aided and abetted PKI’s fraud. Only Counts II through VI were the subject of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In order to dismiss a claim under this standard, the court “must determine with reasonable certainty that, under any set of facts that could be proven to support the claims asserted, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief.”

The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

It is not common for this claim to prevail in most Chancery Court cases but this case is different. This Count III was brought in the alternative in the event that the court did not agree with the breach of contract arguments based on the LLC Agreement. In order to understand this Count III for the breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, it is helpful to understand the breach of contract claims. In the breach of contract claim, Bay Center argues that PKI was required to cause ETI to perform its obligations under the Development Management Agreement and to cause Emery Bay to perform its obligations under the loan documents.

Importantly, the main argument by Bay Center for breach of contract is that PKI unambiguously had the power and authority to cause performance of the related agreements which meant that PKI also had the obligation to do so. PKI’s duty to manage the affairs of the Project, according to the court, can reasonably be read to mean that PKI had the obligation to exercise its authority on behalf of the members.

The court explained how the Delaware courts have been hesitant and cautious in applying the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, especially in detailed, complex agreements. Here, however, in order to ensure that the reasonable expectations of the parties are fulfilled, the court reasoned that:

“PKI had the obligation to manage Emery Bay and the discretion to cause the Supporting Agreements to be performed. PKI was required to carry out these functions in good faith, meaning PKI could not engage in ‘arbitrary or unreasonable conduct’ that had the effect of preventing Bay Center from ‘receiving the fruits of its bargain.’ This bargain was, essentially, that in exchange for contributing the real estate to be developed, Bay Center would reap the rewards of PKI’s project management skills and efforts." (See footnotes 29 and 30.)

Moreover, the breaches by Emery Bay of the loan documents benefited PKI by diverting cash that Emery Bay was supposed to use to repay the loan which PKI would have otherwise had to fund through capital contributions. Moreover, the decision not to pursue claims against ETI was a conflicted one because Nevis, as the controller of both Emery Bay and ETI, stood on both sides of it. Thus, the court determined that Bay Center sufficiently pled that PKI had an implied duty to cause performance of the supporting agreements.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The LLC Agreement’s Treatment of Fiduciary Duties

The court began with the truism that the Delaware LLC Act gives members of an LLC wide latitude to limit or eliminate fiduciary duties. On page 18 of the slip opinion, the court reiterates several statements of  Delaware law regarding LLCs and fiduciary duties that are especially noteworthy:

1) The court stated that “in the absence of a contrary provision in the LLC Agreement, the manager of an LLC owes the traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the members of the LLC.” (See footnote 33.)

2) In addition, the court noted that “the LLC cases have generally, in the absence of provisions in the LLC Agreement explicitly disclaiming the applicability of default principles of fiduciary duty, treated LLC members as owing each other the traditional fiduciary duties that directors owe a corporation.(See footnote 33) (case citations omitted) (emphasis added)


The two foregoing statements of Delaware LLC law are extremely important for their uncommon clarity on these very important descriptions of the legal duties of members and/or managers of a Delaware LLC.

The foregoing legal principles were applied in this case for the following reasons. The court described the arguments of both parties as diametrically opposed in their interpretation of the LLC Agreement. Specifically, one party argued that the LLC Agreement eliminated fiduciary duties; but the other party argued that the same LLC Agreement preserved the traditional fiduciary duties. The court acknowledged the usual principle that in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion it could not choose between reasonable interpretations of ambiguous contract provisions at this early procedural stage; thus the court could not choose either of the opposing interpretations of the LLC Agreement.

Moreover, the court reasoned that “the interpretive scales also tip in favor of preserving fiduciary duties under the rule that the drafters of chartering documents must make their intent to eliminate fiduciary duties plain and unambiguous.” (See footnote 38) (case citations omitted.) Thus, the court ruled that the parties' LLC Agreement requires the members of Emery Bay to act in accordance with traditional fiduciary duties.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty by PKI and Nevis

The fiduciary duty analysis as applied to Nevis was more involved because Nevis himself was neither a member nor an officer of Emery Bay and “thus beyond the normal scope of those who owe fiduciary duties in the corporate context.” Rather, Bay Center’s theory of liability rested on a line of cases beginning with In Re USACafes, L.P. Litigation, 600 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1991), holding that “those affiliates of a general partner who exercise control over the partnership’s property may find themselves owing fiduciary duties to both the partnership and its limited partners.” The applicability of that doctrine in the LLC context was not contested. Rather it was argued that the limited circumstances in which that doctrine applies were not present.

The court noted that the USACafes doctrine only applied in the following circumstances: First, to have any fiduciary duties to an entity, the affiliate must exert control over the assets of that entity. That requirement was satisfied here due to the control that Nevis exerted directly over the property of Emery Bay. Second, USACafes suggests that controlling affiliates do not have the full range of the traditional fiduciary duties and focused on “the duty not to use control over the partnership’s property to advantage the corporate director at the expense of the partnership.” (See footnote 49.)

The court found that it was sufficiently pled that Nevis used his control over the assets of Emery Bay to stave off personal liability, thus benefiting himself at the expense of Emery Bay, and withstanding a motion to dismiss under the reasoning of USACafes and its progeny.

Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The court recited the elements for stating a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. The court held that because it had previously ruled that Bay Center adequately alleged that PKI and Nevis committed breaches of fiduciary duty, it found that the other requirements for stating an aiding and abetting claim have been met. (The aiding and abetting claims against Nevis were applied in the alternative. Although it was not necessary, the court addressed the count for completeness purposes.)

The Fraud Claims

Bay Center alleged that PKI and Nevis committed fraud by failing to disclose the severe problems that were developing at the Project. The court described three ways that common law fraud can be demonstrated: “1) Overt misrepresentation; 2) Silence in the face of a duty to speak: or 3) Deliberate concealment of material facts." (See footnote 52.)

Silence in the Face of a Duty to Disclose

In order to commit a common law fraud through silence, one must have a duty to speak that arises by operation of law, rather than purely by contract. (See footnote 53.) This so-called independent tort doctrine is satisfied if, in addition to a contractual duty, the party was subject to an independent duty, such as a fiduciary duty. (See footnote 54.) The court explained that “the same circumstances may give rise to both breach of contract and tort claims if the plaintiff asserts that the alleged contractual breach was accompanied by the breach of an independent duty imposed by law.” However, it was acknowledged that the general rule is that an action based entirely on a breach of the terms of a contract and not on a violation of an independent duty imposed by law requires a plaintiff to sue in contract and not in tort.

In this case however, the court considered that PKI was subject to the traditional fiduciary duties of a director of a Delaware corporation and defendants conceded that if the court found a breach of fiduciary duty that there was a basis for fraud claims. The court relied on well-settled case law for the analogous duty of a board of directors of a corporation to “disclose fully and fairly all material information within the board’s control when it seeks shareholder action,” (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992)).

Applying this principle by analogy to the fiduciaries of an LLC where they seek members’ consent, the LLC Agreement required the consent of Bay Center which necessarily required disclosure to Bay Center of any refinancing or restructuring of the loans. In this case, Emery Bay had a right to make a decision regarding the renegotiation of the loans and therefore PKI had a fiduciary duty to inform Bay Center of all material facts regarding the renegotiations. The court reasoned that because of the alleged fact that PKI failed to inform Bay Center that most of the renegotiations were taking place, PKI failed to make Bay Center aware of even the most basic facts that Bay Center was entitled to know. Thus, Bay Center sufficiently pled a fraud claim against PKI based on the failure of PKI to disclose material facts in the face of its fiduciary duty to do so. The court also noted at footnote 59 that allowing the fraud claim to proceed because of a fiduciary duty to disclose, generates a redundancy, but cites cases where that redundancy has been permitted.

Individual Liability

The court also discussed the concept that a “corporate officer can be held personally liable for the torts he commits and cannot shield himself behind the corporation when he is a participant.” (See footnote 60). This includes situations where a corporate agent participates in corporate fraud. The court referred to the “Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine,” where if a “corporate officer participates in the wrongful conduct, or knowingly approves the conduct, the officer, as well as the corporation, is liable for the penalties.” Moreover the court cited authority for the position that: “a corporate officer or agent who commits fraud is personally liable to a person injured by the fraud. An officer actively participating in the fraud cannot escape personal liability on the ground that the officer was acting for the corporation.”

The court discussed the third type of fraud theory, active concealment, for the sake of completeness. The critical distinction between active concealment and silence theories of fraud is that active concealment does not require a pre-existing duty to speak but this alternative theory of fraud was not sufficiently pled. In sum, despite the infirmity regarding active concealment, the court determined that Bay Center has pled a claim of fraud against PKI and Nevis based on their failure to disclose loan modifications when they had a duty to do so. 

UPDATE: Professor Larry Ribstein, one of the country's leading authorities on LLCs, fortunately provides his usual scholarly analysis of this case here.

COMPARISON: The North Carolina Business Litigation Report  here, describes a recent decision from the N.C. Business Court, affirmed by the N.C. Court of Appeals, that contrasts sharply with the above Delaware decision. The N.C. ruling highlighted at the foregoing link held that : (i) non-majority members of an LLC do not have fiduciary duties; and (2) managers of an LLC do not have fiduciary duties to members.

Who Will Fill Vacancy on the Delaware Chancery Court?

As reported previously here, one of the Vice Chancellors on the Delaware Chancery Court is not seeking reappointment after his term expires in July 2009. The process for his replacement involves the appointment by the Governor with the consent of the Delaware Senate. See Article IV of the Delaware Constitution. Other publications have recently speculated about a "short list" of potential replacements to fill the vacancy. See, e.g., here.

 I try to maintain this blog "in the nature of a reporter of cases" for corporate and commercial  decisions from Delaware's Chancery and Supreme Court,  as compared to a gossip column, however anyone who follows the Delaware Chancery Court must keep abreast of who might become the newest member of Delaware's equity bench.

Among those I understand to be leading contenders for the position is Delaware Superior Court Judge Mary M. Johnston. Her official court background summary is here. Earlier in her career, she was a corporate litigation partner at the Wilmington firm of Morris James LLP.  She now handles complex civil litigation in the Superior Court, which is the trial court of general jurisdiction in Delaware. My sources indicate that she authored more opinions last year than any other judge on her court. In addition to her superior qualifications, Her Honor would bring a measure of diversity to a court whose sole former female member left over a decade ago for a position on the Delaware Supreme Court.

Other contenders I have heard to be "in the running for the position" include J. Travis Laster, of Abrams and Laster, a well-respected corporate litigator and a seasoned Chancery Court practitioner who started his own firm several years ago with another former partner at Richards, Layton & Finger in Wilmington. Richard Forsten, a partner at Buchanan Ingersoll has been mentioned for this position (as well as in the past for an opening on the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware.) According to some reports, other possible contenders include Joel Friedlander, a partner and corporate litigator at Bouchard Margules & Friedlander P.A. in Wilmington. Another potential contender is Bruce Silverstein, a partner at Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP in Wilmington and chair of his firm's corporate litigation department. 

If any loyal readers are aware of other candidates who should be included above, or additional relevant background information that should be included about those mentioned, please let me know.

UPDATEThe Delaware Law Weekly has an article in its online edition circulated today that refers to this post here.

Chancery Court Interprets Trust Document's Intent

In the Matter of Lammot DuPont Copeland Trust No. 5400, dated March 12, 1956, and the Lammot DuPont Copeland Trust Under Agreement dated April 25, 1955, Del. Ch., No. 192-CC (April 20, 2009), read opinion here;

In this opinion, the Chancery Court resolved a dispute on summary judgment with respect to the language of two trusts valued at a total of $22 million. Chancellor Chandler concluded that the assets of the two trusts, upon their future termination, were intended by the trustor to be distributed to the trustor’s grandchildren on a class-wide, per capita basis.

The petitioner, Gerret van S. Copeland, Jr. (“Petitioner”) is one of two children of Gerret van S. Copeland, son of the trustor, Lammot du Pont Copeland. Respondents are the five children of trustor’s son, Lammot du Pont Copeland, Jr. The Petitioner filed this action seeking instruction from the Court as to how to interpret the language of two trusts formed by trustor in 1955 and 1956. In particular, the Petitioner wanted the Court to instruct the trustee of the two trusts as to how it should distribute the assets of the trusts upon their termination. The Petitioner argued that the relevant language of the trust with respect to how the distribution was to be made, either per stirpes or per capita, was ambiguous and therefore, according to applicable Delaware law, the Court should favor a per stirpes distribution. Respondents argued that the relevant language of the two trusts is clear and unambiguous and properly sets forth the intent of the trustor, which was to distribute the assets to the trustor’s grandchildren as a class, and per capita. Chancellor Chandler agreed with Respondents’ interpretation.

The seminal rule of construction in trust cases is that the trustor’s intent is “determined ‘by considering the language of the trust instrument, read in its entirety, in light of the circumstances surrounding its creation.’” The Chancellor noted that the Court should “rely on two guiding principles in responding to a petition for instructions: 1) where the language of a will [or trust] is unambiguous, the court must enforce its terms as written; and 2) where the language used in a [trust] is ambiguous, the court must give the language that meaning which will effectuate the intent of the [settlor].” Since the Petitioner argued that the language in the trusts was ambiguous because it provides no guidance as to whether the distributions should be made on a per stirpes or per capita basis, the Court looked to the language in the trusts, which contained the phrase “unto Trustor’s then living grandchildren.” The Court went on to note that since the trustor was a “sophisticated businessman and experienced creator of trusts,” and he specifically used the phrase per stirpes to identify how a great-grandchild would take if one of the grandchildren died before the trusts’ assets were distributed, the Court concluded that “if the Trustor intended the grandchildren to take per stirpes than he would have specifically used that phrase.” As a result, the Court concluded that the trustor intended to distribute the assets of the trusts to his grandchildren as a class, per capita.


 

Poison Puts and Delaware Corporate Law

Prof. Steven Davidoff as The Deal Professor on the DealBook blog, here, writes about pending battles for control over the pharmaceutical company, Amylin, including efforts by Carl Icahn and others to nominate new directors, as well as a pending suit in Delaware Chancery Court by a pension fund against Amylin. The good professor also discusses what are referred to as "poison put" provisions that would trigger repayment of debt upon certain changes in control or board composition, as well as whether such triggers would run afoul of the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Unocal and DGCL Section 141(a).

In Appraisal Action Chancery Court Finds That Fair Value for Preferred Shares Based on Language in Certificate of Designation

In Re: Appraisal of Metromedia Int’l Group Inc, Del. Ch., No. 3351-CC (April 16, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his following review of this case.
 

On April 16, 2009, in a post-trial decision in a consolidated appraisal proceeding, Chancellor Chandler addressed the issue of appraisal of preferred shareholders' stock and the primacy of contract as a measure of fair value.

The Court found that the fair value of respondent Metromedia International Group, Inc.'s (“MIG”) preferred shares on the merger date was $38.92 for each share. While the petitioners sought a valuation in a range from $67.50 to $79.76 per share and the company claimed that the highest value should have been $18.07 per share, the Court found that the rights of MIG’s preferred shareholders in the event of a merger were based in contract and in particular the certificate of designation. As a result, the preferred shareholders were limited in their remedy to the contract price; they were precluded from coming to Court seeking additional consideration through the appraisal process.


Background -- Tender Offer – Merger – Top-Up Option – Short-Form Merger

Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262, the petitioners sought a judicial determination of the “fair value” of the 7.25% Cumulative Convertible Preferred Stock of MIG. This appraisal action arose out of the August 22, 2007 merger of CaucusCom Mergerco Corp. (“MergerSub”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of CaucusCom Ventures, L.P. (“CaucusCom”), into MIG.

The merger occurred after an August 21, 2007 tender offer in which MergerSub acquired approximately 77.6% of MIG’s outstanding common shares making CaucusCom, through MergerSub, the controlling shareholder of MIG. Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement between MIG, CaucusCom, and MergerSub, MergerSub was granted an option (the “Top-Up Option”), to obtain additional shares of common stock from MIG in order to raise MergerSub’s ownership stake to 90%. MergerSub exercised the Top-Up Option which was followed by a short-form merger under 8 Del. C. § 253 in which the remaining common shares were cashed out.

Primacy of Contract as Measure of Preferred’s Value vs. Statutory Appraisal Rights

Chancellor Chandler noted initially that “[a] preferred shareholder’s rights are defined in either the corporation’s certificate of incorporation or in the certificate of designation, which acts as an amendment to a certificate of incorporation.” Thus, while the rights of preferred shareholders are contractual in nature, they are “interwoven with a stockholder’s statutory right of appraisal.” With respect to the contractual nature of preferred stock, “a clear contractual provision that establishes the value of preferred stock in the event of a cash-out merger is not inconsistent with the language or the policy of § 262.”

Citing the only reported post-Weinberger opinion involving an appraisal of preferred stock, In Re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock (698 A.2d 973 (Del. Ch. 1997), Chancellor Chandler stated that the primary issue before him then was “whether the certificate of designation, which establishes the rights of MIG’s preferred shares, contractually establishe[d] the metric for valuing the preferred shares in the event of a merger.” If he found that it did, that would “render[] irrelevant many of the underlying disputes among the testifying experts over the competing valuation models.” If he found that it did not, then the Court would be faced with determining fair value through the standard “battle of the experts” with regard to the approved methods of valuation in Delaware -- discounted cash flow valuation methodology, the comparable transactions approach, and the comparable company analysis.

Chancellor Chandler found that the certificate of designation did in fact establish the rights of MIG’s preferred shares and in particular the value to which preferred stockholders were entitled in the event of a merger -- $38.92 per share of preferred stock. Chancellor Chandler went on to state that:

Preferred holders who acquired their stock in 1997 for $50 may be disappointed that ten years later their stock was worth only 78% of its original issuance price, just as common stockholders who paid $12 in 1997 are no doubt disappointed to realize only 15% of their purchase price, but these consequences flow from the certificate and the market, not from the vagaries of financial methodologies applied in appraisal proceedings. Where the rights of preferred shareholders in the event of a merger are clearly stated in the certificate of designation, those shareholders cannot come to this Court seeking additional consideration in the merger through the appraisal process.


Court Awards Statutory Interest Rate

With respect to the issue of interest, Chancellor Chandler noted that “a party shall be awarded interest from the date of the merger through the date of payment of the judgment compounded quarterly and accruing at 5.0% over the Federal Reserve Discount Rate as measured during that period of time. This is the prescriptive statutory interest rate, unless good cause is shown to depart from it.” Finding no basis to depart from standard practice, the Court awarded interest at the statutory interest rate.

 

Upcoming Chancery Court Hearing and Trial Available Online Via Live Video/Audio in "Real Time"

A Chancery Court hearing on Monday, April 20, in the ongoing AIG litigation to address issues raised in the Court's Feb. 10, 2009 opinion, that was summarized on this blog here, such as the applicability of equitable tolling to non-fiduciaries, will be available for live viewing "in real time" via a video/audio feed from the courtroom that can be viewed from one's computer, as provided by the online service at  www.courtroomview.com.

In addition, a five-day trial starting on April 27 will also be available for live viewing online via the service at www.courtroomview.com in the case of Selectica, Inc. v. Vesata Enterprises, Inc. Background on that expedited matter involving a shareholder rights plan is summarized here.

N.B.: The folks at the above service provide me with free access to the referenced online live video/audio feeds of the Chancery Court proceedings, but there is a fee for the general public.

 

Chancery Court Dismisses Sundry Claims Against LLC Members

Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, L.L.C., Del. Ch., No. 4030-CC (April 15, 2009), read opinion here.

This case involves the following claims among members of an LLC, arising out of an LLC Agreement: (i) breach of contract; (ii) tortious interference with contract; (iii) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage; (iv) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (v) conversion; (vi) unjust enrichment; and (vii) civil conspiracy. The court dismissed the foregoing claims against most of the defendants based on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The discussion of this smorgasbord of claims serves as a useful reference to include in the toolbox of the business litigation lawyer.

Background

The factual background involves an intricate web of overlapping entities. The central fact that is key to this dispute is that a few investment management professionals formed several entities for the primary purpose of investing in Japanese companies. The plaintiff was the main "point man" in Japan. Eventually, the plaintiff and the other members of the LLC had disagreements that caused the plaintiff to want to leave. This litigation started when the negotiations for an amicable departure were unsuccessful. Among the problems that gave rise to the suit included the alleged failure of the defendants to provide full payment that the plaintiff thought he was owed, and the issuance to the plaintiff of a K-1 purporting to assign him $10 million in income that he apparently did not receive.

Breach of Contract Claim

Regarding the breach of contract claims relating to the LLC Agreement, the court denied the motion to dismiss against two of the defendants based on the familiar test for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that the court cannot choose at such a preliminary stage the movant's view of the contract if it is "not the only reasonable interpretation". FN 9.

The opinion also includes discussion about whether the LLC members could be held liable "as members, solely by reason of them being members". Reference was made to Section 18-303(a) of the Delaware LLC Act, which addresses the liability of members to third-parties, but, the court explained, it "has no bearing on the liability between members." FN 13.

The court discussed the elements of a breach of contract claim (FN 15). The plaintiff, Kuroda, alleged that issuing him a K-1 that purported to assign him income that he never received. However, he still failed to allege the element of damages because as a Japanese citizen it was not clear that he would owe taxes  in the U.S., or suffer other damages as a result of an inaccurate K-1, though the court did allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint. [This conclusion should be compared with a decision from the Chancery Court of many years ago in an unaffiliated case that reached a different result on different facts but involved an arguably analogous issue. See   Litle v. Waters, 1992 WL 25758 at *8 (Del. Ch., Feb. 11, 1992)(finding that the plaintiff in that case stated a claim for oppression of a minority shareholder by failing to declare dividends in a subchapter S corporation where the plaintiff minority shareholder was incurring tax liability but receiving no income to pay the liability, while the Defendant was receiving loan repayments which he could use to pay his tax liability.)]

Tortious Interference with Contract

It was explained by the court as "well-settled that a party to a contract cannot be held liable for both breaching a contract and tortiously interfering with the same contract." FN 18. Moreover, the individual defendants were in control of the member entities, thus, as long as they were acting within the scope of their respective roles as managers of the member entities, they cannot be held liable for tortious interference with contract, based on the reasoning that they are the agents of the signatories to the contract. FN 20.

Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

The elements of a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage were recited (FN 31), but preliminarily, the court found that those claims were not direct claims that could be brought by the plaintiff, but rather were derivative claims that needed to be brought on behalf of the LLC through which he did business. See 6 Del. C. Section 18-1001 and FN 32.

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

An  explanation of this cause of action and a nuanced amplification of its limited scope in the opinion is the best way to  understand why this claim was dismissed, so I quote from page 24 of the slip opinion:

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in every contract and requires ‘a party in a contractual relationship to refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable conduct which has the effect of preventing the other party to the contract from receiving the fruits’ of the bargain.”38 The implied covenant cannot be invoked to override the express terms of the contract.39 Moreover, rather than constituting a free floating duty imposed on a contracting party, the implied covenant can only be used conservatively “to ensure the parties’ ‘reasonable expectations’ are fulfilled.”40 Thus, to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant, Kuroda “must allege a specific implied contractual obligation, a breach of that obligation by the defendant, and resulting damage to the plaintiff.”41 General allegations of bad faith conduct are not sufficient. Rather, the plaintiff must allege a specific implied contractual obligation and allege how the violation of that obligation denied the plaintiff the fruits of the contract. Consistent with its narrow purpose, the implied covenant is only rarely invoked successfully.42

Conversion

In connection with defining the elements of this claim (FN 49), the  court explains that when a claim arises out of a contract, such a cause of  action cannot be bootstrapped into a tort claim (FN 50). Moreover, the Court emphasized that there is a very narrow exception to the general prohibition against claims for the conversion of money. That is, the plaintiff, Kuroda, would have to establish a right to the money, separate from a contract right, that he asserts is being withheld improperly by the defendants. This he cannot do. FN 54.

Unjust Enrichment

After reciting the elements of this claim (FN 61), the reason given for why it was dismissed is as follows: such a claim is not available where, as here, there is a contract that governs the relationship between the parties. Thus, "when the complaint alleges an express, enforceable contract that controls the parties' relationship ... a claim for unjust enrichment will be dismissed." FN 63.  But cf. FN 65 that cites a case that refers to the limited circumstances in which the concept of "alternative pleading"  will allow both such claims to be pled in the same complaint.

Civil Conspiracy

The plaintiff failed to adequately allege the elements of an underlying claim, and thus this count in the complaint was dismissed because, as the court noted, civil conspiracy is not an independent claim. FNs 70 and 71. Moreover, the opinion cites to authority in footnote 74 for the position that unless a breach of contract constitutes an independent tort (which the excerpt above shows is hard to do), a breach of contract cannot constitute an underlying wrong on which a claim for civil conspiracy can be based.
 

New Delaware Statute Allowing Proxy Access Pursuant to Bylaw Provision

Professor Lisa Fairfax on The Conglomerate blog here,  provides a helpful overview of the new Delaware statute, here, Section 112, effective August 1, 2009, regarding allowance (not requirement) pursuant to a bylaw provision, of shareholder-nominated candidates for director to be included in proxy statements. The good professor's entire blog entry follows:

On Friday, Delaware's governor signed legislation enacting several changes to the Delaware General Corporation Law. Among those changes is a new Section 112 entitled "access to proxy solicitation materials." Section 112 authorizes (but does not require) corporations to adopt bylaws that require the corporation to include shareholder-nominated candidates for director on the corporation's proxy statement, subject to procedures and conditions that may be set forth in the bylaws. Section 112 then includes a list of non-exhaustive potential procedures and conditions including a provision requiring a minimum level of ownership, and one conditioning eligibility upon the number or proportion of directors nominated by stockholders. This latter condition appears to enable corporations to prevent shareholders' access to the proxy statement when it could result in a control contest. The new Section 112 will be effective on August 1, 2009.

This is certainly an interesting development for Delaware corporate law and shareholder activists. Although the bylaw provision is voluntary, it may give shareholder activists greater leverage in demanding proxy access, while giving corporations the ability to shape the conditions under which such access will be granted. Importantly for Delaware, given the new SEC chair's seeming support of proxy access, this new law may ensure that it continues to have some voice in the proxy access debate.

 

Chancery Court Grants Partial Summary Judgment to Both Parties in Self-Dealing Case

Rhodes v. SilkRoad Equity, LLC,  Del. Ch., No. 2133-VCN (April 15, 2009), read letter opinion here. Prior opinions in this case from the Delaware Chancery Court were reviewed on this blog here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his following review of this Delaware Chancery Court decision.

On April 15, 2009, Vice Chancellor Noble granted partial summary judgment in this action involving a dispute between the former founder of a company who sold 80% of his interests, claims he was later forced out and his interest extinguished for an unfair price allegedly in accordance with the terms of a buy-back provision in the purchase agreement. Fittingly given the date, one of the claims that was extinguished was plaintiffs’ challenge regarding IRS penalties.

InterAct Public Safety Systems (“InterAct””), a software development corporation was founded by plaintiff William A. Rhodes III (“Rhodes”). Plaintiff Wijnant van de Groep (“van de Groep”) is Rhodes’s son-in-law, and a former officer and shareholder of InterAct. In 2000, InterAct entered into a contract with BellSouth. In October 2000, in an effort to secure more capital, InterAct entered into negotiations with defendants Andrew J. Filipowski (“Filipowski”) and Matthew G. Roszak (“Roszak”). Defendant SilkRoad Equity, LLC (“SilkRoad”), a Filipowski controlled company, entered into a stock purchase agreement with Interact in December 2004, whereby SilkRoad acquired 80% of the outstanding stock of InterAct in exchange for: (i) a $100 payment to Rhodes and Van de Groep; (ii) a $5 million contingent payment to Rhodes; and (iii) a $10 million line of credit to InterAct (the “SPA”).

SPA -- Option to Purchase Plaintiffs’ Shares

The SPA included a provision granting defendants the option to purchase the plaintiffs’ shares for “fair market value” and on July 25, 2006, defendants gave notice that they were exercising their option to purchase the remaining 20% interest from the plaintiffs. The purchase price was based on a valuation by Houlihan, Lokey. In response, plaintiffs filed suit alleging, among other things: (i) breach of fiduciary duties by defendants’ for engaging in self-dealing transactions involving four companies under defendants’ control (the “sister companies”) and by failing timely to pay IRS payroll penalties incurred by InterAct before the SPA ; and (ii) self-dealing in the InterAct acquisition of TrueSentry, another defendant controlled entity. Defendants responded by claiming that plaintiffs breached certain provisions of the SPA including the representations and warranties. Both sides moved for partial summary judgment. Since the parties later agreed that TrueSecurity was never acquired by InterAct, summary judgment was granted for defendants with respect to that allegation.

Self-Dealing -- Entire Fairness Review – Focus on Price

The plaintiffs claimed that SilkRoad’s transactions with the sister companies demonstrated unfair process and price. In addressing the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Vice Chancellor Noble stated that the focus of his analysis would be primarily on price because, “if the Defendants are unable to show fair price, summary judgment will be denied whether a fair process is demonstrated or not.” Thus, in order to get summary judgment, the defendants had to submit undisputed evidence that “demonstrates that the rates InterAct was charged by each SilkRoad sister company were entirely fair in light of prevailing market rates for the same or similar services.”

SilkRoad’s Transactions with Sister Companies

Vice Chancellor Noble then analyzed in great detail, the relationships and transactions between InterAct and the sister companies in light of plaintiffs’ allegations of self-dealing that the defendants were allegedly siphoning cash from InterAct and depressing its value under the entire fairness standard. With respect to each of the four sister companies, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs set forth enough facts to demonstrate a material issue as to the fairness of the price and thus, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied with respect to those allegations.

IRS Penalties

Prior to the defendants’ acquisition of InterAct, the plaintiffs failed to cause InterAct to pay nearly $1 million in federal payroll taxes. After defendants acquired the company, they appealed the IRS decision regarding penalties and interest but to no avail. The plaintiffs argued that these expenses (the penalties and interest) should not have been considered by Houlihan Lokey in valuing InterAct for the purposes of purchasing plaintiffs’ shares. However, the defendants presented evidence that they were not included in the financials submitted to Houlihan. As a result, the Court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue.

Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion

The Court next analyzed plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to defendants’ counterclaims alleging breach of the SPA regarding the plaintiffs’ representations and warranties concerning: (1) the balance sheet of InterAct as of September 30, 2003, and September 30, 2004; (2) North Carolina Sales and Use Taxes; (3) products and services provided to InterAct’s customers ; and (4) the ownership or licensing of software in InterAct’s possession. After a detailed analysis of the facts, the Vice Chancellor found that with the exception of the North Carolina Sales and Use Tax, plaintiffs failed to carry their burden and summary judgment was denied.

 

Chancery Court Denies Request for Expedited Proceedings in Board Contest Between Exelon Corp. and NRG Energy, Inc.

Louisiana Sheriffs' Pension & Relief Fund v. Crane,  Del. Ch., No. 4193-VCL (April 14, 2009), read letter decision here.

This case involves the hostile bid by Exelon Corp. to take over NRG Energy, Inc.  The plaintiffs in this case are stockholders of NRG who claim that NRG directors are breaching their fiduciary duties by not agreeing to the bid by Exelon. Among the background facts are a proposed bylaw amendment by Exelon to increase the number of NRG board members--without triggering a credit agreement that requires a majority of "continuing directors".

The initial complaint in this case was filed in November 2008. The first amended complaint was filed in March 2009.  On April 3, 2009 a second amended complaint was filed along with a motion for injunctive relief, seeking an order requiring NRG to rescind the appointment of a director and to enjoin any other action that would impede the vote for directors at the upcoming meeting.

The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the prerequisites for expedited proceedings. In particular, there was a failure to establish a sufficient possibility of a threatened irreparable injury, thus the court declined to address the second prong of the test, which requires the moving party to articulate a sufficiently colorable claim.

The Court rejected the arguments of the plaintiffs that the upcoming board elections would trigger the acceleration of debt and therefore there was "no imminent circumstance demanding immediate action". FN 7 (citation omitted).

Notable also was the important point that Exelon, the bidder, expressly opposed expedition in this case. The fact that the potential acquirer and the entity nominating the directors was opposed to expediting the case made it easier to distinguish this case from the famous case of Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. 1988). Also distinguished from the facts of this case was the recent oral ruling in San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Bradbury, C.A. No. 4446-VCL (Del. Ch. March 30, 2009)(TRANSCRIPT). In Bradbury, the dissident slate of directors, if elected, would have accelerated debt obligations, unlike in the instant case.

In sum, unlike other seemingly similar cases in which "defensive measures were erected by the target to fight off the potential acquirer and were strongly opposed by the potential acquirer", in this case the potential acquirer opposed expedition and believes that expedition would hamper the transaction that it sought. Thus, the motion to expedite was denied.

Chancery Court Permits Shareholder By-Law Proposal to be Placed on Ballot While Preserving Company's Legal Challenge for Later Review

Kistefos AS v. Trico Marine Services, Inc., Del. Ch., No. 4497-CC (April 14, 2009), read letter opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his review of this case as follows.

This Chancery Court decision involves an action by a shareholder seeking a declaration that the company had improperly blocked a shareholder vote on a proposed bylaw. Chancellor Chandler on April 14, 2009, heard oral argument and issued a five-page decision the same day denying a motion to expedite the case. While that in and of itself is unremarkable given the pace at which the Court of Chancery operates, it is what Chancellor Chandler did with respect to underlying case that is the interesting part of this decision.

The plaintiff, Kistefos AS (“Kistefos”), a substantial minority stockholder of Trico Marine Services, Inc. (“Trico”), filed a complaint against Trico seeking a declaration that Trico improperly rejected a proposed bylaw on grounds that if adopted, the proposed bylaw would be inconsistent with Delaware law and Trico’s certificate of incorporation. In his April 14 decision, Chancellor Chandler created a process whereby the shareholder was able to get the relief it was seeking and at the same time the company was able to preserve its legal challenge with respect to the proposed bylaw for a later time.

Background – Trico Rejects Shareholder Proposals

In anticipation of Trico’s 2009 annual meeting, Kistefos, Trico’s largest stockholder, on March 14, 2009, sent several proposals to Trico’s board to be placed before Trico’s stockholders for a vote at Trico’s annual meeting. Included in Kistefos’ proposals was one which, according to Kistefos, was designed “to give ‘teeth’ to [Trico’s] otherwise illusory majority voting requirement.” This proposal provided that an incumbent director who “fails to receive the number of votes required to elect directors at any meeting of stockholders at which such person is to be elected” shall be ineligible to continue to serve and his or her term will expire immediately, creating a vacancy on the board. Trico’s bylaws provided that directors were elected by a majority vote of stockholders, however, an incumbent director who received only a plurality of votes could continue to serve as a “holdover” director until a successor had been elected or until the director’s resignation or removal.

On March 25, 2009, Trico rejected Kistefos’ proposed bylaw on the grounds that it would be invalid if adopted because it was inconsistent with the provisions of Trico’s certificate of incorporation and §§ 141(b) and (k) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Trico also said that it would disregard that proposal if Kistefos presented it for stockholder action at the 2009 annual meeting.

On April 8, 2009, plaintiff filed suit challenging Trico’s decision and seeking an order that would require Trico to place Kistefos’ proposed bylaw before the stockholders for a vote. Kistefos also moved for expedited treatment because Trico’s annual meeting could take place as early as late May.

Chancellor Denies Motion to Expedite; Preserves Dispute Until Later

During the teleconference with the Court on April 14, 2009 with respect to Kistefos’ motion to expedite, Kistefos represented that expedition would not be necessary if the stockholders were permitted to vote on Kistefos’ proposed bylaw at the 2009 annual meeting. In response, Trico offered to collect and preserve the proxies submitted for and against Kistefos’ proposal so that it could later be determined if the proposal received the required vote.

In denying the motion to expedite, Chancellor Chandler preserved the defendants legal challenge with respect to the proposed bylaw and at the same time he permitted the bylaw proposed by Kistefos to be placed on the ballot for consideration and stockholder vote at the 2009 annual meeting “in the same manner as other proposals are presented to the stockholders for a vote.” In reaching this decision, Chancellor Chandler found that there was no need to expedite the proceedings because Kistefos no longer faced any irreparable injury. Kistefos got what it wanted in terms of being able to present the proposed bylaw to the stockholders for a vote at the meeting. Moreover, Chancellor Chandler noted that if Kistefos prevailed on its proposed bylaw, the issue with respect to defendants’ legal challenge would then be ripe for judicial review.


 

Motion to Compel Granted

In re: John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, Del. Ch., No. 758-CC (March 25, 2009), read letter decision here.

This Chancery Court ruling granted a motion to compel pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1)  for post-merger financial data. This case involved a shareholder class action arising out of a merger transaction. The court described the very broad scope of discovery allowable under Rule 26(b)(1) that does not require that discoverable data to be admissible at trial but merely that it is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Moreover, the court reasoned that post-merger information may also be relevant in a breach of fiduciary duty action which may, ultimately, justify a rescissory damages remedy. [See footnote 4.]

Chancery Court Grants Stay Requested by Special Litigation Committee Except for Production of Electronic Information

London v. Tyrrell, Del. Ch., No. 3321-CC (April 2, 2009), read letter decision here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, has provided us with the following case review.

In a interesting twist on the issue of staying discovery so the Special Litigation Committee can complete its investigation, Chancellor Chandler, in a two-page letter decision on April 2, 2009, granted a request by the Special Litigation Committee of the Board of MA Federal, Inc. d/b/a iGov to stay discovery for 120 days except for the electronic information sought by the plaintiffs in their discovery requests. While the Chancellor did not give a detailed explanation for this exception, he did mention that defendants had represented on March 17, 2009 that they were ready to begin production "on a biweekly basis beginning next week...." The Chancellor went on to state that the defendants had "postponed production of electronic documents long enough. Further delay would only prejudice plaintiffs." While this might be a tacit nod to the dynamic nature of electronic information and the potential for problems associated with preservation and production of electronic information in general, we will have to wait for more details.


 

Chancery Court Denies Fee Application Again on Remand; Finds Presumption Rebutted that Fee Petitioner Was Cause of Increase in Tender Price

In re William Lyon Homes Shareholder Litigation Consolidated, C.A. No. 2015-VCN (April2, 2009), read letter decision here. See prior Delaware decisions in this case here and here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with this case summary.

On April 2, 2009, Vice Chancellor Noble denied for the second time a fee application for an award of attorneys’ fees in  this Chancery Court decision after remand from the Delaware Supreme Court. The Court found that the presumption that the party seeking the fee and its attorneys were the cause of the price increase in question had been rebutted. The earlier award of December 21, 2006 was therefore reconfirmed (See In re William Lyon Homes S’holder Litig., 2006 WL 3860916 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006)).

Background Facts – Delaware and California Actions

This case involved a going private transaction with William Lyon Homes (“Lyon Homes”), which generated litigation in Delaware and California. A settlement was reached in the Delaware Action but not the California action. As a result of a negotiated settlement in the Delaware action, the original tender price was increased from $93 per share to $100 per share. After the Delaware action settled, the California litigation continued. An increase in the share price to $109 per share resulted following negotiations between representatives of General William Lyon (“General Lyon”), Lyon Homes’ controlling stockholder, and Chesapeake Partners (“Chesapeake”) which held a sizeable interest (approximately 3.5%), in Lyon Homes.

Alaska Electrical Pension Fund (“Alaska”), the plaintiff in the California litigation, intervened in the Delaware Action to file a petition seeking attorneys fees’ for the increase from $93 to $100 per share and the increase from $100 to $109 per share. Vice Chancellor Noble denied Alaska’s fee application with respect to the initial increase (which was affirmed on appeal) and with respect to the second increase.” The Court found that the second increase would not have occurred but for the efforts of Chesapeake (not Alaska) and that “there was no evidence establishing a causal connection between Alaska’s efforts and the increase.”

The Delaware Supreme Court Reverses the Denial

The Supreme Court, in reversing and remanding the decision to the Court of Chancery determined that the Court of Chancery’s analysis was flawed because it required Alaska “to demonstrate some causal connection under Infinity Broadcasting (see In re Infinity Broad. Corp. S’holders Litig., 802 A.2d 285 (Del. 2002)) between its efforts and the second increase. The Supreme Court stated that “Alaska enjoys the benefit of a presumption that its efforts bore a causal connection to the second increase by virtue of its position as the plaintiff in the only litigation pending at the time of the second increase.”

The Court of Chancery on Remand

On remand, Vice Chancellor Noble acknowledged that he would be required to again consider Alaska’s fee request but this time he would recognize that, “unless and until proven otherwise, Alaska’s efforts are presumed to be a cause of the second increase.” The Vice Chancellor was quick to note that he would evaluate the evidence and the presumptions related thereto “[e]ven though Alaska has conceded it was not a direct cause of the second increase.” .

No Causation Between Fee Petitioner and Price Increase

The parties engaged in additional discovery and with an expanded record upon which to evaluate Alaska’s request, Vice Chancellor Noble found that: “the parties opposing Alaska’s fee application have rebutted the presumption that benefits Alaska in its application. In other words, they have demonstrated that Alaska and its attorneys were in no way a cause of the second tender offer price increase.” In particular, Vice Chancellor Noble found that after the first increase, sufficient shares had not been tendered to meet General Lyon’s needs and that for the tender offer to be successful, General Lyon needed Chesapeake to tender its shares. Thus, it was the negotiations between Chesapeake and General Lyon (or his representatives) and not Alaska (or its counsel) that resulted in the second price increase.

As a result, Vice Chancellor Noble found that the presumption that Alaska was the cause of the second price increase had been rebutted and its fee petition was denied again.

 

Chancery Grants Motion to Intervene; Dismisses Claims of Unrepresented Entities

Harris v. RHH Partners, LP , et al.,  Del. Ch.,  No. 1198-VCN April 3, 2009),  read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his analysis of this case.

In this Chancery Court letter decision, Vice Chancellor Noble ruled on two issues in a dispute involving unrepresented entities and a limited partnership agreement: (i) the failure to secure replacement counsel for the juristic entities involved in this action; and (ii) an application to intervene.

Respondent RHH Partners, L.P. (“RHH”) is a Delaware limited partnership. Plaintiff Robert H. Harris is the sole limited partner of RHH and holds a 99% interest in RHH. One of the defendants, 1015 Broadway, Inc. (“Broadway”), is the sole general partner of RHH and owns 1% of the interests in RHH. The only asset of RHH Partners is real property known as 87 Lotus Oval South, Valley Stream, New York, 11581 (the “Property”), which is also where Harris, and his wife, reside

Claims Dismissed After Entities Warned to Get Counsel

The general rule in Delaware is that artificial business entities may appear in Delaware courts only through an attorney admitted to practice law in Delaware. After counsel who represented RHH and Broadway withdrew, the Court warned those entities that if they did not obtain counsel by a date certain, their claims would be dismissed. Those entities failed to heed Vice Chancellor Noble’s warning. When the deadline passed and no counsel had entered their appearance for those entities, Vice Chancellor Noble kept his word and found that “all claims brought by, and all defenses tendered by, those entities will be deemed abandoned, and, thus, dismissed.”

Motion to Intervene

A non-party, Don Hartman moved to intervene under Chancery Court Rule 24(a) claiming an interest in the property. Hartman argued that he had become the sole owner of Broadway for the purpose of controlling RHH, in order to protect a security interest in the property. The Court agreed finding that Hartman’s interest “would be impaired or impeded unless he was allowed to become a party” and that his interest would not otherwise be adequately represented. Therefore, the Court granted Hartman’s motion.

UPDATE: The Chancery Court, in a letter decision of April 23, 2009, denied a motion for reargument in this matter in which all parties appear pro se. The arguments in the motion referred to documents outside the record that were not submitted to the court, but instead the pro se  moving party submitted what the court described as a "blunderbuss of correspondence... with regularity" to the court, which was not a substitute for the prerequisites pursuant to Rule 59(f).
 

Chancery Court Rejects "For Now" a Class Action Settlement in Countrywide Shareholder Litigation

In re Countrywide Corporation Shareholders Litigation, Del. Ch., C.A. No 3464-VCN (March 31, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his following review of this case.

In this Chancery Court decision, Vice Chancellor Noble  denied “for the time being” an application to certify a class and approve a stipulated settlement because the settlement would have improperly eliminated some investors’ claims for common law fraud.

After the January 11, 2008, announcement of Countrywide’s proposed merger with Bank of America Corporation (“BOA”), Countrywide stockholders brought an action seeking to enjoin the merger, alleging breach of fiduciary duties by the individual director-defendants of Countrywide and aiding and abetting charges against BOA. Ultimately, a settlement was negotiated whereby the class claims would be dismissed in return for additional disclosures; there was no additional monetary consideration.

Background Facts

Starting in the summer of 2007, in what has become an all-too-familiar scenario, Countrywide started experiencing financial difficulties due to, among other things, increased rates of loan defaults on residential mortgages, foreclosures due to subprime mortgages, and the need for capital and liquidity. Countrywide entered into an agreement in August 2007 with BOA to secure additional funding. BOA invested $2 billion in Countrywide and in return BOA received numerous benefits in addition to a 16% stake in Countrywide. The crisis continued to worsen. Countrywide’s stock price continued to fall and bankruptcy rumors surfaced. The situation was dire so Countrywide went back to BOA for a potential transaction and on January 11, 2008, Countrywide announced that it had entered into a merger agreement with BOA. On June 25, 2008, Countrywide’s shareholders voted to approve the merger which closed on July 1, 2008.

Class Action Allegations and Settlement

After the merger announcement, stockholder actions were filed alleging that the Countrywide Board had breached its fiduciary duties by: (i) agreeing to a merger which did not provide fair and adequate consideration; (ii) discouraging other bidders from making an offer; (iii) issuing a false and misleading preliminary proxy statement; (iv) agreeing to provisions in the merger agreement that allegedly insulated Countrywide’s directors and officers from liability for breaches of fiduciary duty raised in pending derivative actions; and (v) entering into the merger agreement without adequately valuing certain pending derivative claims. Within days of the plaintiffs moving for a preliminary injunction, the parties reached an agreement to settle the consolidated actions by providing additional disclosures which occurred on May 28, 2008 and releasing the defendants from a wide range of potential claims. A Stipulation of Settlement was filed on June 13, 2008 requesting Court approval. The parties also stipulated to the propriety of certifying a non-opt-out class pursuant to Court of Chancery Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1) or (b)(2). Several shareholders objected emphasing the limited benefits of the proposed settlement to the shareholders and the broad release of claims. In addition, one objector challenged the appropriateness of a certification without an opportunity to opt-out.

The Federal Objectors and “Two Novel Theories”

Objections to the settlement were raised by five former Countrywide shareholders (the “Federal Objectors”) who were plaintiffs in a Federal Court action brought in California against Countrywide. The Federal Objectors lost standing in California Federal Court to pursue the derivative claims after the close of the merger because under Delaware law, “a merger which eliminates a derivative plaintiff’s ownership of shares of the corporation for whose benefit she has sued terminates her standing to pursue those derivative claims.”

To avoid the impact of Delaware law, the Federal Objectors raised what the Vice Chancellor called “two novel theories of direct liability, both of which they argue have value equal to that of the derivative claims and, thereby, render the proposed settlement fundamentally unfair.” Without any supporting case law, the Federal Objectors argued that the Countrywide directors had a fiduciary duty to: (i) value the derivative claims pending against them at the time the merger was negotiated; and (ii) preserve that value “either by extracting additional consideration from BOA or by assigning the derivative claims to a litigation trust that could pursue the claims for the benefit of Countrywide’s shareholders.” The Vice Chancellor, however, was not persuaded.

In discussing the applicable law, the Vice Chancellor noted that because this merger was a stock-for-stock transaction of two widely-held corporations, the Countrywide board’s decisions surrounding the merger were subject to the protections of the business judgment rule. Moreover, the Court noted that the presumption protects a board-approved transaction unless the plaintiff can show that a majority of the directors were self-interested, lacked independence, were grossly negligent in failing to inform themselves, or that the transaction can be attributed to no rational business purpose. The Court concluded that the Federal Objectors had failed to demonstrate “any facts suggesting their claims could overcome the insulating effects of the business judgment rule.” Therefore, the Court overruled the Federal Objectors’ objections.

The SRM Objectors

SRM Global Fund Limited Partnership (“SRM”) challenged the propriety of class certification by arguing that its common law fraud claims for money damages were individual and thus “predominate over the equitable relief found in the Delaware Complaint.” SRM also argued that “to foreclose the individual common law fraud claims of SRM by virtue of certification of a class action and approval of the Proposed Settlement would violate due process.”

For factual support, SRM pointed to January 14, 2008 when, just days after the merger was announced, Kenneth Lewis , the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and President of BOA, in a speech to the Delaware State Chamber of Commerce, dismissed rumors of Countrywide’s impending bankruptcy and asserted that Countrywide “had a very impressive liquidity plan [and] backup lines in place.” SRM claimed that these Lewis Statements were false and that this misrepresentation induced SRM to hold, rather than sell, its shares of Countrywide which resulted in losses of $80 million. As a result, SRM alleged that its common law fraud claims arising out of the Lewis Statements were uniquely individual, not shared by the named plaintiffs and the plaintiffs could not adequately raise them so they should not be dismissed.

Vice Chancellor Noble agreed, finding that it was “improper to include SRM’s individual claims based on the Lewis Statements within the reach of the class action and the scope of the proposed release precludes both class certification and approval of the proposed settlement.”

Almost Approved But Denied For Now – With Options

Vice Chancellor Noble found that “except for the matters raised in the SRM Objections related to the Lewis Statements, the Court would certify the defined class of former Countrywide stockholders.” Moreover, the Court found that except for “the problems with the scope of the release, the settlement … would be approved.” While the Court denied the plaintiffs application for class certification and approval of the settlement for now, he did note that the parties had a number of options including (1) amending the class structure to allow for opt-out rights; (2) amending the release contained in the Proposed Settlement to carve out the common law fraud claims with respect to the Lewis Statements; or (3) abandoning their efforts to settle this litigation altogether.


 

Chancery Court Considers Evidence Outside Operating Agreement to Determine Membership of LLC for Purpose of Books and Records Demand Under Section 18-805 of LLC Act

 Mickman v. American International Processing, L.L.C., et al,  (Del. Ch., C. A. No. 3869-VCP, April 1, 2009),  read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the benefit of his analysis of this case.

In this Chancery Court decision, Vice Chancellor Parsons addressed the issue of what evidence the Court might would consider in determining who had standing under 6 Del. C. § 18-305 to inspect the books and records of a Delaware limited liability company.

No Evidence of Membership in Operating Agreement

Defendant LFF, L.L.C. (“LFF”) moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff was not entitled to inspect the books and records of LFF because she was not a member or manager of LFF. Defendant LFF argued that there was no record evidence in the company’s documents to show that plaintiff had any interest in LFF. Plaintiff responded by referring to documents signed by Richard Mickman (plaintiff’s ex-husband) and Howard Gleit, the only two members of LFF listed in the LLC operating agreement initially. In particular, plaintiff identified a 2001 tax return for LFF, which in the Schedule K-1 for each member, listed the members as Howard Gleit and [plaintiff and her ex-husband]. In addition, before they were divorced, plaintiff’s ex-husband “signed under penalty of perjury an Offer in Compromise to the IRS on or about February 9, 2002, in which he stated that his ‘only assets are his house . . . and stock in a number of closely held companies owned jointly by Taxpayer and his wife.’ ”

Should LLCs Get the Same Treatment as Corporations?

Under 6 Del. C. § 18-305, “[e]ach member of a limited liability company has the
right . . . to obtain from the limited liability company from time to time upon reasonable
demand for any purpose reasonably related to the member’s interest as a member of the
[LLC] . . . [various records of the LLC].” LFF argued that it had a formal operating agreement and that neither that agreement nor any amendments to it listed plaintiff as a member of LFF. LFF also argued that the Court should treat an LLC like a corporation in connection with a demand for inspection of books and records. For a corporation, only stockholders listed in the stock ledger are recognized as holders of record of stock for purposes of a request for books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. LFF argued that the Court should extend that reasoning to LLCs such that “only members listed in an LLC’s operating agreement, where a written agreement exists, should be recognized as members with a right to inspect books and records under Section 18-305.”

To support its argument, LFF cited Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d 464 (Del. 1995), where the Delaware Supreme held that “a party who supplied equity to a stock corporation, but who was not a stockholder of record, had no right to inspect the corporation’s books and records under Delaware common law or under Section 220.”

Vice Chancellor Parsons concluded, however, that there was nothing in that case to suggest, “by analogy or otherwise, that the inspection rights of members of an LLC under Section 18-305 should be limited strictly to persons named as members in the operating agreement.” (citing the decision in Shaw where Court limited the holding to stock corporations.)

Evidence Outside the Operating Agreement Considered?

Vice Chancellor Parsons stated that “LLCs generally are created on a less
formal basis than corporations and are basically creatures of contract.” Based on the
flexible and less formal nature of LLCs, the Court noted that “it is reasonable to consider evidence beyond the four corners of the operating agreement, where, as here, the plaintiff has presented admissible evidence that, notwithstanding the language of the operating agreement, that suggests the parties to the agreement intended to make, and believed they had made, the plaintiff a member of the LLC.”

Summary Judgment Denied

While there was no dispute that the LFF operating agreement did not list plaintiff as a member, there was evidence that the representations about plaintiff’s membership were mistakes. As a result, the Court denied LFF’s motion for summary judgment.
 

Vice Chancellor Lamb to Retire from Chancery Court

Vice Chancellor Lamb of the Delaware Chancery Court has notified the Governor of Delaware that he would not seek reappointment after his 12-year term expires in July 2009.

Chancery Clarifies Limitations on Contractual Waiver of Duties in Corporations v. LLCs

Sutherland v. Sutherland, 2009 WL 750287 (Del. Ch., March 23, 2009).

Professor Larry Ribstein, a nationally recognized expert on LLCs, provides an analysis of this Chancery Court opinion which demonstrates how one can waive duties in the LLC format but such waivers are more limited in the corporate context.

Following is an excerpt from the good professor's post.

The court refused to apply the provision  [in the parties agreement] to treat interested directors as disinterested for purposes of immunizing interested transactions from Delaware's entire fairness analysis. The court said (emphasis added):

The question * * * is whether such a far-reaching provision would be enforceable under Delaware law. It would not. If the meaning of the above provision were as the defendants suggest, it would effectively eviscerate the duty of loyalty for corporate directors as it is generally understood under Delaware law. While such a provision is permissible under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, where freedom of contract is the guiding and overriding principle, it is expressly forbidden by the DGCL. Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL provides that a corporate charter may contain a provision eliminating or limiting personal liability of a director for money damages in a suit for breach of fiduciary duty, so long as such provision does not affect director liability for “any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders....

In other words, if you want to completely opt out, you have to use an uncorporation. In corporations, freedom of contract is not, by negative implication, the "guiding and overriding principle."

This is not form over substance because there are meaningful differences between uncorporations and corporations. Here's more on that.

Read the whole post, and links to Professor Ribstein's related writings on the topic, here.

Six other Chancery Court decisions involving the same (or affilated) parties as in this case, are collected and summarized here.

Chancery Court Determines Third-Party Consents Can Thwart Purchase Agreement Resulting in Significant Damage Awards

West Willow-Bay Court, LLC v. Robino-Bay Court Plaza, LLC,  Del. Ch., No. 2742-VCN (Feb. 23, 2009), read opinion here.

Danielle Blount, an associate in our Delaware office, prepared the following summary of the case.

In this post-trial opinion, the Delaware Court of Chancery determined the appropriate damage award where Defendant breached a purchase agreement by its failure to secure a third party’s consent.

West Willow Bay Court, LLC (“West Willow”) entered into a Purchase Agreement with Robino-Bay Court Plaza, LLC and Robino-Bay Court, LLC (collectively “Robino”) to acquire a pad site in the Bay Court Plaza Shopping center in Dover, Delaware (the “Property”). West Willow’s only interest in the Property was to develop and lease the Property to Wawa. West Willow entered into a lease agreement with Wawa for the use of the Property (the “Wawa lease”). The Wawa lease was structured as a triple net ground lease, assuring a long term and predictable cash flow. West Willow’s plan upon the Purchase Agreement proceeding to closing was to sell the Property, subject to the Wawa lease, on the Section 1031 exchange market. However, a tenant in the shopping center, Value City, withheld it’s consent to any development of the Property for the purposes proposed by West Willow. Value City’s lease with Robino allowed it to reasonably withhold it’s consent to the proposed development although third party consents were not explicitly addressed in the Wawa lease. Notably, the Wawa lease was amended three times in an attempt to give West Willow and Wawa more time to secure municipal approvals.

During this time, Robino continued to ask for Value City’s consent to develop the site pursuant to the Wawa lease. Although Value City was open to negotiations, these talks faltered. On August 23, 2006, Robino’s counsel sent a letter to West Willow stating that the consent was not obtained. In addition, the letter stated that if West Willow proceeded to closing “it must do so in light of the non-consent” and “provide an indemnification and hold harmless from any claim made or action commenced” by Value City. In response, West Willow refused to agree to any of the conditions outlined by Robino. Once again, Robino commenced negotiations with Value City. West Willow offered to assist Robino in meeting the cost of the tenant’s requested concessions, but the negotiations failed.

Upon Value City’s termination of negotiations with Robino, West Willow was notified that Value City’s consent would not be obtained. Thereafter, West Willow learned that WaWa remained interested in leasing the property. There was evidence that Robino proposed to deal directly with Wawa. Based upon these facts, the Court determined that Robino failed to secure Value City’s consent in breach of the Purchase Agreement. This failure frustrated West Willow’s expectation and effectively precluded consummation of the transaction.

Damage Phase

During the damage phase of the trial, the Court determined that three issues predominated:

1) Date of Breach; 2) Fair Market Value of Damages and 3) Award of Attorney’s Fees Under the Purchase Agreement.

In Delaware, the standard remedy for Breach of Contract is based upon the reasonable expectations of the partie ex ante. Because contract damages are based on the injured party’s expectation interest, the extent of the loss is determined is reference to the plaintiff’s particular circumstances.

I. The Breach Date

The Court determined that Robino repudiated its obligation to secure Value City’s consent on two occasions. The first repudiation occurred on August 23, 2006 when West Willow offered to share some of the cost of the potential concessions to Value City. “As a consequence, West Willow cannot be said to have accepted this first repudiation or materially change its position by relying upon it.”

After learning of the second repudiation on November 6, 2006, West Willow chose not to respond and choose to file suit on February 21, 2007. Since Robino conceded that if a breach occurred, it would have occurred with the commencement of the action. The Court was relieved from considering what effect, if any, West Willows forms of relief (specific performance and damages) may have had in determining the date of breach.

II. The Property’s Fair Market Value

Four experts offered opinions regarding valuation and damages. While various methodologies were submitted for the Court’s review, Vice Chancellor Noble, was “tasked with weighing the experts’ testimony” and determined that the lease fee interest analysis was the most appropriate measure of value. The Court reasoned that West Willow intended to lease the property to WaWa and even negotiated a lease agreement with rent schedules. Further, the Court reasoned that West Willow aimed to close on the property, lease it pursuant to the Wawa lease and sell it quickly on the Section 1031 exchange market.

The Court used the January 2007 valuation of the property of $1,408,450 with a discounted cash flow analysis rate of 9.0% based upon a third quarter 2007 average discount rate of 9.55%.

In sum, the Court determined that the fair market value of the property as it was intended to be used by West Willow was $1,350,000. as of the date of the breach minus the purchase price established by the Purchase Agreement of $725,000 thus totaling $625,000. Although Robino attempted to argue that West Willow failed to mitigate losses, the Court determined that reasonable, although unsuccessful, steps to mitigate were taken.

Attorney’s Fees

Delaware generally follows the American rule where each party is obligated to pay their own attorney’s fees regardless of the outcome. “However, where the parties have determined the allocation of fees by private ordering, departure from this general rule and difference to their agreement are warranted.” Additionally “considerations of justice and equity may inform the analysis.”

Relying on paragraph 22 of the Purchase Agreement which provided “[i]n the event legal action is instituted…the prevailing party will be entitled…reasonable attorney’s fees” the court determined that West Willow prevailed on the substantive breach of contract claim.

Relying on Comrie v. Enterasys Networks, Inc., 2004 WL 936505 at *2-3, the Court determined that whether a party prevailed in a case is determined by reference to substantive issues, not damages. “The crux of the case was the Court’s conclusion that Robino was unconditionally obligated to secure the consent; the form and extent of the remedy were important but decidedly secondary issues.” “Thus, because West Willow prevailed on the litigation’s chief issue the proper interpretation of the Purchase Agreement . . entitled [West Willow] to its reasonable [attorney’s fees] fees.”

 

Chancery Court Dismisses Suit for Breach of Non-Competition Covenant Due to Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Mobile Diagnostic Group Holdings, LLC v. Suer,  Del. Ch., No. 4298-CC (March 24, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, provides us with the following review of this decision.

Chancellor Chandler dismissed this action seeking to enforce the terms of non-competition covenants that defendant Suer allegedly agreed to in connection with the sale of his employer to plaintiffs. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court agreed concluding that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing that there is a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Delaware or that the defendant consented to personal jurisdiction.

This dispute arises out of a number of agreements: (i) an employment agreement between plaintiff Kan-Di-Ki- Incorporated (the “Company”), a provider of mobile diagnostic laboratory and x-ray services, and defendant sales professional, Suer; (ii) a Purchase Agreement regarding the sale of the Company which was signed by certain plaintiffs and Suer; and (iii) a Consulting Agreement between Suer and plaintiff DL Holdings. Plaintiff DL Holdings terminated Suer on November 6, 2008 and on January 13, 2009, Suer’s attorneys notified plaintiffs that they intended to advise Suer that he was not bound by the non-competition covenants in the Purchase Agreement. Plaintiffs filed suit on January 16, 2009 and Suer moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Two-Part Test to Determine Personal Jurisdiction

Chancellor Chandler applied a two-prong analysis to determine whether the plaintiffs satisfied their burden of showing a basis for personal jurisdiction in Delaware over a nonresident defendant: (i) whether there was a basis for jurisdiction under Delaware’s long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104; and (ii) whether subjecting the nonresident to jurisdiction in Delaware violates the minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is a personal right that can be obviated by express or implied consent to jurisdiction, the Court’s analysis turned to whether there was an express or implied waiver by Suer.

Consent

Plaintiffs argued that there was implied waiver because Suer “consented” to jurisdiction in Delaware with respect to claims arising out of the Purchase Agreement when he signed the service of process provision in the Purchase Agreement. This provision provided that “each party may be served with process in any manner permitted under Delaware Law….” The Court rejected that argument because the service of process provision in the Purchase Agreement was “an independent and separate provision, not rendered superfluous by a lack of consent to jurisdiction in Delaware.” The Court also referred to § 12.12 of the Purchase Agreement, which included language that indicated that the parties to the Purchase Agreement agreed to be subject to jurisdiction in a court “having jurisdiction over the parties and the matter.” That provision did not specify which court(s) would have such jurisdiction. However, it was clear to Chancellor Chandler that “the parties contemplated the issue of jurisdiction in the contract and chose not to include a provision whereby the parties consented to personal jurisdiction in any particular forum. Rather, the parties agreed to be subject to jurisdiction in a court ‘having jurisdiction over the parties.’”  As a result, the Court concluded that there was no evidence to find that Suer had consented to personal jurisdiction in Delaware.

Long-Arm Statute

Under Delaware’s long-arm statute, Delaware courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant for a claim that “arises from” a “jurisdictional act” enumerated in the statute. Plaintiffs argue that Suer is subject to specific jurisdiction under § 3104(c)(1), which confers jurisdiction over a nonresident who “[t]ransacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State. Plaintiffs argue that § 3104(c)(1) confers jurisdiction over Suer because he signed and participated in negotiations regarding the Purchase Agreement. The Court disagreed finding that “[i]t is well settled law that a contract between a Delaware corporation and a nonresident to . . . transact business outside Delaware, which has been negotiated without any contacts with this State, cannot alone serve as a basis for personal jurisdiction over the nonresident for actions arising out of that contract.”

Plaintiffs then attempted to match the facts of this case with the factual setting in In re General Motors (Hughes) Shareholder Litigation, 2005 WL 1089021 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005), where an action was brought regarding breaches of fiduciary duty (as opposed to breaches of contract as here). That Court found that jurisdiction was proper where the defendant, a South Australian corporation “negotiat[ed] and engag[ed] in a transaction between itself, an indirect Delaware subsidiary . . . and another Delaware corporation . . . in which Delaware law was to be applied”, and the transaction included “necessary acts by the parties in furtherance of that transaction [which] would be taken in Delaware.” Chancellor Chandler determined that Delaware’s interest in providing a forum for claims regarding the internal affairs of Delaware corporations justified concluding in General Motors that the relatively minor act of filing the Certificate of Merger in Delaware constituted a basis for personal jurisdiction in Delaware.

In this case, the plaintiffs contended that the creation of the entities that were used to acquire the Company constituted a jurisdiction-conferring act in Delaware. Chancellor Chandler disagreed finding that Suer’s involvement with the Purchase Agreement and his connection to the alleged jurisdiction-conferring act were not sufficient to support the conclusion that Suer transacted business in Delaware within the meaning of § 3104(c)(1) and to hold otherwise would constitute an “unwarranted extension of the holding in General Motors.” Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to establish a sufficient nexus between Suer and the alleged jurisdiction-conferring act in Delaware.

As a result of the above, the Court dismissed the claims against Suer but said that the plaintiffs were free to pursue their claims against Suer in a court that has jurisdiction over the parties and the matter.


 

Chancery Court Allows Counterclaim in Dissolution Case

In Re Ech, LLC, and In Re Ech Management, LLC, (Del. Ch., March 12, 2009), read short letter decision here.  The procedural noteworthiness of this ruling is that the Chancery Court refused to dismiss a counterclaim  by one member of the LLC in this dispute involving other members of an LLC seeking a dissolution under Section 18-802 of the Delaware LLC Act.

 

 

 

Chancery Court Drills Down and Dismisses Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim in Dispute about Oil and Gas Exploration Investments

Addy v. Piedmonte, et al., Del. Ch., No. 3571-VCP (March 18, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Wilmington lawyer, prepared the following review of this case:

In this Chancery Court decision, Vice Chancellor Parsons dismissed a claim for breach of fiduciary duty in a case with a complex fact pattern involving oil and gas exploration participation agreements, guarantees and notes.

The Court, in a 57-page opinion, addressed a multitude of issues raised by the eleven-count complaint against eleven defendants where the Court characterized the relationships among the parties under the various contracts as, “at best, murky.” In the pending motion, six of the defendants (the “Moving Defendants”) moved to dismiss eight claims for breach of contract, breach of guaranties, fraud and equitable fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and for equitable relief, including specific performance, an accounting, a constructive or resulting trust, and an equitable lien. The Court summed up the factual quagmire by noting “[this] dispute involves the interrelationship of several written contracts each purporting to integrate fully the agreement among the parties with the terms of notes that were described in summary fashion in informal documents, but never formally issued.”

The Court discussed the language of the Participation Agreements and issues related to them including the parties’ intentions, extrinsic evidence, the parol evidence rule and the concept of integration.

The Concept of Integration in Contract Law

With respect to arguments about integration of the contracts in this case, the Court noted:

Clauses indicating that the contract is an expression of the parties’ final intentions generally create a presumption of integration. Courts, however, may consider extrinsic evidence to discern if the contract is completely or partially integrated. Furthermore, in determining whether a contract is fully integrated, the Court focuses on whether it is carefully and formally drafted, whether it addresses the questions that would naturally arise out of the subject matter, and whether it expresses the final intentions of the parties.

With respect to the only claim that was dismissed by the Court (Count VIII Breach of Fiduciary Duty), the Court noted that in early 2006, two defendants, Piedmonte and Stover offered, at approximately the same time, separate investment opportunities to plaintiff. Within three months, the plaintiff, a sophisticated investor, contributed cash to the two investments in an aggregate amount exceeding $3 million. Pursuant to agreements with two of the defendant LLCs, the plaintiff directly provided money to those defendants, which undertook to purchase participation units in the investments from two of the Westside defendants in exchange for notes. The $3 million eventually found its way to two entities, each of which are owned 50% by an entity controlled by Piedmonte and 50% by an entity controlled by Stover.

Creation of Fiduciary Relationship Alleged

In Count VIII, the plaintiff claimed that Stover breached a fiduciary duty with respect to these commercial contracts by inducing his participation in those investments and engaging in self-dealing by retaining a portion of the plaintiff’s cash contribution. On this point, Vice Chancellor Parsons noted:

Under Delaware law, a fiduciary relationship arises where one person places special trust in another or where one person has a special duty to protect the interests of another. Generally, the fiduciary enjoys a position of superiority in knowledge or expertise upon which the other person relies. A fiduciary relationship requires confidence reposed by one side and domination and influence exercised by the other.

Based upon the above, the Court found that Stover did not owe a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff because the Participation Agreements included provisions under which the plaintiff represented that he conducted an independent investigation into Westside, including its business and financial welfare, and that he did not rely on any statements made or investigations performed by other entities.

Fiduciary Relationships v. Commercial Relationships

The Court also discussed the concerns of extending the fiduciary duty doctrine to ordinary commercial transactions:

[I]t is vitally important that the exacting standards of fiduciary duties not be extended to quotidian commercial relationships. This is true both to protect participants in such normal market activities from unexpected sources of liability against which they were unable to protect themselves and, perhaps more important, to prevent an erosion of the exacting standards applied by courts of equity to persons found to stand in a fiduciary relationship to others.

Bargained-for commercial relationships between sophisticated parties do not give rise to fiduciary duties. In addition, this Court is chary of expanding the scope of fiduciary duty to a broad set of commercial relationships which traditionally has been regulated by normal market conditions, rather than the scrupulous concerns of equity for persons in special relationships of trust and confidence.

The Court found that the plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase participation units in the two projects at issue after he had ample opportunity to review their terms and negotiate new terms if required before contributing any money. Thus, the plaintiff’s claim that Stover breached his fiduciary duties was without merit, and as a result, it was dismissed.

 

Article on Good Faith in Corporate Law Co-Authored by Member of Delaware Court of Chancery

A paper on the role of good faith in corporate governance was recently penned by leading practitioners of Delaware corporate law, including one member of the Delaware Court of Chancery. The Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Forum highlights the article here.

An excerpt follows:

In the paper, the authors outline their views as follows:

We conclude, consistent with the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stone v. Ritter, that in the American corporate law tradition, the basic definition of the duty of loyalty is the obligation to act in good faith to advance the best interests of the corporation. What this article also shows is that the duty of loyalty has traditionally been conceived of as being much broader than the duty to avoid acting for personal financial advantage. The duty of loyalty also precludes acting for unlawful purposes, and affirmatively requires directors to make a good faith effort to monitor the corporation’s affairs and compliance with law.

The full title is: "Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law.”  It was co-authored by Leo E. Strine, Jr., who is a Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery and Senior Fellow of the Program of Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School, and by Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti and Jeffrey M. Gorris.
 

Chancery Court Stays Delaware Action in Favor of California Federal Actions

Langford v. Barnholt and KLA-Tencor Corp., No. 2295-VCL (Del. Ch., March 17, 2009), read letter ruling here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator, has prepared the following review of this case.

In this Chancery Court opinion,  Vice Chancellor Lamb revisited a decision in this case that had been in place since August 2008 when the Court stayed the action pending the outcome of the motion to terminate filed by KLA-Tencor Corporation's Special Litigation Committee in the related federal derivative actions in California. Because the California court recently denied that motion, the Chancery Court turned to the remaining arguments made by defendants in their pending motion to dismiss. First, the Court addressed Count II in the Delaware action because that count was not part of the federal action. The plaintiffs had plead Count II (a claim for equity dilution due to improper stock option backdating) as a class claim but Vice Chancellor Lamb found that the claim was clearly a derivative claim under established Delaware precedent which stated that absent a controlling shareholder, a claim for equity dilution must be pleaded as a derivative claim. Moreover, since the plaintiff has alleged neither the existence of a controlling shareholder nor any harm independent from the alleged harm to the corporation, the Court found that Count II cannot be maintained as an individual or class action so it must be dismissed.

With respect to the remaining counts in the Complaint, the Court determined that under McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Engineering Co., 263 A. 2d 281 (Del. 1970) and its progeny as applied in the context of representative litigation, the Delaware action should be stayed -- all of the five federal actions in California were filed before the Delaware action, all six actions arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts (the federal actions actually covered a longer time frame and a broader set of claims), all of the parties to the Delaware action save one are included in the federal actions and the federal court in California is capable of providing prompt and complete justice. 

UPDATE: The Wall Street Journal online picked up this post here.
 

 

Chancery Court Orders Specific Performance of Lease Terms

D Gyms, LLC v. Robino-Bay Court Plaza, LLC, Del. Ch., No. 3649-VCN, (Jan. 15, revised on Feb. 12, 2009), read letter opinion here.

This Chancery Court letter decision ordered specific performance of the terms of a shopping center lease relating to signage space allowed for the tenant. 

Chancery Court Approves Yahoo Settlement

In Re Yahoo! Shareholders Litigation, (Del. Ch., March 6, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Wilmington litigator, prepared this review of the short letter decision.

Chancellor Chandler issued a letter opinion today approving the In Re Yahoo! Shareholders Litigation class action and derivative action settlement, awarding plaintiffs $8.4 million in attorneys' fees plus expenses. The Court found that the plaintiffs had met the Sugarland factors (plaintiffs spent 5,500 attorney hours in a hotly contested litigation that they took on a contingent fee basis.) The settlement resulted in "the elimination of the dead-hand provision that would have prevented a new slate of directors from changing the severance plan and effectively curtailed the employee severance plan, significantly lowering the cost to acquire Yahoo of any potential buyer." The plaintiffs had asked for $12 million in fees; defendants argued that the plaintiffs' fee should be $1 million. The Court found that the plaintiffs had bestowed a sufficient benefit to Yahoo's shareholders in a case that "substantially parallels" the facts in Minneapolis Firefighters' Relief Ass'n v. Ceridan, C.A. No. 2996-CC, tr. at 27 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 2008).
 

Chancery Court Hears Injunction Motion in Genentech/Roche Imbroglio

A hearing on a motion for an injunction is now being held in the Delaware Chancery Court in the tug-of-war between Genentech and Roche, and one can watch the proceedings live online via www.courtroomview.com

Here is an article with background details on the dispute.

UPDATE: The court intimated at about 3:30pmEST that "at this early stage of the tender offer" it was unlikely that, based on what was before it so far, that there was a sufficient basis for it to enjoin the tender offer. In addition, the parties told the court that they would try to work out a resolution or provide additional details on "unclear facts" before the court could make a formal, final ruling.

 Supplement: Here is an article from the AmLaw Daily that picked-up this post.

Rohm and Haas v. Dow Chemical Trial in Delaware Chancery Court Available Live Online

The big trial in this case starts tomorrow, Monday, March 9 (assuming no settlement) in the Delaware Chancery Court in Georgetown and will be available to watch live online via www.courtroomview.com  Of course, there is a charge for the service and details are available at the foregoing link. I have been told that they will provide me a short video clip of the trial that I will post on this blog page soon after I receive it.

Here are posts on several pre-trial rulings in the case as well as some background.

UPDATE: Professor Davidoff has an update here on the potential settlement and related issues. My blog post was picked-up here by The Wall Street Journal's online edition.

SETTLEMENT DETAILS: The settlement of the case was reported here and for those who want to view a 3-minute video clip of Chancellor Chandler reading the Order into the record with the settlement terms, courtesy of www.courtroomview.com, see this link.

Chancery Court Rejects BASF's Claim to be Bought out of Partnership Involving Lyondell

BASF Corp. v. POSM II Properties Partnership, L.P., (Del. Ch., Mar. 3, 2009), read opinion here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator,  prepared the following review of the case.

In this Chancery Court  decision, Vice Chancellor Strine dismissed an action brought by BASF Corporation, seeking to withdraw from defendant POSM II Limited Partnership, L.P. and have its interest in the Partnership bought out. The Court concluded that “the plain language of the withdrawal provision [in the agreement] does not entitle BASF to have its interest bought out simply because Lyondell has experienced a change of control. Rather, BASF only has the right to withdraw if Lyondell or one of its affiliates is no longer operating the plant.”

Under the Partnership Agreement, BASF had a contractual right to withdraw if Lyondell Chemical Company (or one of Lyondell’s affiliates) no longer operated the Partnership’s chemical plant in Texas. In its complaint, BASF argued that the December 2007 purchase of Lyondell, which was then a public company, by Basell AF S.C.A. changed this situation and triggered BASF’s contractual right to have its interest in the Partnership bought out by the general partner, POSM II Properties. BASF claimed that the buy out was triggered either because: (1) Lyondell had experienced a change in control which meant that Lyondell was no longer operating the chemical plant; or (2) LyondellBasell Industries AF S.C.A., Lyondell’s new parent company, was operating the Plant rather than Lyondell. Defendant POSM II Properties and the Partnership argued that the partnership agreement gave BASF no rights upon a change in control of Lyondell and that BASF had not adequately pled that Lyondell no longer operated the plant.

Vice Chancellor Strine in a 22-page opinion, agreed with the defendants. In referring to the specific section of the agreement, the Court noted:

Section 14(b) is only triggered if POSM II Properties ‘becomes aware that the Plant no longer is to be operated by [Lyondell] or its Affiliates.’ On its face, this asks a simple question: is Lyondell or one of its affiliates operating the Plant? Notwithstanding this obvious interpretation, BASF advances a strained reading of § 14(b) to argue that a change in control of the operator of the Plant means that there was a change in the operator itself.

Vice Chancellor Strine then noted that if BASF (or its predecessor in the agreement) wanted language consistent with what it was arguing for, it could have done that using a method that is “far more straightforward that § 14(b); it involves a change of control provision that vests certain rights in one contractual party if the other experiences a change of control as defined by the contract.”

In a theme that has become all too common in the Court of Chancery recently, Vice Chancellor Strine noted that if the parties to the agreement had reached a bargain to give BASF a right to walk away and be bought out upon a change of control, “one would have expected them to use the common technique and do that explicitly.”

Delaware law does not invest judicial officers with the power to creatively rewrite unambiguous contracts in this manner. By its plain terms, § 14(b) is not a change of control provision. Although § 14(b) contains the phrase “change in operation,” § 14(b) is not concerned with any and all changes in operation, but only a specific, albeit important, change. Section 14(b) is only triggered in the event that “the Plant no longer is to be operated by [Lyondell] or its Affiliates.” Putting to the side the question of whether LyondellBasell is an affiliate of Lyondell, the mere fact that Lyondell now has a single stockholder — LyondellBasell — rather than a disaggregated group of public stockholders, does not mean that Lyondell has stopped operating the Plant within the meaning of § 14(b).

With respect to the second issue raised by BASF — that LyondellBasell — Lyondell’s parent company — now operates the Plant, rather than Lyondell itself, Vice Chancellor Strine found that BASF had failed to meet its burden because of its “conclusory allegations” that were not supported by any pled facts.

 

Chancery Denies Request for Receiver; Insolvency Not Proven

Banet, et al. v. Fonds de Régulation et de Contrôle Café Cacao, et al., (Del. Ch., Feb. 18, 2009), read letter decision here.  A prior decision in this case was summarized here.

Danielle Blount, an associate in our Wilmington office, provided the following review of the case.

A “scant two years” after the Court of Chancery’s prior decision in this case seemingly resolved the parties’ disputes, Chancellor Chandler described this latest iteration of the parties' imbroglio as “déjà vu all over again.”  The Plaintiffs, Hausmann-Alain Banet, (“Banet”) and, Lion Capital Management, LLC (“LLM”), (collectively “Plaintiffs”) moved for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative, for summary judgment as to Count I of their amended complaint involving the request for appointment of a receiver. The Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment because Plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant company New York Chocolate and Confections Company, Inc., (“NYCCC”) was insolvent. In the alternative, Plaintiff also failed to prove that NYCCC faced an “imminent threat of great loss.”

The Court noted that the “material facts” were “vigorously disputed.” Leaving a “murky picture of the factual situation” that involved much “conjecture and finger-pointing.” Although Plaintiffs faced an uphill battle in their attempt to prove insolvency because “insolvency is a jurisdictional fact, proof of which must be clear, convincing, and free from doubt”  and would have had to prevail on the following criteria:

In determining insolvency under Section 291 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (1) liabilities must exceed assets or (2) there must be an inability to pay current obligations in the ordinary course of business. Plaintiffs failed to establish that NYCCC’s liabilities exceeded its assets because NYCCC’s assets totaled $5,195,102.04, which far exceeded their stated liabilities of $1,980,040.99. The Court determined that NYCCC maintained a “positive asset to liabilities ratio.” Additionally, Plaintiffs failed to prove that NYCCC could not pay its current obligations in the ordinary course of business. NYCCC provided evidence of its “new found financial stability”. Therefore, Plaintiffs were unable to prove that NYCCC was insolvent.

In its role as a court of equity, the Court of Chancery may exercise its equity power to appoint a receiver upon a clear showing of “fraud, mismanagement or extreme circumstance causing imminent danger of great loss.” However, the Court of Chancery has an obligation to exercise the power with great restraint. Plaintiffs failed to meet this high standard.

Chancery Court Grants Summary Judgment on Claims of Reformation of a Merger Agreement and Unjust Enrichment

In Metcap Securities LLC ,et al. v. Pearl Senior Care, Inc., et al., Del. Ch., No. 2129-VCN (Feb. 27, 2009), the Chancery Court granted summary judgment in a case involving a dispute about the payment of a $20 million fee for a financial advisor to a merger deal.  Prior decisions in this case were summarized here.

Kevin Brady, a highly respected Delaware litigator,  prepared the following review of this case.

One of the Plaintiffs, North American Senior Care, Inc. (“NASC”), a Delaware corporation formed solely for the purpose of acquiring Defendant Beverly Enterprises, Inc. (“Beverly”), entered into a merger agreement on August 16, 2005, pursuant to which Beverly would be acquired for $2 billion. Leonard Grunstein, a partner at the law firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, was a principal of NASC and a principal of the other plaintiff MetCap Securities LLC. Before the merger agreement between NASC and Beverly, MetCap had entered into an Advisory Agreement with NASC to act as NASC’s financial advisor in connection with the Beverly transaction. Under the Advisory Agreement, MetCap was to receive a $20 million fee for its services upon closing of that transaction. However, as the negotiations to finalize the merger documents were winding down, a change was made to the merger agreement by a law partner of Grunstein which in effect deleted the language that permitted MetCap to get the $20 million fee for the transaction.

NASC and MetCap filed this action to recover the $20 million fee from the Defendants. The Defendants moved for summary judgment on two issues: (1) whether NASC can reform the merger agreement and return to the earlier version of the agreement which acknowledged a potential right to compensation regarding MetCap; and (2) whether the Defendants were unjustly enriched by work performed by MetCap after the amendment to the merger agreement.

In discussing the issues, Vice Chancellor Noble went through a very detailed analysis of the plaintiff’s claim for reformation of the merger agreement. There is an interesting discussion about the role of “deal counsel” and whether Grunstein’s law partner (who made the final changes to the merger agreement, deleting the references to MetCap getting the fee), was a “dual or common” agent and thus “conflicted’ thereby having no authority to bind his principal by agreeing to the deletion. The Court decided that he was not conflicted.

The Court also went through a very detailed analysis of the Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment, including discussions about an “unclean hands” defense and whether MetCap conferred a benefit on the Defendants after the amended merger agreement. In a prior decision, the Court had determined that before the amendment to the merger agreement, MetCap’s relationship to the Beverly transaction was governed by the Advisory Agreement which would preclude an unjust enrichment claim. Vice Chancellor Noble concluded that any work done by MetCap after the amendment did not benefit the Defendants, so MetCap was not entitled to any recovery for that work.

The Defendants also argued that if MetCap had conferred a benefit upon the Defendants, it did so officiously and therefore the Defendants’ retention of the benefit was not unjust. The Court, in agreeing with the Defendants, stated that because there was no “mistake, coercion, or request” as required by the Restatement of Restitution § 112 (which Delaware has expressly adopted), any benefit which MetCap may have conferred upon the Defendants was done so officiously. As a result, the Court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the reformation issue and the unjust enrichment claim.


 

Chancery Court Denies Full Amount of Advancement Request

Underbrink v. Warrior Energy Servs. Corp., (Del Ch., Feb. 24, 2009), read opinion here. (HT: Delaware Business Litigation Report). A prior ruling is this case can be found at the following citation: Underbrink v. Warrior Energy Servs. Corp., 2008 WL 2262316 (Del. Ch., May 30, 2008)("Memo Opinion"). (As an aside, an unrelated Chancery Court decision that also addressed  the reasonableness of fees awarded in an advancement action was decided on Feb. 25, 2009 and highlighted on this blog here.)

This is an advancement action for fees and expenses and addresses disputes regarding the exact amount of advancement fees that should be paid, despite the prior determination in the Memo Opinion referred to above that there was an entitlement to advancement. One of the issues related to the exact percentage of fees incurred that were covered by the prior decision granting advancement rights. The plaintiff claimed that 63% of the fees incurred were covered but in this opinion the court awarded 30% on an interim basis. The Memo Opinion previously rendered by the court established a procedure for the parties to use a Special Master to handle ongoing disputes such as the reasonableness of fees.

Although the court delegated to the Special Master particular objections about  specific expenses, the court noted several points that should be highlighted on the issue of expenses:

  • "Neither advancement nor indemnification is appropriate for expenses that cannot be appropriately proven".
  • the request included  $19,000 for "first class airline tickets, an expense generally considered unreasonable."

The court, after explaining its reasoning, granted only half of the disputed expenses "...until such time as the Special Master can address any remaining disputes..."

Chancery Affirms Decision of Master

Cartanza v. DNREC, et al., (Del. Ch., Jan. 12, 2009), read letter decision here. This short Chancery Court decision includes a few procedural gems. For example, it discusses the standard for review of a Master's decision as being de novo, noting that the Chancery Court can review the factual record  and the court can make its own determinations without conducting a new trial. The court in this case adopted the legal reasoning of the Master.

 In addition, the court discusses issues of justiciability under the Declaratory Judgment Act.