Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indiana Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW, Del. Supr., No. 614, 2013 (July 23, 2014).
This Delaware Supreme Court en banc opinion requires Wal-Mart to produce documents about an alleged bribery scandal involving their Mexican subsidiary. The most noteworthy aspect of this decision, about which we will write more later, is that for the first time the Delaware Supreme Court directly addressed and recognized an exception to the rule that documents protected by the attorney/client privilege do not need to be produced. It is referred to as the Garner exception after a case of that name from the Fifth Circuit.
In this case, the Delaware high court said that the well-established attorney/client privilege does not apply, or is subject to an exception, if a stockholder needs the otherwise inaccessible information to sue a director for breach of fiduciary duty. A similar analysis was applied to documents otherwise protected by the work-product doctrine. This opinion will have lasting importance for corporate and commercial litigators regarding this topic.
Delaware’s Key Corporate and Commercial Cases
January through June 2014
You are invited to a free audio conference for a discussion of the top ten decisions of 2014 to date from Delaware’s Supreme Court and Court of Chancery.
Thursday, July 24, 2014 at 3:00 p.m. EST
For the last nine years, Francis G.X. Pileggi and Kevin F. Brady have provided an annual review of key Delaware corporate and commercial decisions. In 2014, so far we have reviewed and summarized over 100 opinions from Delaware’s Supreme Court and Court of Chancery on the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog. Ten decisions with the most far-reaching application and importance during the first half of 2014 will be highlighted and discussed during an audio conference led by an Eckert Seamans’ team of corporate and commercial attorneys. Participants can dial-in on Thursday, July 24, 2014 at 3:00 p.m. EST.
Register and obtain a dial-in number by sending an email to: email@example.com
Francis G.X. Pileggi practices primarily in the areas of corporate and commercial litigation. He has extensive experience in matters involving fiduciary duties and corporate governance as well as summary proceedings under the Delaware General Corporation Law. Francis created and maintains the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog at www.delawarelitigation.com.
Kevin F. Brady represents clients in corporate and commercial litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery, the Delaware Superior Court and the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. He counsels corporations, boards of directors, officers, individual directors, and individual shareholders in a wide range of issues involving corporate governance and interpretation of the Delaware General Corporation Law and federal securities matters.
Tara L. Lattomus represents clients in corporate and commercial litigation, bankruptcy and creditors’ rights and labor and employment matters. She has experience in representing both creditors and debtors in insolvency proceedings and has litigation experience in state and federal courts in commercial litigation matters on behalf of both national and local clients. She frequently publishes articles and makes presentations on recent Delaware decisions.
Jill K. Agro practices in the area of corporate and commercial litigation and represents a broad range of clients, including corporations, stockholders, directors, officers and members and managers of alternate entities. Jill has an extensive background representing clients in Delaware’s Court of Chancery.
SUPPLEMENT: Professor Bainbridge, one of the nation’s foremost corporate law scholars and often cited in Delaware opinions, graciously highlighted this event on his blog. It doesn’t get much better than that–to get such a positive mention by a luminary.
Raul v. Astoria Financial Corporation, C.A. No. 9169-VCG (Del. Ch. June 20, 2014).
Issue Addressed: Whether attorneys’ fees were appropriate under the corporate benefit doctrine when the court considered the benefit to be in the nature of volunteer help, and the claim presented could not survive a motion to dismiss. Answer: No.
This memorandum opinion provides a very useful overview of those situations where a benefit may be conferred on a corporation by a stockholder suggesting corporate action, but when those efforts do not rise to the level of the type of corporate benefit for which attorneys’ fees will be granted.
The key holding was summarized by the court as follows: “. . . the stockholder has simply done the company a good turn by bringing to the attention of the board an action that it ultimately decides to take, [therefore,] she is not entitled to coerced payments of her attorneys’ fees by the stockholders at large.” See generally footnote 51 (explaining that the court does not typically issue injunctions requiring defendants to comply with the law, which they already have an obligation to honor).
The background of this case was a request by the stockholder that the company correct a failure to make proper disclosures pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act.
The court explained that under the corporate benefit doctrine as it applies to moot claims, it is not necessary that a plaintiff actually file an action in order to recover fees. See footnote 21. However, the claim must have been meritorious when presented to the board. The court observed that the corporate benefit doctrine promotes the private enforcement of fiduciary breaches, and through the fee-shifting mechanism, the legal system incentivizes private actors to police corporate misconduct.
The court also noted that the legal system is designed to adjudicate corporate wrongdoing and not the directors’ exercise of their discretion.
The Court reasoned that: “Where a volunteer stockholder . . . notifies directors, not that they are in breach of their duties, but simply that they have missed a corporate opportunity or should avoid a corporate loss, the consideration of such a notification is a board, not a Court, affair.”
Moreover, the court held that: “It is only where a benefit results from a demand to address corporate wrongdoing under Rule 23.1, however, that it is appropriate for the Court to intervene in the equitable distribution of the costs among all stockholders . . .”
Moreover, the court emphasized that a claim is considered meritorious for purposes of the corporate benefit doctrine “if it can withstand a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, and if, at the same time, the plaintiff possesses knowledge of provable facts which hold out some reasonable likelihood of ultimate success.” See footnotes 27 and 29.
To quote Professor Bainbridge:
The ABA Journal is again accepting nominations for their Blawg 100. I’m not allowed to nominate myself, but I am allowed to tell you that you can nominate me here.
At the request of the ABA, I am publishing the following notice:
The Editorial Board of The Business Lawyer is soliciting submission of articles and essays for Volume 70. TBL is the flagship scholarly journal of the American Bar Association Section of Business Law. It reaches 40,000 readers on a quarterly basis. Authors must submit exclusively to the journal and submissions are peer-reviewed. TBL provides a good forum to reframe scholarly articles published elsewhere for an audience of judges and practitioners.
Articles should be submitted to Diane Babal, Production Manager, at firstname.lastname@example.org. Questions about submissions can be addressed to Associate Editor-in-Chief, Professor Gregory Duhl, at email@example.com”
Pontone v. Milso Industries Corp., C.A. No. 7615-VCP (Del. Ch. May 29, 2014).
Issue Addressed: The appropriate standard to apply to determine whether counterclaims are covered for purposes of a former director’s entitlement to advancement of attorneys’ fees.
The Delaware Court of Chancery previously determined in a motion for partial summary judgment in this case that the former officer and director was entitled to advancement for certain counterclaims. The court directed the parties to follow the procedures set forth in Fuhlendorf v. Isilon Systems, Inc., 2010 WL 4570225 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2010), to process the request for advancement. The court also previously appointed a Special Master to resolve any disputes between the parties regarding the amount of fees subject to advancement. This memorandum opinion is a ruling on exceptions to the second report of the Special Master.
The court observed some inconsistency between decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery regarding the types of counterclaims eligible for advancement.
The court in this decision determined that the governing standard is the one established in Roven, under which compulsory counterclaims “advanced to defeat, or offset affirmative claims may be subject to advancement” (citing 603 A.2d at 824 (emphasis in original)).
The Court of Chancery concluded that the following two-part test would control:
A counterclaim will be considered to be ‘defending’ and thus advanceable, if it is: (1) ‘necessarily part of the same dispute,’ in the sense that it qualifies as a compulsory counterclaim under the prevailing Delaware and federal procedural standard; and (2) ‘advanced to defeat, or offset’ the affirmative claims.
Procedure to Determine Which Particular Fees from Among Multiple Claims Are Subject to Advancement (When Bills Are Not Clear On the Point)
The court also determined that when not all claims are subject to advancement, the procedure to follow in order to determine which time charges apply to only those claims that are subject to advancement, should be the procedure utilized by the Court of Chancery in Fasciana v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 829 A.2d 160 (Del. Ch. 2003).
That methodology will determine what portion of the fees and expenses incurred by the parties seeking advancement relate to matters that were subject to advancement. In that decision, the court directed the plaintiff to: “Submit a good faith estimate of expenses incurred to date” that relate to the precise allegations that triggered advancement. Id. at 177.
The court in that case also required the attorneys to provide a sworn affidavit certifying their good faith belief that the identified litigation expenses relate solely to “defense activity” undertaken in response to allegations for which advancement was owed.
Noting that “some level of imprecision will be involved in the retrospective accomplishment of this task,” the court nevertheless found that the procedure put in place provided adequate protection so that the defendant can reserve any ultimate fight about the precise amounts until a later notification proceeding.
The Fasciana decision provides a methodology, and accounts for different work required for various counterclaims.
The court addressed the concern that time entries that were redacted to avoid the revelation of work product or mental impressions created a problem to the extent that redacted time entries lacked meaningful indication of, for example, what general legal issues the billing individuals were researching or working on as a result of the heavy redactions.
The court emphasized that the company making the advancement payments was entitled to information “sufficient to indicate that the claimed expenses do not relate to counterclaims for which advancement has been disallowed, to the extent such information can be provided without revealing attorneys’ work product or mental impressions.”
The court resolved this concern by requiring counsel for the plaintiff to “indicate, under oath, whether any of those time entries [which were inadequately described] relate to those counterclaims [that were non-advanceable], and Milso’s advancement obligations shall be offset accordingly.” See generally, Paolino v. Mace Security International, No. 4462-VCL (Del. Ch., revised December 14, 2009), read opinion here. (In Paolino, the court bound the company by its attorney’s representation that the former director should not be entitled to advancement because the work on his complaint could not be distinguished from the counterclaim as the issues were so interwined. Based on that representation in that case, the court held that the former director was entitled to all the fees incurred and not just those for defending a counterclaim.)
The court also observed that the person seeking advancement needs to present a specific bill for a specific amount demanded in order to trigger the clock for pre-judgment interest, but in this case the court found that a blanket denial made that requirement futile.
Eurofins Panlads, Inc. v. Ricerca Biosciences, LLC, C.A. No. 8431-VCN (Del. Ch. May 30, 2014).
This Delaware Court of Chancery opinion provides an analysis of the Delaware Securities Act and concludes that it does not apply to the alleged fraud that occurred outside the State of Delaware. The court explained that status as a Delaware corporation alone does not provide a sufficient nexus for application of the Delaware Securities Act to activities that occur outside the state.
The court also explained the general rule that a corporate officer who signs a contract on behalf of a corporation does not thereby become a party to that contract. However, there is an exception to that general rule and officers can be personally liable when they personally participate in a tort, for example, if they fraudulently induce a party to enter into the contract. See footnotes 148 and 149.
The Hon. Jack Jacobs recently completed 29 years as a member of the Delaware Judiciary, first as a vice chancellor on the Court of Chancery and then as a Justice on the Delaware Supreme Court. He had all the best qualities that make for an exemplary jurist and his contributions to Delaware corporate law and other areas of Delaware law leave a legacy that will benefit many generations to come.
Professor Bainbridge, one of the favorite corporate law experts among the Delaware Judiciary, has selected the top 20 decisions of Justice Jacobs, and the good professor explains the method he used to select them in his post.
Yesterday’s decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Hobby Lobby case that granted “close corporations” the right to exercise the religious beliefs of their owners in order to avoid the imposition of one of the new health care law’s requirements that violated their beliefs, did not define “close corporations“. Professor Bainbridge provides commentary on the definition of that corporate law issue.
Wayman Fire Protection, Inc. v. Premium Fire & Security, LLC, C.A. No. 7866-VCP (Del. Ch. June 27, 2014).
This Delaware Court of Chancery ruling is noteworthy for at least two reasons: (I) it applies a powerful tool that businesses can use against competitors who hire executives or other employees who leave to work for competitors and take with them electronically-stored data from their former company; and (II) because, for the first time, the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded is quantified in a civil case pursuant to Delaware’s Misuse of Computer System Information Act, 11 Del. C. Section 941. The underlying claims relate to a former employee taking data from the computer of his former employer and using it for the benefit of his competing new employer.
One of the factors the court considered is that this statutory breach was only one of several claims made, and this award of fees was virtually the only recovery in the case. The $200,000 award was about 20% of the total fees incurred, net of expert fees which were also awarded.