Controlling Shareholder May Have Breached Duty By Exploiting Control Over Other Shareholders For Its Benefit

Williamson v. Cox Communications, Inc., ( read opinion online here  ).This Chancery Court case addressed whether or not two cable companies should be considered “controlling shareholders” for purposes of a transaction and if so, whether that transaction was unfair to minority shareholders and should be governed by the entire fairness standard. The court discussed the different factors that determine whether a shareholder is controlling, which can be the case even if less than 50% ownership is held. Only when the shareholder is deemed “controlling” or part of a “controlling group” will it trigger that duty to other shareholders. The court found that the complaint asserted a nexus of facts to suggest that the companies were in a controlling position over the transaction at issue and that they exploited that control for their own benefit. Thus, the Motion to Dismiss was denied.

Covenant Not To Compete May Protect the Middleman

Elite Cleaning Company, Inc. v. Capel, (  read opinion online  here   ). This Chancery Court case involved a Covenant-Not-To-Compete and a claim for wages under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act for failure to pay overtime. The plaintiff was a janitorial service. The court described the standards that apply for the enforcement of a Covenant-Not-To-Compete and was doubtful that there was a legitimate interest of the employer in enforcing a covenant against an unskilled janitor who was making little more than minimum wage. However, the janitorial service was a middleman that worked for another janitorial service and the court found precedent for protecting the role of the middleman.

If the employee were skilled and had trade secrets, there was a protectable interest to avoid disintermediation or eliminating the middleman. The court also discussed the statutory damages including attorneys’ fees and liquidated damages to which someone is entitled in a failure to pay overtime claim under Federal Fair Labor Standards Act. (There is a similar Delaware state statute that allows statutory damages for failure to pay wages due.) 

NJ Bans "Super Lawyer" Ads

In addition to summarizing Delaware Chancery Court and Supreme Court cases on business law matters, this blog also comments on legal ethics and e-discovery matters of interest. In that vein, I bring to your attention The Wall Street Journal's Law Blog report that New Jersey’s Committee on Attorney Advertising ruled this week that lawyer advertising in a publication called “New Jersey Super Lawyers” violates state rules of professional conduct. Here is the link: Law Blog: New Jersey Says “Super Lawyers” is Super Misleading

UPDATE: I just wrote an article for the upcoming issue of the publication of the  American Inns of Court, The Bencher, that discusses the above-referenced Opinion in greater detail.

UPDATE 2: On August 18, the New Jersey Supreme Court stayed the implementation of the foregoing Committee opinion until it had time to more fully consider the matter. Here is the updated article.

Supreme Court Imposes Attorneys' Fees for Bad Faith Conduct During Litigation

In Dover Historical Society, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Commission, (Del. Supreme, July 10, 2006) (read opinion online   here ), the Delaware Supreme Court continued its tradition of enforcing high standards of conduct in litigation matters. In this case the state's high court reviewed the denial of attorneys’ fees by the Superior Court in an appeal involving a developer who destroyed a historical building that was the subject of litigation. The litigation in the trial court was  pursued by the local city  in order to preserve the historical building that the developer sought to demolish. The court determined that the bad faith exception to the American rule applied (the American rule being that each side normally pays for its own fees, win or lose.)

 The noteworthy aspect of this opinion is that the imposition of fees as an exception to the American rule was based on conduct that was not by the lawyers directly and not necessarily a part of what is  "conventionally viewed" as core court proceedings. Here is the money quote from the decision: 

That construction of the bad faith exception (to require that the offensive conduct take place in the court proceeding itself) is, in our view, overly narrow. [The party's ] destruction of the buildings was a direct (albeit highly improper) response to the appellants’ filing their second petition. It is difficult to imagine conduct more abusive and disrespectful of the judicial process, than a party’s intentional destruction of the very subject matter that the lawsuit seeks to protect and preserve. Although that behavior is atypical of the conduct normally found to invoke this exception (and thankfully so), nonetheless it constitutes bad faith."  Bad faith has been found to exist (inter alia) in cases where “parties have unnecessarily prolonged or delayed litigation, falsified records, or knowingly asserted frivolous claims[,] . . . mis[led] the court, alter[ed] testimony, or chang[ed] position on an issue.”(internal citations omitted)



 

 

Preferred Stock Rights Based on Contract Principles


Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd. v. Granite Broadcasting Corporation ,   (read opinion online here. ) In this Chancery Court case the court held that a holder of redeemable preferred stock did not have standing to enjoin the sale of assets that violate the terms of an indenture and that would allegedly constitute a fraudulent conveyance. The court concluded based on the review of documents that the redeemable preferred stock at issue has not and never will give rise to a right to payment against the corporation. This is so despite new GAAP accounting rules that even according to the corporation’s own financial statements treat the preferred stock at issue in accordance with FAS 150.

Continue Reading...

Preferred Stock Rights Determined By Interpretation of Charter

Thoughtworks, Inc. v. SV Investment Partners LLC , (read opinion online here .)  In this Chancery Court decision the court interpreted a put (right to redeem) preferred stock which was made part of the Certificate of Incorporation as protection for the risk that an IPO might not be held. The court determined that there was a right to redemption of the preferred shares that would only be limited by “legally available funds.”

Internal Affairs Doctrine

Prof. Ribstein blogs about a California case that addresses whether insider trading claims should be covered by the corporate "internal affairs" rule or by the choice of law rule that applies to state securities claims. The internal affairs doctrine provides that the governance of the issues among shareholders and directors is controlled by the state of incorporation, and has been repeatedly upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court. Here is the link:Ideoblog: Insider trading and the internal affairs rule

Blogging Changes Lives

Cathy Kirkman, a Silicon Valley lawyer whose blog is called Silicon Valley Media Law, posts about a conference at which she was a panel member. The conference was reported on the front page of the San Jose Mercury News, and addresses how blogging has tranformed the lives of the bloggers on the panel. Here is the link: Silicon Valley Media Law Blog: Blogher 2006 -- on the impact of blogging

Duties of Directors of Insolvent Subsidiary

Prof. Bainbridge blogs about the recent decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware regarding the duties under Delaware law of directors of an insolvent susidiary. In re Scott Acquisition Corp., 2006 WL 1731277 (Bkrtcy. D.Del. 2006). Though he agrees with the result, the good professor cites Delaware Chancery Court decisions and his own prior articles on the topic to explain why the court should have framed the issue differently: "...the bankruptcy court should have concluded that the duties of direcors and officers of an insolvent subsidiary run to the creditors of the subsidiary."Here is the link to the thoughtful analysis with full citations:ProfessorBainbridge.com: Duties of Directors of an Insolvent Corporation

Section 220 Demand Denied As Overly Broad

Although many DGCL Section 220 cases are summarized on this blog, the following 3  unrelated Chancery Court decisions, all rendered within the last few weeks, give a good overview of some of the challenges that face one seeking books and records under Section 220 and highlight the fact that despite being a summary statutory proceeding, it is not always as simple a matter as one might be tempted to otherwise think.

Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P. v. Motient Corporation,  download fileIn this Chancery Court opinion interpreting Section 220 of the DGCL,  the entire demand for books and records was denied, after an expedited trial, due to the request being overly broad. This opinion is a helpful and instructive analysis regarding the limited scope of Section 220 in terms of the documents that are available even  if the prerequisites of the statute are satisfied--by comparison with the broader scope of discovery under Rule 34 in a conventional lawsuit.  Many Section 220 cases have been summarized on this blog (and they can be easily searched using the search function in the margin), but this case is among the better explanations for the limited scope of a Section 220 demand under the DGCL as compared with Rule 34 and the broader scope of normal discovery. 

The court also explained that in addition to the statutory prerequisites of proper purpose reasonably related to status as a shareholder, as well as a credible basis for alleged wrongdoing, there is a requirement of both good faith on which a request must be based, as well as a responsibility of the court to prevent “possible abuse of the shareholder’s right of inspection,” so that the requested inspection of books and records is limited to those necessary and essential to the satisfaction of the stated purpose.

In this particular case, there were several affiliated proceedings in other states and the court made it clear that Section 220 of the DGCL is not a way to circumvent discovery proceedings and is not meant to be a forum for the types of wide-ranging document requests permissible under Rule 34. The Chancery Court relied on the Delaware Supreme Court decision of Security First Corporation v. U.S. Die Casting and Development Company, 687 A.2d 563 (Del. 1997), which described the limited scope of discovery in a Section 220 case. 

The court also noted that the pretrial discovery in this case, before the trial on the Section 220 case, involved a deposition under Rule 30(b)(6) which was problematic in some respects. For example, the designated representative of the company was not very knowledgeable. The court cited authority for the requirement that in a 30(b)(6) deposition the entity presenting  the designated person has an affirmative duty to produce a witness who can answer questions regarding the subject matter listed in the notice and that a corporate party violates the rule when a person is sent to the deposition unequipped to participate meaningfully. 

In sum, the court rejected in its entirety the overly broad request for documents that initially was 25 pages of single-spaced type, even though the day before the Section 220 trial the list of documents requested was reduced, but not with the "rifled precision" required for demands made under the statute. A  practical lesson from this case, among others, is that if one's  Section 220 demand is too broad, one runs the risk of it being rejected in its entirety.

Section 220 Confidentiality Issues Addressed In Light of Competitive Concerns

Schoon v. Troy Corporation, download file.  This Chancery Court case involved an issue that remained after a trial pursuant to Section 220 involving the competing terms of a proposed Confidentiality Agreement. The court, as required by Section 220 the DGCL, attempted to balance the right of a stockholder to find a buyer for its shares with the legitimate interest of the company in protecting its competitive position by the disclosure of confidential financial and operating information to its principle creditors or competitors who were among the most likely potential buyers. 

A Section 220 case was filed because even though access to books and records was made available at the corporate headquarters because the parties could not agree on the terms of a Confidentiality Agreement . Although the court recognized its ability under Section 220 of the DGCL to impose restrictions to protect the corporation from having stockholders divulge confidential information to creditors and others, after trial in this case, the court determined that the demands of Troy for the terms of a Confidentiality Agreement were unreasonable. 

The court emphasized that the terms of a Shareholders Agreement did not restrict rights under Section 220 because such an attempted restriction on the statutory rights  in Section 220 would have had to expressly and clearly and affirmatively express such a waiver of rights under Section 220.

The court also found that evidence at trial supported the conclusion that the stockholder had a proper purpose to inspect the corporate books and records of Troy, i.e., to value the shares and to negotiate the sale of stock to a third party.

 Documents needed to value one’s shares in order to facilitate a sale is well established as a proper purpose under Section 220. The court also found after trial that the corporation did not establish that the shareholder had improperly shared confidential information in the past to competitors and held that it was entitled to share that information with bona fide prospective purchasers pursuant to a reasonable confidentiality order. (Parenthetically it should be noted that Section 220 specifically imposes the burden on the corporation when the shareholder list alone is requested. ) The court was aware of the need to balance the right to inspection of the stockholder with the legitimate interest of the corporation to safeguard its highly confidential information from competitors. 

The court found that there was no basis in Delaware law for an absolute restriction that prevented financial statements or any data derived therefrom or any valuation of the corporate stock to be given to a competitor. The court also found unreasonable a provision in the proposed confidentiality order by the corporation of a $5 million liquidated damages penalty. The court also allowed for other procedures to ensure that the recipient of company data was a bona fide prospective purchaser.

UPDATE: The court granted in part a motion for reconsideration to the extent that due to a settlement after trial, and before the decision was issued, and thus due to mootness, the decision would not have any res judicata effect. Read letter opinion on motion  here.

Section 220 Requires Breakdown To Contact Owners of Shares Held by Nominee

Wynnefield Partners Cap Value L.P. v. Niagara Corporation , download file.  This Chancery Court case is an action under Section 220 of the DGCL. Wynnefield filed this action on April 14, 2005 seeking an inspection of books and records pursuant to Section 220 due to the decision of Niagara to deregister its common stock and an allegation that Niagra failed to comply with its reporting obligations under Federal Securities Laws.

This case provides a comprehensive analysis of the requirements of Section 220 and also illustrates how Section 220 cases can often be far from simple. Although on a conceptual level they are summary proceedings that simply seek documents, this case went to trial approximately five months after the complaint was filed and post-trial briefing and oral argument was not completed until February 15, 2006 with the detailed and thorough final written opinion coming four months thereafter. Thus, the right to obtain enumerated books and records came after approximately 15 months of filing suit and the substantial costs that necessarily follow therefrom. 

 Though many other Section 220 cases have been summarized on this blog,[use the search function in the right margin to find them], this case is a reminder that there must be a credible basis for wrongdoing and not a mere suspicion--assuming the claim of  wrongdoing is the proper purpose for which the books and records are sought. Noteworthy about this decision is the clarification about a request for the stocklist (which the statute gives the corporation the burden to oppose as compared with the normal burden being on the shareholder). The case addressed the fact that the stocklist on its face did not reflect the number of Depository Trust Company (“DTC”) participants. The DTC registered its shares in the name of CEDE & Co., a partnership used by DTC solely as a nominee to hold the shares of the participants. ( The court observed that the names DTC and CEDE are often used interchangeably. )

 Relying in part on prior caselaw, the court determined that a corporation was required to provide the breakdown and details behind the nominee names for purposes of allowing one to make contact with the shareholders whose shares are held by DTC. Those details are necessary in order to make meaningful the proper purpose of soliciting those stockholders for their proxies.

Majority Shareholder Not Liable in Sale of Shares

Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp.,  download fileIn this Chancery Court case, the complaint attempted to establish a claim against the majority shareholder for selling its majority stake for a premium to a purchaser that, upon acquiring control, set out to “transfer valuable assets to the use and benefit of the purchaser'shareholders to the detriment of Sport Supply’s (seller's entity) shareholders.” In effect, the complaint sought an order to “equitably redistribute the premium the majority shareholder received from the buyer to the other minority shareholders of the seller”. This case was decided on a Motion to Dismiss which was granted.

The essence of the argument about why the complaint failed to state a claim, according to the court “is simple: under Delaware law, Emerson [the majority shareholder and seller] was free, as a general matter, to sell its majority bloc in Sports Supply for a premium that was not shared with the other Sport Supply stockholders.” The complaint failed to allege adequate circumstances to support the suggestion that Emerson knew, suspected or should have suspected that the buyer was either a looter or was dishonest, and had improper plans for Sports Supply. The court was dubious that the common law of corporations would recognize a duty of care-based claim against the controlling stockholder for failing to (in the judgment of the court) examine the bona fides of a buyer, at least when the corporate charter contains an exculpatory provision authorized  expressly by DGCL Section 102(b)(7) [of Section 8 of the Delaware Code.]

 Thus, the court reasoned, when the board itself is exempt from liability for violations of the duty of care, pursuant to the DGCL, by what logic would the judiciary extend liability to a controlling shareholder exercising its ordinarily unfettered right to sell its shares? The court concluded its reasoning in dismissing the claims by observing that, when opposing the basic right of every stockholder to sell its shares: “a plaintiff seeking to support the claim must plead facts that indicate that the controller knew there was a risk that the buyer was a looter or otherwise intended to extract illegal rents from the subsidiary, at the expense of the subsidiary’s remaining stockholders.”

Delaware Investigates Class Action Firm

Today's Sunday News Journal in Wilmington reports that the Delaware Supreme Court's Office of Disciplinary Counsel is investigating the Milberg Weiss firm to the extent that any of the allegations for which it was indicted involved cases filed in the Delaware Chancery Court. The article also mentions that the firm's Wilmington, Delaware office will be closing on August 1. Here is the link: delawareonline: The News Journal. High court investigates law firm

Advancement Under Section 145(k) Required

Brown v. LiveOps, Inc., download file . This Chancery Court case addressed the issue of whether a former officer was entitled to advancement under Section 145(k) of the DGCL. The specific issue was whether an underlying California action against a former officer asserted claims that were against the former officer “by reason of the fact” that he was an officer, director or employee of the Delaware corporation. The court concluded that the claims arose out of his former position and that mere “relabeling of those claims did not change the substantive, operative reality of those claims." Thus, the Motion to Dismiss the advancement claim was denied.

Law Review Article on Securities Litigation

Adam Savett posts on his blog commentary about a new law review article by Professors James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas entitled: An Empirical Analysis Of Institutional Investors' Impact as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud Class Actions. Many of the issues and cases the authors discuss often have a Delaware corporate component and thus would be of interest to many readers of this blog. Here is the link: Lies, Damn Lies, & Forward Looking Statements: April 2006

Do Clients Want Courtesies Given to Opposing Counsel

Veteran lawyer and blogger Carolyn Elefant has an intriguing post on law.com about whether clients really want their lawyers to be courteous to opposing counsel. (This does not directly address the issue of whether lawyers should be civil to opposing counsel regardless of what their clients prefer--assuming it does not adversely impact substantive aspects of the representation.) The post includes insights and useful references to other sources on the topic.Here is the link:Law.com - Inside Opinions: Legal Blogs

Law Firms in Blogosphere

Kevin O'Keefe has an informative post on the undeniable impact of the blogosphere on law firms and their public image in light of the recent firing by Reed Smith of leading blogger Denise Howell. Here is the link:LexBlog Blog : Reed Smith : Hiring firm? Considering employment?

Limiting Directors' Ability to Amend Bylaws

Gordon Smith posts about the recent change to DGCL Section 216 which limits the right of a board to amend a bylaw provision that has been adopted by the shareholders. He also discusses this new Section 216 in light of DGCL Section 109 and any unilateral power of the board generally to amend bylaws. Here is the link:Conglomerate Blog: Business, Law, Economics & Society

E-Discovery Order Awards Fees

Electronic discovery issues are of increasing importance and apply to all litigators as I have written about on this blog. From the E-Discovery Blog comes a report about an order granting a Motion to Compel along with fees awarded in excess of $70,000. Here is the link to the story and the actual order:Magistrate Awards Attorneys' Fees and Threatens Adverse Inference Jury Instruction to Force Defendants' Compliance with Outstanding Production Requests and Discovery Orders : Electronic Discovery Law

Chancery Court Bars Claim for Fake Artwork

Krahmer v. Christie’s, Incorporated ,  (download decision from this link). This Chancery Court opinion involved the claim that a painting acquired at an auction in 1986 was not the original painting that it was represented to be and the purchaser sought a rescission. The original petition alleged intentional concealment that the work of art was not an original, but after discovery was concluded, the petitioner sought to add claims for mutual mistake of fact, negligent misrepresentation and/or constructive fraud. 

The court found that the proposed new claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that the proposed amendment failed to state a claim of negligent misrepresentation as a matter of law. The factual basis was a purchase in 1986 from the famed auction house, Christie’s, Inc., of a painting thought to be by Frank Weston Benson. Although Christie’s had removed its representation as to the provenance of the painting from the catalogue, after the purchase of the painting, Christie’s gave the buyers a nameplate which stated that the painting belonged to the Detroit Club of Michigan and that the Detroit Club purchased the painting directly from the artist. In the 1990s the purchasers began researching the painting and wrote to the Catalogue Raisonne’ Committee for Benson’s Paintings to have the painting listed as authentic. That committee for Benson’s Paintings is headquartered at Vose Galleries in Boston. However, it was not until the Spring of 2002 when they attempted to sell the painting at Sotheby’s Auction House that they learned about the concern that the painting was not authentic. Sotheby’s declined to accept the painting for sale and for the first time the purchasers suspected that the painting might not be a genuine work by Benson. The purchasers then contacted Christie’s and the parties agreed to have the Benson Catalogue Raisonne’s Committee determine the authenticity of the painting. On October 20, 2003 the committee opined that the painting was a fake. After learning that their painting was not a genuine work of art by Benson, the purchasers asked Christie’s to rescind the December 1986 sale. In the Christie’s catalogue, there was a conspicuous six year warranty of authenticity for the painting.

The court determined that the cause of action accrued in December of 1986 when the purchase from Christie’s was made. The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations for negligent misrepresentation and equitable fraud under Section 8106 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code is a three year period, however, Delaware courts have carved out limited circumstances in which the running of the limitations period can be tolled based on the following doctrines: (1) fraudulent concealment; (2) inherent unknowable injuries; and (3) equitable tolling.

The court regarded Christie’s, as the auction house, as a mere intermediary between the seller who consigns the artwork and the buyer, in that the auction house is considered a fiduciary to the consignor and only owes a duty to him as opposed to the purchaser. Moreover, a buyer at an auction assumes a greater risk as to authenticity than a buyer who purchases directly from the artist. For the reasons explained in detail by the court, moreover, it determined that the deadline for filing negligent misrepresentation claims and actual fraud allegations expired in 1989. The court also determined that under New York law that there was no cognizable claim of negligent misrepresentation. This is so because under New York law the purchase of a painting and even subsequent appraisals from an auction house do not create the special relationship necessary to maintain a negligent misrepresentation claim. 

Under New York law, the Delaware Chancery Court determined that the plaintiff may only recover for negligent misrepresentation where there is a fiduciary or special relationship between the parties, which was not found here. Thus, the Motion for Leave to Amend was denied but no decision was made on the initial claim in the original petition for fraud by intentional concealment.

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 Editor's Note: I expect to catch up on blurbs of recent cases very soon. The Chancery Court website lists about 25 opinions for the month of June and that was a very busy month for me as well. I have the cases for that month  and more recent cases summarized and I plan to post the summaries for cases not yet  shown here within the next few days and/or over the weekend. Trivia:  the rough average based on my memory of the usual length of the opinions is about 20 to 30 pages, and it is not uncommon for the decisions to reach 50 to 60 pages or more.

Working Moms/Lawyers

For a thoughtful post on lawyers who are also working moms, one would be well-served to read the comments of Denise Howell, one of the pioneers among lawyers who blog. She talks about her recent departure from a major firm and how she juggles the demands of her duties as a lawyer with her important job of raising her young son. Here is the link: Bag and Baggage - Denise Howell, appellate, intellectual property, and technology lawyer .  Here are links from Robert Ambrogi to what others are saying about this ripple in the blogosphere which has generated quite a bit of commentary: Bloggers React.

Recent Changes to the DGCL

The Delaware Business Blog provides short highlights of recent updates to the DGCL just passed by the Delaware General Assembly. Here is the link: Delaware Business Blog --Blog Archive --New Legislation regarding the Delaware General Corporation Law and Delaware Limited Liability Company Act

Lions Gate II: Reformation of Charter and Bylaws; Restrictions on Voting Rights Subject to High Scrutiny and Equity Can't Save Statutory Violation

Lions Gate Entertainment Corp. v. Image Entertainment, Inc., (download file) .  Previously summarized on this blog here was a decision on a  procedural dispute in this case. In this opinion,  the Chancery Court described this matter as involving “novel issues regarding the construction of corporate instruments providing for a classified board of directors and the reformation of bylaws of a publicly traded company.” The court was called upon to determine whether the Certificate of Incorporation provision involving a classified board became effective immediately or at the next annual meeting. Lions Gate also sought a declaration that the board did not have authority to amend the bylaws and that the board did not have authority to amend the Certificate of Incorporation without a vote of  shareholders. The court observed the common rules of contract interpretation and noted that the proper construction of any contract is purely a question of law and noting numerous Chancery Court decisions interpreting Certificates of Incorporation and bylaws on Motions for Summary Judgment.

The court also reiterated Delaware canons of interpretation that: “When a corporate charter is alleged to contain a restriction on fundamental electoral rights of stockholders under default provisions of the law . . . the restriction must be ‘clear and unambiguous’ to be enforceable.” The court found that annual director elections were fundamental electoral rights under the default provisions of Delaware law and a classified board was a fundamental governance change which has an obvious disenfranchising affect, and any ambiguity must be construed against the drafter. See generally, here, for recent post here from Gordon Smith's blog on the importance of the shareholder franchise enshrined  in the Blasius case.

The court described the requirements for reformation of a contract. The purpose of reformation is to make an erroneous instrument express correctly the intent of, or the real agreement between, the parties. The court relied on the Delaware Supreme Court decision of Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1135 (Del. 1990) to clarify that the existence of a scrivener’s error, without more, is not sufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard that must be satisfied for reformation. That level of evidence must establish the intent of all interested parties, which in connection with the reformation of a Certificate of Incorporation, includes all the stockholders  For this publicly held corporation that  was virtually an impossible task. 

The court concluded in granting summary judgment for the plaintiff, that there was no authority to support the proposition that equity may be invoked to rescue a corporate act that violates a statutory command and the Delaware Supreme Court has made it clear that equitable principles cannot be employed to change the terms of authoritatively binding corporate documents.

 

Importance of The Shareholder Franchise

Gordon Smith writes about how much he likes the Delaware Chancery Court decision in Blasius by former Chancellor Allen, which emphasized the importance of the shareholder vote and stated that the court would require: "compelling justification" for any corporate action "intended primarily to thwart effective exercise of the franchise." Here is the link: Conglomerate Blog: Business, Law, Economics & Society

Notice to Outdated Address Not Adequate to Waive Rights

Gildor v. Optical Solutions, Inc., download file. This Chancery Court decision involved cross motions for summary judgment. A preferred shareholder attempted to assert his preemptive rights to buy preferred shares issued by a privately-held company.
The main issue was whether or not the company gave proper notice to the shareholder as required by the agreement that gave him preemptive rights. The shareholder did not receive actual notice until after the issuance and the company argued that he waived the preemptive rights that he had bargained for in the Shareholders Agreement. In essence, because the agreement on which his preemptive rights were based, did not include a current address, even though the company had a current address in its records, the court determined that the company breached the agreement by not properly notifying the shareholder and resting on the mistaken belief that it had complied when it learned that notice did not reach the stockholder, Gildor, at the address to which the notice was sent.
The court reasoned that the company was required to make better efforts to comply with the notice provision, which was not literally possible, but required reasonable efforts to at least use the other addresses in the records of the corporation. Although the agreement required notice to be provided pursuant to the address in the agreement, the agreement did not include an address and the court concluded that

"issuers who create contractual ambiguity about the method of notice bear the proportionate costs of their own drafting infelicities by undertaking reasonable efforts to provide actual notice."

The court did not rely on the "implied duty of good faith and fair dealing" because the court was hesitant to alter the dynamics of the bedrock principle of the freedom of contract by imposing duties that two sophisticated parties did not provide on their own.
The court also emphasized that specific performance was only available at the discretion of the court and required a showing that a legal remedy would be inadequate. However, it did note that when the stock of a private company is not available in the market, is unique or has unique value, that specific performance has been held to be appropriate (citing Amaysing Tech. Corp. v. CyberAir Communications, Inc. 2004 WL 1192602 (Del. Ch. 2004)).
In sum, it was not sufficient for the company to send two notices that it knew were sent to outdated addresses.
This calls to mind an article in the Sunday New York Times of July 9, 2006 by Linda Greenhouse at page 5 of Section 4. She was describing a recent decision by U.S. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. in which he wrote a majority opinion that found that the State of Arkansas denied due process to a homeowner by seizing and selling his house for non-payment of property taxes without taking reasonable steps to notify him of the risk he was facing. Chief Justice Roberts wrote in that case that "in response to the returned form suggesting that Jones [the homeowner] had not received notice that he was about to lose his property, the state did - - nothing." Similar common sense logic and reasoning was used in the Gildor case. See generally a recent Delaware Supreme Court decision, summarized here, which addressed the issue of "when a mailed letter is presumed to be received by the addressee" in a different context than the Gildor case.

Delaware Chancery Court Visit

Gordon Smith blogs about his recent impromptu personal visit to the Delaware Chancery Court in Georgetown and how the Chancellor let his young daughter sit on the bench. Also included in his post is a photo of the outside of the new Courthouse. Perhaps indirectly, it provides a nice insight about the Court. Here is the link:
Conglomerate Blog: Business, Law, Economics & Society

No Damages Found in Disclosure Claim

Anglo American Security Fund, L.P. v. S.R. Global International Fund, L.P., download file. In this Chancery Court decision, the court addressed disputes arising from the interpretation of a Limited Partnership Agreement and certain alleged duties existing between the limited and general partners. On cross motions for summary judgment, the court found a basis for the claim for breach of contract but no damages.
On the fiduciary duty claim of breach due to non-disclosure the court found that there was a failure in the argument because no reliance was shown and no shareholder action was requested. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. 1998) (absent a request for shareholder action, no "rebuttable presumption of reliance" due to omissions.)
The court also found that the negligence claim failed because of a provision in the Limited Partnership Agreement and based on Section 17-407 of the DRULPA which protects a general partner of a limited partnership who relies in good faith on financials prepared by others.

Motions for Commissions Denied (Mostly)

Lions Gate Entm't & Corp. v. Image Entm't, Inc., download file, dealt with Motions for Commissions, which are often routinely granted without opposition as they are the first step in forcing someone to appear for a deposition who is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Chancery Court.
[Sidebar: my schedule recently has been too hectic to post many case summaries, but I plan to catch up this weekend on summaries of recent cases I have not be able to post.]
In this letter opinion, the Chancery Court addressed the issues raised by 26 Motions for Commissions, most of which were denied in the context of this expedited proceeding based on the following two primary criteria: (1) Being unduly burdensome; (2) Not relevant to any issues in the litigation.
The court discussed the familiar applicable standard for obtaining discoverable information being fairly broad, if not privileged, even if it does not directly elicit admissible evidence for trial. The primary issue in the case was the reformation of the Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws. The court also addressed the applicable standard for reforming an agreement in order to express the "real agreement" of the parties involved under one of two doctrines. The first being mutual mistake and the second being unilateral mistake. The court allowed only granted 5 out of 26 motions for commissions with the following conditions: (1) That the other party receive contemporaneous copies of all written communications by the party filing the motion and third parties; (2) That the other party receive copies of documents produced in response to the subpoenas; and (3) That the other party be consulted regarding the manner and timing of production.

Direct v. Derivative Claim Determined; and Pre-Suit Demand Held to be Neither Futile Nor Excused

Gatz v. Ponsoldt , download file. This brief Chancery Court letter opinion addressed when a claim involving a corporation was direct or derivative. The plaintiffs neither attempted to make a demand nor have they argued that pre-suit demand is excused. The court determined that because the sham transaction did not itself cause any harm to plaintiffs and that the harm that the plaintiffs seek to remedy flows from the terms of the recapitalization at issue, any remedy would be to unwind the recapitalization and return to the corporation some or all of the funds that were allegedly distributed due to recapitalization. Thus, the remedy would not benefit the shareholders individually and the complaint was dismissed (citing Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 825 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004)).

Agreement Allows Payment of Attorneys' Fees

Lillis v. AT&T Corp., download file. This Chancery Court case addressed the issue of whether a contractual provision which provided for attorneys' fees arising "in connection with" a written agreement required the indemnification of a party who paids fees for litigation. The court found that the agreement should be interpreted broadly enough to cover such a claim.

Dissolution Denied Despite Dysfunctional Dealings Among 3 LLC Members

A Delaware Chancery Court opinion was cited in a recent New York Supreme Court decision where a dissolution was denied to one of 3 members of a profitable LLC, based on the interpretation of a statute that is very similar to the Delaware LLC Act's provision for allowing an LLC member to petition the court for dissolution "...when it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the operating agreement". The New York case is Horning v. Horning Construction LLC, download file.
The Delaware Chancery Court case cited was Haley v. Talcott, which was summarized on my blog here; and you can also download the opinion here. The Haley case interpreted Section 18-802 of the Delaware LLC Act which is similar to the New York statute interpreted by the Horning court. The Haley case however, only involved 2 members each of whom owned 50% of the LLC, which allowed the court to apply by analogy a Delaware joint venture statute that would not likely apply to a 3 member LLC.
The New York case cites to several articles and cases that collect sources on the history of the model LLC Act on which the Delaware and New York statutes are based. The NY court explains why it was intended to be harder to dissolve an LLC as opposed to a corporation, and ultimately, noting that there is no absolute right to dissolution.

Sovereign Immunity: No; Contribution and Indemnity: Maybe

Quereguan v. New Castle County, download file. In this Chancery Court case, the court addressed whether the State of Delaware waived its sovereign immunity via the Bond Bill by authorizing property to be leased, in connection with a claim for damage to adjoining private property. The analysis of the Bond Bill gives the reader an insight into both legislative history in Delaware and how state action that has the force of law can be made through the Bond Bill, but the text of which may never appear in the bound volumes of the Delaware Code where Delaware statutes appear. The court also addressed the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasers Act that applies to tort claims.
Contribution and indemnity were discussed to the extent that the court observed that a breach of contract claim, such as that based on a lease, can also be the basis for a claim of contribution and indemnity. The court also discussed latches and res judicata and found that the Motion to Dismiss filed by the State should be denied.

Court Decisions Citing to Blogs

This is not new (i.e., it's a few months old), but upon coming across it again it is worth noting a post by Ian Best, a recent law school graduate, who compiled a list of court decisions, including one from the U.S. Supreme Court, that cite to blogs in their opinions--a clear sign that blogs are becoming part of the mainstream of legal literature. Here is the link:
3L Epiphany: Cases Citing Legal Blogs

Deepening Insolvency

Those interested in business litigation should read my friend Steve Jakubowski's post on his Bankruptcy Litigation Blog about the issue of deepening insolvency in the aftermath of the recent Third Circuit decision in: CitX Corp., Inc. v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs., P.C., 2006 WL 1453117 (3d Cir. 5/26/06). Here is the link:
Bankruptcy Litigation Blog: More Questions from the 3rd Circuit's Recent "Deepening Insolvency" Decision

The Death of Ken Lay

Prof. Ribstein has thoughtful comments on the death of former Enron Chairman Ken Lay in the context of the whole "Enron matter" and the varied aspects of that debacle. Here is the link:
Ideoblog: The death of Ken Lay.

Executive Compensation

Prof. Ribstein posts about a New York Times article today that discusses the firing of coach Larry Brown in the context of executive compensation and how the large amount due on his contract compares with the issues addressed in the recent Delaware Supreme Court decision involving the hefty pay package of Michael Ovitz and the Disney Company. Here is the link:
Ideoblog: Ayres and Donahue on the Knicks and Disney

Bylaw Dispute Not Ripe

As reported by CorporateCounsel.net Blog, Vice Chancellor Lamb recently decided that the suit by Prof. Bebchuk against CA regarding its bylaws was not ripe. See link:
TheCorporateCounsel.net Blog: Delaware Court Watch: The Mandatory By-Law Amendment Saga Continues.
I previously blogged about Prof. Ribstein's take on the case here. The full text of the opinion of the Delaware Chancery Court can be downloaded here:download file